NATO Enlargement Research Articles

NATO po skončení studené války

The article analyses the process of the NATO enlargement after 1990. It starts by a detailed analysis of the secret negotiations which have been started just after the end of the Cold War. In the light of the institutional liberalism, the NATO enlargement is a positive process which satisfied especially new member states. But in the light of the American neorealism, this process resulted into profound changes in the balance of the security threats and into a large militarisation and tension at the new Eastern frontier of NATO in a direct neighbourhood with the Russia. New military units with the modern arms systems are deployed over there and we are witnessing a growing number of dangerous military incidents. As a result, the contemporary situation needs new political negotiations between two competitors and a shift from the contemporary negative Peace towards the positive Peace.

Flexible democratic conditionality? The role of democracy and human rights adherence in NATO enlargement decisions

What explains NATO’s decision to admit new members even when they fall short of the organisational expectations of democracy and adherence to human rights? After the end of the Cold War NATO put in place an elaborate scheme of democratic conditionality; however, recent waves of enlargement since 2004 have proven increasingly incompatible with these criteria. This paper argues that this policy results from gradual erosion in the prominence of democratic discourse within the organisation, normalising deviations from previous optimistic expectations that became increasingly unsustainable, inducing within-organisation socialisation. This process is paralleled by an increasingly hostile Russian foreign policy, that served as a catalyst for the cognitive normalisation process. To support the argument, the author conducts interviews with key NATO officials previously or presently involved in the enlargement process, building on unique institutional accessibility, performs content analysis of North Atlantic Council discussions (ministerial/heads of state level) and NATO Summit Declarations in 1995‒2019, diving into Albania’s accession in 2009 as a case study. The results suggest that NATO decision-making over expansion was subject to significant politicisation that increased over time, normalising the deviations, reducing the democratic discourse in periods that preceded the integration of states that did not meet the criteria for democracy (most notably, Albania in 2009, Montenegro in 2017, and North Macedonia in 2020). The results emphasise the place of cognitive processes in IO decision-making on enlargement.

The Rocky Road of Western Balkan Countries toward European Integration: The Need for a Credible and Effective Approach

The EU enlargement has been considered as a one of EU’s most powerful policy tools which has helped to transform Central and Eastern European Countries from communist regimes to modern, well-functioning market economy and functional democracies. Such transformative power has not been replicated in the case of Western Balkan countries. Since 2003, when the EU leaders promised the European future to Western Balkan countries, save Croatia, which joined in 2013, other Western Balkan countries are backsliding on the rule of law, media freedoms, and democratic accountability. State capture and the growth of corrupt patronage networks are becoming more present in the society. Recently, with the legislative measures to prevent COVID-19, the Western Balkan countries are becoming more authoritarian. The paper argues that lack of EU to become a ‘transformative power’ in the Western Balkan countries hinders the risk of this region to return to authoritarianism and opens the ‘Pandora box’ for non-EU actors to advance their agenda, which impede NATO expansion and the EU enlargement. Therefore, the current enlargement strategy should be revised to address problems faced by Western Balkan countries and most importantly, EU Member States should not politicize enlargement process by exerting their veto power during accession process. A credible enlargement approach needs to be adopted where rules and principles are clearly set.

Territorial competitiveness, cohesion and sustainability in Romania’s urban border areas

ABSTRACT Following the expansion of NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007, Romania has become the Eastern frontier of these structures, which lends Romanian borders a strategic role. The territorial development of a border area is influenced by the political, economic, socio-cultural, demographic characteristics of the neighbouring countries sharing the same border. The border areas of Romania include 898 Local Administrative Units (LAU), of which 88 are urban. Romania has a border line (2956.4 km, of which 63.5% is non-European Union border) with the following countries: Bulgaria, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Ukraine, Hungary. The current paper seeks to identify the territorial disparities in the urban development of the Romanian border areas by 3 secondary indexes in order to reflect the main territorial development aspects: competitiveness (TComp), cohesion (TCoh), and sustainability (TSust). Lastly, the authors were able to establish the Index of Territorial Development (ITD) revealing the levels of territorial development. Assessing the competitiveness, cohesion and sustainability levels of urban centres is a useful and necessary stage, done through this study, for establishing those socio-economic fields, those towns and border sectors which are less developed, requiring attention from the regional, national and local administrations, reflected in investments.

NATO Enlargement, Russia, and Balance of Threat

This paper explores the causes of Russian revanchism alongside phases of NATO expansion, and concludes that evidence of Moscow’s reflexive revanchism is sparse. Russian foreign policy is tested and correlated with Russian rhetoric, military strategy and Russian balancing actions, in light of each phase of actual and potential NATO expansion. The paper concludes that, first, Russia balances against perceived threats, only in areas where it has entrenched material and military interests. Otherwise, Russia is aware of relative military inferiority, and is agnostic about NATO and EU enlargement. These findings have enormous policy relevance, as both NATO and EU plans further enlargement, American and British isolationism grows, and European security scenario alters rapidly.

The United States and the NATO Non-extension Assurances of 1990: New Light on an Old Problem?

The Russian government has claimed that the Western powers promised at the end of the Cold War not to expand NATO, but later reneged on that promise. Most former officials in the West, and many scholars as well, have denied that this was the case; but other scholars, along with a handful of former officials, believe that promises to that effect were, in fact, made in 1990. So who is right? The question still has political importance: how it is answered has bearing on how we should feel about NATO expansion and, indeed, about the United States' post–Cold War policy more generally. So it makes sense to stand back and try to see where the truth lies. An examination of the debate in light of the evidence—especially evidence that the participants themselves have presented—leads to the conclusion that the Russian allegations are by no means baseless, which affects how the U.S.-Russian relationship today is to be understood.

The geopolitical risks and prospects for Russia-Western relations in the Baltic region

The article presents a conceptual vision of existing and future geopolitical risks and prospects for Russia-Western relations in the Baltic region. Emphasis is placed on relations with countries belonging to the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO). Existing and future relations are considered within several important geopolitical and geostrategic tracks: Russia-NATO and Russia-EU, as well as bilateral relations with key global and regional actors. The most complex and turbulent relations are those between Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO). As the analytical basis of the research, the evolution of key strategic documents of Russia, including the strategy of national security of the Russian Federation in 2000–2020 was analyzed. Geopolitical scenarios of relations between Russia and the West in the Baltic region, including the conflict potential in the so-called “gray zone” located in the buffer zone between Russia and European countries, were shown. It is concluded that there are only two scenarios and associated geopolitical risks — the destruction or consolidation of the “gray zone” between Russia and the West, NATO expansion, the strengthening of cooperation between neutral countries and NATO up to joining, an armed conflict between Russia and NATO on the territory of third countries, an armed conflict between Russia and NATO on the territory of one of the NATO countries. For the Baltic region, the most sensitive areas are the following: Kaliningrad region, “Suvalki Corridor” zone, Belarus, Eastern Estonia, Latgale. In our study, we emphasize that the existing complex geopolitical background and tensions in relations between Russia and the West have created conditions for seeking new partners and allies, as well as strengthening and diversifying relations with proven and reliable partners. One of the key and traditional partners, and now allies, we see as China, which has a special interest in entering European markets and expanding its geopolitical influence in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic region.

Начало эры Путина (2000–2008)

Received 21.08.2020. The author of the article believes the beginning of the “Putin’s era” – the first two terms of his presidency (2000–2008) – to be generally successful for Russia. In eight years, the bases of the state shaken in the 1990s were strengthened, the threat of an intensive political struggle, which, however, lost much of its outdoor competitive nature, decreased, the economy became stronger, the living conditions of the population improved, the activity and influence of Russia in international affairs increased. This was largely due to the favorable global economic environment for Russia and, above all, high prices for energy resources, which were the main item of Russian exports. No less obvious were the personal achievements of President Putin, who managed to consolidate the unbalanced state, put an end to the pressure of oligarchs on authorities, restore the Kremlin’s control over regional elites, and extinguish hotbeds of separatism in Russia. He has built the very “vertical of power” for which his political opponents, both inside the country and abroad, will consistently criticize him. Having inherited Boris Yeltsin’s policy of developing cooperation with the West, Vladimir Putin at first continued to follow this path, but gradually became disillusioned with the sincerity of Western partners towards Russia. He was most concerned about the eastward expansion of NATO’s military infrastructure, its approach to Russian borders, and the West’s general reluctance to consider Russian interests. Putin openly expressed the accumulated claims against the United States and NATO in February 2007 at the Munich Security Conference. 2007 was a turning point in Putin’s foreign policy towards the West. Since then, the focus has been shifted to protecting Russia’s national interests. Within the country, for eight years, Putin had failed to create a modern, self-regulating and multi-level system of government. The destructive chaos of the 1990s was replaced by centralized “manual control” from the Kremlin, but it also worked with constant failures. The state apparatus, especially at the regional level, did not work effectively enough, and regional authorities often did not follow the orders of the President. The lessons of the first stage of the Putin’s era were: the reasonably required consolidation of the state, building the “vertical of power” often occurred at the expense of the civil society’s interests, the interests of consolidating and expanding democracy in Russia.

Политика России на Балканах: современное состояние и перспективы

The article discusses the current situation and prospects of Russian policy in the Balkans. Officially, today, the Balkans are not assigned to the priorities of the Russian foreign policy, but there is one of the lines of the “Cool War” against the West. It is Russia’s desire to oppose the expansion of NATO and the EU, to create an infrastructure for the transportation of energy resources; it is also the emergence of sanctions and counter-sanctions. The purpose of this article is to characterize the foreign policy of the Russian Federation in the Balkans in the context of the current confrontation between Russia and the West. The authors try to identify possible scenarios for further development of international relations in the region. The term “Cool War” is used as the most accurate for characterizing the confrontation between Russia and the West, because – the authors believe – it differs from the “Cold War” in content, directions and its severity, although it is waged with the same methods and tools. The analysis of the Russian foreign policy in the Balkans and the method of constructing scenarios are used in the article as a research methodology. In this paper, five groups of states are distinguished in the Balkans according to their relations with Russia. Also it is assumed that three scenarios are possible in the future: weakening of Russia’s position, its maintaining at the current level, and its strengthening. This will largely depend on the confrontation degree and Russia’s activity, especially in the economic and humanitarian spheres.

Россия и Европейский союз: отложенное партнерство

Received 12.02.2021. The article is devoted to the analysis of the fundamental reasons that led to the crisis in relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union as well as relations between Russia and the West at large. The main attention is paid to both objective changes in international relations and subjective factors in the policies of Russia and the EU, that which predetermined the vector of evolution of their interaction. The article proposes a layer-by-layer analysis of these reasons, leading from a superficial perception of problems in depth to the origins of the current crisis. This method of analysis can be called the “matryoshka method”, when the main problem lies in the very depths of the phenomenon under study. In other words, the article proposes a “countdown” from the current crisis to the postbipolar start of cooperation between Russia and the European Union. Why did it all go wrong when it all started so well? And, finally, who is to blame for the failed partnership, and is it possible to get out of this deadlock? These and other questions are at the center of this article. The Ukraine conflict is widely perceived by the European Union and the West as whole as a turning point in their relations with the Russian Federation and the main reason of the deepest divide between them. However, this conflict is not so much the reason but rather the consequence of more profound contradictions between Russia and the West. These contradictions are revolving around the mutual misperceptions about the acceptable foundation of the post-bipolar European security and rivalry in the CIS space. The EU and NATO enlargement strategies presented by both institutions as two complementary processes raised Russia’s concerns about their intentions in the CIS region. But these contradictions did not appear from “the middle of nowhere”. They resulted from the uneven end of the bipolarity and mistakes made by the West and its institutions as well as miscalculations of the new Russian leadership. In the very centre of this “matryoshka doll” one can find the arguments explaining Russia’s historic convolutions on its way to Europe. Acknowledgements. The article was prepared within the project “Post-Crisis World Order: Challenges and Technologies, Competition and Cooperation” supported by the grant from Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (Agreement № 075-15-2020-783).

Russian Bases Abroad: Security Policy or Power Projection?

After the collapse of the bipolar system, the Soviet Union, and then its heir, the Russian Federation, lost its position as a global player in favour of US hegemony. The arms race was abandoned, reduction of military spending began, and Russian troops were withdrawn from most bases outside the country. The changing conditions of Russia’s security, NATO enlargement, and loss of influence in many regions of the world have prompted the Russian authorities to change their security policy and restore the former balance. The security policy of the Russian Federation aimed at rebuilding its superpower position in the world is implemented, among others, through their military presence outside its borders. The use of this instrument in foreign policy serves both to regain a dominant role and to pursue particular interests – including internal ones. A critical analysis based on the literature on the subject, strategic documents of the Russian Federation, and reports and articles available on the Internet confirms the assumption that the Russian Federation successfully strengthens its position in the world, thus strengthening not only the security of the state, but also manifesting its power.

Europa Środkowa w polityce zagranicznej Białorusi

The article is dedicated to Central Europe in the foreign policy of Belarus. In the process of shaping the concept of Belarus’ foreign policy in the early 1990s, Minsk considered the Central European option. Already at that time, attention was paid to the region of Central Europe and the need to center the road between East and West. However, NATO enlargement in the region led to the choice of the eastern vector and to close cooperation with Russia. After 20 years of close integration, it turned out that the alliance with Russia is not perfect. Belarus has once again activated the Central European vector in foreign policy. Central Europe is a natural area for the pursuing Belarussian interest. Cooperation with neighboring countries (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary) is a positive impulse for comprehensive economic and possibly political reforms in the near future.

Has Russia’s Anti-NATO Agenda Succeeded?

ABSTRACT Stopping NATO enlargement has become a clear foreign policy priority for Russia. Given the diminished likelihood of Ukrainian and Georgian membership, Russia’s anti-NATO agenda may appear as an unqualified success. However, the net impact of Russia’s anti-NATO foreign policy agenda is quite mixed. Ukraine's and Georgia's stakes for accession have increased and key European NATO members' hesitancy to provoke Russia unnecessarily is clear, but Russia's actions have not prevented progress toward accession in other candidate countries, while the appeal of membership actually has increased in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe.

El retorno de Moscú: la gran estrategia de Rusia en la era Putin (2000-2020)

Desde el ascenso de Vladimir Putin al poder, Rusia ha combinado estabilidad política y económica con asertividad internacional, lo que ha sentado las bases para el regreso de Moscú a la primera plana del escenario mundial. El artículo presenta las principales discusiones en torno a la gran estrategia de la Federación de Rusia y analiza la trayectoria de su política exterior desde la llegada de Vladimir Putin al poder hasta el inicio de la crisis global de la covid-19. Desde la perspectiva del realismo neoclásico, el principal argumento es que Rusia posee una gran estrategia pragmática basada en un trípode de objetivos –preservación de estatus como potencia global, primacía en el espacio postsoviético y disuasión a la expansión de la otan– que se implementan mediante la utilización de una gama amplia de herramientas, incluida la coerción por vías militares. A continuación, se desarrolla la evolución de la estrategia internacional del pragmatismo estratégico ruso que generó una serie de tensiones con Occidente tras las crisis de Georgia en 2008 y Ucrania en 2014, en paralelo con el ascenso de un vector alternativo eurasiático.

Japanese foreign policy towards the Republic of Croatia: the non-military practice of post-Cold War trilateralism and multilateralism 1989–1993

After the Cold War, one of the biggest security challenges in Europe was the war in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). This article analyses Japanese foreign policy towards the Republic of Croatia, considering it the focal point of the Yugoslav crisis from the end of the Cold War in 1989, through the disintegration of the SFRY in 1991, until the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan in 1993. Although the general opinion was that Japan did not have strong interests in this region, this article shows that Japan used the trilateral US–Europe–Japan framework to approach the Yugoslav crisis. It is argued that Japan acted indirectly through international institutions. Japan acted bilaterally to condition international recognition and sanctions using diplomacy and aid as its tools and multilaterally through the EBRD, G7, G24, UN, and the CSCE/OSCE by providing Japanese nationals as election monitoring staff. Japan’s diplomatic efforts and humanitarian and reconstruction aid in the former SFRY were considerable. The larger implications of this article concern Japan–EU relations. By aiding the former SFRY republics to achieve democracy and market economy, Japan facilitated future NATO and EU expansion to protect its economic interests in the region.

Managing risks, side payments, and multi-institutional enlargement: the role of US defence, big four investment agreements and candidate risks on NATO and EU enlargement

ABSTRACT Risky investments under incomplete information (i.e. about future behaviour, future state of the world) characterize international institution enlargements. In clubs, a logic of lowest common denominator accompanies member heterogeneity as weaker states reduce collective good quality to their suboptimal level. Disturbances in a good’s provision are attenuated if a club provides diverse goods, however reductions are problematic when it produces fewer/scarce goods. Heavily invested, stronger partners may offset candidate risk through bilateral contracting. NATO & EU enlargement after the cold war provides a set of states to examine the effects of risks and bilateral (security/economic) investments on membership offers in either or both organizations providing a test of rationalist claims. Despite distinct criteria, perceptions of candidate’s (political or investment) risk shaped when offers were given. Finally, research treats enlargements as separate despite simultaneous occurrence. This research contributes by (1) specifying a simultaneous model of enlargements linking the processes indirectly and (2) examining risks and side payments. Results confirm security side payments increased chances of a NATO offer, but economic equivalents had no effect on EU offers. Reducing risks increased the likelihood of offers. Finally, the unmeasured factors correlated with offers in both were positive and substantively significant.

‘Nothing but humiliation for Russia’: Moscow and NATO’s eastern enlargement, 1993-1995

ABSTRACT This article recounts Russia’s response to NATO’s eastern enlargement. It argues that NATO enlargement was seen as perfectly acceptable in Moscow, as long as it was inclusive of Russia, which would gain in status as America’s key partner and ally. Once it became apparent that Russia would not be invited to join, the narrative changed to active opposition, as Boris Yeltsin sought domestic legitimacy from being perceived as thedefender of the national interest against Western encroachment. The article highlights the fluid nature of so called national interests, which are defined and redefined in ways affording the greatest legitimation to the political elites.

The overlooked importance of economics: why the Bush Administration wanted NATO enlargement

ABSTRACT This paper shows that, during 1991–1992, the George H.W. Bush Administration settled to pursue NATO enlargement in order to ensure both stability in and influence over Europe. Both were necessary subsidiary objectives towards achieving long-term security aims and the medium-term goal of furthering American prosperity. Bush officials concluded that European instability, protectionism, and self-absorption could menace US-led economic globalization. Anchoring NATO at the centre of the post-Cold War European order was seen as the best available response. NATO enlargement would alleviate European security concerns; prevent the emergence of regional security structures that endangered the Alliance; and provide the leverage Washington needed to encourage European participation in America’s global economic order.

An uncertain journey to the promised land: The Baltic states’ road to NATO membership

ABSTRACT Most accounts of NATO enlargement depict it as the implementation of US grand strategy. This article aims to restore agency to the acceding states, specifically the Baltic states who joined the Alliance in 2004. It analyzes the dynamics of competition and cooperation among Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the late 1990s and early 2000s during the process of NATO accession. The article demonstrates that both rivalry and joint efforts among the Baltic states in their reforms and lobbying were crucial factors in shaping the outcome. Unlike their inclusion into the EU, NATO membership for the Baltic states seemed improbable, and thus the paper highlights the demand-driven aspect of NATO expansion.

Poland’s Accession to NATO Considering “Partnership for Peace” and the U.S. Perspective

The accession of Poland to the group of NATO member states was undoubtedly one of the milestones in the modern history of the country and in the direction of strengthening security in the international arena. The whole process was conditioned by various types of determinants: technological, organizational, political and ideological (Kupiecki, 2016). Many publications have been dedicated to Poland's accession to NATO and its later role among the allied members. Nevertheless, there is a lack of particular studies in the professional literature that presents a detailed chronology of Polish pre-accession activities and the diverse opinions of the US administration regarding the enlargement of NATO with new member states recruiting from the former Warsaw Pact. This gap in available literature was a trigger for writing this article with the purpose to present the undertakings of Poland aimed at accession to NATO in the aspect of “Partnership for Peace” and the US point of view. In the research process, two basic methods were employed: analysis and synthesis. The method of analysis was used in relation to the verification of collected literature, normative acts and documents on international security. The method of synthesis was applied for conclusions. The undertaken research on the topic proved that without consistent actions and initiatives conducted by Poland in the international area and without the support of the US, joining NATO would be highly difficult or even impossible. At the same time, a detailed analysis highlighted that the accession of Poland to NATO was and still is mutually and beneficial for Warsaw and Washington.