Abstract
This paper explores the causes of Russian revanchism alongside phases of NATO expansion, and concludes that evidence of Moscow’s reflexive revanchism is sparse. Russian foreign policy is tested and correlated with Russian rhetoric, military strategy and Russian balancing actions, in light of each phase of actual and potential NATO expansion. The paper concludes that, first, Russia balances against perceived threats, only in areas where it has entrenched material and military interests. Otherwise, Russia is aware of relative military inferiority, and is agnostic about NATO and EU enlargement. These findings have enormous policy relevance, as both NATO and EU plans further enlargement, American and British isolationism grows, and European security scenario alters rapidly.
Highlights
R ecent scholarship and declassified documents have thrown open further debates about NATO enlargement at a time when the unity and strength of the alliance is under scrutiny
Joshua Shifrinson, an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University, argues that American policymakers repeatedly assured the desperate Soviet leadership that the alliance would not move east, even though most of the pledges were informal in nature, and arguably, were debatable when one of the original parties, the Soviet Union, collapsed.[2]
Putin immediately demanded that any new NATO member state accede and ratify the Conventional Forces Treaty to avoid any sort of a “strategic grey area.”[55]. By that time, there were massive transformations within Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004), which added on to Russian understanding that NATO is behind the crisis, and is trying to encircle Russia and encroach even further
Summary
R ecent scholarship and declassified documents have thrown open further debates about NATO enlargement at a time when the unity and strength of the alliance is under scrutiny. Putin immediately demanded that any new NATO member state accede and ratify the Conventional Forces Treaty to avoid any sort of a “strategic grey area.”[55] By that time, there were massive transformations within Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004), which added on to Russian understanding that NATO is behind the crisis, and is trying to encircle Russia and encroach even further By this period, it was clear that Russian intention (and Putin’s dream) of a “transformation” of NATO into a political institution instead of a primarily military one, with Russia being an equal member, was not going to be fulfilled anytime soon, and that was mainly because tion of NATO’s design on Russian borders.
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