NATO Structures Research Articles

The dangerous trends of using malware by the aggressor country to the damage of state interests under the legal regime of martial law

The trends in the use of malware by the russian hackers and cybercriminals commissioned by the special services of the Russian Federation have been determined. The scope and consequences of the spread of malware on a global scale are outlined. The threats and risks associated with cyber-attacks and the spread of malicious software are detailed. The attention is focused on the use of the TOR network by cybercriminals in modern conditions. The tasks of the special services of the Russian Federation in the conditions of cyber warfare, the forms and methods of conducting attacks using malicious software are summarized. The methodology of spreading malicious software through such mechanisms as financial fraud and phishing has been updated. The peculiarities of the distribution of malicious software of Russian origin have been revealed. The achievements related to Ukraine's acquisition of membership in the NATO structure on cooperation in the field of cyber defense are highlighted. The further directions of improving the current legislation in the matter of combating malware, in particular phishing have been determined.

Noninstitutionalized international security alliances: safeguarding world peace and regional stability

The article summarizes the Ukrainian diplomatic’ success stories in launching non-conventional modalities, instruments, methods of cooperation with global actors aimed to protect fundamental human rights and maintains the grounds for the present international order and stability.
 The constructions, instruments and methods in question are peculiar security alliances that encourage intergovernmental cooperation, first of all, in the case of international human rights protection and deepening political, economic, cultural and education diplomacy.
 The author produces a personal description of the noninstitutionalized security alliances and provides evidence-based examples of the permanent efficiency of such partnerships. The author pays attention to examining noninstitutionalized intergovernmental cooperation to clearly understand the security status quo in Europe and the world.
 Although most classic international organizations informally support Ukraine in its military defense against russia, there are no factual perspectives to formalize this cooperation, such as NATO or EU integration, in the nearest future. The author illustrates the dualistic nature of noninstitutionalized international security alliances. On the one hand, they support fundamental regional actors such as NATO and the EU to execute their policy without formal promises or official bunding upon Ukraine. From another hand, it assists Ukraine in integrating state policy into the NATO and EU agenda and structure. Thus it brings Ukraine closer to Euro-Atlantic and European integration implicitly with both separate EU and NATO member states and such organizations as a whole.
 Eventually, the democratic states practice establishing and maintaining international cooperation in extraordinary security alliances as alternatives to classic international relations to ensure regional security and global peace. Ukrainian experience based on the full-scale international armed conflict is an excellent case to examine and further research.

Knowing your CJEF from your JEF: Europe’s “Alphabet soup” of interstitial military cooperation-what relevance for cold war 2.0?

ABSTRACT This paper examines four of Europe’s more marginal military institutions that receive less attention: the Franco-British Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF); the French led European Intervention Initiative (EI2); the British led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF); and the Polish, Lithuanian and Ukrainian joint brigade (LITPOLUKRBRIG). These are described here as “interstitial” because they exist in the niches between both the main multilateral security forums (NATO, EU, UN, OSCE) and the national level. They are intermediaries, working like bridges to cover political obstacles, while often borrowing resources from established actors (notably NATO). It is argued here that such institutions are a form of national hedging against institutional blockages within NATO/EU while providing a platform for national defence policy entrepreneurship. In the context of Cold War 2.0 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, such institutional practices should not be dismissed as marginal. They offer a means to deploy European military forces outside formal NATO or EU decision-making structures, a feature which confers a useful flexibility. (161)

DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUSSIAN ANTI ACCESS/ANTI DENIAL (A2/AD) CONCEPT AS A THREAT TO NATO AND POLAND

This article presents an analysis of the development of the Russian Anti Access/Anti Denial concept – A2/AD. The considerations contained in this article focus on identifying the threats that the Russian A2/AD concept creates for NATO and Poland. This article compiles empirical data from scientific publications, formal strategic and doctrinal documents, which allowed to define the A2/AD category, specify its essence and characterize it through the prism of military and non-military forces and resources engaged by Russia in several important operational regions: the Kaliningrad Oblast, Crimea, Syria and the Arctic.The aim of this article is to evaluate the Russian Anti-Access/Anti Denial concept from the perspective of the threats it creates for NATO and Poland.The obtained research results allow us to make the conclusion that when assessing the current external conditions, effective opposition to the Russian A2/AD by NATO will be very difficult to implement. Increasing the capabilities in this area will probably require the individual member states to increase their defense spending, mainly on the modernization and development of their armed forces. In addition to increasing the financial expenditures, increasing the ability to counteract the Russian A2/AD will require proper coordination and integration of the activities of the entire NATO structure around one coherent operational concept. This applies not only to counteracting the Russian A2/AD in Europe but also in other regions of the world, which in the near future may become the theatre of military operations, both classic, asymmetric or hybrid.

ROMANIA'S DEFENCE CAPACITY, BETWEEN THE PROFESSIONAL ARMED FORCES AND THE TERRITORIAL FORCES

Defense planning is a particularly important topic, which implies an analysis of the international situation, a realistic assessment of its own national security system, whichinvolves medium- and long-term decisions. The allocation of resources should follow the defense policy established following a strategic analysis process, after the strategic objectivesand level of ambition have been established. The construction of military capabilities is complex, is carried out over time and requires the allocation of financial resources and apredictable and coherent human resource policy. Discontinuous reforms, or the alteration of decisions with opportunistic, conjuncture solutions, adversely affect future programs andproduce waste of financial and material resources, as well as social convulsions in human resources. The structure of forces on which the state's defense capacity is built must beincreasingly professional to have a timely and effective responsiveness, and the resilience capacity for national defense should be based on the mental and armed resilience of thepopulation in the case of temporary occupation of the national territory. Membership of NATO and the European Union increases resilience through the commitments of the two organizationsto support the restoration of Romania's territorial integrity in the event of military aggression. The increasingly technologically evolved human society requires a rethinking of thenational mobilization system, both in terms of human resources and in terms of the involvement of the resources of the national economy. Maintaining the functioning of critical infrastructure,operationalizing industrial facilities and maintaining the capacity to provide the material and financial resources needed for the war effort are particularly important, and the workforce inthese areas cannot be made available to complement military structures. Law enforcement and civil emergency forces will be engaged in the specific missions of each of them but may formbases of resistance in the case of national occupation. Participation in NATO and EU force structures must be in line with the force structure designed for national needs, renegotiated,realistically, in the medium and long term, with sustainable promises corresponding to common standards. Allocating a 2% defense budget is not the single and sufficient solution to achievinga credible and sustainable defense capability. Difficult, socially and politically impact corrective measures are needed, but any delay will produce increasing imbalances.Keywords: Defense planning, national defense, NATO, Romania, European Union

Bilateral relations with the republic of /North/ Macedonia as an element of Bulgarian regional policy after 1989

The article begins with a re-evaluation of the often neglected importance of 1989 developments in Skopje that inaugurated the subsequent transition of Yugoslav Macedonia leading to its transformation into an independent republic. The text argues that the outcome of the often overlooked congress of the League of Communists of Macedonia in late November 1989 dismantled a small break out of the pan-European Berlin Wall that autumn. After 1989 Bulgaria maintained a policy aimed at limiting and the non-proliferation of the conflict from the dissolving Yugoslav federation and contributed to the stabilization of the former Yugoslav and wider region. One of the most sensitive aspects of Sofia’s regional policy was that towards Skopje. The article offers evidence and argues that Bulgaria’s approach since 1989 went through different phases but nonetheless was based on three key constant principles: first, support for the independence and for the statehood of the new Republic of Macedonia; second, the countering and dismantling of Macedonianism (in its ‘Yugoslav’ and ‘antiquated’ versions alike) both as a provocative construct of history and as Skopje’s foreign policy practice; third, seeking of solutions within the wider EU and NATO framework and support for the Republic of /North/ Macedonia’s integration into NATO and EU structures.

Macedonia – nowe wyzwania i trudne kompromisy (2016−2019)

Macedonia – New Challenges and Difficult Compromises (2016−2019) After the SDSM (Socijaldemokratski sojuz na Makedonija – Social Democratic Union of Macedonia) took over the government in 2017, the party proposed reforms which, although fundamental for the future of the country, were difficult to accept by the majority of Macedonian society. Nevertheless, SDSM’s policy, approved and monitored by the European Union and the US, was to lead to Macedonia joining NATO and EU structures in the near future. It should also be noted that both the US and the EU are strategic partners of the Republic, which actively support the processes taking place there. Having signed the agreement with Greece, on 17 June 2018 the Republic of Macedonia changed its official name. After the entry into force of the amendments to the Constitution and ratification of the Greek-Macedonian bilateral agreement by both parties, the country adopted the name of the Republic of North Macedonia (mac. Република Серверна Македонија). In February 2019, just after the parliaments of North Macedonia and Greece ratified the Prespa Agreement, the accession process of North Macedonia to NATO began. The condition for accession was the consent of the parliaments of all members of the Alliance for enlargement. Immediately after such approval, on 27 March 2020, the decision on membership was announced in Brussels by its chairman, Jens Stoltenberg. Macedonia’s relations with Bulgaria and Serbia have also changed, and the Albanians have been granted further privileges and rights in this country – in the opinion of the Macedonians it is very difficult to accept and implement. The escalation of nationalist sentiment in the country’s internal relations is important, caused not only by foreign policy but also by concessions to the Albanians. The Law on the Use of Languages, also known as the ‘language law’, criticized not only by the Macedonian scientific elite, but also by the Venice Commission, which sees certain threats to Macedonia in granting such extensive rights to the Albanian population, strengthens the opposition. On 26 March 2020, the EU gave its consent to start accession negotiations with Albania and the Republic of North Macedonia. Negotiations with Bulgaria are ongoing and it will be difficult to find a compromise. The biggest challenge for the government will be to convince the public that it is in the interest of its citizens to make compromises with both Greeks and Albanians and in the future with Bulgarians. In this case, the EU position will be very important, both in relation to the Albanian and Bulgarian demands.

Greece as a NATO Member in the Longue Durée

Greece entered NATO in order to guarantee its existence against the revisionism of the Balkan communist states during the Cold War. The rise of Greek-Turkish rivalry during the 1950s and 1960s and its climax, the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, caused Greece’s withdrawal from NATO structure from 1974 to 1980. After the end of the Cold War Greece attempted to form a multilateral approach in its foreign policy and secure its interests in both the Balkan area and the Eastern Mediterranean. The new unstable environment of the early 21st century and Greece’s economic crisis complicated Greece’s position in NATO. Still the macro-historic parameters of Greece’s identity as a sea power confirm its ties to the Atlantic world and predict a possible realignment of Greece in an increasingly unstable European framework that could well see the demise of the European Union.

European defence policy at a crossroads – Germany preserving the status quo and France seeking change?

ABSTRACT The combination of an increasingly assertive Russia with growing uncertainty over long-term US commitment to Europe's security has resulted in calls for new efforts to be made in European defence cooperation. Post-Brexit, France and Germany become the two remaining significant defence actors within the EU policy framework. Given this reconfiguration, an important question to has to be answered. Which state, France or Germany, is currently gaining more influence in European defence cooperation? A critical conceptual framework is utilised to explore the nature of Franco-German rivalry and to determine which nation is likely to obtain more influence in this policy area. Firstly, the article explores the clash between France's desire to direct European defence cooperation towards the stabilisation of Europe's southern neighbourhood with Germany's preference to minimise its own military involvement outside Europe. The article then focuses on non-EU defence solutions separately proposed by France and Germany, those being the European Intervention Initiative and the Framework Nations Concept respectively. The article finds that Germany's preferences are a considerable obstacle to attempts to create a more autonomous form of European defence cooperation and that dependence on US military strength and NATO structures continues to be an unavoidable reality.

УКРАЇНСЬКО-ЛАТВІЙСЬКЕ СПІВРОБІТНИЦТВО У ВІЙСЬКОВІЙ СФЕРІ У ПЕРІОД 1991–2018 РР.

The article discusses the main forms and methods of Ukrainian-Latvian military cooperation. It is pointed out that there is no separate scientific intelligence that would systematically cover all stages of Ukrainian-Latvian military cooperation. Considerable attention is paid to the place and role played by Latvia in the process of Ukraine’s integration into EU and NATO structures. It is proved that Latvia is an active external partner of Ukraine in deepening its relations with the EU and NATO, it contributes to the Euro-Atlantic movement of Ukraine.The study points out that in the context of Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine and the threat to security and peace in Europe, Latvia provides military and economic assistance, both within NATO and on a bilateral basis.It includes helps in the treatment and rehabilitation of wounded warriors, as well as providing professional expert-consultants in combat and tactical medicine, humanitarian as- sistance to residents of the pro-war areas and more. Latvia also acts as a reliable ally of Ukraine in the foreign policy arena, strongly supporting Ukrainian initia- tives and thus promotes its international prestige.The author of the article also notes that today, in the context of Russian armed aggression against Ukraine, the necessity of intensifying the Ukrainian-Latvian cooperation in the military sphere becomes more urgent, since it is in the vital interests of both states.

Central Europe and NATO Transformation 2014–2018

The collapse of the Cold-War order in Europe brought about a radical change in the global security system. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact created a situation where the only serious and effective guarantee of stability in Europe was NATO. Central European states, which until that time had been subordinated to the USSR, unequivocally and consistently chose to pursue the Euro-Atlantic direction in their security policy. The decision resulted in their gaining full, even though gradual, membership in the Alliance during the years 1999–2004. The accession process was first completed by the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Central Europe is not free from dangers stemming from national and supranational transformations. NATO is facing the need to increase its activity and systematically ensure joint cooperation and security guarantees as regards all its member states. This is primarily caused by a revival of Russia’s superpower ambitions under the presidency of Vladimir Putin and an escalation of terrorism and cyberspace threats. The decisions and practical actions related to biennial NATO summits are of vital importance in this respect. The text presented here is an analysis of the security of Central Europe within NATO structures in the light of the last three NATO summits: in Newport in 2014, in Warsaw in 2016 and in Brussels in 2018.

Populist and Nationalist Trends in the Polish Influential Press: Pro-European or Euro-Skeptical?

The aim of this paper is to determine the level of populist and nationalist trends in the Polish influential press articles related to the global financial crisis triggered on 15 September 2008 by the collapse of the Lehman Brothers investment bank. The result of the Polish presence in the European Union and NATO structures is that the crisis situations in Western Europe and the USA constitute an important topic for Polish media, and allow for the assessment of the level of approval/criticism towards the Western world. The author assumed that the domination of populist and nationalist trends is a sign of Euro-skepticism, while their presence that is not more than incidental – a sign of pro-European attitude. The paper versions of the most influential Polish press titles constitute the research material, namely daily papers: “Rzeczpospolita” and “Gazeta Wyborcza” and weekly magazines: “Newsweek Polska” and “Polityka”.

Smart defence: Joint geospatial support in NATO

Abstract Smart defence in NATO may in its very nature represent not only automated remote solutions for battle activities, but harmonized and efficient system of geospatial support of deployed units as well. The objective of this study is to uncover the essence of allied geospatial support mechanism, determine critical spots and propose appropriate system enhancements. Wealth of experience of members of the Armed forces of the Czech Republic was utilized to summarize the state of geospatial support in NATO. It is preferentially experience from foreign operations ISAF and KFOR, cooperation with NATO Headquarters SHAPE and from participation in Multinational Geospatial Support Group. Presented proposals for improvements of geospatial support might have significant impact on intelligence service and military units themselves. Highlights for public administration, management and planning: • Multinational Geospatial Support Group will become a single complex executive component of NATO geospatial support for foreign operations. • Financial and capacity means for geospatial support must be centralized directly within NATO structure to reach maximum efficiency. • Production of standardized-only scale set maps covering territory of NATO and areas of interest is to be obligatorily for all member nations. • Access to the web service CoreGIS should be granted for all NATO nations at a national level.

The European intervention initiative is the interstate cooperation in the sphere of defence in the frames of the existing EU and NATO structures

The European intervention initiative is the interstate cooperation in the sphere of defence in the frames of the existing EU and NATO structures

Life Cycle of a Military Product

Abstract Romania’s membership of the select group of states belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization brings, in addition to the expected security benefits and assurances and commitments and obligations that we have to assume. The participation of politicians, militaries and Romanian experts in the decision-making within the specialized committees of the NATO structures is an extremely important element for the assertion of Romania as a security guarantor in the area, a hypostasis that was only a vision a few years ago. This role of our country must be supported by strong and powerful military capabilities, capabilities that are hard to reach for many of the countries in Eastern Europe. The economically advantageous and technologically viable solution for a period of time is to acquire advanced military technical systems that are equipped with the great economic powers of NATO, systems used and verified by these armies, revitalized and upgraded, a second life goal.

TRANSPORT CYWILNY W NATO

The current security and defence challenges require a new approach to the military logistics. To ensuring collective defence of the Alliance in the 21st century, additionally to the military, a wide range of civilian capabilities and active cooperation between public and private partners, government, science and the private sector is critical. Developing further arrangements to manage efficiently civil capabilities, particularly transport ones, in time of crisis and war and reducing dependency on commercial support will improve military mobility. The article presents current security environment, analysis of NATO civil transport task, structures, procedures and processes enabling civil transport support in crisis and war, including NATO Civil War Time Agencies. This article is related to the research on “Challenges and threats of security and defence of the Republic of Poland in the twenty first century”, which is carried out by the Institute of Security and Defence Systems of the Faculty of Logistics at the Military University of Technology in Warsaw.

Tactical Friends with Strategic Benefits

NATO structures drive the effective socialisation of norms, rules and procedures. The cumulative effect of such structuring precipitates its persistence over time. Focusing on the Tactical Leadership Programme (TLP), J Wesley Hutto and Derrick V Frazier highlight how this programme affects socialisation at the lowest levels. It creates a sense of shared understanding of mission goals and operations through standardised and shared tactics, common equipment and common language. While challenges undoubtedly exist, programmes such as the TLP will continue to function and cumulatively create tactical, operational and strategic advantages that make the future persistence of NATO more likely.

Institucionalizace funkce analytické podpory pro potřeby důvěryhodného řízení obrany

The paper outlines several recommendations for strengthening the institutional framework of the analytical support function for credible defence management. Recommendations are drawn based on the outcome of the institutional research project named Strategic Alternatives conducted by the Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies of University of Defence (CSMSS). The multi-objective research focuses on organisational arrangement of the analytical support function within the overall ministry of defence organisational architecture of several countries (Canada, Norway, Sweden) as well as the NATO structure and management (in this case, the main focus embraces the analytical support to defence planning). Analytical support to defence decision making process in these countries enjoys a long-term tradition which goes back to the period of WWII. The way the analytical function is understood is highly relevant also for the enhancement of credible defence management in the Czech Republic and its Ministry of Defence.

VIEWS OF SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES MEMBERS ON POSTINGS TO INTERNATIONAL DUTIES ABROAD

By manning duties within NATO structure, the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) implement their integration aims, facilitate the enforcement of national interests, and acquire knowledge, skills and experiences necessary for their national needs and professional development. SAF members posted to duties within the Peacetime Structure of the Slovenian Armed Forces Abroad (PSSAFA) have to cope with various challenges concerning them personally, their life and work, as well as the life of their families, which have to deal with separation from their important members or with displacement to a completely new and unknown environment. Although the system supporting the duties abroad has been established, it should constantly be monitored and upgraded in order to become even more effective.

NATO IN THE DEFENCE DOCTRINE OF FINLAND

Finland is not a NATO member but continues close cooperation with NATO structures and forces. Finnish relations with NATO have been determining on one hand by internal factors (Finnish neutrality doctrine, public opinion), on the other – by developments of global security system. New security situation after 1990 led to fundamental changes in the conditions on which defence policy is based. Finland has now strong ambition to participate actively in most international peace-keeping endeavors. In 1994 an agreement was signed on Finnish participation in the NATO-sponsored Partnership for Peace. Since this date Finland is deeply involved in military cooperation with NATO), esp. during peace-support operation.The article goes through the questions of impact of Finnish integration with NATO on the Finnish defence system. The aim is to discuss how NATO’s membership would influence Finnish defence structures, capabilities and Finnish military policy.