NATO Missions Research Articles

Explaining NATO's Resilience: Is International Relations Theory Useful?

Over the past two decades, NATO's membership and mission have expanded. Practitioners and scholars have extensively debated the pros and cons of the changes, but few have sought to explain why the alliance is so resilient. This paper directly asks and answers the question: Why has NATO mission and membership expanded since the end of the Cold War? Three leading approaches of international relations are used to answer this question. The empirical analysis finds that in isolation, none of the theories perform well at predicting or explaining NATO's adaptation to the post-Cold War environment. However, when combined, they do offer a coherent explanation for the alliance's enlargement and the development of out-of-area operations.

Reclaiming Afghanistan

Reclaiming Afghanistan

Lithuania in the NATO Mission in Afghanistan: Between Idealism and Pragmatism

The article is first of all aimed at demonstrating how in the case of Lithuania's participation in the NATO mission in Afghanistan the discourse that has spread by idealistic rhetoric figures, as a tool for creating a certain image of Lithuania (as an actor in international relations), is employed by the Lithuanian government to pursue pragmatic goals of the Lithuanian foreign policy, oriented toward a totally different geographic and mental space (in Lithuania, commonly referred to as 'transatlantic space') than the region, the Central Asia, in which the physical action takes place and in which Lithuania has no vested interests whatsoever. At the same time, making use of the concepts 'construction of social reality' and 'social construction of knowledge' formulated by Stefan Guzzini, the relationship between the image broadcast through discourse and the reality are analyzed. The article also seeks to tackle the question of whether, taking into account the worsening worldwide economic situation, specifically in Lithuania, as well as the security situation in Afghanistan, the chosen tactics of pursuing foreign policy goals will pay off in the long term perspective and what could be scenarios for further development. To answer the latter question, the new government-endorsed "Strategy of the participation of the Republic of Lithuania in the activities of the international community in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for the years 2009-2013" is analyzed in the last part of the article.

A Nuclear Iran and NATO

While NATO is already taking into account the putative Iranian nuclear threat through its missile-defence programme, few if any comprehensive assessments have been made of what it would mean to live with a nuclear-armed Iran. In many NATO meetings the looms large, but political sensitivities and differing perceptions among member states generally preclude any serious and explicit discussions of what it would mean for the Alliance. A nuclear-armed Iran would in fact have profound, lasting and far-reaching consequences for key NATO roles and missions. NATO's Article V may be invoked to deter and defend against an Iranian threat or blackmail attempts. Security partnerships in the Near and Middle East would have to be adapted, if not transformed. NATO's relationship with Russia would be also be affected. Operations in Iran's neighbourhood would have to take into account Iran's new ability to project influence. But a nuclear-armed Iran might also make it more problematic for European countries to embark on new NATO operations in the Middle East or Central Asia. NATO should refrain for the present from any drastic and possibly irreversible decisions regarding its nuclear posture, such as a complete withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from European territory. On the contrary, it should keep all options open, including the future modernisation of the US nuclear presence, if and when technically necessary, as long as the Iranian nuclear crisis is not solved.

NATO's out-of-area norm from Suez to Afghanistan

The parameters of NATO's out-of-area missions are defined not just by the treaty norms encoded in Articles 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, but also by a social norm entrenched during the Suez crisis. The evolution of the social norm defining the responsibilities allies have to each other in NATO missions, together with changing definitions of security and mutual defence, have led to a situation where the distinction between Article 4 (concerning consultation on global security issues) and Article 5 (concerning mutual defence) is non-existent. This change can help explain the current inter-allied dispute over burden-sharing in NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan.

From Middle Power to Peacebuilder: The Use of the Canadian Forces in Modern Canadian Foreign Policy

Traditionally, Canadian foreign policy was committed to maintaining a middle ground between large and minor powers. Canada dedicated itself to ensuring its national security and participated heavily in international institutions to do so. Canadian Forces' participation in the NATO mission in Afghanistan since 2001 may prove that the ideas of middlepowermanship and peacekeeping have been replaced as the dominant Canadian military strategies in favor of peacebuilding. As the timeline for Canadian withdrawal from Afghanistan approaches, it is time to determine how successful the shift in Canadian military practice has been and what its consequences may be for Canada on the international stage. By examining Canada's traditional role as a middle power and comparing that role with Canada's modern counterinsurgency strategy, we argue that, until the Canadian Forces are given the adequate tools, Canadian military policy should adhere to the traditional peacekeeping model and not be overly eager to erode national military power.

Years of Free-Riding? Canada, the New NATO, and Collective Crisis Management in Europe, 1989–2001

Most discussions about the impact of Afghanistan on the future of NATO focus on transatlantic relations between the United States and the European Union. But for Canada, which is one of the few NATO allies that voluntarily deployed into the south, facing heavy resistance and fighting from Taliban insurgents, the Afghanistan operations have become the most salient dimension of its continued involvement in the Atlantic Alliance. While this may seem surprising, given the cutbacks in Canadian defense spending in the 1990s and the withdrawal of Canada's standing forces from Germany, it should not. For during that so-called dark decade, Canada continued to make major contributions to NATO and European security. This essay argues that Ottawa's multi-faceted military and political support of the “new” NATO of the post–Cold War era continued when the alliance undertook its involvement in Afghanistan. Indeed, in its efforts in support of NATO's mission in Afghanistan, Canada has demonstrated a dedication to the alliance that seems stronger than NATO's collective commitment to itself.

Correlates of Perceived Need for Mental Health Care Among Active Military Personnel

Correlates of Perceived Need for Mental Health Care Among Active Military Personnel

What Options for NATO? Dutch Force Projection and Defense Capabilities

Much research on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization laments Europe's limited military capabilities and low defense spending trends. Much less recent analysis, however, has been devoted to specific European member allies and the extent to which they have individually sought to transform their own national military capabilities to comport with NATO's broader security needs. This research finds that while the Netherlands makes significant military contributions to NATO's mission in Afghanistan and other peacekeeping operations, and has taken some steps to improve upon its existing force projection capabilities, important limitations exist on how much additional military assistance it will be able to provide to the allies, both in the short and long term.

Challenges facing NATO in the 21st century

During the entire post Cold-War era numerous security challenges were pushing NATO in search of a new mission. Although redefined several times in the past, NATO's mission is still not steady and in its final shape. NATO's framework is not final yet for several reasons: lack of internal balance; NATO is moving towards rather 'loose' formula of Trans-Atlantic relations, through a 'Coalition of the Willing', in which countries accept the level and scope of military engagement in war missions (Afghanistan and Iraq) according to their own interests. This certainly has influenced the character of NATO mission in the 21st Century. Therefore, NATO countries do not speak with 'one voice' and they do not equally participate in military missions. Instead, specific countries are engaged in specific issues, in compliance with UN Security Council resolutions. NATO deepening and widening process is continuing in the 21st Century. .

All Politics is Local

Given the debates over the current NATO mission in Afghanistan, it might be assumed that German interest in that country is unprecedented. Yet history holds a different record, for an earlier generation of German leaders also paid considerable attention to Afghanistan. In 1915, Germany (aided by its Ottoman ally) hoped to ignite Islamic fervour throughout the Middle East and, in particular, persuade the Afghan emir to invade India with his army and deal a deathblow to the British empire. Kaiser Wilhelm Mohammed, a caricature created by Berlin's propagandists, would then advance the Muslim cause elsewhere to the detriment of Germany's Russian and British enemies. However, such heady dreams of conquest remained just that. Despite the enormous courage of the small military expedition to Kabul, the emir could not be moved and Germany's Afghanistan strategy collapsed.Nine decades later, German military personnel are again in Afghanistan. This time, however, Berlin's is far removed from fomenting jihad. Instead, the German contingent of approximately 3500 troops is part of the 40,000-strong NATO-led international security assistance force (ISAF), of which the German component is the third largest after those of the United States and Great Britain. As in 1915, a direct link has been asserted between the fate of that distant central Asian country and more immediate national interests. Shortly after the initial deployment of Bundeswehr troops, then- Defence Minister Peter Struck asserted, in an oft- cited phrase, that a military contribution to the ongoing allied effort was necessary because Germany's front line of defence ran along the Hindu- Kush. Despite important differences in foreign policy, the past two governments, the Red- Green (1998-2005) composed of the Green party and Social Democratic party led by Gerhard Schroder and the current grand of Chancellor Angela Merkel, have publicly endorsed that perspective.Nevertheless, German leaders often seem reluctant to voice this view. Merkel has been criticized for not leading from the front on Afghanistan, despite a willingness to do so on other foreign issues, such as Russia, China, and transatlantic relations. In a speech entitled new questions of foreign policy delivered only two days after the September 2005 general election, Frank- Walter Steinmeier (now foreign minister) failed to mention Afghanistan at all.1 And the agreement (November 2005) that established guidelines for the current government (composed of the Christian Democratic Union-CDU, Christian Socialist Union-CSU, and the Social Democratic party-SPD), is hardly more vocal. The stabilization of the western Balkans is declared a vital interest, but Afghanistan is only very briefly touched upon in a short passage about nation-building. Such reticence highlights the caution that has been adopted toward the Afghan missions.THE DIMENSIONS OF A CONTROVERSIAL COMMITMENTGermany's latest involvement in Afghanistan began in response to the events of 11 September. Shortly after, Gerhard Schroder pledged unqualified solidarity with the US, and a month later promised a military contribution to the coming campaign in Afghanistan. That pledge was quickly tested when the Bush administration formally requested assistance and, on 6 November, the chancellor announced that 3900 troops would be made available for the US-led operation Enduring Freedom. The Schroder government was nevertheless disquieted early on by Washington's use of a coalition of the willing to go after the Taliban. That US military operations quickly outpaced any efforts at postconflict planning was also a concern. The belief that Germany, without an imperial past in central Asia, would be seen as neutral led the government to host the international gathering that fashioned the Bonn agreement for a provisional Afghan government and an approach for the political reconstruction efforts in that country. …

Out of Area and Very Much in Business? NATO, the U.S., and the Post–9/11 International Security Environment

This paper seeks to determine why the United States chose to bypass NATO after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the relative strengths and weaknesses of alliance and coalition operations, through an examination of NATO's missions in Bosnia and Kosovo and U.S.-led coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the United States emerged from NATO's two Balkans missions with a belief that its operational freedom and flexibility had been hampered by operating within alliance constraints, coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq raised key questions about whether ad hoc coalitions are the most appropriate mechanisms for conducting such operations. NATO's contributions to postcombat reconstruction and stabilization also highlighted some of the core advantages to be derived from working through the alliance. If NATO can follow through on the transformation agenda it has undertaken since the 2002 Prague Summit, the indications are that the United States is more likely to turn to NATO for future operations and that NATO's days as a “toolbox” may well be numbered.

NATO's new mission: projecting stability in a post-Cold War world

Reports of NATO's death have been greatly exaggerated. Characterizations of NATO as a relic of the past do not square with the fact that the Alliance is busier today than at any time in its history. As Europe has become more unified and more democratic, NATO has assumed new layers of significance in the global security environment. In a post-September 11 world, the old 1990s debate about what is in area and what is out of area is a luxury that the Alliance can no longer afford. Decisions made at the 2004 Istanbul summit aimed at enhancing NATO's partnerships with the states of Central Asia and extending the partnership concept to the Greater Middle East reflect the Alliance's new, more global presence as do new military missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan. Moore argues that a careful analysis of NATO's new, more global focus suggests that it's not the nature of NATO's mission that has changed, but rather its scope. NATO is approaching its new out of area missions with the political tools developed after the Soviet threat faded in the early 1990s when the Allies agreed that, rather than merely defend an old order, they would now create a new one grounded in liberal democratic values, including individual liberty and the rule of law. Indeed, the mission of projecting stability eastward was understood to be inextricable from the promotion of these values. This new mission required that NATO devote greater attention to its political dimension. In fact, as the United States turned to promoting democracy around the world in the wake of September 11, it ultimately sought to enlist NATO in its mission of extending democracy beyond Europe to Central Asia and the Middle East. As Moore demonstrates in her attempt to provide a full and comprehensive understanding of the new NATO, while divisions within the Alliance persist as to just how global NATO should be, the post-September 11 security environment ensures that NATO's survival depends upon its willingness to project security beyond Europe. That mission will be as much political as it is military.

NATO's International Security Role in the Terrorist Era

What role does NATO play in combating terror? NATO's missions have expanded dramatically since the end of the Cold War, and most of the United States’ closest allies are members of the alliance. Nevertheless, NATO plays, at best, a supportive role in U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. The alliance contributes to preventive and defensive missions to address the threat of terrorism, and its consequence management plans aim to respond to terrorist attacks and to mitigate their effects. But many of the essential activities of the fight against terrorism occur outside NATO, through bilateral cooperation or loose coalitions of the willing. Three factors help to explain NATO's minor role in combating terrorism: shifts in alignments and threat perceptions caused by systemic changes, the alliance's limited military capabilities, and the nature of the fight against terror itself. Over time the consequences of NATO's limited role could be severe. If NATO's strongest members do not seek to address their core security threats within the alliance, NATO may have difficulty sustaining its military value.

European security - NATO's Mission for the New Millennium: A Value-Based Approach to Building Security

(2002). European security - NATO's Mission for the New Millennium: A Value-Based Approach to Building Security. Contemporary Security Policy: Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 1-34.

NATO after Fifty Years

Chapter 1 Introduction Part 2 I The Transatlantic Relationship Chapter 3 Continuity or Change? The View from America Chapter 4 NATO's Search for Relevance Chapter 5 NATO, Britain, and the Emergence of a European Defense Capability Chapter 6 Continuity or Change? The View from Europe Part 7 II NATO as an International Organization Chapter 8 NATO's Post-Cold War Strategy: The Role of Combined Joint Task Forces Chapter 9 NATO as a Political Organization: The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and the Politics of Command Chapter 10 Civil-Military Relations in the New NATO: The Standard and the Boundaries of Professionalism Chapter 11 NATO Enlargement: Crossing the Rubicon Chapter 12 NATO and the European Union: The Quest for a Security/Defense Identity, 1948-1999 Part 13 III NATO in Theory and Practice Chapter 14 From Collective Defense to Cooperative Security? The New NATO and Nontraditional Challenges and Mission Chapter 15 Arms Control after the Cold War: The Challenge of Diverging Security Agendas Chapter 16 NATO and Internal Disputes: Greece and Turkey Part 17 IV The Long View Chapter 18 Russia and NATO: Lessons Learned Chapter 19 The United States and NATO: The Relevance of History

Survey Research and Russian Perspectives on NATO Expansion

A specialist on Russian politics and foreign relations employs large-N survey research to analyze the reactions of Russian elites and mass publics to the expansion of NATO eastward. The article assesses the salience of NATO-related issues to elites and mass publics; preferences as to current and future Russian policy responses; the correlation between elite and mass threat perceptions and their orientations to the domestic political economy; and orientations to further NATO expansion. Survey data are combined with insights about foreign-policy orientations in relatively open systems to explain and anticipate Russian policy choices in the face of NATO expansion, NATO's intervention in Kosovo, debates concerning the scope of NATO's mission, and prospects for a further increase in NATO's membership.

Care for the Caregivers: A Program for Canadian Military Chaplains after Serving in NATO and United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the 1990s

The Mental Health Department of the Canadian Forces Support Unit (Ottawa) developed the Care for the Caregivers program to help participants deal with stressful events experienced directly or vicariously from the NATO and United Nations military missions of the 1990s. The program was developed after complaints of postdeployment stress were received from various military care providers. The objectives were to improve the skills of support personnel and to reduce the distress that some caregivers experienced. Thirty-one chaplains who had been exposed to stressful military operations participated in five workshops. These educational 4-day small-group workshops covered topics such as post-traumatic stress disorder, vicarious traumatization, coping techniques, spirituality, self-care, and family issues. An adult education model was chosen to encourage dialogue. Outcomes included reports of professional and personal benefits, requests for additional programs, local education initiatives, and referrals to mental health professionals. Having met its objectives, the program has become a normal concluding part of stressful deployments.

欧州連合の軍事化と米欧関係

Firstly, this article traces the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the European Union from the “Blair Initiative” in October 1998 to the European Council in Santa Maria da Feira in June 2000. The idea of conducting military crisis management by the EU has gained quick consensus among the 15 member countries. The major reason for introducing this new policy is because of the EU's incapability in Bosnia and then in Kosovo.Secondly, it deals with US attitudes towards the ESDP since EU military crisis management needs to establish a modality of cooperation with NATO. Hitherto, there has been no formal contact between NATO and the EU mainly because France has tried to impede strong US influence on EU affairs. The US administration has an ambivalent attitude towards the development of the ESDP. It might damage NATO cohesion while stronger European capabilities might strengthern NATO and reduce the US burden.At the moment, the EU has no idea about its territorial defence. Many countries in the EU oppose it for different reasons. The UK believes that it is NATO's mission, and Sweden, Finland and other countries are not in favor of being involved in a military alliance. This is one of the rationales for the EU's developing capabilities of non-military crisis management which is based on a tradition of a “civilian power.”In order to conduct military crisis management, the EU needs to have real military capability and decision-making mechanisms. The EU-NATO mechanisms for consultation and cooperation is another challenge. Lastly, this article examines future prospects. This evolution might lead to a changing balance between Europe and the US, if the EU successfully develops its military capability.

The new NATO

Over the last five years, the Atlantic Alliance has had to evolve to meet the dramatic changes of the new security environment. As Supreme Allied Commander Europe. General Joulwan is responsible for overseeing the successful implementation of those changes and of a new doctrine taking into account the growing partnership with former enemies. In this article, General Joulwan gives an operational assessment of today's Europe and of NATO's place in European security. He explores new NATO missions and initiatives and adapting force and command structures, plus resourcing constraints and the complex challenge of the situation in the Balkans. He concludes that NATO's strength lies in its unify, and that it is and will remain as relevant to defence and security as at any time in its history.