NATO Countries Research Articles

Language Assistance to Multinational Partners in Coalition Operations

Extended abstract: Knowledge of medical-related terminology and communication skills are essential for multinational partners participating in a wide variety of missions – combat, stabilization, humanitarian support and natural disaster relief. In case of injures and sickness they need to know basic medical terminology in English to evaluate the situation, arrange for MEDEVAC or coordinate health services. Although the First aid and MEDEVAC topics are included into many language training programs, participants are unable to use health-related vocabulary in challenging situations due to the lack of language practice and limited training time. The purpose of this study was to identify specific needs of the multinational partners in medical terminology, explore a range of technology-enhanced language learning strategies for vocabulary extension and refreshing, and suggest a framework for medical terminology assistance based on mobile learning. The study started with needs analysis to reveal specific language gaps and challenges in use of common medical terminology that may be addressed by individual mobile learning. It was intended to identify typical communication situations and vocabulary that should be addressed. Native and non-native English speakers from 14 NATO and partner countries (officers and civilians) who had participated in stability operations and other missions around the world were interviewed and answered a questionnaire. Additionally, five instructors who teach medical and health-related English to future mission participants were interviewed. As a result, three main areas of vocabulary were identified: parts of body, injuries and other health issues (feelings, symptoms), and medical assets/devices used for first aid and healthcare prescriptions. Most typical communication situations were related to car accidents, MEDEVAC calls, taking a person to the hospital, and writing a report about the accident. To identify the best way of exploiting mobile learning for language assistance to the multinational partners we focused on clarifying the differences between e-learning and m-learning and identifying specific features of m-learning that may be beneficial and even unique in supporting terminology acquisition for the multinational audience. Early research in m-learning emphasized limitations of the mobile devices, such as size of the display, reduced input, small memory, abridged or specific OS version, and lack of standards, which positioned m-learning as a specific case of e-learning. However, rapid evolution of mobile technologies, their recent features,

How Europeans view tactical nuclear weapons on their continent

With the debate among NATO member states over the stationing of US nuclear weapons in Europe likely to continue, it is useful to examine why some European NATO members wish to see an end to the US nuclear presence and why others stick to the status quo. In assessing the different positions of key European NATO countries on nuclear disarmament, the author notes that the positions depend on whether the states possess nuclear weapons, how their history and geography affect threat perceptions, and how the nations variously perceive their role in international and regional affairs. Geography-driven history produces one dividing line, which largely runs along the former border between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Less obvious are the reasons for a north—south division on this issue within “old Europe.” The northern nations are more vocally pro-disarmament than are the Mediterranean nations. Domestic politics, of course, also play a determining factor in all counties. Interest in removing the weapons is strongest in countries where senior statesmen spanning the political spectrum have sought to lead public opinion in the direction of disarmament.

Cold Peace

The Arctic, located directly between the United States and the Soviet Union, was on the front lines of the Cold War. Nuclear submarines prowled the Arctic Ocean while long-range bombers circled overhead. Runways and radar stations were built across the Canadian north, along with underwater acoustic sensors for detecting the submarines.A more cooperative approach has emerged since 1990, when the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on the location of their maritime boundary in the Bering Sea, Bering Strait, and Chukchi Sea. In 1996, the creation of the Arctic Council institutionalized cooperation on nonmilitary matters among the eight Arctic countries: Russia, the United States (Alaska), Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland.In the past decade, the cooperation has intensified because of climate change, which is melting the Arctic sea ice, opening new shipping routes, and faccilitating access to oil and gas. As a result, existing and potential maritime boundary disputes have acquired new relevance. In May 2008, the five countries that border on the Arctic Ocean (Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark, and Norway) adopted the Ilulissat declaration, in which they reaffirmed their commitment to working within an existing framework of international law to delimit their respective areas of jurisdiction over the seabed. In March 2010, the Canadian government announced in the throne speech that it would work with other northern countries to settle boundary disagreements.The Cold War divide has not been as easy to bridge on security matters. NATO's membership has been expanded to include several countries bordering on Russia, causing concern there, while the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has been extended to include the sharing of maritime surveillance between Canada and the United States, including in the Northwest Passage. That said, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 provided an impetus for some forms of security cooperation between NATO countries and Russia, notably the proliferation security initiative, which applies to oceans everywhere, including in the Arctic. Recent improvements in US-Russia relations, especially with respect to missile defence, nuclear nonproliferation, and disarmament, could have major implications for circumpolar politics. They also create an opportunity for Canada, the United States' largest trading partner and Russia's Arctic neighbour, to assist with transforming our Cold War adversary into a safe, reliable partner of the west.CLIMATE CHANGEClimate change is more apparent in the Arctic than anywhere else on Earth. In addition to the rising temperatures caused by global greenhouse gas emissions, change is being driven by Arctic- specific feedback loops arising out of the precarious balance between water and ice. An increase in average annual temperatures of just a fraction of one degree can transform highly reflective sea ice into dark, heat-absorbing open water. The same increase can turn rock-hard, chemically stable permafrost into a decomposing, methane-emitting, morass of ancient plant material. In recent decades, average annual temperatures in the western Canadian Arctic have increased by more than three degrees Celsius.In 2004, the Arctic climate impact assessment reported that the average extent of sea ice cover in summer had declined by 15 to 20 percent over the previous three decades. The rate of ice melt has accelerated since then, with a loss of one million square kilometres in 2007 alone - leaving the Northwest Passage temporarily ice-free. The heat absorbed by the newly revealed open water not only melts additional ice during the summer but also delays the formation of the next winter's ice, which makes that ice thinner and more susceptible to melting the following summer.A complete, late-summer melt-out of Arctic sea ice could occur as early as 2013.1 When that happens, Arctic waters will become navigable 12 months a year, since a complete melt will spell the end of the multiyear ice that, after surviving the summer, becomes thicker and harder as a result of the accretion of new ice and the leaching out of sea salt during the warming-and-cooling cycle. …

MEDEVAC Miscategorization

To assess the effectiveness of an education program designed to improve medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) categorization. To remedy the MEDEVAC miscategorization rates identified in the southern region of Afghanistan, the MEDEVAC medical director for that area created an education program to improve the situation. This education program was implemented through the region by the 14 NATO countries serving in southern Afghanistan and adopted by the Canadian Army as part of the training for Canadian medics. The education program yielded statistically significant improvement in the MEDEVAC miscategorization rate. Education concerning the categorization of MEDEVAC patients is essential for efficient use of Army MEDEVAC. Further investigation is warranted concerning the accuracy of categorization among an Army-only population.

The International Symposium on Ballistics

The International Symposium on Ballistics

INTRODUCTION: France's ‘return’ to NATO: implications for transatlantic relations

The paper looks at France's return to NATO, looking at the impact of its ongoing reintegration in the alliance's military structure from a strategic, a political and an operational perspective. We address three main questions: (1) How will France's reintegration affect other NATO countries? This question will be answered from the perspectives of Canada, the UK, Germany and the United States; (2) How will France cope with the transition? French experts will assess the French debate on NATO, the operational dimension of France's reintegration of the command structure and France's role in transatlantic relations; (3) How will the decision affect the future prospects for allied action? This question will be addressed by looking at the nuclear dimension of NATO, burden-sharing, NATO's transformation and the impact of France's reintegration on European defence.

An exploration of the current state of information assurance education

Information Assurance and computer security are serious worldwide concerns of governments, industry, and academia. Computer security is one of the three new focal areas of the ACM/IEEE's Computer Science Curriculum update in 2008. This ACM/IEEE report describes, as the first of its three recent trends, "the emergence of security as a major area of concern." The importance of Information Assurance and Information Assurance education is not limited to the United States. Other nations, including the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and other members from NATO countries and the EU, have inquired as to how they may be able to establish Information Assurance education programs in their own country. The goal of this document is to explore the space of various existing Information Assurance educational standards and guidelines, and how they may serve as a basis for helping to define the field of Information Assurance. It was necessary for this working group to study what has been done for other areas of computing. For example, computer science (CS 2008 and associate-degree CS 2009), information technology (IT 2008), and software engineering (SE 2004), all have available curricular guidelines. In its exploration of existing government, industry, and academic Information Assurance guidelines and standards, as well as in its discovery of what guidance is being provided for other areas of computing, the working group has developed this paper as a foundation, or a starting point, for creating an appropriate set of guidelines for Information Assurance education. In researching the space of existing guidelines and standards, several challenges and opportunities to Information Assurance education were discovered. These are briefly described and discussed, and some next steps suggested.

Bearing their share of the burden: Europe in Afghanistan

This article assesses the relative burden European members of NATO are bearing in the war in Afghanistan. Some argue that the current contribution of European forces is on par with the American contribution. However, current studies do not analyze Europe's ISAF contribution in comparison to some benchmark by which relative burden-sharing can be accurately determined. This article compares Europe's involvement in the war in Afghanistan to past missions, current contributions and in light of the benefits each country is likely to enjoy. The quantitative and qualitative findings show that there is an extensive amount of free-riding occurring both in terms of hard and soft power, although it varies across time and even within NATO Europe. Inadequate forces provided by European NATO countries jeopardize the likelihood of success in Afghanistan.

The Modern Foreign Policy of Russia

Over the two decades of post-Soviet history of modern Russia, its foreign policy has gone through several distinct periods and long-term trends. 
 The periodization of the new Russia’s foreign policy includes a “romantic” or “Kozyrev’s” period, during which the leaders of a democratic Russia tried to integrate the country into a system of institutions and partnerships with the leading Western states. Kozyrev’s departure from his post as foreign minister in January 1996 and the arrival of a new foreign minister, who would later become the Prime Minister, a “political heavyweight” of modern Russia Yevgeny Primakov, marked a change in the strategic direction of the country’s foreign policy. The key definition of this period was “multipolarity.” 
 The arrival of Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin in early 2000, marked a new stage in the development of Russia’s diplomacy. At first it was characterized by attempts to build relations of partnership on an equal footing with Washington and NATO countries in the anti-terrorist coalition, and then, from about 2003, by a gradual build up of contradictions between Russia and the United States. During this period (2000-2008) a special feature of Russia’s foreign policy was its increased assertiveness in relation to the neighboring CIS countries. After the election of Dmitry Medvedev as president in March 2008 Russia has been busy searching for a new strategy for its foreign policy, which would retain some of the achievements of previous periods, but would also be more cooperative toward the leading nations of the world. Such policy should create a favorable external climate for the modernization of Russia’s political system and its national economy.

DOES NEUTRALITY MAKE A DIFFERENCE? EXPLAINING PATTERNS OF SWISS DEFENSE SPENDING IN 1975–2001

We study the behavior of defense spending in Switzerland over 1975–2001. Our main interest is in determining how neutrality in international affairs (non‐membership in military alliances) affects defense spending. We find that neutrality is associated with a perception of lower levels of external threat; hence it confers economic benefits in the form of a smaller defense burden. However, neutrality does not fully insulate a country from variations in the level of external threat in the global system as perceived by members of military alliances. Swiss defense spending has tracked very closely the spending trends – but at a lower average level – of the United States and other NATO countries. To the extent that post‐Cold War threats, such as international terrorism, materialize primarily in the context of existing security alliances, Swiss military spending patterns observed in 1975–2001 are likely to remain the same in the future.

The Johnson Administration and the Recruitment of Allies in Vietnam, 1964-1968

The Vietnam War has generated a vast literature but one which has often forgotten that the United States fought in Vietnam as part of a coalition. This article examines Washington's efforts under President Lyndon B. Johnson to recruit third country combat assistance. He and his colleagues sought military help less for practical reasons than for political ones as a way of legitimizing the war both domestically and abroad. However, no NATO countries were willing to participate, and some of the five troop-contributing countries (Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand) were attracted probably more by American largesse than by idealism. In exploring the diplomacy of coalition-building, this article has a contemporary resonance in the light of the military campaigns initiated by the White House since 2003.

Validity of SDOF Models for Analyzing Two-Way Reinforced Concrete Panels under Blast Loading

The combined manual TM 5-1300/NAVFAC P-397/AFR 88-22, Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental Explosions, published by the joint departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, has been used in all NATO countries for the past 50 years for protective design applications. The manual was recently reformatted to meet the Department of Defense Unified Facility Criteria (UFC). As a first step, the current production of the new document, UFC 3-340-02, focused on making the original TM 5-1300 available in a more functional format so that future technical updates can be facilitated. In this study, a single-degree-of-freedom (SDOF) model, based on the guidelines of the UFC 3-340-02, was used to formulate a FORTRAN code to predict the response of SDOF systems under blast. The code was used to generate pressure-impulse (P-I) diagrams for a series of two-way reinforced concrete (RC) panels with different dimensions, aspect and reinforcement ratios, and support conditions. The P-I diagram predictions were compared to the results of experimentally validated nonlinear explicit finite-element (FE) analyses and significant differences in deflection and shear predictions were observed. The general trend of results and the major characteristics of the P-I diagrams were discussed in terms of the discrepancies between the SDOF and the FE predictions. The work presented in this paper is expected to contribute to improving the modeling provisions of the two-way RC panels in the future edition of the UFC 3-340-02 by understanding the limitations of SDOF models using advanced FE analysis techniques.

Troop Withdrawals from Europe: Cold War American Foreign Policy and Military Strategy

In 1971, U.S. Senator Mike Mansfield introduced a proposal calling for a fifty percent reduction of the number of U.S. troops stationed in Europe. The proposal was ultimately voted down in the Senate but it sparked sweeping changes in the defence policies of some major NATO nations. This paper examines the pre and post “Mansfield Amendment” defence policies of Britain, France, and West Germany, and strives to answer the question of how a single failed Senate proposal could lead three major NATO countries to drastically change their defence policies.

Afganistan and Renewing Canadian Leadership

has committed significant resources to military operations in Afghanistan. By 2011, roughly 41,000 Canadian forces personnel will have served in the country (15,000 more than fought in Korea) and $7.5 billion will have been spent on combat operations.1 It is highly unlikely that the Canadian government could make any other significant military commitment - in Darfur, for example - until after the combat mission ends.2 It would not be an exaggeration to claim that Canada's international security policy has essentially been reduced to the current Afghan campaign.The Stephen Harper government has not been coy about the merits of this mission and relies frequently on a security rationale to justify the current combat role. Reconstruction, stabilization, and counterinsurgency, according to this argument, are critical to prevent the return of an al Qaeda terrorist sanctuary in Afghanistan. Other justifications have also been used - likely due to the growing skepticism of Canadians about the threat of terrorism after several years without an attack in North America. Perhaps most interesting has been the argument that Canada's military commitment raises the country's international leadership profile. The previous Liberal government was the first to interject such a rationale into Canadian policy, but Harper has been less shy in his claims that Canada is back on the world stage - and critical support for such a bold assertion has been the expenditure of blood and treasure in Afghanistan.Claims of reinvigorating the country's international leadership role, especially as it pertains to the related notion of obtaining influence amongst its allies, can be found on two levels. First, the Afghan mission is seen as facilitating the long-awaited renewal of the Canadian forces. The rebuilding of Canada's military assets, which had deteriorated under a succession of deficit-cutting governments, is seen as heralding a more robust international security role. Second, will have expanded its influence in two longstanding pillars of Canadian foreign policy - namely, the Canada- U S relationship and NATO. As one of the few NATO countries participating in high-intensity combat operations, appears to have reinforced both familial ties with the US and solidarity within the alliance.Upon closer examination, however, the diminishing returns and increasing costs of this intervention should at least raise doubts about any alleged renewal of Canadian leadership or influence. As strategist Colin Gray wisely observed, it remains notoriously difficult to evaluate claims that Canadian military activity results in influence in, or access to, the important political/military councils of the West.3 I have argued elsewhere that the mission represents a gamble for the forces that could further facilitate either the military's rebuilding or its eventual hollowing.4 This article will expand that analysis with further details on the declining prospects for a reinvigorated Canadian forces, and will provide a wider strategic context by showing how Canada's Afghan role intersects with - but has minimal influence on - critical developments in the US and NATO. Ultimately, the gamble does not appear to be paying off: the decision to extend deployment until 20II seems destined only to limit further the country's strategic options.THE ROAD TO KANDAHARIn the immediate aftermath ofthe 9/11 attacks, deployed a relatively significant maritime force to the region. Operation Apollo witnessed the deployment of 16 warships over a two-year period, whose primary task was maritime interdiction and force protection. This was followed by the 2002 deployment of a Canadian battalion that was initially rebuffed by European governments and then operated closely with the Americans, most notably by leading operations Torii and Harpoon, and taking part in operation Anaconda. These soldiers were withdrawn after six months, though elements of Canada's joint task force 2 continued to operate in theatre. …

NATO and Post-Cold War Burden-Sharing

NATO was taken by surprise by the events surrounding the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. No official anticipated the speed with which the peaceful turmoil in central and eastern Europe took place. At the same time, while NATO discussed how to respond to those events, a major ethnic conflict exploded in the Balkans. Initial attempts were undertaken by the international community to contain the violence, first by the United Nations and later by NATO. In 1992, the UN security council authorized the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force, the so-called protection force (UNPROFOR). This was a 38,5 9 9 -strong multinational force under chapter VI of the UN charter. The force was mandated to ensure the demilitarization of the three protected areas in Croatia as well as to provide safety for all persons in those zones. While NATO as an international organization was not part of UNPROFOR directly, most of its constituent states were and made troops and equipment available. The top three were France, 4493; the United Kingdom, 3405; and Canada, 2091. When UNPROFOR was unsuccessful in containing the violence in 1994, NATO took over that responsibility and assembled a considerable force to enforce peace in the Balkans.1 This mandate was in NATO's interest as the Balkan peninsula was in close proximity to NATO territory and thus posed a spillover threat. It also spoke to the new role of the alliance as a crisis manager in international security affairs post-1989. This is a role that NATO gave itself at the Rome summit in 1991.While NATO's peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations in Bosnia, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Kosovo are well documented in the literature, the question of how the internal burden of NATO activities was shared post-1990 has not attracted much scholarship.2 This is a significant oversight for at least three reasons: first, the issue of NATO burden-sharing in the post-Cold War era remains controversial as larger member-states such as the US and the UK downsized their armed forces by up to 40 percent (see table 1 below) and put pressure on smaller states to increase their commitments to collective defence. Second, after 1989, geopolitical changes in the international security environment called into question the raison d'etre of NATO as a defence alliance. These forces of transformation also affected the perception of international threats, the meaning of security and power, and the role and functions of armed services.3 Historically, the amount of military equipment, the size of the armed forces, and the level of defence spending in relation to a country's GDP have been used as the primary indicators for measuring allied contributions to collective defence in the Cold War. However, these determinants, one might contend, have become outdated in the post-Cold War era. In addition, using these old indicators and applying them in a postCold War security environment may not adequately reflect the level of burden- sharing of the alliance's smaller member- states. Canada is one of those countries and has been criticized for not doing enough for the alliance. And finally, an analysis of the share of burdens and commitments to the alliance in the 1990s by each member-state can be seen as vital to full comprehension of the extent of NATO's current role in and pledges to Afghanistan. In other words, an examination of the 1990s gives one a better understanding of member- states' commitments to the current mission in Afghanistan.Against this backdrop, this article asks the following questions: what was the distribution of the Atlantic burden between 1989 and 2001?4 More specifically, what was the level of burden that Canada - as a medium-sized NATO country - shouldered in NATO in the 1990s?In the Canadian foreign policy literature, it has been suggested that in the 1990s Canada became the slacker of transatlantica, especially after the government decided to close its two forward-operating bases in Germany in 1994. …

Analysis of some command systems of Armed Forces of NATO countries and other states

The article deals with the progress in combat actions command of Armed Forces of NATO and other states on different levels of command (from strategic to tactical) on battlefield with the application of advanced information technologies.

Kosovo: A Powerful Precedent for the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention

NATO's action in Kosovo constitutes the most important modern precedent for the legitimacy of unauthorized humanitarian intervention in appropriate cases. The article briefly examines the fact and shows that NATO countries evinced humanitarian intent. It then discusses the arguments against the legitimacy of the intervention and finds them wanting. In particular, critics of the intervention fail to explain why the incident is discarded as state practice. The article claims that world reaction to Kosovo, as well as appropriate interpretation of applicable law, confirm the validity of the precedent.

Defense innovation at any (out of control) cost? The stalemate in today's R&D and an alternative model

Technological superiority is a key element to achieve defense effectiveness, and R&D spending is crucial to access leading-edge technologies. Nevertheless, the current defense R&D model seems to reach its limits, leading to an out-of-control burden: In spite of spending almost USD70 billion yearly, defense R&D in NATO countries does not produce the expected results. This low effectiveness leads to criticism about today's model of defense R&D, especially the channeling of credits by large incumbents through the Lead System Integrator model. Spurring disruptive technologies and path-breaking innovation requires an alternative approach. It is then interesting to analyze the possible use of venture-capital mechanisms to complement the mainstream approach to defense R&D. Even though the article does not develop a full analysis of the relationship between defense R&D and the principles of venture capital, it identifies criteria for such an alternative approach.

Challenges facing NATO in the 21st century

During the entire post Cold-War era numerous security challenges were pushing NATO in search of a new mission. Although redefined several times in the past, NATO's mission is still not steady and in its final shape. NATO's framework is not final yet for several reasons: lack of internal balance; NATO is moving towards rather 'loose' formula of Trans-Atlantic relations, through a 'Coalition of the Willing', in which countries accept the level and scope of military engagement in war missions (Afghanistan and Iraq) according to their own interests. This certainly has influenced the character of NATO mission in the 21st Century. Therefore, NATO countries do not speak with 'one voice' and they do not equally participate in military missions. Instead, specific countries are engaged in specific issues, in compliance with UN Security Council resolutions. NATO deepening and widening process is continuing in the 21st Century. .

Using Architectural Models to Identify Opportunities for Improvement of Acquisition Management

The article presents a model of the processes of one of the Bulgarian force-management subsystems – the acquisition system. The modeling approach adopted is architecture-oriented, which means that the processes are represented according to their sub-processes or phases and activities and the connections in terms of information exchanged between them. The modeling framework selected for this purpose is the widely accepted in NATO and partner countries DODAF (Department of Defense Modeling Framework). The authors provide a brief discussion of the model and some recommendations for improvement of the process of acquisition management.