Afganistan and Renewing Canadian Leadership

Abstract

has committed significant resources to military operations in Afghanistan. By 2011, roughly 41,000 Canadian forces personnel will have served in the country (15,000 more than fought in Korea) and $7.5 billion will have been spent on combat operations.1 It is highly unlikely that the Canadian government could make any other significant military commitment - in Darfur, for example - until after the combat mission ends.2 It would not be an exaggeration to claim that Canada's international security policy has essentially been reduced to the current Afghan campaign.The Stephen Harper government has not been coy about the merits of this mission and relies frequently on a security rationale to justify the current combat role. Reconstruction, stabilization, and counterinsurgency, according to this argument, are critical to prevent the return of an al Qaeda terrorist sanctuary in Afghanistan. Other justifications have also been used - likely due to the growing skepticism of Canadians about the threat of terrorism after several years without an attack in North America. Perhaps most interesting has been the argument that Canada's military commitment raises the country's international leadership profile. The previous Liberal government was the first to interject such a rationale into Canadian policy, but Harper has been less shy in his claims that Canada is back on the world stage - and critical support for such a bold assertion has been the expenditure of blood and treasure in Afghanistan.Claims of reinvigorating the country's international leadership role, especially as it pertains to the related notion of obtaining influence amongst its allies, can be found on two levels. First, the Afghan mission is seen as facilitating the long-awaited renewal of the Canadian forces. The rebuilding of Canada's military assets, which had deteriorated under a succession of deficit-cutting governments, is seen as heralding a more robust international security role. Second, will have expanded its influence in two longstanding pillars of Canadian foreign policy - namely, the Canada- U S relationship and NATO. As one of the few NATO countries participating in high-intensity combat operations, appears to have reinforced both familial ties with the US and solidarity within the alliance.Upon closer examination, however, the diminishing returns and increasing costs of this intervention should at least raise doubts about any alleged renewal of Canadian leadership or influence. As strategist Colin Gray wisely observed, it remains notoriously difficult to evaluate claims that Canadian military activity results in influence in, or access to, the important political/military councils of the West.3 I have argued elsewhere that the mission represents a gamble for the forces that could further facilitate either the military's rebuilding or its eventual hollowing.4 This article will expand that analysis with further details on the declining prospects for a reinvigorated Canadian forces, and will provide a wider strategic context by showing how Canada's Afghan role intersects with - but has minimal influence on - critical developments in the US and NATO. Ultimately, the gamble does not appear to be paying off: the decision to extend deployment until 20II seems destined only to limit further the country's strategic options.THE ROAD TO KANDAHARIn the immediate aftermath ofthe 9/11 attacks, deployed a relatively significant maritime force to the region. Operation Apollo witnessed the deployment of 16 warships over a two-year period, whose primary task was maritime interdiction and force protection. This was followed by the 2002 deployment of a Canadian battalion that was initially rebuffed by European governments and then operated closely with the Americans, most notably by leading operations Torii and Harpoon, and taking part in operation Anaconda. These soldiers were withdrawn after six months, though elements of Canada's joint task force 2 continued to operate in theatre. …