Nationality Policy Research Articles

Did He Really Do It? Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, Party Disloyalty, and the 1923 Affair

The article uses a variety of documents, published and unpublished, to explore the 1923 arrest, interrogation and ‘trial’ of Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, often considered the Bolsheviks' leading expert on Muslim affairs in the early Soviet period. Contrary to the historiography on this crucial moment in the development of Soviet nationality policy, I argue that Sultan-Galiev was not Stalin's ‘first victim’. Rather, responding to the vagaries of Soviet nationality policy, he did indeed violate party discipline in a number of ways, and was engaged in developing conspiratorial ties outside of the party. In fact, the party leaders, and Stalin in particular, treated him less severely than they could have.

“Colonizers with Party Cards”: Soviet Internal Colonialism in Central Asia, 1917–39

In November 1929, soon after the November Plenum and the announcement of mass collectivization, Stalin received a letter from a young Kyrgyz official named Iusup Abdrakhmanov. Then 28 years old, Abdrakhmanov was the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR). Located just south of Kazakhstan on the Chinese border, the Kyrgyz ASSR was then a small region in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), having come into existence just a few years before in the course of Central Asia's so-called delimitation. Like officials in many distant regions of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan's leaders, including Abdrakhmanov, struggled to advance the interests of this little-known territory. In his letter, Abdrakhmanov pushed for greater local control over economic matters. He argued that Kyrgyzstan's triple subjugation (troinaia podchinennost')--to the USSR, the RSFSR, and various regional organs in Central Asia--had retarded the territory's development by requiring that its leaders coordinate their policies among three centers, none of which understood local economic and social realities. In particular, the state's privileging of grain production (the occupation of Kyrgyzstan's predominantly Slavic settler population) over livestock production (the sector in which most ethnic Kyrgyz were engaged) favored the settler minority over the indigenous majority and threatened to perpetuate and even exacerbate the economic inequalities of the tsarist colonial era. (1) Abdrakhmanov contended that this disparity contradicted stated Soviet efforts to liquidate the real economic inequality between the backward regions of the Soviet Union and its more advanced ones, thereby distorting the Party's policy. (2) Policies disadvantageous to the Kyrgyz population even had international implications, as the failure of Soviet Kyrgyzstan to catch up with the other parts of the Soviet Union would make a bad impression on the Kyrgyz population living over the border in China. solution to these problems, Abdrakhmanov concluded, lay ultimately in transforming the Kyrgyz ASSR into a union republic: The national makeup of the population (70 percent Kyrgyz), its foreign policy significance, and the economic possibilities of Kyrgyzstan [all] point to this [conclusion], he wrote. (3) In this letter, Abdrakhmanov demonstrated a bureaucrat's knack for aligning his own ambitions (Kyrgyzstan's transformation into a union republic, presumably with Abdrakhmanov in a key post) with the policy goals of the party-state (increasing the production of key commodities and attracting the population of neighboring countries). But he also pointed to an essential feature of Soviet rule in Central Asia: the frequent contradiction between the Soviet Union's plans for economic development of the country as a whole and its stated goal of promoting the interests of formerly marginalized ethnic groups. As Abdrakhmanov's example of grain production showed, these two priorities frequently worked at cross purposes. In particular, he warned that the Kyrgyz ASSR would slip into a state of economic backwardness if its predominantly Kyrgyz local administration were not granted more control over economic policy and, specifically, more discretion in making agricultural investments. (4) This tendency was not unique to Kyrgyzstan: throughout the Soviet East, Bolshevik goals of social equality and economic advancement--indeed, a complete decolonization--for disadvantaged ethnic minorities frequently clashed with the economic and political priorities of central institutions in Moscow. (5) As Abdrakhmanov demonstrates in his appeal to Stalin, construction, which aimed to develop a socialist economy in a unified state under a strong central government, and nationality policy, which strove to promote the development of every minority ethnic group, contradicted each other all too often. …

Whose land is it? Land reform, minorities, and the titular “nation” in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan

Each of the post-Soviet Central Asian states inherited both inefficient collectivized agricultural systems and an understanding of the nation rooted in categories defined by Soviet nationality policy. Despite the importance placed on territorial homelands in many contemporary understandings of nationalism, the divergent formal responses to these dual Soviet legacies have generally been studied in isolation from one another. However, there are conceptual reasons to expect more overlap in these responses than generally assumed; in this paper, we engage in a focused comparison of three post-Soviet Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) in order to investigate how nationalizing policies and discourse, land distribution, and ethnic tensions interact with each other over time. We reveal that the nationalizing discourses of the three states – despite promoting the titular groups vis-à-vis other groups – have had limited influence on the actual processes of land distribution. Furthermore, the Kyrgyzstani case challenges the assumption that the effect flows unidirectionally from nationalizing policies and discourse to land reform implementation; in this case, there is evidence that the disruption caused by farm reorganization generated grievances which werethenarticulated by some nationalistic political elites.

제2대민족정책 논쟁 연구: 국가주의의 틀에 갇힌 공론의 장

제2대민족정책 논쟁 연구: 국가주의의 틀에 갇힌 공론의 장

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER IN ABKHAZIA: ETHNICITY, CONTESTATION AND CLIENTELISM IN THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIPHERY

This article investigates the intersection of Soviet nationality policy, ethno-federal territorialism, clientelism and the creation of new administrative institutions in the course of the establishment of Soviet power in Abkhazia, an ethnically diverse territory in the periphery of the former tsarist empire. Based on materials from the Georgian archives, as well as from the personal collections of Efrem Eshba and Nestor Lakoba, this article demonstrates the ways in which nationality policy played out at the local level and how the ‘indigenisation’ of local titular elites intersected with contestations over power and the distribution of resources inherent to the construction of the new institutions of Soviet rule.

Stalin's Answer to the National Question: A Case Study on the Editing of the 1938 Short Course

As a cornerstone of early Bolshevik propaganda, nationality policy allowed the revolutionary regime to cast the Soviet “experiment” as emancipatory in both ethnic and class terms. Paradoxically, much of the attention paid to the national question vanished from the party canon in 1938, for reasons that have never been fully explained. In this article we investigate this dramatic turnabout by examining how party historians and Iosif Stalin himself drafted what was to be the official narrative on nationality policy in the infamous Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). In so doing, we not only supply a new answer to the national question but also highlight a key new source for other investigations of the Stalin period.

Between the Soviet Past and Genghis Khan: Visual Arts in Contemporary Buryatia

The paper explores the Soviet and post-Soviet art discourse of the Russian Republic of Buryatia. While during the Soviet time, the art discourse in Buryatia and other national republics of the USSR was considerably influenced by the Soviet nationality policy, the post-Soviet art is being absorbed by the national revival discourse. The Soviet nationality policy fostered a contradictory national discourse that had a crucial impact on arts. The implementation of this discourse on visual arts in the Soviet national republics, as well as the effects on the artistic scene in post-Soviet Buryatia, will be showcased here by looking at the art and artistic career of two artists Dashi Namdakov and Zorikto Dorzhiev. Dashi Namdakov and Zorikto Dorzhiev are visual artists with Buryat roots whose art has become quite popular among the Russian economic and political elite. Sculptor Dashi Namdakov has made a remarkable breakthrough in the Russian art scene with his mysterious bronze statues. Since 2007 his name has become well-known in Russia and abroad as a result of his collaboration with the producer of the film Mongol by Sergey Bodrov. His exhibitions in the Tretyakov Gallery, the Hermitage, and the Beijing Museum created a big media stir. Among other projects, he has now been asked to create a statue of Genghis Khan in London. Zorikto Dorzhiev has also carried out one-man shows in prominent exhibition places in Russia and abroad. Their works are obviously inspired by their ethnicity and rooted in Buryat mythology and the Buddhist and Shamanist religions. The artists are particularly notable for two things: firstly, their working practices and career strategies, and secondly, the reception of their art in Russia and abroad. How is the artistic and economic logic combined in their careers? How is their art perceived in the Russian artistic field?

Nationalism and Legitimation for Authoritarianism: A Comparison of Nicholas I and Vladimir Putin

This article draws parallels between Tsar Nicholas I and current Russian President Vladimir Putin with respect to their use of nationalism to justify statist policies and political authoritarianism. Building upon insights by Alexander Gerschenkron about the economic development of “backwards” states, it argues that both Nicholas and Putin have rhetorically used Western concepts such as nationalism and democracy to legitimize their rule but have modified them to give them more statist content. Under Nicholas, this was exemplified in the tripartite (Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality) Official Nationality policy. Putin has emphasized patriotism, power, and statism to justify centralization of power and authoritarian policies. Putin's policies and rhetoric are strong analogs to those of Nicholas. Ultimately, the goal of this paper is to explain state-inspired Russian nationalism and how it has been aligned with authoritarian politics, as well as specifying similarities between present and past in Russia.

Nationalism in the USSR: A Historical and Comparative Perspective

The late 1980s and early 1990s were characterized by the sudden rise of nationalist movements in almost all Soviet ethnic regions. It is argued that the rise of political nationalism since the late 1980s can be explained by development of cultural nationalism in the previous decades, as an unintended outcome of communist nationalities policy. Soviet political and cultural nationalism is studied in historical and comparative perspective. All ethnic regions are examined throughout entire history of the Soviet Union (49 regions, 1917-91), using the structural equation modeling approach. This paper aims to make at least three contributions in the field. Firstly, it is a methodological contribution for studying nationalism: a ‘quantification of history’ approach. Quantitative values are assigned to historical trends and events. Having constructed variables from historical data, I use conventional statistical methods like SEM. Secondly, this paper contributes to the theoretical debate about the role of cultural autonomy in multiethnic states. The results rethink the notion of ‘cultural autonomy’ as solution of interethnic conflict. Cultural nationalism matters, it indirectly reinforces political nationalism. In both cases concessions in the cultural domain has not stopped the growth of political nationalism in the late 1980s. Finally, the paper statistically proves that the break between early Soviet and Stalinist nationalities policy explains the entire Soviet nationalities policy. In fact, the late Soviet nationalities policy was inherited from the Stalin’s rule period. This finding revealed in other studies now gets statistical evidence.

OhannesGeukjianEthnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in the South Caucasus: Nagorno‐Karabakh and the Legacy of Soviet Nationalities PolicyFarnham: Ashgate, 2012, 264 pp. £60.00 hbk

Studies in Ethnicity and NationalismVolume 13, Issue 2 p. 263-265 Book Review Geukjian, Ohannes Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in the South Caucasus: Nagorno-Karabakh and the Legacy of Soviet Nationalities Policy , Farnham: Ashgate, 2012, 264 pp. £60.00 hbk Tracey German, Tracey German Defence Studies Department, King's College London at the Joint Services Command and Staff CollegeSearch for more papers by this author Tracey German, Tracey German Defence Studies Department, King's College London at the Joint Services Command and Staff CollegeSearch for more papers by this author First published: 15 October 2013 https://doi.org/10.1111/sena.12030Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume13, Issue2October 2013Pages 263-265 RelatedInformation

Ohannes Geukjian, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in the South Caucasus: Nagorno-Karabakh and the Legacy of Soviet Nationalities Policy. London: Ashgate, 2012, 247pp. £60.00 (hbk).

Ohannes Geukjian, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in the South Caucasus: Nagorno-Karabakh and the Legacy of Soviet Nationalities Policy. London: Ashgate, 2012, 247pp. £60.00 (hbk).

A Broken Promise : A Hundred Years of Language Policy in Kalmykia

This article analyses language policy in Soviet Kalmykia in the 1920s-40s. It argues that the ill-thought alphabet reforms which entailed three changes of the Kalmyk language script in less than fifteen years contributed to the general failure of the rootinisation policy in the republic and resulted in a decline in Kalmyk language proficiency among its native speakers and a disruption in its written culture. Exacerbated by the deportation of Kalmyks in 1943 to Siberia, the Kalmyk language risked undergoing a radical language death, and is currently experiencing a gradual language shift, with Kalmyk listed as a «definitely endangered» language in the UNESCO Atlas of Endangered Languages. The article seeks to demonstrate how political expediency of Soviet language reforms and nationality policies led to a paradox when the predominantly Kalmyk-speaking community in the 1920s lost their native language in the course of a century.

From Marx to Stalin: Marxist Engagement with National Question and Soviet Nationality Policy Revisited

From Marx to Stalin: Marxist Engagement with National Question and Soviet Nationality Policy Revisited

Gypsies as a litmus test for rational, tolerant rule: Fin-de-siècle Russian ethnographers confront the comparative history of Roma in Europe

This article examines six ethnographic studies of Gypsies published in late imperial Russia that offered a comparative history of Roma in Europe. In representing Gypsies’ culture and history, Russian ethnographers deployed “the Gypsy question” as a litmus test of tolerant, rational governance. Comparing European modes of managing ethnic difference, they argued for the superiority of imperial Russian rule. The rational and tolerant Russian state, they insisted, endeavored to transform the “semi-savage” Gypsies into integrated citizens of the autocratic empire. By contrast, Western European states oppressed Gypsies, thereby alienating them from civic life. Late imperial ethnographic writings on Gypsies presaged similar, but also different claims made about Gypsies and their history in the context of early Soviet nationality policy during the 1930s. They also deserve consideration as an underappreciated antecedent to late twentieth- and early twenty-first century debates over social justice and European states’ policies directed toward either the civic inclusion or exclusion of Roma.

To Be at One with Drums: Social Order and Headhunting among the Wa of China

To Be at One with Drums: Social Order and Headhunting among the Wa of China Bernard Formoso (bio) Introduction The beating of large drums in the form of hollowed-out tree trunks is not specific to groups who traditionally carried out headhunting. In many parts of the world, some of these groups never punctuated their rituals of regeneration of life by such drumming. However, headhunters of Southeast Asia systematically resort to drums or gongs. In mainland Southeast Asia, two separate clusters of head-hunting groups used to beat tree trunk drums: the Naga of Assam (Northeast of India), and the so-called “wild” Wa who live across the Burma-China border. These two groups are comparable in several ways.1 Their kinship system is based on exogamous patrilineages, some of them endowed with political and religious prerogatives. They are predominantly upland dry-field farmers, but also grow wet rice wherever suitable land is available. Their communities of headhunters used to live on higher mountain slopes, in large fortified villages of 100 to 300 households. In both cases, headhunting [End Page 121] was carried out before the rice-growing season, and took the form of distant expeditions and ambushes. Its overt purpose was to insure protection, good health, and abundant crops to the whole community. Among the Naga and the Wa, head-hunting was the starting point of a ritual cycle aimed at seasoning the new head. The cycle concluded with the installation of the head on a pole, outside the main gate of the village. In both cases too, large drums were beaten during the rituals by rows of men distributed on both their sides. The warping and hollowing-out of the tree trunks from which these drums were made was a major event in the ritual life of both groups. However, the Wa and Naga raiding groups were of different extent. Whereas headhunting raids among the Naga were carried out by sub-villages compounds, those of the Wa involved villages or supra-villages organizations acting as a small-scale sociocosmos.2 Consequently, headhunting contributed in the latter case to uphold a strong cooperativeness between local segments of the lineages forming the whole society. This group solidarity and the functions acknowledged to each social unit were staged at the occasion of drumming sessions that came with the hunting of new heads. Such events, on whose symbolism I shall focus in the following pages, echoed the myth of origin of the Wa lineages and reinforced its “truth.” This article is based both on ethnographic data that I collected in 1997 among the Wa of the Lancang district (Simao prefecture, Yunnan province), and on the rich report published by Chinese ethnographers who, in the early 1950s, recorded the folklore of China’s different populations to implement the nationalities policy of the People’s Republic of China.3 [End Page 122] Headhunters on the Margins of China The Wa speak a Môn-Khmer language (Palaung-Wa branch) of the Austroasiatic family. They live in an upland area on both sides of the border between Burma (northeast of the Shan State) and China (southwest of the Yunnan province). In China, their population of about 400,000 is mainly located in the Lincang and Simao prefectures. I did my fieldwork in 1997, in Simao, more precisely among the Wa of the Xuelin township, in the Lancang autonomous county. These local Wa call themselves Palaukoe. At the end of the 1990s, they accounted for 84 percent of the township population and were divided among 45 compact villages.4 In lowlands and on mountain slopes, up to an altitude of 800 meters, they cultivate irrigated rice fields, whose technology they say to have learned from the Han five or six generations ago. Above an altitude of 800 meters, they cultivate crops such as paddy, maize and tubers in upland dry fields. The Xuelin township is located along a mountain range that extends to the Wa state of Burma, and corresponds to an area that James George Scott and John Percy Hardiman identified at the end of the 19th century as the northern limit of headhunting practice. Evidence I recorded locally suggests that the Palaukoe cut their...

Calculated Indifference: The Soviet Union and Requests to Bomb Auschwitz

In the ongoing debate about whether the Allies should have bombed the Auschwitz extermination camp, the Soviet Union is rarely mentioned. Focusing on four operational challenges—accuracy, range, time, and intelligence—the authors compare British, American, and Soviet preparedness for such a mission. In addition, on the basis of little-used documentary evidence, they argue that Stalin's refusal to bomb Auschwitz must be attributed not only to his antisemitism, but also to a complicated shift in the Soviet Union's nationalities policy.

The Role of the Second Party Secretary in the “Election” of the First: The Political Mechanism for the Appointment of the Head of Soviet Lithuania in 1974

On 5 February 1974, a Tuesday, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Ivan Kapitonov paid a visit to the Politburo member Mikhail Suslov at Moscow's Old Square. Kapitonov was accompanied by the Soviet Lithuanian functionary Valerii Kharazov, who presented to Suslov a blue notebook containing the opinions of the Lithuanian nomenklatura about the potential candidates for the position of first secretary of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP). Kharazov's visit to Suslov was the crucial moment in the appointment/ election of the new head of the republic after the death of Antanas Snieckus, who had held the position from 1940 to 1974. Kharazov (b. 1918) has survived in Lithuanian collective memory as one of the most ruthless Soviet governors-general. This was the title conferred behind their backs on all the second secretaries of the Central Committee of the LCP, who--with the exception of a brief period from 1953 to 1956--were not locals but Russians sent from Moscow. The political institution of the second secretaries was important for Moscow as a means of controlling the national republics--functionaries would be sent from Moscow to all the national republics (with the exception of the three Slavic republics). Having arrived in Soviet Lithuania, the second secretary directly supervised the work of important departments--notably those of Organizational Party Work and Administrative Organs, which oversaw the judicial system and the Committee for State Security (KGB). His key function was to supervise the work of the local nomenklatura and report regularly to the sector for Belorussia and the Baltic republics of the Department for Organizational Party Work of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Kharazov's career followed a trajectory similar to second secretaries of most other republics. Before being appointed to Lithuania, he worked as an instructor at the Department for Organizational Party Work of the Central Committee of the CPSU in Moscow. There he supervised the work of the party apparatus and administrative institutions in neighboring Belorussia. (1) In 1964, he was promoted to become an inspector in the Central Committee, already not attached to a concrete republic. Now he was directly responsible to the secretary and head of the Central Committee department rather than the head of the department sector. (2) Kharazov's duties included organizing inspections in the Soviet republics and leading commissions formed by the Central Committee for solving newly arisen problems or issues. Kharazov was not the only actor in this election. The workings of the Lithuanian nomenklatura, and in particular its use of personal relations, provide an opportunity to look more thoroughly into all-union politics from the local perspective. That investigation, in turn, makes possible distinctions between the statuses of Soviet republic and Russian region (oblast'), which fundamentally affected the nature of relations with the center. The long drawn-out interregnum, which began after the death of Snieckus on 22 January 1974 and ended with the election of Petras Griskevicius as the new first secretary on 18 February, is important not only as a case study of a period that marked a new stage in Soviet Lithuania's administration. It also sheds light on the changing relationship between the center and a Soviet republic in the Brezhnev era, as well as shifts in Moscow's cadre policy. Three main theoretical approaches have been used to analyze center-region relations in the Soviet system. Two approaches--the totalitarian and the corporatist--have a direct bearing on the subject of Soviet nationality policy, while the third one--the patron--client, or clientelistic approach--is generally used by scholars investigating center-region relations rather than nationality policy. I explain why the totalitarian approach is not sufficient as an explanatory model and how the two other models--corporatist and clientelistic--can be integrated in the concrete case of Lithuania in 1974. …

Polnische Ukrainepolitik in Wolhynien 1921-1939

With the Treaty of Riga, western Volhynia became part of newly founded Poland in 1921. The aim of Polish nationalities policy in Volhynia and the other Northeastern voivodes was the fixed and permanent integration of these regions into the Polish state. In view of existing external threats, this could only be achieved if the predominantly non-Polish population acknowledged the legitimacy of Polish state authority. The Second Republic failed to achieve this objective by the beginning of World War II. It had not been possible to generate loyalty towards the Polish state among the Ukrainian population of Volhynia. Moreover, it also proved impossible to prevent bitter ethnic conflicts between the ruling Polish minority and the Volhynian Ukrainians. The nationality policy strategies applied in an attempt to gain acceptance in the minority region of Volhynia and to assert claims to power can be summarised in three key words: assimilation, modernisation, repression. The civic and/or ethnically defined assimilation of the Ukrainian population remained the central concern of Polish nationality policy in Volhynia in the Second Republic. The state modernisation policy was given a supporting role in relation to the superordinate objective of assimilation. Even then, investments in modernisation and the increased influence of Polish culture fell short of expectations placed on them. When the Ukrainians’ drive for social, cultural and political emancipation began to have visible results in Volhynia, a policy of repression emerged as a frustrated reaction to failed attempts to promote assimilation. In the last years of the Second Republic the policy of repression ensured that ethnic antagonism in Volhynia became less visible from the outside than in neighbouring eastern Galician voivodships. It was, however, no less virulent. There existed few legal possibilities for the Ukrainians in Volhynia to publicly articulate, organise or represent Ukrainian interests in competition with the ruling Polish minority or in opposition to Polish policy. Whilst the dispute in eastern Galicia was by comparison, carried out quite openly, though the state favoured the Polish minority, in Volhynia civil forms of handling this conflict were lacking.

From Homogenisation to 'Multiculturalism': Socialist and Postsocialist Nationality Policy and Practice in Poland (1944-2010)

From Homogenisation to 'Multiculturalism': Socialist and Postsocialist Nationality Policy and Practice in Poland (1944-2010)

Understanding and Explaining the Kyrgyz–Uzbek Interethnic Conflict in Southern Kyrgyzstan

The violence between the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 has shocked many who thought of Kyrgyzstan as the most liberal country and the strongest democracy in Central Asia. That conflict, still, has not been explained and understood very well. Opposing and rival explanations often accuse one or other party, or certain obscure and even foreign forces. Many analysts, on the other hand, rely only on the internal Kyrgyzstani affairs in order to explain that conflict. This article tries to find explanations and offer an understanding of the Uzbek–Kyrgyz interethnic conflict. Its aim is beyond a mere description and understanding of a single case. It will use different kinds of data in order to offer analytic explanations of the events. The legacy of the Soviet nationalities policy, in combination with regional peculiarities – particularly its ethno-demographic features – were the ultimate causes of the eruption of the Uzbek–Kyrgyz conflicts in southern Kyrgyzstan in 1990 and 2010.