Nationality Policy Research Articles

The Soviet Far East as a strategic outpost and the regional authorities' nationality policy: the Korean question, 1920-1929

This article analyses the centre-periphery divergence over the Korean question in the Russian Far East, taking into account material from both Russian central and regional archives. The relative permeability of the frontiers in the Far East practically up to the 1950s and the heavy dependence of the Russian/Soviet Far East's economy on Manchurian commodity streams at least until the beginning of the 1930s gave this region a 'double periphery' character. After the act of judicial 'Sovietization' of the Russian Far East, the Bolsheviks initially tested a model wherein the 'political substance' of Bolshevism was developed on the old market economic framework, which had been adapted to the needs of the new regime mainly through reform measures and not with revolutionary sweep. However, the export-import orientation of the Dal'krai regional economy, which resulted from the region's economic separation from European Russia and its dependence on Manchurian and Pacific commodity markets, was not initially understood by its practitioners in Dal'krai as a retreat from Bolshevik doctrine, but rather as a variant of socialist economic principles applied to special conditions. The constant threat of political annexation and economic subordination by Japan, along with active Japanese and Chinese 'colonial engineering' on the frontier territories, forced the regional authorities to be guided to a considerable extent by foreign policy considerations in their search for solutions to internal issues. In this context, the Bolsheviks manifested appreciable 'central-regional' diversity towards the 'Korean question'. The analysis of the dynamics of this diversity from 1920 to 1929 supports the theoretical considerations of Terry Martin ('Peidmont principle') and Nick Baron (European 'governmentality') on the material of the Russian Far East.

Richard Böckh (1824–1907): Sprachenstatistik zwischen Nationalitätsprinzip und Nationalstaat

The present article discusses politically relevant aspects of the work of the Prussian statistician Richard Böckh (1824–1907), a renowned specialist on language statistics, nationality policy and general demographics in his day. Two of his publications are focused on: the article “Über die statistische Bedeutung der Volksprache” (‘On the Statistical Significance of the National Tongue’, 1866), in which Böckh expresses the view that nationality is defined exclusively by virtue of language, and the bookDer Deutschen Volkszahl und Sprachgebiet in den europäischen Staaten(‘The Number and Areal Extension of Germans in the States of Europe’, 1869), in which he proposes a catalogue of linguistic human rights. The purpose of the present article is to analyse the public reception of Böckh’s works in two contexts: the Franco-German war of 1870/71, when the German public interpreted Böckh’s ideas as justifying the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and the debates over the Official Language question in Prussia in 1873–1876. Finally, two characteristic aspects of Böckh’s activities in his later years are highlighted: his active support ofAuslandsdeutschtum(German minorities outside the Reich), and his protest at the misuse of statistics for anti-semitic propaganda around 1880. The latter issue in particular, though courageous, proves just how much the formerly popular language-based concept of nationality was already on the defensive ten years after the foundation of the German Reich in 1871.

Nationality Statistics and Russian Politics in the Mid-Nineteenth Century

In the first half of the nineteenth century the polyethnic nature of the Russian Empire was not a serious problem for its ruling elite. However, ongoing modernization processes and various nationality problems forced the government to pay attention to the ethnic variety of the state. Endeavours to rule the large empire more effectively and certain political reasons led to the taking of nationality censuses. The present paper deals with the causes of the censuses in the Northwest Province of the Russian Empire (in what is now Lithuania and Belarus) in the mid-nineteenth century, with the changes that the gathering of the material underwent and with the use of the collected data for political purposes. Nationality statistics should not be seen merely as an ideological tool. The authorities were in need of nationality statistical data to ensure more effective administration and assessment of the results of their nationality policies. Nevertheless, nationality censuses served ideological aims, too. That was attested by the increasing mistrust of the authorities in statistical data, presented by ‘the Poles’ (mostly by the Catholic clergy). Although Russian ethnographers had placed emphasis on language as a criterion handy for the imperial government in the definition of the nationality of the common people, even in the mid-nineteenth century priority was often given to faith rather than language. That demonstrated how deep-rooted was the equation between faith and nationality in Russian public discourse at that time. Meanwhile as far as the social elite was concerned, national identity was specified by faith, culture, political aspirations and language, too. Although ideologically it was sometimes more convenient to emphasize the Russian or Lithuanian origin of the majority of the gentry, ethno-political reality prevented this from being done with any consistency. Nationality statistics were used in order to ‘prove’ that the region was allegedly not Polish but Russian. Other arguments, largely historical, were used as well.

From the Other Shore: Reflections of Russian Émigré Thinkers on Soviet Nationality Policies, 1920s–1930s

SUMMARY This paper discusses the complex ethnic situation in the late Russian Empire and the early Soviet Union as seen by Russian émigrés. Observers from many political perspectives identified that, whereas ethnic minorities often had a relatively well-developed sense of national identity within the empire/union, “Russia” was relatively undeveloped in terms of self-identification. This paradox affected both Soviet policy and émigré observers.

Dissolution: Sovereignty and the Breakup of the Soviet Union

Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 2 Sovereignty, Federalism, and Soviet Nationality Policy Chapter 3 Perestroika and the Parade of Sovereignties Chapter 4 Sovereignty for the Autonomies Chapter 5 Multiple Sovereignty and the New Union Treaty Chapter 6 Sovereignty as Independence Chapter 7 Conclusion Part 8 Suggested Additional Readings

The Ethnic Composition of Families in Russia in 1989: Insights into the Soviet “Nationalities Policy”

A sample from the 1989 Soviet census is used to study the ethnic composition of families in the Russian Federation on the eve of the breakup of the Soviet Union. The aim is to gain insight into the consequences of the Soviet “nationalities policy” through examining the marriage patterns of different ethnic groups and the nature of the relations between these groups. The analysis is based on general log‐linear models. The main findings are: there was a relatively well‐pronounced tendency toward endogamy; Russians were the least endoga‐mous, while Chechens were the most endoga‐mous among the 11 ethnic groups included in the analysis; “zones of attraction” related to exogamy were well discernible, the two most pronounced being within the Eastern Slav and Turkic groups; testing for cohort effects revealed a decrease in endogamy when older and middle cohorts were compared, while the differences between middle and younger cohorts were in many cases not statistically significant.

Lenin by Hélène Carrère s> d'Encausse George Holoch (review)

REVIEWS 563 Carrere d'Encausse, H1elne. Lenin.Translated by George Holoch. Holmes and Meier, New York and London, 2001. Xi+ 371 PP. Select Bibliography .Chronology. Glossary.Notes. Index. ?35.00. INthe ten yearssince the fallof the Soviet Union a numberof new biographies of Lenin have appeared, taking advantage of the changed political climate, the revelationsof the glasnostyearsunder Gorbachev, and new materialfrom the Russian archives. ProfessorHelene Carrered'Encausseis the doyenne of French historians of Russia and an authority on Soviet nationality policies. Her new biography of Lenin was published in France in I998 and has now been translated.She admitsat the beginning of the selected bibliographythat this is a work of reinterpretationand rethinking,not of archival scholarship. The new material incorporated into her account is taken largely from the biography of Lenin by Dmitry Volkogonov (New York, I994) and the documents in ne Unknown Lenin,editedby RichardPipes(New Haven, I996). Professor Carrere d'Encausse is very much a political historian and her interpretation of Lenin is very similar to that given by both Pipes and Volkogonov. Indeed, although new material is incorporated, it is not very differentfromher own earlierworkon Lenin (Paris,I979). It is of a pragmatic and ruthlesspolitician, with utopian dreamsfor the futureof mankindbut no pity or interestfor the individualmen and women whose fate he saw it was to create this brave new world. Lenin's characterwas 'brutal',(pp. 64, 79), and markedby 'voluntarismand lackof scruple'(p. 57) as befittedone influenced by Tkachev. In a minority in both Russian and European Social Democratic circles before I914 the outbreak of war gave him his opportunity, and his policy of defeatismwas calculatedto enable him to use the resultingrevolution to his advantage.In common with much of the new documentationsherightly stressesLenin'sencouragement of terrorat every opportunityafter I9I7. He was also a pragmatist.Lenin is portrayed as constantly subordinating principles to political expediency, from Brest Litovskto his treatment of the peasantry.His rejection of spontaneityin I902 with the writingof WJ7at Is To BeDone?changed in I91 7 when he associated himself and his party with the spontaneity of the popular movement, only to abandon it again after I9I8. Although the change to disciplineand partycontrolstartedvery earlyin I9I8, when the model of the self-governing 'commune state' gave way to an emphasis on dicatorship of the proletariat led by the party, the year 1920 emerges forthe authoras the pivotal moment in earlyBolshevikRussia. The second Comintern Conference and the disaster of the war against Poland led to an emphasis in Lenin's writingsand policies on statismonce it became clear that the revolution was not going to spread across Europe. At the same time the earlieremphasis,very much the policy of Lenin himself,on self-determinationfor the national minorities also gave way to an increased centralizationand a new version of the sixteenth centurypolicy of 'gathering in the Russian lands'. This was to be achieved, as far as possible, by what could be portrayedas a voluntaryagreementwith new socialistrepublicsbut, as in Georgia, by force when that was not possible and when Lenin was convinced that the outsideworldwould not openly oppose. By thisperiod the authorsees Lenin as more a head of statein his instinctsthan an international 564 SEER, 8o, 3, 2002 revolutionary.She accepts, however, that he remained a genuine internationalist , seeing the revolution as spreadingnotjust across Europe but acrossthe world.As is to be expected given the author'sexpertisethebook isparticularly strongon thenationalminoritiesandtheforeignpolicyofthenewgovernment. There is little on social or culturalpolicy and even War Communism is paid relativelylittle attention and seen as a policy of the left ratherthan of Lenin himself. Powerwas thus all importantto Lenin and, althoughthe dreamsof a future utopia remained, the role he played in the last five years of his effective life was in creating and ruling a state. In that sense the policy of socialismin one countrytrulystartedwith Lenin, althoughlater Soviet or Russiannationalism did not. He was sincere in his attackson Great Russian chauvinism, and the author portrays him as, above all, a Westernizer, seeing German-type modernization as his goal. Indeed she arguesthat he would have preferredto starthis revolutionin WesternEurope if given the chance. It isjust one of the many contradictionsshe highlightsthat he succeeded only in isolatinghis new statefromthe Westerndevelopment he in many ways admired. School ofEuropean...

Russia's Fate through Russian Eyes. Voices of the New Generation by Heyward s> Isham Natan M. Shkylar (review)

378 SEER, 8o, 2, 2002 process also involved the renaming of some Metro stationswhose names were linkedwith the renamed streets. Murray gives particular attention to the practice begun under Stalin of replacing non-Russian place-names with Russian or Russified names. He beginsbylookingatthe consequencesof thedeportationsofwhole nationalities during and after the Great Patriotic War. In the former Volga German republic, Kalmykiaand the Crimea, nativeplace-names were rooted out, and in I946 in Kaliningradoblast' alone I500 new Russiannameswere introduced. He follows this with an outline of Soviet nationality policy from Lenin to Gorbachev. This is perhaps the less successfulpart of the book. It deviates from his main theme, and Murrayuses it to attacksome Russian writersand media for refusing to use the new names preferred by some republics from around I990, such as Bashkortostan,Kyrgyzstanand Moldova. The concluding chapter examines the history of the naming of St Petersburg,beginning with the Dutch and German originsof the name under Peter I and proceeding through its renaming as Petrograd and Leningrad. The account of the debate over restoringthe name of St Petersburgin I99I is somewhat lacking and needs to be placed in the wider political context. Murray expresses surprisethat the reformistChairperson of Leningrad City Soviet, Anatolii Sobchak, wished to postpone a decision on changing the name. This was because the issue was divisive among the democrats of the Leningrad PopularFrontwho had won control of the soviet in March i990. Some saw the restorationof the tsaristname asan anti-democraticratherthan an anti-Communist move. Moreover, the referendum on the name change took place on the same day as the election for the new post of Mayor of the city, forwhich Sobchakwas a candidate. Sobchak did arguefor renaming the city, but (as far as I can see) was motivated primarilyby the desire to attract foreigninvestmentto the city,which he thought the restorationof the imperial name would facilitate, and he went out of his way to insist that no disrespect to Lenin was intended by the change. Murray'slow-priced volume is a useful analysis of the movement and the tables provide a valuable anthology of name changes. The book might have been improved if the author had considered cases where the toponymic movement had failed to restore former names, such as Ul'ianovsk city and oblast'(the book is wrong to assertthat the city has been renamed Simbirsk), Kirov and Leningradoblastiand even BorisEl'tsin'shome base of Sverdlovsk oblast'. Murraydoes not considerdevelopmentssince the collapseof the Soviet Union, when themovement seemsto have been in retreat,and the outstanding toponymic issue now is whetherVolgogradwill be restoredas Stalingrad. School ofSlavonic andEastEuropean Studies PETERJ. S. DUNCAN University College London Isham, Heyward, with Shkylar, Natan M. (ed.) Russia's Fate throughRussian Eyes. Voicesof the New Generation.Westview Press, Boulder, CO, and Oxford, 2001. XViii + 429 pp. Index. fi8.50. BOOKSof essays and interviews with Russian policy makers and intellectuals became very popular during perestroika as publishers tried to peer through REVIEWS 379 the fog of our confusion about change through Russian eyes. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, such collections have been less common. Russians can now speakto us more directlyat conferences, injournal articles and through books of their own. Whilst this development is a good thing, it means that most of the voices that we hear, or at least that appear in English and can speak to our students, are those of specialistswriting for a specialist audience. There is thus room in the marketand on the readinglist for a more general collection of thoughts about Russia from Russians, especially if the voices that are heard represent an accurate sample of Russian social and political thought. Unfortunately, although thereare some interestingpieces in this volume of Heyward Isham and Natan Shklyar's,there is not always the balance of opinion that one might hope for, and some of the control that specialistsexercise over their thoughts, or that might have been added by the editors to give context to opinions, is missing. The book also suffersfrom the common problem of being completed BP (Before Putin); Putin only gets a mention in the preface and it is now hard to think of Russia's futurewithout consideringhis characterand beliefs. The editors break the book into five...

Politics and Place-Names: Changing Names in the Late Soviet Period by John s> Murray (review)

REVIEWS 377 of the authorities in a country formally committed to Marxism-Leninism and thus internationalism. Centrefor Studies onAnti-Semitism MARKUS MATHYL Technical University Berlin Murray,John. Politics and Place-Names. ChangingNames in theLate SovietPeriod. BirminghamSlavonicMonographs, 32. Department of Russian, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, 2000. 203 pp. Notes. Tables. Bibliography .Index. I8.oo (paperback). THE toponymic movement described here by John Murray appeared under MikhailGorbachevwith the aim of restoringthe old names to towns, villages, streets and squares which had been renamed since the Russian Revolution. The development of the movement paralleledthat of glasnostand perestroika. It began by putting forwarddemands that fullycoincided with the aims of the reforming leaders, who wished to return the former Russian names to towns which had been renamed after the leaders of the Brezhnev era, whom Gorbachev and his allies now desired to discredit. Here Gorbachev was repeating Nikita Khrushchev'spolicy of removing Stalin'sname from places. The movement developed its own momentum, however, and grew out of the political leaders' control, scoring its greatest success with the campaign to restore the name of St Petersburgto Leningrad, against the expresswishes of Gorbachev. Murraybegins with the launch of the movement, heraldedby an article in Literaturnaiagazeta published in January I986. Following the intervention of the writer Sergei Zalygin and the cultural historian Academician Dmitrii Likhachev, a Toponymic Council was established under the auspices of Likhachev's Soviet Foundation for Culture. This organized two All-Union Toponymic Conferences, in April I989 and June I99I. The toponymic reformersdenounced not only the denigration of Russian culture caused by the loss of historicalnames such as Tver', Viatka and Nizhnii Novgorod, but the confusion caused by the proliferationof avenues and lanes named aftera small number of revolutionariessuch as Sergei Kirov and Mikhail Kalinin or abstractnouns associatedwith Communism. Moscow had found itselfin I960 with twenty Sovetskaiastreets,while Kirov alone had I50 towns and villages named after him. The name of Lenin, however, for most of the perestroika period was seen as inviolable. Describing the restoration of old names, the author cites the examples of Ustinov/Jzhevsk in I987 and Brezhnev/Naberezhnye chelny in i988 to argue that these renaming decisions were taken in line with Gorbachev's policies. But they gave the toponymic movement the belief that it was they who had brought about the name changes, and encouraged them to push more widely and deeply. In November I990, the Moscow City Soviet, which had been captured by the democrats the previousMarch, restoredthe formernames to places which had been renamed afteroutstandingCommunists such as Iakov Sverdlov, Maksim Gor'kii, Feliks Dzerzhinskii and even Karl Marx. This 378 SEER, 8o, 2, 2002 process also involved the renaming of some Metro stationswhose names were linkedwith the renamed streets. Murray gives particular attention to the practice begun under Stalin of replacing non-Russian place-names with Russian or Russified names. He beginsbylookingatthe consequencesof thedeportationsofwhole nationalities during and after the Great Patriotic War. In the former Volga German republic, Kalmykiaand the Crimea, nativeplace-names were rooted out, and in I946 in Kaliningradoblast' alone I500 new Russiannameswere introduced. He follows this with an outline of Soviet nationality policy from Lenin to Gorbachev. This is perhaps the less successfulpart of the book. It deviates from his main theme, and Murrayuses it to attacksome Russian writersand media for refusing to use the new names preferred by some republics from around I990, such as Bashkortostan,Kyrgyzstanand Moldova. The concluding chapter examines the history of the naming of St Petersburg,beginning with the Dutch and German originsof the name under Peter I and proceeding through its renaming as Petrograd and Leningrad. The account of the debate over restoringthe name of St Petersburgin I99I is somewhat lacking and needs to be placed in the wider political context. Murray expresses surprisethat the reformistChairperson of Leningrad City Soviet, Anatolii Sobchak, wished to postpone a decision on changing the name. This was because the issue was divisive among the democrats of the Leningrad PopularFrontwho had won control of the soviet in March i990. Some saw the restorationof the tsaristname asan anti-democraticratherthan an anti-Communist move. Moreover, the referendum on the name change took place on the same day as the election for the new post of Mayor...

Формирование и расцвет автономной Советской Карелии, 1918–1929 гг. Забытый успех раннесоветской национальной политики

SUMMARY: Imperial Russia never witnessed any specific positive interest to the formation of “alien” nations and the Karel national movement was no exception. Furthermore, attempts by a part of the White Sea Karels and Finns to incorporate Karels as a component of the developing Finnish nation triggered particular animosity. At the beginning of the 20 th century the authorities promoted an ethnocultural myth according to which Karels were closer to Russians than Finns and, correspondingly, ought to become part of the Russian nation. In comparison to these developments the conception of Soviet nationalities policy in Karelia, formed in 1920, was indeed revolutionary. The model selected then would have encountered most vicious counteraction in Imperial Russia. The leadership of Soviet Karelia, with Lenin’s full support and at least in the early 1920s with the support of the Soviet leadership as a whole, viewed Karels as a part of the Finnish nation, and it was only the political border between the Reds and the Whites that separated the two. The nationalities policy in Karelia was oriented towards this model and it was most successful exactly where it most corresponded to reality, namely in White Sea Karelia. Here the Russian language was replaced with the classical literary Finnish in all spheres of public life without any adaptation of the latter. In those regions where the conditions were more complicated, namely in Southern Karelia, the replacement of Russian with Finnish went on slower, albeit intensively enough. In this sense, the processes that took place in Karelia in the 1920s–1930s can hardly be termed as formation of the Karelian nation. But the Soviet empire in this period can easily be called the creator of the united Great Finnish nation, although in practice this nation was divided into two parts by the border. The leadership of the Soviet Union and, in equal degree, that of Finland, showed no interest in this border becoming transparent. In both countries the real policy was aimed at the continued opposition with each other in the hope that the enemy will collapse in the future. The leadership of Soviet Karelia, insofar as it was allowed by available means, attempted to make the border more transparent but failed to achieve this goal.

Interpreting "Nationality" and "Language" in the 2001 Ukrainian Census

Ukraine conducted its first post-Soviet census in December 2001. The author examines the use of the categories "nationality" and "native language" in the census and relates them to fundamental precepts of Soviet nationality and census policies. The enumeration of national and linguistic identities is related to the expression of political preferences. Orientations toward language policies (particularly in Galicia and Crimea), regional autonomy (in Transcarpathia), and territorial belonging (among the younger generation) are analyzed in order to reveal the politics of the 2001 Ukrainian census.

Race without the Practice of Racial Politics

Eric D. Weitz argues that the Soviet Union promoted the development of national institutions and consciousness and explicidy rejected the ideology of race. Yet traces of racial politics crept into Soviet nationalities policies, especially between 1937 and 1953. In the Stalin period particular populations were endowed with immutable traits that every member of the group possessed and that were passed from one generation to the next. Recent scholarship, he suggests, has been resistant to drawing out the racial elements in the Stalinist purges of certain nationalities. Francine Hirsch challenges Weitz’s argument, arguing that the Soviet regime had a developed concept of “race,” but did not practice what contemporaries thought of as “racial politics.” Hirsch argues that while the Nazi regime attempted to enact social change by racial means, the Soviet regime aspired to build socialism dirough die manipulation of mass (national and class) consciousness. She contends that it is imperative to analyze the conceptual categories that both regimes used in order to undertake a true comparative analysis. Weiner proposes that Soviet population politics constandy fluctuated between sociological and biological categorization. Although the Soviets often came close to adapting bioracial principles and practices, at no point did they let human heredity become a defining feature of political schemes. Race in the Soviet world applied mainly to concerns for the health of population groups. Despite the capacity to conduct genocidal campaigns and operate death camps, the Soviets never sought the physical extermination of entire groups nor did they stop celebrating the multiethnicity of tiieir polity. The radicalization of state violence in the postwar era was triggered by die nature and role of the war in the Soviet world, the alleged conduct of those who failed to rise to the occasion, and the endemic unstable and unassimilated borderlands, and not by die genetic makeup of the internal enemies. Alaina Lemon’s contribution suggests that scholars seek racialized concepts by treating discourse as situated practice, rather than by separating discourse from practice. This allows consideration of the ways people use language not only to name categories but also to point to social relationships (such as “race”) with or without explicidy naming them as such. Doing so, however, is admittedly more difficult when die only available evidence of past discursive practices are printed texts or interviews. In conclusion, Weitz responds to these critics.

On Certainties and Ambivalencies: Reply to My Critics

Eric D. Weitz argues that the Soviet Union promoted the development of national institutions and consciousness and explicidy rejected the ideology of race. Yet traces of racial politics crept into Soviet nationalities policies, especially between 1937 and 1953. In the Stalin period particular populations were endowed with immutable traits that every member of the group possessed and that were passed from one generation to the next. Recent scholarship, he suggests, has been resistant to drawing out the racial elements in the Stalinist purges of certain nationalities. Francine Hirsch challenges Weitz’s argument, arguing that the Soviet regime had a developed concept of “race,” but did not practice what contemporaries thought of as “racial politics.” Hirsch argues that while the Nazi regime attempted to enact social change by racial means, the Soviet regime aspired to build socialism dirough die manipulation of mass (national and class) consciousness. She contends that it is imperative to analyze the conceptual categories that both regimes used in order to undertake a true comparative analysis. Weiner proposes that Soviet population politics constandy fluctuated between sociological and biological categorization. Although the Soviets often came close to adapting bioracial principles and practices, at no point did they let human heredity become a defining feature of political schemes. Race in the Soviet world applied mainly to concerns for the health of population groups. Despite the capacity to conduct genocidal campaigns and operate death camps, the Soviets never sought the physical extermination of entire groups nor did they stop celebrating the multiethnicity of tiieir polity. The radicalization of state violence in the postwar era was triggered by die nature and role of the war in the Soviet world, the alleged conduct of those who failed to rise to the occasion, and the endemic unstable and unassimilated borderlands, and not by die genetic makeup of the internal enemies. Alaina Lemon’s contribution suggests that scholars seek racialized concepts by treating discourse as situated practice, rather than by separating discourse from practice. This allows consideration of the ways people use language not only to name categories but also to point to social relationships (such as “race”) with or without explicidy naming them as such. Doing so, however, is admittedly more difficult when die only available evidence of past discursive practices are printed texts or interviews. In conclusion, Weitz responds to these critics.

Racial Politics without the Concept of Race: Reevaluating Soviet Ethnic and National Purges

Eric D. Weitz argues that the Soviet Union promoted the development of national institutions and consciousness and explicidy rejected the ideology of race. Yet traces of racial politics crept into Soviet nationalities policies, especially between 1937 and 1953. In the Stalin period particular populations were endowed with immutable traits that every member of the group possessed and that were passed from one generation to the next. Recent scholarship, he suggests, has been resistant to drawing out the racial elements in the Stalinist purges of certain nationalities. Francine Hirsch challenges Weitz’s argument, arguing that the Soviet regime had a developed concept of “race,” but did not practice what contemporaries thought of as “racial politics.” Hirsch argues that while the Nazi regime attempted to enact social change by racial means, the Soviet regime aspired to build socialism dirough the manipulation of mass (national and class) consciousness. She contends that it is imperative to analyze the conceptual categories that both regimes used in order to undertake a true comparative analysis. Weiner proposes that Soviet population politics constandy fluctuated between sociological and biological categorization. Although the Soviets often came close to adapting bioracial principles and practices, at no point did they let human heredity become a defining feature of political schemes. Race in the Soviet world applied mainly to concerns for the health of population groups. Despite the capacity to conduct genocidal campaigns and operate death camps, the Soviets never sought the physical extermination of entire groups nor did they stop celebrating the multiethnicity of tiieir polity. The radicalization of state violence in the postwar era was triggered by the nature and role of the war in the Soviet world, the alleged conduct of those who failed to rise to the occasion, and the endemic unstable and unassimilated borderlands, and not by the genetic makeup of the internal enemies. Alaina Lemon’s contribution suggests that scholars seek racialized concepts by treating discourse as situated practice, rather than by separating discourse from practice. This allows consideration of the ways people use language not only to name categories but also to point to social relationships (such as “race”) with or without explicidy naming them as such. Doing so, however, is admittedly more difficult when the only available evidence of past discursive practices are printed texts or interviews. In conclusion, Weitz responds to these critics.

Without a “Concept”? Race as Discursive Practice

Eric D. Weitz argues that the Soviet Union promoted the development of national institutions and consciousness and explicidy rejected the ideology of race. Yet traces of racial politics crept into Soviet nationalities policies, especially between 1937 and 1953. In the Stalin period particular populations were endowed with immutable traits that every member of the group possessed and that were passed from one generation to the next. Recent scholarship, he suggests, has been resistant to drawing out the racial elements in the Stalinist purges of certain nationalities. Francine Hirsch challenges Weitz’s argument, arguing that the Soviet regime had a developed concept of “race,” but did not practice what contemporaries thought of as “racial politics.” Hirsch argues that while the Nazi regime attempted to enact social change by racial means, the Soviet regime aspired to build socialism dirough die manipulation of mass (national and class) consciousness. She contends that it is imperative to analyze the conceptual categories that both regimes used in order to undertake a true comparative analysis. Weiner proposes that Soviet population politics constandy fluctuated between sociological and biological categorization. Although the Soviets often came close to adapting bioracial principles and practices, at no point did they let human heredity become a defining feature of political schemes. Race in the Soviet world applied mainly to concerns for the health of population groups. Despite the capacity to conduct genocidal campaigns and operate death camps, the Soviets never sought the physical extermination of entire groups nor did they stop celebrating the multiethnicity of tiieir polity. The radicalization of state violence in the postwar era was triggered by die nature and role of the war in the Soviet world, the alleged conduct of those who failed to rise to the occasion, and the endemic unstable and unassimilated borderlands, and not by die genetic makeup of the internal enemies. Alaina Lemon’s contribution suggests that scholars seek racialized concepts by treating discourse as situated practice, rather than by separating discourse from practice. This allows consideration of the ways people use language not only to name categories but also to point to social relationships (such as “race”) with or without explicidy naming them as such. Doing so, however, is admittedly more difficult when die only available evidence of past discursive practices are printed texts or interviews. In conclusion, Weitz responds to these critics.

Nothing but Certainty

Eric D. Weitz argues that the Soviet Union promoted the development of national institutions and consciousness and explicidy rejected the ideology of race. Yet traces of racial politics crept into Soviet nationalities policies, especially between 1937 and 1953. In the Stalin period particular populations were endowed with immutable traits that every member of the group possessed and that were passed from one generation to the next. Recent scholarship, he suggests, has been resistant to drawing out the racial elements in the Stalinist purges of certain nationalities. Francine Hirsch challenges Weitz’s argument, arguing that the Soviet regime had a developed concept of “race,” but did not practice what contemporaries thought of as “racial politics.” Hirsch argues that while the Nazi regime attempted to enact social change by racial means, the Soviet regime aspired to build socialism dirough die manipulation of mass (national and class) consciousness. She contends that it is imperative to analyze the conceptual categories that both regimes used in order to undertake a true comparative analysis. Weiner proposes that Soviet population politics constandy fluctuated between sociological and biological categorization. Although the Soviets often came close to adapting bioracial principles and practices, at no point did they let human heredity become a defining feature of political schemes. Race in the Soviet world applied mainly to concerns for the health of population groups. Despite the capacity to conduct genocidal campaigns and operate death camps, the Soviets never sought the physical extermination of entire groups nor did they stop celebrating the multiethnicity of tiieir polity. The radicalization of state violence in the postwar era was triggered by die nature and role of the war in the Soviet world, the alleged conduct of those who failed to rise to the occasion, and the endemic unstable and unassimilated borderlands, and not by die genetic makeup of the internal enemies. Alaina Lemon’s contribution suggests that scholars seek racialized concepts by treating discourse as situated practice, rather than by separating discourse from practice. This allows consideration of the ways people use language not only to name categories but also to point to social relationships (such as “race”) with or without explicidy naming them as such. Doing so, however, is admittedly more difficult when die only available evidence of past discursive practices are printed texts or interviews. In conclusion, Weitz responds to these critics.

Dual Nationality and Military Service: Strategy Number Two

This paper is part of a team project sponsored by the German Marshall Fund, and organized by Professors Kay Hailbronner and David Martin, on the subject of dual nationality. The paper deals with one specific area of traditional concern - the effect of dual nationality on either voluntary or compulsory military service. The various problems could be addressed either by trying to diminish the number of dual nationals (strategy number 1) or by fixing any problematic consequences of dual nationality in the military service context (strategy number 2). Persuaded by arguments that dual nationality engenders only minor problems while yielding offsetting benefits, and highly skeptical that dual nationality could be substantially reduced at acceptable costs, the author opts for strategy number two - addressing the specific problems that result when dual nationality policies and military service policies collide. The paper begins with brief commentary on the sources of dual nationality, the reasons for its rise, and the concerns (and benefits) it generates. The paper then examines various issues that can arise in Germany, the United States, and several of their respective migration source countries, including especially Turkey and Mexico. In analyzing those issues, the paper considers relevant domestic laws, three major international conventions on nationality, and 22 bilateral treaties. Four distinct but related problems are explored - eligibility requirements for voluntary enlistment in the armed forces; military conscription, especially the problems associated with dual or conflicting obligations; loss of nationality by either individual renunciation before military service or denationalization after foreign military service; and special problems that arise when the individual's states of nationality are engaged in armed conflict with one another.

Citizenship and immigration in post-war Britain: the institutional origins of a multicultural nation

In this ground-breaking book, the author draws extensively on archival material and theortical advances in the social sciences literature on citizenship and migration. Citizenship and Immigration in Postwar Britain examines the transformation since 1945 of the UK from a homogeneous into a multicultural society. Rejecting a dominant strain of sociological and historical inquiry emphasising state racism, Hansen argues that politicians and civil servants were overall liberal relative to a public, to which it owed its office, and pursued policies that were rational for any liberal democratic politician. He explains the trajectory of British migration and nationality policy - its exceptional liberality until the 1950s, its exceptional restrictiveness after then, and its tortured and seemingly racist definition of citizenship. The combined effect of a 1948 imperial definition of citizenship (adopted independently of immigration) and a primary commitment to migration from the Old Dominions, locked British politicians into a series of policy choices resulting in a migration and nationality regime that was not racist in intention, but was racist in effect. In the context of a liberal elite and an illiberal public, Britain's current restrictive migration policies result not from the faling of its policy-makers but those of its institutions.

Reconstructing Citizenship: The Politics of Nationality Reform and Immigration in Contemporary France. By Miriam Feldblum. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999. 227p. $54.50 cloth, $17.95 paper.

As recently as a quarter-century ago, virtually no one knew or cared about French nationality law and policy. But in the wake of the May-June events of 1968 there was a prise de conscience about international migration and its effects upon French society and the immigrants themselves. New Order, the then quite obscure extreme rightist group, began to organize protest rallies against illegal immigration. In 1974, the post of Secretary of State for Immigration was created to symbolize the growing concern accorded international migra- tion by the French government. Successive governments, whether rightist or leftist in orientation, pledged to recover control over migration.

The Vepsians: An Administratively Divided Nationality

The administrative division of late imperial Russia made few concessions to minority populations, who often found themselves divided among several provinces. The Bolshevik ascendancy to power changed the situation; Vladimir Lenin's “federal compromise” marked a breakthrough from the tsarist unitary practice to a system of governance which, at least on paper, made allowance for the ethnocultural diversity of the population. The chief designers of the Bolshevik nationality policy believed that a federal arrangement would offer a framework for controlling undesirable national sentiments during the transitional stage when class identities would gradually replace ethnic attachments. However, it turned out that for non-Russian groups the national-territorial autonomous units were not simply empty containers, free of cultural and emotional meaning, in which their political socialization would occur. These units became an integral part of their national identity; ethnicity obtained “legal” territorial roots and the various territorial units began to function as vessels of ethnic consciousness.