National Supervisors Research Articles

Las NIIF: Una forma de educar a los gerentes en la gestión de la PYMES

Este artículo explora el impacto de las Normas Internacionales de Información Financiera - NIIF sobre las Pymes en Colombia, y en las estrategias que todo gerente de empresa que lidera una empresa debe tener para el correcto manejo contable y financiero, con respecto a la entrada en vigencia de la nueva normatividad internacional. El estudio investigativo fue realizado bajo el modelo cualitativo y el enfoque hermenéutico. Se utilizó el método documental y descriptivo. Uno de los resultados que se evidenciaron fue la prioridad en los contadores en forjar la cultura en el uso de las NIIF, actividad que se debe extender hacia los gerentes de cualquier Pyme. En suma, esta es una labor conjunta entre Gobierno Nacional, Supervisores, Revisores Fiscales y Contadores, entre otros, porque se hace indispensable que la dirección de la Pyme en cabeza de este líder, debe buscar desde ahora involucrarse más con el área contable, dado que el no realizarlo desde el inicio, estaría forzado él y la empresa a cometer decisiones con posibles costos que pudieron evitarse.

Designing macroprudential regulation and supervision outside the scope of the banking union: Lessons from the Netherlands and Ireland

In the EU, macroprudential regulation and supervision is partly harmonised with the adoption of the capital requirements package and the creation of the SSM in 2013. However, some macroprudential measures remain the exclusive domain of member states and national supervisors, creating an ideal field for policy learning. This includes maximum loan-to-income (LTI) and loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, which are increasingly adopted in EU member states. This article examines the legal design choices in the Netherlands and Ireland regarding these maximum ratios. It particularly analyses how these choices contribute to preventing creative compliance, ensuring sufficient autonomy of and a balanced degree of discretion for supervisors and minimising unnecessary suppression of borrowing and lending. Both member states have made different choices regarding these three issues. This article draws lessons from these choices for designing macroprudential regulation and supervision in other countries and the EU and identifies possible improvements.

Cross-Border Insurance in Europe: Challenges for Supervision

At the start of Solvency II in January 2016, there is no overview of the insurance market in Europe. This paper develops a methodology to link various data sets on foreign branches and subsidiaries. The result is a new and comprehensive data set of cross-border insurance in Europe. We find that cross-border business in insurance is higher than in banking. We also find that the share of cross-border insurance has increased over the last decade, notwithstanding the global financial crisis. EIOPA, the European supervisory authority, plays a coordinating role among the national supervisors in the approval of internal models under Solvency II. Game theory suggests that there are limits to the coordination model. The increasing share of cross-border insurance, documented in this paper, may tilt the supervisory balance from coordination towards centralisation in an Insurance Union.

Surprised or Not Surprised? The Investorss Reaction to the Comprehensive Assessment Preceding the Launch of the Banking Union

Did the Comprehensive Assessment (CA), preceding the Single Supervisory Mechanism’s launch in Europe, achieve its aims of producing new valuable information for the market? We show that the CA achieved the goal of increasing transparency: investors were able to detect weak banks at the announcement of the procedure (23 October 2013), but gained full information on the amount of the capital shortfall only at the disclosure of results (26 October 2014). Furthermore, at the official launch of the SSM (4 November 2014), banks under direct ECB supervision registered a more negative market reaction with respect to banks maintaining their national supervisors. Using a control function regression model, including possible confounders and allowing for treatment effect heterogeneity, this negative reaction is confirmed. These findings suggest that, at least in the short run, investors penalized banks subject to direct ECB supervision, probably because of the fear of regulatory inconsistencies.

Single Supervision and the Governance of Banking Markets: Will the SSM Deliver the Expected Benefits?

In this paper, I try to assess the likely impact of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) on eurozone banking markets. I start by analysing the predictions made by economists and policy-makers with regard to the deeper integration of financial markets which may derive from the Banking Union. I then try to identify the regulatory weaknesses that may throw uncertainty on the benefits commonly expected from the Banking Union. Firstly, I highlight the limits of EU supervisory centralisation as shaped by the reforms enacted after the 2008 financial crisis. Secondly, I analyse the limits of the SSM, which, to some extent, is still grounded on supervisory cooperation despite the fact that the ECB has powers of direction and substitution with respect to national supervisors. I argue, in particular, that the SSM represents a system of semi-strong centralisation, which may still give rise to agency problems, particularly in the relationships with supervisors of non-euro area countries that are still governed by the EU system of enhanced cooperation. Thirdly, I examine the decoupling of supervision from regulation, which derives from the fact that the ECB lacks sufficient regulatory powers when acting as a supervisor of the eurozone banking systems. The separation of regulation—which is harmonised (often with excessive detail) at EU level—and supervision—which is centralised in the euro area—may create problems to the extent that the single supervisor cannot create a prudential rulebook for the eurozone but is subject to EU prudential regulation and national law provisions, often unduly limiting its supervisory discretion.

Single Supervision and the Governance of Banking Markets

In this paper, I try to assess the likely impact of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) on Eurozone banking markets. I start by analysing the predictions made by economists and policy makers with regard to the deeper integration of financial markets which may derive from the Banking Union. I then try to identify the regulatory weaknesses that may throw uncertainty on the benefits commonly expected from the Banking Union. Firstly, I highlight the limits of EU supervisory centralisation as shaped by the reforms enacted after the 2008 financial crisis. Secondly, I analyse the limits of the SSM, which is to some extent still grounded on supervisory cooperation despite the fact that the ECB has powers of direction and substitution with respect to national supervisors. I argue, in particular, that the SSM represents a system of semi-strong centralization, which may still give rise to agency problems particularly in the relationships with supervisors of non-euro area countries that are still governed by the EU system of enhanced cooperation. Thirdly, I examine the decoupling of supervision from regulation deriving from the fact that the ECB lacks sufficient regulatory powers when acting as a supervisor of the Eurozone banking systems. The separation of regulation – which is harmonized (often with excessive detail) at EU level – and supervision – which is centralized in the euro area – may create problems to the extent that the single supervisor cannot create a prudential rulebook for the Eurozone, but is subject to EU prudential regulation and national law provisions often unduly limiting its supervisory discretion.

An analysis of dental patient safety incidents in a patient complaint and healthcare supervisory database in Finland

Objective. Few studies of patient harm and harm-prevention methods in dentistry exist. This study aimed to identify and characterize dental patient safety incidents (PSIs) in a national sample of closed dental cases reported to the Regional State Administrative Agencies (AVIs) and the National Supervisory Authority for Welfare and Health (Valvira) in Finland. Materials and methods. The sample included all available fully resolved dental cases (n = 948) during 2000–2012 (initiated by the end of 2011). Cases included both patient and next of kin complaints and notifications from other authorities, employers, pharmacies, etc. The cases analyzed concerned both public and private dentistry and included incident reports lodged against dentists and other dental-care professionals. Data also include the most severe cases since these are reported to Valvira. PSIs were categorized according to common incident types and preventability and severity assessments were based on expert opinions in the decisions from closed cases. Results. Most alleged PSIs were proven valid and evaluated as potentially preventable. PSIs were most often related to different dental treatment procedures or diagnostics. More than half of all PSIs were assessed as severe, posing severe risk or as causing permanent or long-lasting harm to patients. The risk for PSI was highest among male general dental practitioners with recurring complaints and notifications. Conclusions. Despite some limitations, this register-based study identifies new perspectives on improving safety in dental care. Many PSIs could be prevented through the proper and more systematic use of already available error-prevention methods.

Can patients detect hazardous dental practice? A patient complaint study.

The purpose of this paper is to: determine the prevalence and distribution of patient/family-generated, dentistry-related complaints to Regional State Administrative Agencies (AVIs) and the National Supervisory Authority for Welfare and Health (Valvira) in Finland from 2000 to 2011, study patient/family safety incident experiences and other reasons for complaints, assess complaint validity and evaluate factors associated with disciplinary processes against dentists. Data included closed cases handled by AVIs and Valvira (2000-2011) against dental practitioners or dental practice units (n=782). The authors analysed the complaints distribution and examined the antecedent factors and circumstances. This study demonstrated that patients/families can detect many dental treatment hazards, substandard processes and even serious safety risks rather well. The investigation processes revealed some physical harm or potential patient safety (PS) risks in more than half the alleged cases. Many complaints accumulated against certain individuals and statistically significant positive correlations were found between some patient/family complaints, dentist-specific variables and disciplinary actions. Patient/family-generated complaints must be taken seriously and seen as relatively good safety risk indicators. However, more knowledge on how patients might cooperate with dental care providers to prevent errors is needed. This work provides a unique opportunity to learn from several dentistry-related patient complaints. Despite some limitations, patient complaints appear to be useful as a complementary source together with other PS study methods.

XBRL: Different Approach of Utilization

Abstract The present study investigate the role of XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting Language) as an electronic format for submitting and communicating of financial and business data in effective and efficient way. The study is analysing different approach, which has been shaped across the world. The study is focused on current situation within the European Union countries, investigating in the level of adopting XBRL taxonomy for major countries in EU, compared with situation in USA and Asia. The financial reporting is requiring quality and timelines of business information and speed of collection and formation of the information needed is crucial. The XBRL technology will aim to create a single channel of reporting from the company all the way through to the supervisory bodies without “human hands” involvement and online. Adopting XBRL enables the reporting entity report to the national supervisor only. With the nature diversity of Europe – 28 countries are members of EU, more than 60 countries in total, more than 200 languages used across the Europe – the XBRL can be unique tool to improve competitiveness of European companies within the world. In European Union, European Central Bank plays a major role, as a supervising bank for the national central banks, in establishing flexible, cost efficient and errorless reporting system. In USA, SEC requirement is (since 2009 through 2011) for all U.S. listed companies to submit their financial statements in XBRL, including IFRS files. Used taxonomy needs to be approved by SEC.

Does Banking Union Worsen theEU's Democratic Deficit? The Need for Greater Supervisory Data Transparency

AbstractDoes banking union exacerbate the European Union's democratic deficit? Using Scharpf's ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy concepts, it is argued in this article that its design does worsen the democratic deficit. There are good reasons to limit ‘input legitimacy’ for politically independent institutions. ‘Output legitimacy’ is then even more relevant. Transparency is a key part of ‘output legitimacy’. It enables actors to judge whether the regulator is acting in the public's interest and can improve their outputs. This article focuses on the banking data that the supervisors collect. Data available to the European public is evaluated and compared toAmerica's banking union. European practices are not comparable in terms of availability or detail. An original survey of relevant officials is conducted, which results in the finding that only 11 of 28 Member States release any information on the banks they supervise. BothEUand national supervisors should provide publicly available, timely and consistent individual bank data.

The Single Supervisory Mechanism — Panacea or Quack Banking Regulation?

This paper analyses the new architecture for the prudential supervision of banks in the euro area. It is primarily concerned with the likely effectiveness of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) as a regime that intends to bolster financial stability in the steady state. By using insights from the political economy of bureaucracy it finds that the SSM is overly focused on sharp tools to discipline captured national supervisors and thus under-incentivises their top-level personnel to voluntarily contribute to rigid supervision. The success of the SSM in this regard will hinge on establishing a common supervisory culture that provides positive incentives for national supervisors. To this end, the internal decision-making structure of the European Central Bank (ECB) in supervisory matters provides some integrative elements. Yet, the complex procedures also impede swift decision making and do not adequately solve the problem. Ultimately, a careful design and animation of the ECB-defined supervisory framework and the development of inter-agency career opportunities will be critical. The ECB will become a de facto standard setter that competes with the European Banking Authority (EBA). A likely stand-off in the EBA’s Board of Supervisors will lead to a growing gap in regulatory integration between SSM participants and other EU Member States. Joining the SSM as a non-euro area Member State is unattractive because the current legal framework grants no voting rights in the ECB’s ultimate decision-making body. Nor does it supply a credible commitment opportunity for Member States that seek to bond to high-quality supervision.

Reforma Systemów Nadzoru Fnansowego UE i USA Ze Szczególnym Uwzględnieniem Kryzysu z Lat 2007-2008

The magnitude of the fnancial crisis, which begun in the U.S. in 2007-2008, revealed gaps in the supervisory system that were amplified in the increasingly integrated fnancial markets. Liberalisation of capital flows, which created space for functioning of international fnancial institutions of systemic importance, increased fragility of singular economies to anomalies occurring in other regions and facilitated transition of the crisis. At the same time, the ineptness of the supervisory mechanisms in handling systemic problems inherent in those realities was demonstrated. Confronting those challenges, the EU made a considerable effort to establish by 1 January 2011 the European System of Financial Supervision - a micro- and macro prudential system designed to facilitate coordination between national supervisors and enhance early warning capacities. In the United States, broad reforms were put into play by adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act. Given that effectiveness and cooperation require a convergence of standards and a similarity of institutional framework facilitates the task, the institutional analysis provided in the article enables a critical comparison of the reform efforts. It remains to be verified in practice, however, whether concerns about only the nominal “outside” nature of the reform prove accurate.

Increased risk of human parvovirus B19 infection in day-care employees: a cohort study among pregnant workers during an epidemic in Finland

BackgroundHuman parvovirus B19 (B19V) infection during early pregnancy increases the risk of miscarriage. Studies have inconsistently shown an elevated risk of infection among women with occupational contacts with children. Methodological...

Strengthening the governance of national financial supervision in the EU: existing weaknesses and a proposal for reform

The paper is a contribution to the debate on the governance of financial supervision in Europe. It analyses the: [i] rationale for delegation of regulatory and supervisory powers to an independent supervisor; [ii] governance arrangements for independence and accountability of supervision; and [iii] institutional models for supervision at national level. The paper also examines the extent of the independence and supervisory capacity of national supervisors in Europe by reference to the financial sector assessment programme reports published by the International Monetary Fund and identifies the main weaknesses in the governance of financial supervisors, which also have a negative impact on supervision on a European scale. The paper makes recommendations for a mechanism to address these weaknesses.

Harmonising Basel III and the Dodd Frank Act Through Greater Collaboration between Standard Setters and National Supervisors

Having considered a vital means whereby the Basel III framework and the Dodd Frank Act could achieve a respectable degree of harmonization, in the paper which precedes this, namely, the paper on “Harmonising Basel III and the Dodd Frank Act through International Accounting Standards – Reasons why International Accounting Standards Should Serve as “Thermostats”, this paper considers another important means of effectively achieving the aims and objectives of these important and major regulatory reforms aimed at achieving greater financial stability. In so doing, it will highlight challenges encountered by the Basel III framework, as well as that encountered by the Dodd Frank Act – particularly in the areas of enforcement, coordination and communication. In facilitating better enforcement, the need for high level principles, bright line rules and a more effective mandate will be emphasized. Furthermore, a system whereby greater collaboration between standard setters and national supervisors can be better facilitated requires effective coordination and communication mechanisms aimed at ensuring that vital decisions and information are communicated timely, accurately, effectively and completely.

Regulação da auditoria em sistemas bancários: análise do cenário internacional e fatores determinantes

Este estudo empírico-analítico tem por objetivos promover uma comparação dos níveis de regulação da atividade de auditoria em instituições bancárias e avaliar a relação entre esse grau de regulação e características dos sistemas bancários nacionais. Utilizou-se uma base de dados mantida pelo Banco Mundial, contendo pesquisa realizada junto a autoridades supervisoras e regulatórias bancárias nacionais de 172 países. Por meio de estatísticas descritivas, foi constatado que o nível mais elevado de regulação é registrado nas nações mais desenvolvidas e nos países do Oriente Médio, Norte da África, Europa e Ásia Central. Também foi constatado que o Brasil apresenta grau de regulação superior à média verificada internacionalmente. Quanto aos testes realizados, por meio de regressão, para avaliar a relação entre o nível de regulação de auditoria e características do setor bancário, foi evidenciado que há mais requerimentos para a atuação dos auditores nos países em que o crédito doméstico provido pelo setor bancário é maior e onde os bancos são mais rentáveis. Por outro lado, há menor regulação nos países em que há maior participação de bancos estatais no sistema financeiro e onde há mais restrições à atuação das instituições bancárias. Não foi confirmada a hipótese de associação positiva entre grau de concentração do setor bancário e o nível de regulação da atividade de auditoria. Por fim, foi constatado que, em 2000, primeiro ano da pesquisa, o nível de regulação era menor que os níveis apurados nos demais exercícios, enquanto que, em 2007, último ano da pesquisa, o nível de regulação é maior que nos anos anteriores, confirmando o que foi encontrado na literatura de que as normas de auditoria tendem a se tornar mais rigorosas com o passar do tempo, na medida em que a demanda por requerimentos mais estritos se acumula, notadamente em momentos de crise de credibilidade.

Spermidine/spermine N1-acetyltransferase activity associates with white blood cell count in myeloid leukemias

The metabolism of polyamines, the cationic small molecules essential for cell proliferation and differentiation, is altered in cancer cells and can be exploited in cancer diagnosis and therapy. Spermidine/spermine N(1)-acetyltransferase (SSAT), which regulates intracellular levels of polyamines by catabolizing spermidine and spermine, has a controversial role in the development of cancers. In this study, the polyamine metabolism and function of SSAT were characterized in acute myeloid leukemia (AML), chronic myeloid leukemia (CML), and acute lymphoid leukemia patient samples. Also, mice overexpressing SSAT and having a myeloproliferative phenotype were analyzed for their response to decitabine and histone deacetylase inhibitor trichostatin A. The presence of epigenetic factors in the bone marrow cells of SSAT mice was analyzed. Elevated levels of spermidine and spermine, as well as increased activity of SSAT, were detected in AML, CML, and acute lymphoid leukemia patients compared with the controls. However, we found SSAT activity to be associated with white blood cell count only in AML and CML patients. Decitabine treatment brought the peripheral blood and bone marrow cell counts of SSAT mice to the level of wild-type mice. Spermidine/spermine N(1)-acetyltransferase mice had increased histone methylation and an increased level of histone deacetylase 1 in their bone marrow cells. The study suggests that SSAT influences the development of myeloid malignancies, and epigenetic factors partly contribute to the SSAT overexpression-induced myeloproliferative disease in mice.

Unleashing the European Securities and Markets Authority: Governance and Accountability After the ECJ Decision on the Short Selling Regulation (Case C-270/12)

The creation of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has marked a major step towards more integrated rulemaking and supervision in the European financial market sector. ESMA’s organisation and operations are strongly influenced by the position of this new Authority within the EU institutional framework. The European Court of Justice (in Case C-270/12) confirmed the legitimacy of the legal basis of ESMA itself and of its powers. While ESMA’s governance still displays some features of a network among national supervisors, its quasi-regulatory functions and supervisory tasks are constrained by limitations directly or indirectly dictated by the Treaties. This paper highlights how the traditional concepts of independence and accountability towards EU institutions and stakeholders apply to ESMA. ESMA’s relationships with national competent authorities, which retain direct supervisory powers with limited exceptions, and the EU institutions, which are competent for the adoption of legislative and non-legislative regulatory measures, are also considered. The analysis shows that tasks conferred on ESMA fall short to match its relatively high accountability, which is aligned with international best practices. The European Commission announced a possible revision of the European Supervisory Authorities (including ESMA) framework for 2014; we therefore suggest some reform proposals that could help streamline regulatory and supervisory functions at EU level, thus allowing ESMA to better exploit its potential while avoiding the risk of excessive centralisation of supervisory powers.

The Single Supervisory Mechanism or 'Ssm', Part One of the Banking Union

The Regulation on the Single Supervisory Mechanism mandates the European Central Bank to exercise prudential supervision on the most significant banks located in the Euro area, whether directly by the Bank’s own services, or indirectly by the national prudential supervisors but under the general guidance of the ECB. The paper gives a detailed analysis of the new regime, its scope, the consequences for the existing supervisory systems, especially the home-host attribution of competences and the cooperation between the ECB and the national supervisors, the consequences for the non-euro Member States and for the third country jurisdictions. This regime is likely to substantially modify the existing supervisory landscape. It is the first step towards the Banking Union and is to be followed by legislative instruments on Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, the Regulations on a Single Resolution Mechanism and on Deposit Guarantee Systems. These three measures should allow dealing with defaulting banks without calling on the taxpayers.

The Application of National Banking Supervision Law by the ECB: Three Parallel Modes of Executing EU Law?

The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which establishes the European Central Bank's (ECB) competence for the prudential supervision of banks, will assume operations in the course of 2014. This mechanism will have to rely on various acts across which the material provisions of EU banking regulation are to be found: regulations, directives and national statutes that implement directives. The purpose of this paper is to examine different ‘modes' of executing substantive European legal provisions, that is, the avenues by which the legal norms are translated into binding decisions which are addressed to a specific credit institution, in an individual case. After setting out the context in which the establishment of the SSM is taking place, this paper concludes that the SSM Regulation contains three such modes for executing banking law: direct powers drawn from the SSM Regulation itself; powers of instruction for the ECB to command national supervisors to use their powers under national law in a particular way; and an application of national statutes by the ECB as a European organ. The first mode is trivial; the second is not novel, but such powers have significantly expanded in the SSM Regulation; and the third mode is genuinely novel. This paper discusses the three modes and attempts to conceptualize the third in a theoretical framework. It also discusses the implications of the three modes regarding the availability of judicial review.