National Response Framework Research Articles

Preparing for an Integrated Response

In many cases, service providers can offer a holistic “total solution” requiring the absolute minimum of intervention from the contracting company. However, despite what an oil company may wish, it is not normally possible to fully out-source the response to an oil spill. The Responsible Party is morally and legally the “owner” of the incident, regardless of scale, however there are aspects of spill response and management which, depending on the national response framework, may be ideally suited to the expertise of an Oil Spill Response Organisation (OSRO).

Emergency responder health: what have we learned from past disasters?

As the Deepwater Horizon disaster unfolds in the Gulf of Mexico, public health practitioners are having a sinking deja vu feeling. Once again, environmental disaster has struck, and tens of thousands of emergency responders—some professionals, but many more volunteers—have swung into action, potentially risking their health as they work to clean up the worst oil spill in U.S. history. Veterans of similar disasters are wondering if historical lessons learned can help keep the damage to a bare minimum. But a paucity of hard data on emergency responder health makes it difficult even to ask the right questions. “Emergency responders have not been adequately studied,” says Gina Solomon, codirector of the occupational and environmental medicine residency and fellowship program at the University of California, San Francisco, and a senior scientist with the Natural Resources Defense Council. “They tend to be ignored.” Professional emergency responders such as firefighters may not put much emphasis on health effects studies. “They are going to do what they need to do regardless of their own safety,” says Don Donahue, executive director of the Center for Health Policy & Preparedness at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, who has firefighters in his extended family. “They have to be a little crazy by definition.” That heroic approach is manna for the people they save, but firefighters may pay a price with disorders such as cancer. Studies of cancers in firefighters have had mixed results, but there is evidence linking this occupation with brain, thyroid, esophageal, bladder, testicular, prostate, and cervical cancers, as well as melanoma and Hodgkin disease (Bates1 and Ma et al.2 are two such studies). Health risks tend to be even greater for the many nonprofessional emergency responders who rush to the scene of crises such as oil spills, terrorist attacks, hurricanes, train derailments, and chemical releases. Those workers often don’t have the training and advanced equipment that protect professional emergency responders to some degree. These and many other factors make it a daunting challenge to protect the health of emergency responders during disasters.

THE VIEW FROM THE TRENCHES: PART 1–EMERGENCY MEDICAL RESPONSE PLANS AND THE NEED FOR EPR SCREENING

Few natural disasters or intentional acts of war or terrorism have the potential for such severe impact upon a population and infrastructure as the intentional detonation of a nuclear device within a major U.S. city. In stark contrast to other disasters or even a "dirty bomb," hundreds of thousands will be affected and potentially exposed to a clinically significant dose of ionizing radiation. This will result in immediate deaths and injuries and subsequently the development of Acute Radiation Syndrome (ARS). Additionally, millions more who are unlikely to develop ARS will seek medical evaluation and treatment, overwhelming the capacity of an already compromised medical system. In this paper, the authors propose that in vivo electron paramagnetic resonance (EPR) dosimetry be utilized to screen large numbers of potentially exposed victims, and that this screening process be incorporated into the medical-surge framework that is currently being implemented across the nation for other catastrophic public health emergencies. The National Incident Management System (NIMS), the National Response Framework (NRF), the Target Capabilities List (TCL), Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD), as well as additional guidance from multiple federal agencies provide a solid framework for this response. The effective screening of potentially-exposed victims directly following a nuclear attack could decrease the number of patients seeking immediate medical care by greater than 90%.

Response capabilities of the National Guard: A focus on domestic disaster medical response

The National Guard has a 373-year history of responding to the nation's call to duty for service both at home and abroad (The National Guard Bureau Web site: Available at http://www.ngb.army.mil/default. aspx.). The National Guard (NG) is a constitutionally unique organization (United States Constitution, US Government Printing Office Web site: Available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/index.html.). Today's Guard conducts domestic disaster response and civilian assistance missions on a daily basis. Yet, the NG's role, mission, and capabilities are not well-known or understood. The National Response Framework (NRF) places significant responsibility on the local and state disaster planners (Department of Homeland Security: National Response Framework. US Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC, January 2008). The public health professionals are an integral component of the disaster planning community. It is critical that the public health community be knowledgeable of types and capabilities of all the response assets at their disposal.

State emergency plans: assessing the inclusiveness of vulnerable populations

The US federal government's involvement in emergency management has evolved in magnitude since the 1800s. Each significant change usually occurred following a catastrophic event. The USA had two large-scale emergencies in 2001 and 2005 – man-made (September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001) and natural (Hurricane Katrina in 2005) – that shaped a new policy regarding emergency management. These disasters revealed numerous failures in planning for, preparedness for and response to disasters. Of the identified failures, accessible emergency communications for all and, distinctively, for Vulnerable Populations (VPs), were studied in this paper. With over 37 million people over 65 years of age and 38.22 million people (over the age of 5) with disabilities, it is important that these populations be appropriately included in emergency management plans. This paper looks at the change in national emergency policy from the National Response Plan to the National Response Framework in 2008 to determine how this change has affected the state emergency plans. The results show that recent changes in the national emergency plan has had little effect on state emergency plans (in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region IV) with regard to VPs.

An analysis of US government and media disaster frames

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to evaluate whether the media's disaster coverage reflects the messages disseminated by state emergency management agencies (SEMAs).Design/methodology/approachSEMAs were selected as the unit of analysis because the 2008 National Response Framework designates SEMAs with primary responsibility for managing disaster planning and coordinating the inter‐governmental response to disasters. Specifically, this study identifies ten disaster frames SEMAs use through a qualitative content analysis of all the media releases distributed by three SEMAs (n=303) during a two‐year time frame. It then evaluates whether the coverage reflects SEMA's frames through a quantitative content analysis of 1,088 newspaper articles.FindingsTaken as a whole, the research indicates that framing allows the media to efficiently tell disaster stories, but the media's disaster frames often are not ideal from the perspective of emergency managers. These frames also are affected by individuals and groups outside of the media as well as cultural and societal values.Originality/valueThe paper can help emergency managers identify which disaster frames are best suited for information subsidies (e.g. media releases) and which frames may be better suited for direct‐to‐the public dissemination (e.g. community meetings and public service announcements).

Leveraging public‐private partnerships to improve community resilience in times of disaster

PurposeAs noted in the Department of Homeland Security's National Response Framework, disasters are inherently local and ultimately the responsibility of the lowest jurisdictional level present within the impacted area. Given these parameters, this paper aims to sharpen the concept of national resilience by recommending a framework which positions community resilience as an integral variable in understanding the ability of impacted areas to effectively manage the consequences of disasters. Conceptualized as a dependent variable, community resilience is influenced by the relationships government (public) agencies develop with private sector partners and the resilience of relevant supply chains and critical infrastructures/key resources which exist in their communities.Design/methodology/approachThe authors augment a topical literature review of academic and practitioner journals by synthesizing existing findings into a holistic framework of community resilience.FindingsThis paper argues that interdependent systems like social and economic networks will ultimately influence the ability of communities to adapt and respond to the consequences of disasters. In addressing the resilience of these systems, all levels of government must recognize and embrace the public‐private interfaces that can improve their ability to manage the response and recovery phases of disaster management. While 85 percent of critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector, 100 percent of it exists within communities and impacts the ability of the nation to recover from disasters. Resilience calls upon active management and relies upon assessment and a willingness to take action in the face of adversity.Originality/valueResilience is discussed within economics, behavioral sciences, supply chain management and critical infrastructure protection. This paper integrates these research streams to develop a framework for shaping national resilience.

Prepare, plan, practice

Prepare, plan, practice

Drafting, revising, and updating local emergency operations plans: The National Response Framework and the Emergency Support Function Annex model

Lessons learned and public scrutiny resulting from the Gulf Coast hurricane disasters in 2005 led the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to restructure its national incident response guidance. The National Response Framework (NRF) replaced the National Response Plan (NRP) in early 2008. The updated Framework has focused the attention of emergency management planning to, among other things, updating Emergency Operations Plans (EOPs) on a State and local jurisdictional level, utilizing an Emergency Support Function (ESF) model.Since 2005, compliance mandates under the National Incident Management System (NIMS) have required local government entities to revise and update emergency operations plans to incorporate NIMS components. With the introduction of the NRF in 2008, the ESF model is now the recommended standard for local government EOPs under the NIMS compliance objectives. The ESF model provides for a coordinated response effort and mutual aid options local agencies may receive from State and Federal resources in the wake of an emergency. It also works to ensure that local entities themselves have a careful accounting of all of their own resources and capabilities to avoid another slow and inadequate response that was at the heart of the Hurricanes Katrina and Rita tragedies in 2005.

Interorganizational Coordination in Complex Environments of Disasters: The Evolution of Intergovernmental Disaster Response Systems

This article evaluates the Federal Response Plan (FRP), the National Response Plan (NRP), and the National Response Framework (NRF) from the perspectives of interorganizational networks and complex adaptive systems. The article uses the theoretical approach of complexity theory and dynamic network analysis to assess the relationships among organizations using the NRP/NRF as the structure that shapes their functional and organizational relationships. It also examines the applicability of concepts from complexity science for emergency and crisis management, to the evolution of NRP/NRF from the earlier FRP. The article uses the network analysis method in evaluating changes from FRP to NRF. The network analysis results demonstrate increases in complexity in the disaster and crises response and recovery plans over time.

Reform, Don't Merge, the Homeland Security Council

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Lynn Eden and Amy Zegart for their comments on earlier drafts. Notes 1. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Homeland Security Presidential Directive-1/HSPD-1,” October 29, 2001, p. 1, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011030-1.html 2. Also see 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: Norton, 2004), p. 406; Richard C. Clarke and Rand Beers, The Forgotten Homeland (New York: Century Foundation, 2006), pp. 129–33; P.J. Crowley, Safe at Home: A National Security Strategy to Protect the American Homeland, the Real Central Front (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2008), pp. 60-1; Jonah Czerwinski, “A Future for the Homeland Security Council?” Homeland Security Watch, 21 November 2007, http://www.hlswatch.com/index.php?s=A+Future+for+the+Homeland+Security+Council; Clark A. Murdock and Michèle A. Flournoy, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government & Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), p. 68; Cindy Williams, Strengthening Homeland Security: Reforming Planning and Resource Allocation (Washington, D.C.: IOBM Center for the Business of Government, 2008), p. 36; Christine Wormuth and Anne Witkowsky, Managing the Next Catastrophe: Ready (Or Not)? (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies), pp. 16–18. 3. Williams, “Strengthening Homeland Security,” p. 30; Wormuth, “Managing the Next Catastrophe,” p. 16. 4. Wormuth, “Managing the Next Catastrophe,” p. 16. 5. Wormuth, “Managing the Next Catastrophe,” pp. 4–5, 29. 6. U.S. General Accounting Office, “Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Key Emergency Response Facilities Could be Strengthened,” GAO-08-285T, November 2009. 7. Nelson Hernandez and Philip Rucker, “Anthrax Case Raises Doubt on Security,” Washington Post, 8 August 2008, p. A1. 8. Elizabeth Becker and Tim Weiner, “A Nation Challenged: Homeland Security; New Office to Become a White House Agency, New York Times, September 28, 2001. 9. Williams, “Strengthening Homeland Security,” p. 29; Wormuth, “Managing the Next Catastrophe,” p. 16. 10. Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: Free Press, 1990) 11. Becker and Weiner, “A Nation Challenged.” 12. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Homeland Security Council Executive Order, Order Establishing the President's Homeland Security Advisory Council and Senior Advisory Committees for Homeland Security,” March 21, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020321-9.html. 13. U.S. General Accounting Office, “Information Technology: Homeland Security Information Network Needs to Be Better Coordinated with Key State and Local Initiatives,” GAO-07-822T, May 10, 2007. 14. Rep. Bennie Thompson (R-Miss.), Chair, House Committee on Homeland Security, Letter to Michael Chertoff, Secretary of DHS, July 23, 2008, http://fas.org/irp/congress/2007_cr/thompson082207.pdf. Thompson's letter summarizes the findings of a GAO study of the Next Generation initiative that GAO has not yet released. 15. U.S. General Accounting Office, “National Response Framework: FEMA Needs Policies and Procedures to Better Integrate Non-Federal Stakeholders in the Revision Process,” GAO-08-768, June 11, 2008. 16. U.S. General Accounting Office, “Influenza Pandemic: Further Efforts Are Needed to Ensure Clearer Leadership Roles and an Effective National Strategy,” GAO-07-781, August 14, 2007. 17. The National Homeland Security Consortium, “Protecting Americans in the 21st Century: Imperatives for the Homeland,” April 2008, pp. 1–2, http://www.nemaweb.org/?2253. Additional informationNotes on contributorsPaul N. StocktonPaul N. Stockton is a senior research scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and can be reached at pnstock@stanford.edu

The Next Catastrophe: Ready or Not?

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. For a more detailed discussion of these themes, see Anne Witkowsky and Christine Wormuth, “Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe: Ready or Not?” CSIS Report (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2008), http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080909_wormuth_managingcatastrophe_web.pdf 2. See The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, special report prepared at the request of President George. W. Bush, February 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/; Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 2006, H. Rep. 109–396; Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 2006, S. Rep. 109–322. 3. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107–296, 107th Cong., 2nd sess. (November 15, 2002); Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5,” February 28, 2003, paragraph 4, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html; Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, Public Law 109–295, 109th Cong., 2nd sess. (October 4, 2006). 4. Department of Homeland Security, “National Response Framework”, January 2008, p. 25, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf. 5. Eric Lipton, Christopher Drew, Scott Shane, and David Rohde, “Breakdowns Marked Path From Hurricane to Anarchy,” New York Times, September 11, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/11/national/nationalspecial/11response.html 6. George W. Bush, “President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address to the Nation,” speech, Jackson Square, New Orleans, Louisiana, September 15, 2005. 7. William Perry, Ashton Carter, and Michael May, “After the Bomb,” New York Times, June 12, 2007. 8. Although the title and content of the DOD planning guidance document has evolved substantially in recent years, for many years this document has played a critical role in translating strategy into the planning, programming and budgeting system. In the past, DHS has issued an integrated planning guidance document that has attempted to link strategic objectives to its five year budget, but the document's impact on the overall DHS planning, programming, and budgeting system has been modest at best. 9. Chris Logan, “2007 State Homeland Security Directors Survey,” Issue Brief (Washington D.C.: National Governors Association, December 18, 2007), p. 7, http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0712HOMELANDSURVEY.PDF 10. See Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable: How Our Government is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism (New York: Harper Collins, 2004); Clark Kent Ervin, Open Target: Where America is Vulnerable to Attack (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Richard A. Clarke, Rand Beers, et al., The Forgotten Homeland, A Century Foundation Task Force Report (New York: Century Foundation Press, 2006), http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=PB&pubid=569 . Additional informationNotes on contributorsChristine WormuthChristine Wormuth is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS and principal author of Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe: Ready or Not?(2008). She can be reached at CWormuth@csis.org

Frozen red blood cells: cold comfort in a disaster?

Frozen red blood cells: cold comfort in a disaster?

THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM TRAINING REQUIREMENTS ON THE PRIVATE SECTOR

ABSTRACT In the National Incident Management System (NIMS) Document dated March 1, 2004, all federal, state, local, tribal, private sector and non-governmental personnel with a direct role in emergency management and response were required to be NIMS and Incident Command System (ICS) trained. National standards for qualification and certification of emergency response personnel were established under NIMS to ensure that personnel possess the minimum knowledge, skills, and experience necessary to execute incident management and emergency response activities safely and effectively. Most recently documented in the National Response Framework, all mid-level managers of federal, state, and local governmental personnel are encouraged to complete ICS-300 and ICS-400 training in fiscal year 2007. Although these standards will greatly improve the ability for governmental personnel to respond in emergencies, private sector personnel are not regulated to participate in the same qualification and certification process. At this time, NIMS has no legal authority to place these requirements on industry personnel, such as members of oil spill management teams. The resulting imbalance of qualification and certification requirements between these two groups could severely hinder oil spill response efforts in the near future by causing miscommunication in the Unified Command during critical points in the response, including when setting response objectives and sharing resources. However, the solution cannot be to pass further governmental regulations on an already highly-regulated community. The NIMS Integration Center should consider utilizing the existing partnerships in individual regions, particularly through the Area Committee and the Area Maritime Security Committee, to solve this issue before it becomes a significant problem in the middle of a large-scale response effort.