National League For Democracy Research Articles

An Exploration of the Causes of the 2021 Military Coup in Myanmar

On February 1, 2021, the Burmese military suddenly staged a military coup, detaining some key officials of the democratic government, including Senior Minister Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, and overthrowing the National League for Democracy (NLD) government elected in the 2020 election. Since the coup occurred only a few months after the election, its sudden occurrence shocked the world and caused extensive discussions among scholars. Focusing on the reasons for this military coup in Myanmar, this paper analyzes it from multiple perspectives. By observing the economic situation and social conflicts in Myanmar before the coup and studying the relevant measures under the NLD government, this paper argues that the NLD failed to solve the problem of being restricted by the military regime and that the military still manipulated the actual power of the country behind the scenes. Some of the political moves by the NLD even complicated the conflict between the democratic government and the military, which caused the military to have a sense of crisis, thus directly leading to the coup in 2021. Other reasons for the coup were the failure of the NLD to solve social problems, such as ethnic and religious issues in the country, and to improve the economic downturn, which allowed the military to stage a coup to prevent further democratization.

The Power Struggle Between the Military Junta and Democracy in Myanmar

Ever since the first coup by the military forces in 1962, Myanmar has stood out among the Southeast Asian nations due to the prolonged political turmoil between the ever-powerful junta and the rising forces of the people, assisted by the National League for Democracy (NLD) party who demanded democracy. These clashes have profoundly affected the country’s socio-economic and politics for decades. Hence, to find the root of this long-ongoing conflict, this paper examines the historical timeline of the friction between the two factions, the military junta (Tatmadaw), and the general population from the post-independent years until now. The study analyses various aspects, including the ethnic tension, the formation of Tatmadaw, the events leading to three military coups, and the people with their multiple uprisings. This paper also sheds light on the leading party, NLD, especially on the central figure, Aung San Suu Kyi, who became the voice of democracy. Overall, this study mainly used the library research method and a content-analysis approach to gather information and assess the dynamic relations between the two forces and how the power struggle remains well into the 21st century.

China’s Intervention Policy in Myanmar Facing Challenges from India

In the context of the 21st century, Myanmar holds a significant geopolitical position, serving as a hotbed of competition between India and China in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia region. To counter India’s influence, China has employed various tools to increase its sway in Myanmar. This article investigates China’s intervention policies in Myanmar in the face of challenges from India. The research results indicate that China is implementing four main policies to intervene in Myanmar: (1) Approaching political factions; (2) Exploiting ethnic issues, particularly the Rohingya; (3) Creating economic dependence through investment and trade; (4) Enhancing military and defense cooperation. However, Myanmar’s policies have undergone numerous changes, causing China’s influence to waver. Nevertheless, in the current volatile context, Myanmar tends to rely on China economically and militarily. This has posed challenges to India’s position, especially since the National League for Democracy (NLD) leader - Aung San Suu Kyi was ousted.

Liberalism and illiberalism in Myanmar’s National League for Democracy

The National League for Democracy (NLD) was largely synonymous with Myanmar’s semi-democratic intermezzo in 2016–21. For 2 years after the military coup in 2021, it resumed the role of major opposition party performed from 1988 to 2015. Although it was dissolved by the military junta in 2023, it remains a dominant political force inside the country. This article examines the commitment of NLD leaders and voters to liberal agendas. It reviews existing literature, draws on our dataset of Facebook posts by NLD members of parliament, analyses our 2017 survey, and triangulates it with 2020 World Values Survey data. It argues that the NLD was a relatively liberal force in Myanmar’s democratisation in the 2010s, though its liberal commitments were coupled with rising illiberal values. It is thus possible that even if the NLD were reconstituted and re-elected under a future democratic settlement, that democracy would not be liberal.

Misunderstanding Myanmar

executive summary: This article examines how, in retrospect, the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021 was a foreseeable consequence of domestic political dynamics in the country and the misperceptions of the international community about the hybrid civilian-military government. main argumentOn February 1, 2021, the military in Myanmar deposed the civilian side of the hybrid civilian-military government to reassert direct military rule. The coup ignited a nationwide resistance against the new military junta, the State Administrative Council, involving many of the nation's decades-old ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), newly created People's Defense Forces (PDFs), and an opposition National Unity Government. Looking back, Myanmar's military saw the 2008 constitution and its hybrid government as the end point for political reform, not as the beginning of a transition. The military's actions during this decade reflect this. Attempts by Aung San Suu Kyi, the National League for Democracy, and the international community to foster further political changes may have been contributing factors to the military's decision to stage a coup. Myanmar is now embroiled in a multifront civil war involving most of the country's largest ethnic communities, including the Bamar majority, with no end in sight. policy implications • Peaceful resolution of the conflict in Myanmar is not likely at this time. The U.S. and other nations should consider providing limited and targeted military assistance to the EAOs and PDFs. • The Biden administration should expedite implementation of the authorities provided in the BURMA Act, including the provision of nonlethal assistance to the EAOs and PDFs. The U.S. State Department should rekindle its ties to the EAOs to facilitate nonlethal assistance and efforts to form local governments in areas "liberated" by the EAOs and PDFs. • The U.S. Agency for International Development should shift the delivery of humanitarian assistance to local organizations operating in India and Thailand to more effectively provide aid to refugees and internally displaced persons from the civil war. • The U.S. and other nations should provide financial assistance for efforts to document possible war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed by the junta's military forces and coordinate this effort with the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, the International Criminal Court, and the International Court of Justice.

The Relations of Middle Eastern Countries with Myanmar: The Challenge of Increasing Influence through Strategic and/or Economic Ties Amid the Persecution of the Muslim Rohingyas

The Relations of Middle Eastern Countries with Myanmar:The Challenge of Increasing Influence through Strategic and/or Economic Ties Amid the Persecution of the Muslim Rohingyas Michael B. Bishku (bio) Introduction Myanmar, known as Burma until June 18, 1989, received its independence from Britain on January 4, 1948, and, unlike India, never joined the Commonwealth. It has been either under direct military rule or that institution's strong influence since 1962. From that time until at least the late 1970s, it was "almost completely sealed off from the rest of the world." General Ne Win's regime "was reluctant to allow any foreigners into the country, and had a passion for keeping foreign influences at a minimum."1 As a result, the country's economic situation deteriorated greatly and Burma began seeking investment from abroad, something that would have adequate success by the early 2000s. Burma's powerful neighbors were the [End Page 22] first approached and were quite receptive.2 As conditions did not improve, by 1988 there was civilian unrest which the military quashed with the use of torture, arrests, and the killings of thousands. While an election was held in 1990 resulting in a landslide win for Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD), the military refused to hand over power. Nevertheless, Myanmar, which had been reluctant to join the Association of Asian Nations (ASEAN), an organization of states in Southeast Asia, during the Cold War, was admitted to the group in 1997. Today, even after the 2021 coup by Myanmar's army, most of ASEAN's other members, along with China and India, are the biggest foreign investors in Myanmar, with China and Singapore at the very top.3 Over the years, the United States, Britain, the European Union, Australia and Canada have imposed economic sanctions and arms embargos against Myanmar due to the human rights violations committed by the military, but eased them when political conditions improved.4 Those sanctions, corruption, and bureaucratic restrictions have discouraged some countries from investing in Myanmar. In 2012, Suu Kyi – who had been under house arrest for more than two-thirds of the time between 1989 and 2010 – and members of the NLD were elected to a limited number of seats in parliament, with that institution (and the country) still firmly under the control of the military. Also, in 2012, sectarian violence broke out in Rakhine (formerly Arakan) state – bordering Bangladesh – between Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims, the latter having been persecuted since General Ne Win's regime and effectively becoming stateless in 1982 when the Burmese government did not include them as one of 135 official ethnic groups. Since 2016, there has been an insurgency led by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, in which civilians have borne the [End Page 23] brunt of Myanmar's military actions. Meanwhile, in parliamentary elections in 2015 and 2020, Suu Kyi's NLD won landslide votes, but she was barred from becoming president, as her family members were British citizens; instead, she had to settle for the newly created post of state counsellor, a Myanmar version of prime minister. Although, in December 2019, Suu Kyi denied that the military's actions against the Rohingyas was genocide at the International Court of Justice,5 just over a year later, in February 2021, she was removed from office in a military coup and subsequently convicted of corruption, with other charges still pending. Myanmar is once again facing Western economic sanctions. While Middle Eastern states have periodically expressed concern for the welfare of the Rohingyas and criticism of Myanmar's policy in Rakhine state, the Arab Gulf states nevertheless have shown the greatest interest in increasing economic ties with Myanmar. Following the coup against Suu Kyi's government in 2021, Iran has reportedly provided Myanmar with military assistance. While there has been some academic study of Israel's relations with Burma/Myanmar, especially during the early years when that country was under civilian rule,6 no significant attention has been given to the ties of countries in the Muslim Middle East with Burma/Myanmar, a relationship that has been slower to develop, with the exception of Egypt, whose interests in Asia have diminished...

Peran ASEAN dalam Menghadapi Isu Pelanggaran HAM Pasca Kudeta Militer di Myanmar Tahun 2021

The background of this research The background of this research is the military coup in Myanmar in 2021, military coup occurred because of allegations of corruption and election fraud Myanmar in 2020 won by National League for Democracy. Myanmar’s people refuse the coup by doing a demonstration to government and new policies, but Tatmadaw reactionto rejection of the coup resulted a human Rights violations, many victims were killed, violence against society, and violate individual rights. This case raises the issue of human rights violations was conducted by Myanmar post military coup, ASEAN as regional organization in Southeast Asia have the authority to give a response on the issue of human rights violations in Myanmar post military coup. This research used qualitative-descriptive method with liberalism institutionalism and role of international organizations, in this research was conducted to describe the role of ASEAN in resolve the issue of human rights violations in Myanmar post military coup. The result of this research show ASEAN’s role as a communication and cooperation tool to raise this issue in ASEAN’s forum, ASEAN as a platform to generate of five point consensus as a positive solution for Myanmar, and ASEAN as administration platform in promoting realization of five point consensus. All forms of ASEAN’s action in 2021 until 2022 is a part of ASEAN effort to resolve human rights violations in Myanmar post military coup.

SOLIDARITY FOR MYANMAR: #MILKTEAALLIANCE INDONESIA’S TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM IN PRESSURING THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA AND ASEAN

The military coup in Myanmar on February 1, 2021, carried out by the Tatmadaw against top officials from the newly elected-government–in which National League for Democracy (NLD) Party made the majority–brought strong backlashes from civil society, one of which was the Milk Tea Alliance. This paper discusses the activism of Milk Tea Alliance Indonesia in pressuring the Indonesian government and ASEAN, especially during the ASEAN Special Summit. This paper is based on qualitative method using literature review on the case study of Milk Tea Alliance activism in Indonesia. By referring to the ‘Boomerang pattern’ framework on transnational advocacy network, this paper argues that the Milk Tea Alliance represents a valuable model in South-South civil society cooperation due to the multiplicity of channels, actor form, and issues. Therefore, it plays an essential role in decolonizing the unequal North-South relations in the initial concept of Keck & Sikkink. Furthermore, this article also exposes the role of regional norms in influencing the ‘boomerang pattern,’ making it difficult for the solidarity to push ASEAN & Indonesian government as the de-facto leader of ASEAN to act stricter on Tatmadaw.

Myanmar's 2020 Election: Explaining the Strong Performance of the NLD and Some Ethnic Parties

AbstractAung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) won another landslide victory in the 2020 general election. Although there was widespread dissatisfaction with the government's poor management of the economy and ethnic conflicts, as well as with the pre-electoral coordination of ethnic parties in several states, opposition and ethnic-based parties had failed to gain more seats. Previous explanations had focused on the economy, electoral system bias, weak party institutionalization, and vote splitting among ethnic parties; however, they underestimated the significance of two contextual factors: military dominance of politics and ethnic conflict. This article argues that military dominance hindered normal political development in Myanmar. The anti-military sentiment favored the NLD, which made most Bamar voters disregard the party's poor economic performance. Despite the electoral system's bias, prolonged ethnic conflicts made ethnic parties that had fought for their community's causes more likely to maintain support. These arguments are verified by survey and electoral data sets. The military nullified the 2020 election claiming that electoral fraud was to blame, but the findings indicate that it was the political environment the military created that led to the victory of the NLD and some ethnic parties in the first place.

ASEAN’s Response to the Myanmar Military Coup: From Non-Intervention to Responsibility to Protect

This article examines how ASEAN has reacted to the military coup in Myanmar. The February 1, 2021 coup was appalling because Myanmar was progressing toward democracy especially since Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory in the 2015 general election. This article shows that although ASEAN tries to adopt ‘constructive engagement’ towards Myanmar, its approaches remain ineffective because it basically still maintains the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of its member states. ASEAN must recognize that regional stability depends on respect for democracy, human rights, and rule of law within each member states. This article argues that ASEAN needs to transform its ineffective approaches toward more active response by gradually internalizing the new concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) and actively put pressures on the military to restore democracy in the country.

Myanmar's strategy in the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor: a failure in hedging?

Abstract This article examines Myanmar's hedging strategies in China's Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a key component of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Myanmar has avoided being overly reliant on China by strategically hedging and diversifying its foreign relations with other countries in the region. However, Myanmar's ability to hedge is compromised by its domestic fragmentation, caused by the protracted civil war and rising civil–military tensions. We focus on the two advanced projects in CMEC, the Muse–Mandalay railway and Kyaukphyu deep seaport, and have conducted qualitative, semi-structured interviews with key actors involved in China–Myanmar relations (2016–2021) under the National League for Democracy (NLD). Through the fieldwork findings, we problematize the assumption in the hedging literature which takes for granted a country's competence to act strategically in their foreign policy. Our findings from the Myanmar case suggest that the state's level of fragmentation and capability to hedge are inversely proportional. The multiple actors in Myanmar's political space complicate its China policy and limit its ability to hedge effectively. This is augmented by the military coup in February 2021, which further fragmented the country, compromising Myanmar's China policy even further, making hedging a less viable framework to examine Myanmar's China strategy.

On My Way Home

On My Way Home Khin Min Zaw (bio) Translated from Burmese by ko ko thett This poem is witness to the mass deportation of Burmese immigrant workers from Thailand in early 2020, during the first wave of covid-19. k.k.t. Yes,I am on my way home.At home I have Aphay.At home I have Amay.At home there are childrenof my bosom, who count on me.There is my little brother.There is my little sister.There's a pair of oxen in hock;I ought to go back for them.Through the thatch roof of our housewe can see the moon and the stars:I will have to patch it up.Yes,I am on my way home.The factory I worked for has shut down.The country I was in temporarilyhas revoked my temporary stay permit.I am returning to my place of birth.I am going back to my native land.Yes,I am on my way home.I am a daughter of Myanmar.I was born in Myanmar.I hold a Myanmar national identity card.The only language I know is Burmese.Wherever my children are bornthey will be from Myanmar. [End Page 213] Yes,I am on my way home.Whatever pandemicI will face it together with Myanmar people.Whatever virusI want to ride it out at home.Whatever might ail meI want to die in the loving shelterof Aphay and Amay.How could I leave them?Bury me at my birthplace when I die.Yes,I am on my way home.I will abide by restrictions at home.I'd like to receive care at home.I'd like an embrace from home.Yes,I am on my way home.I'd like to livean honest and incorrupt life.I am on my way home. [End Page 214] Khin Min Zaw Khin Min Zaw is from Pathein. While a student at Rangoon University, she became active in the 1988 democracy uprising, first with the university's student union and later with the National League for Democracy. In 1990 she was arrested, interrogated, and jailed for her political activism. She later published a memoir, I am Khin Min Zaw, about the period. Ko Ko Thett ko ko thett is a bilingual poet and author of several collections of poetry and poetry translations in Burmese and English. He has been featured at literary events from Sharjah to Shanghai, and his poems and translations have appeared in literary journals and anthologies worldwide. He was the poetry editor for Mekong Review from 2017 to 2022. His most recent volume is Bamboophobia (Zephyr, 2022). He lives in Norwich, U.K. Copyright © 2022 University of Hawai'i Press

The Union Election Commission of Myanmar 2010–2020

AbstractThe 2008 Constitution of the Union of Myanmar establishes the framework for a ‘discipline-flourishing’ constitutional democracy in which the Tatmadaw, the Burmese military, retains a significant degree of power. Under this Constitution, the Union Election Commission (UEC) is vested with significant authority to supervise elections, regulate political parties and electoral campaigns, register voters, suspend elections, and to make conclusive determinations in electoral disputes. Between 2010 and 2020, the UEC oversaw three consecutive general elections and three by-elections. Following a term under the former military leadership, the country's major democratic opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), won a resounding victory in the 2015 elections. In the years that followed, civilian-military relations were a source of tension, as the NLD attempted to reform the executive and legislative roles for the military guaranteed by the Constitution. These tensions became in particular tangible during the 2020 elections, which the NLD again won in a landslide victory. The military alleged the election was marred by fraud while the UEC rejected this allegation. On 1 February 2021, hours before the new parliament was to convene, the Tatmadaw staged a coup d’état. This article reviews the UEC in its constitutional and political context. It identifies its institutional features, significant points in its brief history, and the impact of UEC leadership as a contributing factor in fostering confidence in the electoral process.

Democratic Deficits: Structural and Agency Factors in Myanmar’s Ethnic Peace Process during Regime Transition

Myanmar has undergone democratic transition since 2010 when the country introduced elections and a parliamentary form of government. The country has now had two successive governments, the first led by President Thein Sein and the second by Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy. Both governments have made the ethnic peace process, based on the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, a key policy issue. Nonetheless, only limited success has been obtained thus far, and important structural and agency factors inhibit greater progress. These factors, termed “democracy deficits” in this article, suggest that the peace process has limited scope for further success in the medium term, and that the interactions between these two factors has only worsened the situation. A postscript brings the article up to date.

Myanmar's Foreign Policy: Shifting Legitimacy, Shifting Strategic Culture

Since 2011, while the principles of foreign policy “independent, active, and non-aligned” under the respective governments under the Union Solidarity and Development Party and the National League for Democracy have remained the same, the foreign policy approaches – including the concept of non-alignment – of the two leaders of these governments have been quite different. This article describes the survival and foreign policy of the small country of Myanmar beyond the great power lens, arguing that the impact of strategic culture on the two governments since 2011 has differed because of the different levels of legitimacy enjoyed by the two leaders. The cornerstones of Myanmar's strategic culture are (1) that it shall never tolerate foreign interference, (2) that it shall always pursue self-reliance in its diplomacy, and (3) that the very nature of Myanmar is to be independent.

Why the NLD fails to consolidate democratic transition in Myanmar

The general populace in Myanmar, as well as international observers, have expected that the National League for Democracy (NLD) would be able to consolidate democratic transition, since the latter obtained a certain degree of support from home and abroad. During the five years of the NLD administration, transition has nevertheless been in regression instead of progression. All rating agencies (Freedom House, Bertelsmann, VDem) consider that Myanmar is not yet a democracy. Freedom House's report indicates that Myanmar's status changed from ‘Partly Free’ to ‘Not Free’ in 2020. Much of the existing literature argues that this stems from the NLD having had to operate within structural constraints and agency curbs. Therefore, this article will examine why the NLD is unable to overcome these barriers, under which structural factors and what kind of agency. The article argues that, instead of structure-altering, the NLD has reinforced structural barriers without seeking any considerable leeway within the bounds of existing constraints. In the context of structure, this article will examine the transition process itself, as well as constitutional arrangements, the economic system, and the political culture. The agency context will include the behaviours of the chief executive, the Tatmadaw, and the general populace.

Party strength and party weakness in transitional elections: Myanmar’s National League for Democracy in 2015

ABSTRACT The National League for Democracy secured an astonishing electoral victory in Myanmar’s 2015 general elections after nearly three decades of repression of the party. Despite this victory, there are conflicting accounts on whether the NLD was a strong or a weak party leading into these elections. Appealing to data from an original survey and extensive qualitative field research, this article measures the NLD’s strength in 2015 and explores the mechanisms behind it. When operationalized as reported contact with voters, the NLD appears to have been a very strong party, but this strength can be explained by the same widespread enthusiasm for change, for democracy, and for Aung San Suu Kyi that existing scholarship appeals to in explaining the party’s victory in general. This finding has important implications for the NLD in the 2020 and future elections, as well as for our understanding of the dynamics of party strength in transitional regimes and new democracies more generally. Most importantly, the strategies parties have employed in transitions are unlikely to be successful in subsequent elections, as widespread enthusiasm and momentum gives way to everyday politics, but newly governing parties are likely to keep appealing to them precisely because they were so successful.

The Persecution of Rohingya Muslims and the Path to Democratization in Myanmar

Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar have long endured severe discrimination and persecution. Although the Rohingya have lived in Myanmar for centuries, their existence is not fully accepted by the majority of Buddhist society. Rohingya Muslims residing in the north-western area of Rakhine are considered stateless people. In the last ten years, Rohingya Muslims have been treated severely and even expelled from their place of birth. This humanitarian crisis has attracted many international organizations that are aiding Rohingya and urging Myanmar’s civilian government to recognize Rohingya as an official ethnic group. This article explores the roots of Islamophobia in Myanmar and analyses its effect on Muslims’ daily life in Myanmar, and in particular for the Rohingya. Ultimately, it is important to discern the path of democratization in Myanmar, as currently led by Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), analyzing the present state and future of democratization of the country, especially on a socio-political level.

Myanmar’s military coup and the elevation of the minority agenda?

ABSTRACT The military overthrow of Myanmar’s elected government in February 2021 has again thrown into upheaval the troublesome relationship between civilian politicians and armed forces that has plagued the country since its first military coup in 1962. t has also brought back into view the relationship between Myanmar’s Bamar majority and the country’s ethnic minorities, a fractious issue that has long been subject to band-aid and patchwork solutions that skirt around the deeper causes of minority disaffection. Myanmar’s minority groups have long-standing grievances against the repression and brutality of the Bamar-dominated military and feel marginalized. Their attitude to the Bamar-dominated National League for Democracy (NLD) government of 2016-2021, led by Aung San Suu Kyi until her ouster and arrest, was one of despair at the continuing death and destruction brought by civil conflict, dismay at the silence of political leaders on the plight of civilians displaced by war, and anger at the quasi-authoritarian policies by the civilian administration. These dynamics have helped determine allegiances in the ongoing protests against military rule, pressed the ousted government into changing its policies to better reflect minority aspirations, and will likely transform Myanmar’s political landscape in a manner that would have been inconceivable before the coup.

‘Politicide’ and the Myanmar coup

Can the 2021 Myanmar coup be understood as part of a broader campaign by the Burmese army to commit ‘politicide’? The recent wave of violent raids, detentions and extrajudicial killings taking place across Myanmar is part of a long‐standing pattern of systematic violence perpetrated against political groups and social movements that challenge military control and dominance. The author reviews the history of persecution directed at the National League for Democracy (NLD), the 88 Generation, All Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU) and others who took part in the Burmese democracy movement. The author also reports findings from a multi‐year ethnography she conducted with a community of activists and former political prisoners. She observes that, like ethnic and religious groups, this political community possesses stable, characteristic features, which are transmitted intergenerationally. She advocates for use of the term ‘politicide’ to understand both the recent coup and the history of violence perpetrated against the NLD, 88 Generation ABSFU and other groups inside Myanmar.