In the mid-twentieth century, the identity of those who oversaw the UK electricity grid tentatively and slowly began to shift from those who joined the electricity industry directly from secondary school to a university-educated elite with a higher level of technical education. At the same time, electricity infrastructure became increasingly centralised, leading to the creation of a national grid in 1938, meaning that control of electricity became concentrated in the hands of an ever-smaller group and increasing the stakes in debates over strategy. By using the case studies of power engineer Paul Schiller and mathematician Maurice Davies, this paper traces how the boundaries of what mathematics could or could not be used for were renegotiated between factions within the UK electricity industry. Schiller unsuccessfully attempted to use mathematics, including the authority of academic mathematicians, to reinforce controversial arguments about the strategic direction of the industry in the 1940s. Such arguments failed to resonate with a class of, as Schiller put it, “practical men” that still held considerable influence. Davies on the other hand was employed by the industry in the 1950s to improve efficiency, and was able to implement lasting measures in this effort by using the weather to forecast electricity demand, and successfully defended the usefulness of his work in the 1970s against colleagues who felt that forecasting could be done better with mathematical models without weather inputs. The contrast between these two stories shows how the influence of mathematical thinking was contingent upon existing power dynamics, and reinforce how the history of mathematics should be socially embedded.
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