National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Research Articles

지구중력장모형에 따른 국내 지역별 지오이드고

최근 새로운 초 고차 지구중력장 모형(EGM2008)의 개발로 인하여 중력관련 응용분야의 향상이 기대되고 있다. 본 연구는 지구중력장모형(EGM)으로부터 남한지역에 대한 고도이상(height anomalies)를 산정하고 지역별 지오이드고의 특성을 분석하였다. 이를 위하여 7가지 지구중력장모형(EGM2008<2,190>, EGM2008<360>, EGM96, EIGEN-GL04C, EIGEN-CG03C, EIGEN-GL04S1 및 ITG- Grace02S)을 선정하였다. GPS 관측이 수행된 수준점 50개 측점을 점검점으로 선정하여 GPS/Levelling, 국립해양조사원(NORI)의 NORI-05 모형 및 7가지 EGMs에 의한 지오이드 고를 비교 분석하였다. 또한, 남한지역의 경 위도 <TEX>$1^{\circ}\times1^{\circ}$</TEX> 6개 육상부 및 4개 해상부에 대한 30"<TEX>$\times$</TEX>30" 격자점을 대상으로 EGM2008 모델에 의한 지오이드고를 NORI-05 모델 및 6가지 EGMs로 부터 구한 결과와 비교하였다. 연구결과, NGA(National Geospatial Intelligence Agency)의 EGM2008(2,190) 모형이 GPS/Levelling 결과에 가장 근접함을 보였다. The new high order Earth's gravity Model(EGM2008) are expected to improve the application about the Earth's global gravity field. The objectives of this research are to present characteristics on the geoid heights of provinces in South KOREA which calculated from the height anomalies by Earth Gravity Models. For this, seven EGMs (EGM2008<2,190>, EGM2008<360>, EGM96, EIGEN-GL04C, EIGEN-CG03C, EIGEN-GL04S1, and ITG-Grace02S) selected. Geoid heights of fifty BM check points by GPS/levelling are compared with those by NORI-05 model and seven EGMs. And also, geoid heights of 30"<TEX>$\times$</TEX>30" grid points in land(sixes blocks ; <TEX>$1^{\circ}\times1^{\circ}$</TEX> sampled) and sea (four blocks ; <TEX>$1^{\circ}\times1^{\circ}$</TEX> sampled) areas of South KOREA by EGM2008 are compared with those by NORI-05 and six EGMs. The results show that geoid heights obtained from EGM2008(2,190) of NGA displayed the nearest results to those by GPS/levelling.

Of Note: Intelligent Reform?

Of Note:Intelligent Reform? Emma Ashburn In the run-up to 9/11, the U.S. government spent millions of dollars to reproduce information that agencies already had but refused to share with others. These efforts included building antennae aimed to intercept phone calls of suspected terrorists and setting up a satellite phone booth in Kandahar for eavesdropping on suspected terrorists.1 After 9/11, Congress created the office of the Director of National Intelligence to integrate intelligence collecting and analysis work, yet critics argue that nothing short of a change as drastic as the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act can reform such structural deficiencies. The lack of a unifying authority in the intelligence community was mirrored in U.S. combat operations before the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. several military disasters in the early 1980s prompted the passage of the act in 1986. These blunders resulted from the military's inability to coordinate planning, and included the botched 1980 rescue mission of U.S. hostages in Iran, the 1982 Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, and the clumsy intervention in Grenada in 1983. Before 1986, the leaders of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps were charged with forming and implementing an integrated defense policy, but were not forced to plan with other agencies, only to coordinate their plans.2 The Goldwater-Nichols Act, named for Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative Bill Nichols, created the Unified Command plan, which required different commands to command "jointly" together in the field. The four services—Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps—must assign personnel to the joint combatant commander. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has budgetary authority and speaks with the authority of the President in important matters. In addition, as a prerequisite for promotion, officers must serve tours in different commands, both regional and functional.3 Much like the pre-reform defense structure, the pre-9/11 intelligence community was set up to satisfy post-World War II and Cold War demands. Each intelligence agency had a specific function, with the expectation that the agency would produce narrowly focused, thorough research.4 The community's current configuration resembles that of the disjointed military framework before the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which was at its highest levels a committee that could act only with the consensus of all of its members. [End Page 139] Inter-departmental rivalries and security fears lead to each agency acting in near-isolation. Serious reform is still needed to prevent additional terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, intelligence reform has proven to be more difficult to complete than military reform. One problem is that U.S. intelligence agencies are spread between pure intelligence functions and defense-related functions. In 2004, Robert Gates, now the head of the Department of Defense (DOD), wrote in a New York Times editorial that "more than 80% of foreign intelligence dollars are spent by agencies under the control of the Secretary of Defense," and went on to explain that since these agencies perform other functions in addition to intelligence, Defense officials would never agree to relinquish control to an intelligence "czar" in the white house.5 Observers have noted continued struggles over jurisdiction between the CIA and DOD. The Defense Department has continued to develop multi-million dollar information-gathering units as well as enter into the territory previously held by the CIA in terms of collecting "human intelligence," or intelligence collecting through interpersonal contact as opposed to through wiretapping or other data mining.6 Also in November 2005, the Pentagon issued a directive in which it asserted control over the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, which are all part of DOD. Then Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte received criticism for not resisting the DOD assertion of authority.7 The problem of isolated intelligence gatherers has persisted even since the time of the Cold War. The writers of a 1969 CIA report lamented the fact that "US intelligence activities are to be conducted as a coordinated rather than an integrated effort."8 Different agencies and departments still require more drastic overhaul in order to solve the problems of not...

Access to Aeronautical Charts and Data by the U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

In November, 2004 the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) announced its intention to withdraw essentially all of its aeronautical chart and related digital data publications from public distribution. Citing multiple concerns (potential use by terrorists, potential threats to the integrity of its own data, and commercial/copyright issues), NGA's proposed withdrawal would have removed huge volumes of traditionally open data from public access and established ominous precedents in the post-9/11 environment. Map libraries of all kinds would have been affected correspondingly. The paper seeks to explore each stated rationale by NGA, and also seeks to explain all NGA product series, including some rather arcane digital products, that were at stake for withdrawal.

New products from the shuttle radar topography mission

New data products with broad applicability to the Earth sciences are now available from the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM). SRTM, a joint project of the National Geospatial‐Intelligence Agency (NGA) and NASA, flew aboard the Space Shuttle Endeavour on an 11‐day mission in February 2000 with the goal of collecting a near‐global data set of high‐resolution elevation data [Fan and Kobrick, 2000]. Data from the mission have been available to researchers for several years, but newly available products offer enhanced usability and applicability.Final products include elevation data resulting from a substantial editing effort by the NGA in which water bodies and coastlines were well defined and data artifacts known as spikes and wells (single pixel errors) were removed. This second version of the SRTM data set, also referred to as ‘finished’ data, represents a significant improvement over earlier versions that had nonflat water bodies, poorly defined coastlines, and numerous noise artifacts. The edited data are available at a one‐arc‐second resolution (approximately 30 meters) for the United States and its territories, and at a three‐arc‐second resolution (approximately 90 meters) for non‐U.S. areas.

Modeling and analysis of a Canadian Forces Geomatics division workflow

This paper addresses workflow issues of a Geomatics division in the Canadian Forces. This division is dedicated to the production of Geomatics Information under the US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s Foundation Based Operations concept. This paper outlines a methodology for modeling and analyzing the workflow of the Canadian Forces Geomatics division. A discrete event simulation model is developed and applied to measure the performance of the workflow system for developing Geomatics products. A hybrid queueing network/optimization model is also developed to support the simulation model. The objective of the queueing network/optimization formulation is to provide the optimal configuration of the Geomatics division. The paper successfully addresses a complex workflow problem in the context of real world system and provides insights into the performance of the Canadian Forces Geomatics processing.

The SRTM Data “Finishing” Process and Products

The Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM) successfully acquired terrain elevation data for 80 percent of the Earth’s landmass in February 2000. The radar system and data collection scheme designed by NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) met the global requirements of the U.S. Department of Defense for Level 2 Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED ® ). JPL processed the raw data into unfinished DTED ® 2 and other products that were delivered to two contractors of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The contractors edited the unfinished DTED ® 2, updated the associated products, and generated finished products for distribution. Automated processes were developed by each contractor to identify, delineate and set heights for lakes, rivers, and ocean coastlines in conformance with an extensive set of editing rules created to maintain consistency and uniformity in the final products. The finished DTED ® is significantly better than the 16 m vertical accuracy required by the original specification.

Science and the Digital Divide

A t the launch of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in Geneva in December 2003, the world community strongly affirmed the central role of science in developing an information society and affirmed the principle of “universal access with equal opportunities for all scientific knowledge and the creation and dissemination of scientific and technical information.” The WSIS Declaration of Principles recognized the essential role of the public domain and public institutions such as libraries, archives, and museums in supporting the growth of the Information Society and providing free and equitable access to information.[*][1] The WSIS Plan of Action suggested numerous approaches to implement these principles, including “e-science” as a key application of information and communication technologies in support of sustainable development.[†][2] The international scientific community succeeded in raising these issues at WSIS and securing widespread support from participating governments. Now, with the second phase of WSIS taking place in Tunis in November 2005, the scientific community needs to take the lead in demonstrating how science—and universal access to scientific data, information, and knowledge—can make a critical difference in sustainable development and overcoming the “digital divide.” The deadly South Asian tsunami in December 2004 and what many have called the “silent tsunamis” of millions of unnecessary deaths and untold suffering from malnutrition, disease, and poverty remind us that science has far to go. Scientists must work not only to predict future hazards and develop new medicines and vaccines, but also to make scientific data and information much more accessible and useful for real-world decision-making. These disasters underscore the need to better understand how societies can best organize themselves to address pressing problems posed by limited resources, conflict, poor infrastructure, and inadequate skills and knowledge. Scientists, the original developers of information and communication technologies, often take for granted their ready access to data and information, software and hardware, and networks of colleagues. But for billions of people, even the most rudimentary access to life-saving scientific expertise and knowledge, such as an early warning or a new cropping method, is a major challenge. ![Figure][3] CREDIT: STEVEN HUNT/GETTY IMAGES How can the international scientific community help reduce the digital divide? Already, many scientists and scientific institutions are working to improve the reach and effectiveness of science through information and communication technologies. The International Council for Science (ICSU) and its Committee on Data for Science and Technology (CODATA) are collaborating with WSIS to collect and document such efforts ([www.wsis-online.net/science/home_EN/][4]). But more needs to be done. Scientists can support distance education and training; improve the accessibility of information and communication technologies to disadvantaged, marginalized, and vulnerable groups; communicate technical knowledge to the general public; and establish digital libraries, data archives, and other mechanisms to increase access to scientific information. We urge the scientific community to come up with more creative ideas and outcomes. Noteworthy examples on this front include the efforts by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to provide electronic access to its course materials ( ) and by the Global Biodiversity Information Facility to make primary scientific biodiversity data openly available ( ). The scientific community should also consider new approaches to open electronic access, such as the Science Commons ( ), that, among other things, address the complex issue of licensing structures. Immediately after the South Asian tsunami, critical data on elevation, population location, administrative boundaries, and damage could not be shared because of intellectual property and national security constraints. Even now, the 30-meter-resolution data from the Shuttle Radar Topographic Mission (SRTM) flown by NASA in the year 2000 is not publicly available, although it could potentially provide the best available elevation information regarding most of the world's coasts. The pending decision by the U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to prohibit public access to various aeronautical products would be another step in the wrong direction. The scientific community needs to press governments not only to release specific data sets that are vital to disaster management and planning, but also to establish a “good Samaritan” principle for the use of data and information in humanitarian emergencies. Science helped to create the Information Society—it can now help extend that society to all. [1]: #fn-1 [2]: #fn-2 [3]: pending:yes [4]: http://www.wsis-online.net/science/home_EN/

7.2.1 Development of an Integrated Facilities' Management Baseline at a Federal Agency Using a Systems Engineering Approach

AbstractThe National Geospatial‐Intelligence Agency (NGA) has implemented an integrated facilities' management program covering its many buildings, operations, and site locations. In conjunction with organizational structure development, a commercial‐off‐the‐shelf (COTS) computer aided facilities management (CAFM) system was implemented to integrate data collection and user control. These facilities' management aspects include tracking building floor space usage, employee locations, AutoCad building designs, equipment inventory, operations and maintenance scheduling, etc. The systems engineering process included a spiral architecture development model, initial and recurring data validations, a risk management review, and multiple phases of tracking requirements and change control. Formal configuration management boards (CMB) were a critical element of development and continuing operation of CAFM. Use of an open systems interface design to allow exchange of data between CAFM and related databases from Human Resources and Security Departments was essential. By replacing the many separate legacy facilities programs with an integrated CAFM package, more complete data information was collected which allowed for better control and operation of facilities resources and improved strategic facilities' planning.