1. Introduction The EU and its member states have had remarkable influence on the modernisation and development in candidate, neighbouring and colonial countries throughout its existence. Conditionality, integration, harmonisation and Europeanisation have been the main conceptual instruments of such partnership, and possible future membership has often been the main motivation for keeping this cooperation effective. It has been specific type of partnership with an ever-growing set of criteria for democracy, market economy and administrative capacity in target countries and with remarkable financial and knowledge support on the EU's part. Since the 1990s, the conditions have been developed into an official comprehensive form with demands, an evaluation model, rewards and possible sanctions. The EU and its member states have characterised conditionality as functional part of integration, where guidance and strict rules are needed to provide effective modernisation, convergence and the use of funds. In many aspects the pre-accession conditionality has served as the best option to explain to candidate countries that they have 'take it or leave it' situation. Solana (2003) simply describes it as, We just ask the countries which are interested in participating in our structures to comply with our rules and to share our values. This paper will focus on the driving forces which have been dominant in the pre-accession conditionality from the first to fifth enlargements: has it been neo-functional motive to support fulfilment of accession criteria by candidates, or neo-imperial motive to use the accession conditionality mainly in the interests of the existing member states to fix their advantages in economic and political affairs? It will offer comparative analysis on the pre-accession situation, conditionality levels and argumentation of motivation for the first five EU enlargements. Finally the paper will analyse the developing trends in the components and levels of positive conditionality affecting the neighbourhood and pre-accession frameworks. Presumably these research results allow us to evaluate and project the logic and dynamics of the EU enlargement process and external relations in the future. But the analysis of conditionality principles also allows us to debate the nature and goals of the EU: is it still functional and integrated union of member states or is it transforming into an empire with centre and peripheries? 2. What do we mean by conditionality? Generally speaking, conditionality can be considered theoretical sub-component or method explaining the logical relations between two or more actors. Conditionality provides toolbox in linking the state or international organisation, or benefits desired by another state, to the fulfilment of certain conditions (Smith 1987). Conditionality can be perceived in that sense as norm or institutional agreement. Killick (1998:6) has defined conditionality as a set of mutual arrangements by which government takes, or promises to take, certain policy actions, in support of which an international financial institution or other agency will provide specified amounts of financial assistance. There is some analogy with legal norms, especially with negative conditionality, where any rejection or violation causes punishments and sanctions. The main functional argument for using conditionality is greater social, economic or political influence, while avoiding more dangerous or costlier methods. Conditionality is based on the belief that assistance will produce cumulative progress and growth: forced reforms create political support and political support allows the reforms and modernisation to continue (Fiero 2003:95). Conditionality models can be divided into two quite different sets: first, those designed for development cooperation in the least developed countries (e.g. Killick 1998, Chekel 2001, Collier 1999), and second, those developed by the EU and NATO in order to impose structural pre-accession conditionality (e. …