Muslim Activists Research Articles

Hip Hop Matters: Race, Space, and Islam in Chicago

AbstractIn this article I examine pious Muslim placemaking against the backdrop of race and class tensions in the United States. I contend that ideologies of anti‐Blackness converge with pious Muslim space and placemaking practices to create a moralized division of space for Chicago Muslims. Specifically, I look at the ways that pious Muslim placemaking in Chicago suburbs by Muslim immigrant parents is entangled in elisions of race and class in the US. I show that whereas a generation of Muslim parents pursued a pious Muslim life in proximity to a White, middle‐class, American dream, groups of young Muslim activists are making Muslim space and place through Blackness in the 'hood. I argue that young Muslim activists embrace hip hop's remaking of space and place to remap the pious geographies of Muslims in Chicago and challenge conceptions of pious Muslim identity that are inflected with anti‐Blackness. I demonstrate how these young Muslims find value in Blackness, as an ethic of social justice and an exemplar of Muslim piety, to contest hegemonic isomorphisms of race, space, place, and morality. Thus, I argue that by reclaiming and remaking space and place, young Muslims oppose anti‐Black racism found within broader US society as well as within the entrenched divisions of pious Muslim space in Chicago.

Social media and the birth of an Islamic social movement: ODOJ (One Day One Juz) in contemporary Indonesia

ABSTRACTThe Indonesian democratic transition, which occurred after the collapse of the New Order, was a significant moment that enabled diverse Islamic groups to use media for their own interests. However, little has been discussed regarding the use of media in dakwah (Islamic proselytising) performed by Muslim activists who are not inclined to participate in radical activities. This article focuses on the use of social media in dakwah by One Day One Juz (ODOJ), which endeavours to encourage Muslims to revive the spirit of reading the Qur’an through the mobile application WhatsApp. Given that ODOJ has successfully recruited more than 140,000 followers in Indonesia and abroad, this article investigates the key actors of ODOJ and the extent to which it has mobilised religious sentiments among Muslims from diverse affiliations. It argues that WhatsApp has enabled the birth of a semi-virtual Qur’anic movement, which is rooted in the Tarbiyah movement. Unlike well established Islamic movements in Indonesia that harness global computer networks to strengthen their influence, ODOJ has been dependant on technology since its inception. It demonstrates the capacity of technology in generating and crafting this new semi-virtual socio-religious movement. ODOJ has painted new colour onto the contemporary Islamic public and its presence is imperative to understanding the transformation of the religious media-scape in Indonesia.

A Muslim Azef, or One More Orientalist: Playing the Other in Imperio-Orientalist Mirrors

The paper discusses constructing various versions of Muslim identity by politically opposite actors, the government and Muslim activists, involved in ‘placing’ Muslims in modernizing late-imperial Russia. The problem is approached through the extreme case of M.B. Hadjetlache (ca. 1870-1929), a baptized Jew reinventing himself as Circassian and Muslim and as such working as a State agent against Muslim opposition and vice versa. His strategies of deceit and reasons to trust him in different cultural and political milieus reveal reciprocal and often shared Orientalisms of the ‘regimes of truth’ defining the processes under study.

Pendekatan Hukum Islam terhadap Jihad dan Terorisme

There is a presumption of some circles of non-Muslims that Muslims are the spreader of terrors and terrorism throughout the world through the implementation of the concept of jihād. This assumption seemed to be justified the emerging terrorism cases involving Muslim actors, such as suicide bombings. This paper aims to clarify the issue by critically scrutinizing the true meaning of jihād rooted both in the holy book the al-Qur’an and sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad. Socio-historical approach is applied to better understand the holistic context of the meaning of jihād concept in both sources of Islamic teachings. The author concludes that the presumption is a misconception resulting from ignorance of certain parties about the true meaning of jihād in Islam. There is also a possibility that the misunderstanding is intentional, because the motives of abusing the dignity of Islamic teachings, especially about jihād.

Homeschooling: Indonesia New Trend of Islamic Education in the Global Era

Nowadays, concept of school is not only in the formal school concept but also non-formal and informal school. Schooling at home (homeschooling) occur in Indonesia marks a new trend of education which is quite interesting to observe. Moreover, some homeschooling that occurred in recent years has identified itself as homeschooling that applied Islamic education concept. Moreover, the interesting side of this homeschooling is that it’s initiated by the former College Muslim Activists. The movement of College Muslim Activist is interesting to note further because of its role in the Islamization of the educational institutions in Indonesia. This article describes one educational model established by former College Muslim Activist, Homeschooling Group Khairu Ummah Bantul. The results showed that the establishment of Homeschooling Group Khairu Ummah Bantul motivated by four reasons, there are: (1) moral and religious reasons, (2) family unity reasons, (3) academic reasons, and (4) socialization reasons.

On the ‘front lines’ of the classroom: moral education and Muslim students in French state schools

This paper examines the role of the French state school classroom as a scene of moral pedagogy from the point of view of the French state and Muslim community activists. I argue that in both sets of discourses, the state school classroom is consistently figured as the front lines of a battleground, in which teachers, students, and parents are all combatants, but the sides and stakes of the battle are drawn differently. In each account, though, the stakes of the battle centre on the moral education of the rising generation. The state discourses fit with the history of French pedagogical theory since the inception of the state schools, and mark a recent ‘return of the moral’ in French public discourse and policy making. In response to the increased securitisation of the state school classroom in the aftermath of the attacks of January and November 2015, French Muslim activists have addressed a variety of conflicts related to the schools as a single coordinated fight against Islamophobia, discrimination, and persistent inequalities. By both paralleling and inverting the state’s ‘battleground’ rhetoric in their critiques, these activists situate themselves at the heart of the national conversation about how to form the rising generation as ethical subjects.

Muslim Innovations in American Exceptionalist Rhetoric: Linda Sarsour's American Jeremiad

This article focuses on the rhetoric of American Muslim activist Linda Sarsour. Sarsour makes use of social media to pose a critique of American society, in the style of an American jeremiad. Sarsour serves as a jeremiadic preacher, who lambastes the chosen American people for straying from their ideals of liberty and justice, and incites them to fulfill their destiny as beacons of hope for racial harmony and respect for human rights.

Coded Language Among Muslim Activists: Salafīs and the Prophet’s Sermon of Necessity

This article examines how use of the Prophet Muḥammad’s Khuṭbat al-ḥāja (Sermon of Necessity) became a distinguishing marker of Salafism. To understand the Sermon’s role, the article draws on the notion of “coded language,” messages that communities use to communicate with insiders while excluding outsiders. The article analyzes the content of the Sermon and describes its spread among Salafīs. The Sermon was championed by Muḥammad Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī (1914-99), who played a pivotal role in shaping Salafī practice. Relating the Sermon’s spread to methodological debates about studying Salafism, the article suggests that the Sermon furnishes one empirical criterion that can be used to date Salafism’s crystallization to the mid-twentieth century. The article closes by examining how jihādīs selectively use the Sermon to “Salafize” their speech, and by discussing how instances of opposition to the Sermon’s use were connected to debates over the validity of Salafism and the status of al-Albānī.

Chinese Strategy for De-radicalization

ABSTRACTChina is fighting a tough battle against separatist terrorism perpetrated by militant Muslim Uyghurs in the far-western region of Xinjiang. De-radicalization is one of the policies the authorities in Xinjiang have recently taken to address the upsurge in terrorist violence. This paper consists of five parts. The first part deals with the background against which the de-radicalization strategy was conceived and developed. The second part discusses several major approaches to the strategy such as “five keys,” “four prongs,” “three contingents,” “two hands,” and “one rule.” The third part presents custodial, post-imprisonment, and social programs for targeting three groups of people: imprisoned radicals, released radicals, as well as those who are radicalized but not prosecuted. The fourth part describes programs for engaging communities in order to win over politically reliable people from civil society for support in de-radicalization. The last part draws a conclusion regarding the characteristics of, effectiveness of, controversies over, and future of the Chinese de-radicalization campaign.

Gender, Identity and Belonging: New Citizenships beyond Orientalism

By applying the gender perspective to the concept of Orientalism elaborated by Edward Said, the article debates how the Orient is not only a cultural construction, but also a sexual one. This lens is able to disclose the gender rhetoric through which the Western feminist eye has framed the ‘Other Woman’, depicting her as bounded by cultural ties. This is well exemplified by the stereotype of the Muslim woman as veiled, victim and powerless. The deconstructive strategy and the intersectional approach will fruitfully interact with the vivid experience of some Italian and British Muslim women activists, to show that the agency of Muslim women emerges in different contexts, thus breaking the Western mainstream essentialist perspective. The concept of fluid identity is proposed to make sense of the processes of identity formation with a focus on the intertwining of religious, gender and political dimensions vis-à-vis controversial practices such as the veil and arranged marriages. It is the voices of these women that challenge and re-signify fundamental principles such as democratic citizenship and personal autonomy, creating the basis for a transnational feminism that, from the recognition of women’s specificities and global inequalities, proves able to devise shared, more equitable and empowering pathways.

Whose Freedom of Religion?

Whose Freedom of Religion? Peter Heinegg Religious Freedom: The Contested History of an American Idea. By Tisa Wenger, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2017. 298 pp. $34.95. In this intellectually original, carefully conceived, cogently argued, but dully written work, Wenger (who teaches American religious history at Yale) surveys the baffling variety of ways the sacrosanct principle of freedom of religion has been used as a tool or weapon in crucial episodes of our history where politics, culture, and race were at least as much the issue as religion. Starting in the late nineteenth century and working through the mid‐twentieth century, Wenger focuses on the role of religious freedom in the U.S. occupation of the Philippines, government interference in ritual practices on Indian reservations, the quest for social acceptance by Catholics and Jews, and the African‐American struggle for equality. To call the concept a double‐edged sword would be an understatement. The American seizure of the Philippines in the wake of the Spanish‐American War might have been (was) an act of naked aggression, but politicians, clergymen, and journalists liked to see it as a Christian liberation of Filipinos from the medieval yoke of Spanish Catholicism. (The same notion applied to Cuba and Puerto Rico.) Of course, given the “infantile” condition of the natives, any real self‐determination would have to be put on hold (until 1946, as it turned out). But turnabout is fair play; and fighters for Philippine independence could claim that, like their white Protestant liberators‐adversaries, they believed in both the unique greatness of Christianity and the separation of church and state. And even traditional Catholics loyal to Rome could stress their superiority to both the Moros (militant Muslims in the south of the country) and pagan peoples. Yet, as with most of the other oppressed groups Wenger has studied, whatever American‐style rights the Filipinos maintained they had were not enough to move their American conquerors. And by stressing religion (the only legal card they had) to the exclusion of other elements of their identity, Filipinos were both misrepresenting themselves and not confronting the massive racism behind U.S. imperialism (but how could they?). Even before this time, American Indians, decimated and robbed of practically everything, were making desperate attempts to hold on to what was left of their native traditions, which included such late developments as the Ghost Dances (whence the catastrophic Battle of Wounded Knee in 1890), the “Shakers” in the Pacific Northwest (unrelated to the New England followers of Mother Ann Lee), and the peyotists (later incorporated as the Native American Church) in the Southwest. But they faced fierce resistance from the committed racists running the all‐powerful Bureau of Indian Affairs; and their invoking of freedom of religion to defend their folkways largely went for naught. What little success they had—at least until FDR's wise appointment of John Collier as head of the B.I.A. in 1934—was won by shaping their ceremonies to resemble Christian worship (and underlying belief) as much as possible. And once again, presenting their cause as wholly religious involved a serious distortion. The classical Enlightenment distinction between the sacred and the profane simply didn't apply to the Indians, whose languages often had no word for “religion” and whose “services” formed part of an all‐encompassing way of life. The most successful saluting the flag of religious freedom took place among Catholics and Jews, though the Jews plainly faced much deeper and more bitter bias. But by the end of World War II, the “tri‐faith” of Protestant–Catholic–Jew had become more or less established as the normal spectrum of religion in America. To fit into this scheme, Jews had to downplay the role of “race” (history, language, and a vast array of customs and habits) in a manner that Zionists, among others, could never be comfortable with. But this adjustment basically worked, as the thousands of panels ever since that feature a team of minister‐priest‐and‐rabbi have demonstrated. (How long will it take before the presence of an imam is also de rigueur?) One downside to this equal status, Wenger insists, is that...

Lost worlds

This article thinks about decline as part of the sociology of time, by exploring ways former politically dominant communities seek to negotiate their ritual traditions by forging newer relationships to modern time. It offers an ethnography of decline among the Shia community of Hyderabad old city, whose weakened political status by colonial modernity speaks in different ways of the experience of the contemporary as diachronic and not in succession with the past. These perceptions of decline describe the moral loss of the Shia community through the spatial decline of Hyderabad old city, as a fallen state that has been produced by Muslim actors in time. It reflects on the contradictory perceptions of decline that describes the deprivations produced by time as well as implicates community actors as offenders in time who persist with the performance of what appear to be meaningless rituals in the present context. What are the relations to time that make communities redefine culture in ways that are temporally meaningful to them is of interest here.

København - Cairo tur/retur: Om transnational politisk aktivisme under karikaturkrisen og det ‘arabiske forår’

Recent scholarly work on political protest has often highlighted the potential of new social media in gathering transnational support and driving political reforms, not least in authoritarian regimes. This idea seems to have won even more credence after the ‘online revolutions’ of the ‘Arab spring’ in early 2011. However, as this article demonstrates, attempts at creating transnational exposure of national political issues through various forms of transnational political activism may also, under certain circumstances, be linked to significant costs. The article delivers an empirical analysis of the effects of Danish Muslims’ transnational activities during the Muhammad cartoons controversy in 2005/06 on subsequent Muslim claims-making. The article argues that the envisioned ‘boomerang effect’ of the transnational activities – the attempt to put pressure on Danish authorities by contacting political and religious authorities in the Middle East – backfired on Danish Muslims. The transnational move was successfully ‘securitized’ by elements of the media and the political elite, inviting soft forms of repression against especially the Muslim actors involved in the delegations of primarily religious authorities that travelled to Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria in December 2005. These actors were forced into a more defensive mode of claims-making soon after their return to Denmark through processes of name-calling and stigmatization. Building on this case study, the article concludes by suggesting some theoretical modifications/specifications of the boomerang model of transnational activism.

Thinking about Islam, Politics and Muslim Identity in a Digital Age

Since digitality emerges from a Western, Eurocentric weltanschauung, it follows that the digital sphere tacitly rejects Islam and Muslims, where Islam and Muslims are the archetypal Other of the West. Digitality is a continuation of Orientalism, or a Eurocentric power/knowledge project of (continued) global domination. Given Eurocentrism’s inherent racism, given digitality’s omnipresence, and given that Islamophobia is the paradigmatic example of racism, it is inevitable that there will be more and more anti-Islamic/anti-Muslim sentiments throughout the world. This essay is an examination of the ways in which politics in the digital age are reconfigured to fit specific parameters preordained by the digital sphere, and, concurrently, ideas around Islam and Muslimness—whether according to the wider social (media) landscape or by Muslim actors themselves—are also significantly re-shaped by digitality. Digital Islam is disrupting traditional ulematic authority in ways never seen before. This is because authority/knowledge within the interactive spaces of Web 2.0 is dissected, reconfigured and reassembled as another kind of knowledge. Digitality is challenging various branches of Islam (whether Shia, Sunni, Wahhabi, or what have you), when it comes to their authority, not least because traditional Islamic authorities have to now—consciously and unconsciously—comport themselves and their message to the logic of digitality.

It's Institutions, Not Theology! Muslim Actors’ Influence on Democratization in Mali

AbstractThis article aims at explaining religious actors' influence on democratic transition in Mali (1987–1992). It argues that it takes more than political theology to effectively influence democratization processes. Although Muslim actors used their political theology during democratization, they had neither the organizational means nor the legitimization to convince others of their preferences for a post-authoritarian institutional set-up. They had very limited influence on the institutions that today are supposed to regulate the relations between religion and the state under democratic rule. In fact, this high path-dependency of institutional factors since the colonial era led to an informalization of non-liberal Muslim politics in the 2000s. It is likely that accepting Muslim actors' demands for institutionalized cooperation between the state and religion during democratic transition would have caused fewer problems for democracy in the long run. The article concludes with general lessons for the study of religion in democratization.

Islamic leaders and the legal geography of family law in Aceh, Indonesia

This article explores the legal geography of family law in post‐colonial Muslim societies. Drawing on a case study in Aceh, Indonesia, it analyses how diverse Islamic leaders were able to influence a controversial administrative reform of family law in the reconstruction period after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. I argue that while Islamic leaders are important stakeholders in law‐making in Aceh, they are not a unified collective: rather they mobilise a variety of different practices of legal reasoning to bring legal constructions into agreement. Using the case of an administrative reform of marriage registration, a subordinate regulation in family law, I describe how Islamic leaders deliberate about social issues across their different schools and factions in order to address contemporary problems, while at the same time, mobilising interpretations of Islamic texts as a meaningful tradition for law‐making. The analysis builds on ethnographic fieldwork in Aceh, in particular qualitative interviews with civil servants working in the provincial government: Muslim actors, civil rights activists, national experts, international experts, politicians, and diplomats. The article provides impetus to debates in legal geography by illuminating the negotiations of legal reasoning in Muslim societies to make Islamic law, customary law and state‐centric state administration compatible.

Acts and practices of citizenship: Muslim women’s activism in the UK

ABSTRACTDrawing on the growing literature on Muslim women’s activism, this paper explores grammars of action that frame political mobilizations of Muslim women in the UK. By taking a broad view of political activism, we identify acts and practices of citizenship through which Muslim women activists engage with, reinterpret and challenge social norms. The article critically engages with dominant readings of post-migration minorities’ political mobilization through the lens of citizenship regimes and draws attention to more processual and agency-centred perspectives on citizenship. We focus on two salient themes that Bristol-based Muslim activists were concerned with: mobilizing against violence against women, manifested in the anti-FGM campaign by Integrate Bristol, and attempts to re-negotiate the terms of participation in religious spaces, manifested in claims for more inclusive mosques. In both instances, mobilization was not confined to the local community or national level, but supported by and embedded in related transnational struggles.

Religious Ideological Rigidity: Political Attitude of Muslim Group’s Leaders who are Compatible with or Oppos Democracy in Indonesia

Criticizing motivated social cognition perspective (Jost et. al, 2003) and ideological rigidity (Greenberg and Jonas, 2003) that caused differences in political attitude; this study sugests that high religious ideological rigidity in individuals and groups contests democracy while low religious ideological rigidity supports it. Concerning political context in Indonesia, there are some groups of Muslims who are compatible with democracy (as a secular system), while the others oppose it and wants to establish Daula Islamiya (with khilafa-sharia). The case study in this research is Abu Bakar Baasyir, the leader of Jamaa Anshoru Tauhid (JAT), and Jamaa Islamiya (which is affiliated with Al-Qaidah) who wants to establish Daula Islamiya. Also Hasyim Mujadi, leader of / Nahdhlatul Ulama/NU (Renaissance of Islamic scholars) who supports democracy and deradicalization for militant Muslims in Indonesia, South-Thailand and Mindanao. Thematic analysis was used for analyzing data. The result shows that Baasyir‟s religious ideology is more rigid, authoritarian, dogmatic and closed-minded compared to Mujadi‟s. Baasyir‟s ideology is also absolute, reluctant to adapt and interpret Islamic law according to current situation and condition. Meanwhile, Mujadi explained that we can wisely express religion as a claim of truth by having dialogue with others. High religious ideological rigidity of Baasyir caused him to contest democracy while low religious ideological rigidity of Mujadi caused him to support it. Religious ideological rigidity of the political attitude was discussed. Keyword: Religious ideological rigidity, authoritarian, dogmatic, closed-minded and political attitude

“All Dominion Belongs to Allah… Capital Get Out”: The Issue of Social Justice and Muslim Anti‐Capitalists in Turkey

“All Dominion Belongs to Allah… Capital Get Out”: The Issue of Social Justice and Muslim Anti‐Capitalists in Turkey Güldem Baykal Büyüksaraç Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the opium of the people. Karl Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law Humanity is devastated. […] Money is a totem, property a taboo for the monster with only one tooth left that is called Civilization. Humanity has fallen into the hands of usurers. […] We search for the heart of the age. We seek the heaven; we seek the land of peace, with its boundless and classless justice. […] To break the chains and to cry out ‘Freedom to Slaves!’ […] United with all the oppressed people, we are founding the Anti‐Capitalist Muslims Movement to claim our rights granted by Allah. There is another world in our heart. […] All dominion belongs to Allah! Manifesto of the Anti‐Capitalist Muslims (Istanbul, ) On the first Saturday of Ramadan 2011, a group of young Muslim activists known as the Labor and Justice Platform (Emek ve Adalet Platformu) organized an alternative iftar event right in front of an international five‐star hotel in Istanbul. They wanted to draw attention to extravagant Ramadan meals organized by the government. Protestors sat on the pavement to break their fast in a crowd of friends and strangers that included several public figures as well as street children and African migrants. As a gesture to express their yearning for social solidarity and altruistic reciprocity, everyone brought in food to share with others. The event indicated a deepening discontent with the evils of global capitalism and neoliberalism, from the commodification and commercialization of religion to the inequitable distribution of wealth and public services. The slogans required no further explanation: “Do not break your fast with capitalism,” “We are hungry for humanity,” “Yes to fairness, no to extravagance,” “We are here to spoil your enjoyment”… This very first iftar protest paved the way for a Ramadan tradition of street dining in Turkey, known as “Earth Tables” (Yeryüzü Sofraları). Every Ramadan since then, larger groups of anti‐capitalists—both religious and non‐religious—continue the tradition, gathering on streets and at parks, sitting on the ground to share their iftar meals with the unemployed, the homeless, and the displaced. It is May 1, 2012. A group of around 200 demonstrators captures the public's eye as they proceed from the Fatih Mosque to Taksim Square where they merge with workers’ unions, the usual Labor Day marchers. They are mostly young men and headscarved women, with those in the front line carrying a black‐and‐white banner that reads “All dominion belongs to Allah.” They are chanting, “Allah, bread, freedom”… In the morning, the men performed a symbolic funeral prayer at the mosque for the eleven workers who had lately been killed in the fire that broke out at an Istanbul construction site. They commemorated all others as well who had perished in frequent workplace accidents that had occurred in recent years. The group's meeting at the Fatih Mosque on that day implied more than a protest of unsafe working conditions in Turkey. They gathered at a mosque in the conservative district of Fatih, where a right‐wing mob, a bunch of die‐hard anti‐communists, had assembled on a winter day of 1969, preparing to attack the leftists who had organized an anti‐imperialist rally at Taksim during the visit of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. These new marchers of Labor Day call themselves Anti‐Capitalist Muslims (Antikapitalist Müslümanlar), and their presence at the rally today indicates a will for breaking with a particular history. Muslim politics in Turkey, as it seems, is evolving from a struggle with communism to one with capitalism. It is June 7, 2013, the eleventh day of the Gezi resistance in Istanbul. It all started, one could say, with a hashtag on twitter: #occupygezi. Prior to that, however, an urban advocacy group called Taksim Solidarity had been campaigning for more than a year against plans to redesign Taksim in the guise...

Struggles over Identity and Territory: Regional Identities in Ethnoreligious Conflict in Northern Nigeria

This article explores how ethnoreligious conflict over boundaries and territoriality involves a politics of scale, that is, how positions and demands are framed by actors according to, for instance, local, regional, and national scales. The analysis focuses on how Muslim actors in a conflict in Kaduna State in Nigeria frame a regional, northern Nigerian identity that varies in content and form depending on the scalar context in which communal conflict is placed with regional and national politics yielding different identifications.