In this paper, we empirically examine the capital budgeting process of a large multi-divisional firm and the implications of the dynamics that underlie this process. Although investment decisions are one of the most important decisions made by firms, relatively little is known about the capital allocation process that triggers these investment decisions. Despite the prevalence of multi-stage budget processes in practice, prior studies mostly assume only a single negotiation period and provide no clear indication how agents behave in multi-period settings. To fill this void, we examine how information and agency problems affect the allocation of capital to individual investment projects over time, starting from the initial investment proposal moving to subsequent renegotiations. We argue that information asymmetry and uncertainty about private consumption preferences affect the budgeting behavior of managers when they have investment decision rights, and that the specific type of behavior is time-dependent. Based on capital budget data from a large, multi-divisional firm, we find that managers incorporate more slack into budgets during renegotiations the more the principal delegates investment decision rights to the manager. This occurs to a higher extent during the earlier stages of the investment when the principal has less information about the true nature of the investment. We further find that the manager takes advantage of multi-period budget processes to shift budgetary slack between investment stages of a project. He does so to a higher extent the more decision rights are delegated and during the more mature stages of the investment when uncertainty about his consumption preferences has been resolved. These results indicate that, for a manager with delegated investment decision rights, cost escalation is the dominant budgeting behavior during the early stages of the investment, while cost shifting is the dominant budgeting behavior during the more mature stages.
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