Multilateral Force Research Articles

Nuclear topsy turvy: the security-economics nexus in Turkish-American relations

This article discusses the shift in Turkey’s nuclear alliance with the United States from client to junior partner. Ankara sought to bring the Turkish economy and military forces in line with those of its patron to signal its loyalty. But power asymmetries made it so that Washington became Ankara’s lifeline. From the 1950s until the mid-1960s, American policymakers applied a top-down style of alliance management, making important decisions without consulting Ankara. But the mid-1960s marked a turning point in the nature of this relationship, as Turkey became better able to stand on its own feet. Rather than relying on unilateral measures, the Americans had to consult and coordinate with Ankara. Also, Turkey could reject key American proposals involving nuclear weapons, such as the creation of a Multilateral Force for NATO, and even create some ambiguity about its nuclear intentions to signal its loss of faith in the American security guarantee.

Automatic structural optimization design using sensitivity-based method

Traditional structural design involves repeated modeling and parameter tuning of buildings, which is time-consuming work. To solve the problem, the automatic structural optimization design of a multi-lateral force resist system is proposed out. The aim is to minimize the cost of structural materials based on initial determinate structural model subjected to multiple constraints according to the design codes. A simplified model including mega braces, mega frames, truss systems, shear walls etc. is employed, which can be easily generalized to other types of structures. The finite element method is used to obtain the structural responses by ETABS, while two modified algorithms are adopted for structural optimization. The first one is total penalty cost-based constant incremental sensitivity analysis method that is introduced with full-level constraints as a whole and the adaptive adjustment mechanism. The second one is structural constraint-based Hooke-Jeeves algorithm considering different building modulus and discreteness of design variables. The influence of their parameter settings on optimization performances are discussed such as different initial designs. The results show that the sensitivity-based methods are useful tools for automatic optimization design of an existing building with known structural parameters and the recommended parameter settings of algorithms are provided. As a result, both the structural safety and economic benefit of the discussed structure can be achieved with high efficiency. A prompt convergence rate and a good approximation to a deterministic solution can also be observed. It can provide a reference to the structural design in practice.

ЧЕТВЕРТАЯ АФГАНСКАЯ ВОЙНА ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИИ

In the collective memory of the British, there was a perception that Afghanistan was a space that could not be colonized: a space that limited British power and influence. Nevertheless, selectively using its experience of colonial warfare, Britain invaded Afghanistan for the fourth time, this time as part of a multilateral force. In analyzing the performance of Britain’s counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan, Western sources have most often favored identifying tactical and operational failures of military or civilian structures rather than addressing the fundamental shortcomings of the operation in Afghanistan. Britain has joined the efforts of the «collective West» in Afghanistan, primarily to demonstrate to Washington that London remains its most reliable and most significant military ally. Over time, attachment to the United States went so far as to atrophy Britain’s ability to develop its own national strategy. Western countries have replaced the fight against al-Qaeda who carried out terrorist attacks in the United States with the fight against the Taliban insurgency. The English narrative used the category of moral obligation more often than national interest. Great Britain demanded that Afghanistan turn into a liberal-democratic state. The troops not only introduced foreign Western ideas of democracy and the rule of law, they also tried to expand the power of the central government in Kabul, a government that was not accepted by the insurgents and generally lacked legitimacy among Afghans. The continued presence of Western forces in Afghanistan has generated hatred and initiated jihad.

Monetary Policy Transmission Through the Rate Channel in Some Countries in ASEAN

Using a quantitative regression of table data through FEM and REM models, the study has measured the extent and direction of exchange rate impacts on the economic growth of five ASEAN countries namely, Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, Malaysia, in the period of 1985-2015. The estimation results show that for every 1% rise in the real exchange rate, the multilateral force will have a positive impact, since the speed of economic growth of five countries increased by 2.09%. This result is consistent with some previous studies, especially in some developing countries. Further, the thesis has assessed the exchange rate policy in Vietnam and analyzed the situation. As a result, the authors have made some recommendations for exchange rate policy. The recommendations focus on the State’s intervention in adjusting the exchange rate and pay attention to the real exchange rate for policy evaluation. The recommendations of the thesis are consistent with the actual situation in the five ASEAN countries in order to stabilize economic growth.

Das Vadanya" To the Multilateral Force: The Societ Union's Role in the Johnson Administration's Decision to Abandon the MLF

The Multilateral Force (MLF) was a proposed nuclear sharing arrangement between the United States and a number of its NATO partners. Proposed in 1958, the MLF was debated until about 1965 or 1966 and was often distinguished by its controversial nature and failure to gain traction. This paper examines documents from the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA), Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State, and various secondary sources to evaluate the extent to which the Soviet Union contributed to the MLF’s failure as an initiative. The Force is often treated as a narrow and highly technical policy debate by existing literature. However, examination of these documents highlighted the necessity of viewing the Force as a topic of distinct political import in American-Soviet nuclear negotiations. While technical disputes over the MLF’s constitution was an immediate cause of its demise, U.S. policymakers also faced strategic incentives not to pursue the treaty. In particular, the documents reflect growing belief within the Johnson administration that exiting the agreement could improve broader bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and ensure that the international community could continue to make progress on the creation of a nuclear non-proliferation agreement.

Blueprint for Survival: A New Paradigm for International Environmental Emergencies

Experts predict that the world is going to experience an ever-increasing number of major environmental emergencies in which one or more pollutant(s) is/are released, given our societies’ increasing use of pollutants in industry and commerce. Furthermore, given many States’ increasing populations and urbanization, such events are likely to harm an ever-increasing number of people and environments exposed to these pollutants. Moreover, in our increasingly interconnected world, such events are likely to expose an ever-increasing number of nationals and environments in other States (target States) to such pollutants. At present, the international community does not have a workable system that would permit a target State to protect its own nationals and environments from such a disaster. The U.N. Security Council most likely would possess the power to order a multilateral force to enter a State experiencing a major international environmental emergency (locus State) to investigate and then remediate the emergency, if necessary. However, any of the five permanent members of the Security Council could veto a resolution authorizing such action. On the other hand, while a target State which is actually threatened with widespread harm should possess the power to enter the locus State to protect its nationals and environment, the locus State could prevent the target State from entering the locus State for the purpose of determining the level of threat that it is facing. My article proposes the adoption of a new treaty that would provide a workable system for the international community whenever it appears that a major international environmental emergency has occurred. This treaty is based on my dual background in international law and property law. My proposed treaty is also supported by criminal law, property law, torts law, and environmental law. While the details of such a treaty undoubtedly would evolve over time, I hope that my article will initiate serious study of such a treaty.

La Fuerza Multilateral y la multiplicidad nuclear en la OTAN (1960-1965)

In the late 1950s and until 1965, the US government promoted the creation of a naval force armed with ballistic missiles, known as Multilateral Force (MLF), with multinational crews and under NATO command. The initial proposal of the Eisenhower administration was to satisfy complaints from some NATO members about the US monopoly on European nuclear defense. Although the official aim was to provide an active role to European countries, particularly to Germany, in the joint nuclear strategy. with the MLF, the US were relying on both UK and France to integrate their respective nuclear deterrents into a single organism. However, this one would not be under the direct US control, at least it will avoid independents, if not divergents, nuclear strategies.

Atlantis Lost: The American Experience with De Gaulle, 1958-1969, by Sebastian Reyn

The historiography on United States–French relations during the de Gaulle era is a crowded field. But Sebastian Reyn, a Dutch defence official as well as an impressive scholar, has produced an extremely important book. Rather than the exhaustively-mined French angle, he focuses on the less excavated theme of US perceptions and policies. In contrast to most other works on the American side, he also covers the whole of the de Gaulle presidency from 1958 to 1969, having undertaken research into four different administrations: those of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. And, above all, he explores the US response in impressive detail, adding layers of complexity and nuance to a range of familiar issues and crises. The book comprises six chronologically organised chapters. Reyn begins with Eisenhower’s and Kennedy’s reactions to de Gaulle’s ‘Tripartite’ Memorandum proposal between 1958 and 1962. He emphasises how seriously both US administrations took de Gaulle’s challenge; but he also stresses that neither president was prepared to countenance de Gaulle’s push for a major NATO overhaul, partly because both men thought it would undermine the alliance at a particularly dangerous point in the Cold War and partly because de Gaulle’s tactics seemed to suggest that he was not really serious. Reyn then devotes two chapters solely to the Kennedy years. The first simply explores Kennedy’s Atlanticist vision; but the second is crucial, for Reyn emphasises how important de Gaulle’s rejection of this vision was to the unfolding of the attitudes of the United States towards Western Europe—undermining the idea that the two ‘were part of a budding Atlantic community in which political and institutional ties were to become ever tighter’ (p. 374). Chapter Four then explores Johnson’s key role in the demise of the Multilateral Force, especially his acute awareness of the political costs of this initiative at a time when the Vietnam crisis had become his central preoccupation. But the end of the ‘last Atlantic project’ was by no means the end of the United States’ problems with de Gaulle. In Chapter Five, Reyn looks at the most visible crisis of the relationship: de Gaulle’s 1966 decision to end French military participation in NATO. The final chapter then explores the rapidly changing context of the relationship, as the US position in Vietnam deteriorated and Nixon came to office with a desire not only to pursue détente but also to listen to a French leader whose style, wisdom, and political philosophy he admired.

The President, the ‘Theologians’ and the Europeans: The Johnson Administration and NATO Nuclear Sharing

This article examines Lyndon Johnson's handling of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nuclear-sharing issue and specifically plans for a NATO Multilateral Force during the first three years of his presidency. The article argues that although Johnson did not confront the nuclear sharing/Multilateral Force issue directly for the first year of his presidency, he subsequently made sensible policy decisions in the face of a number of challenges. These included pressure for a speedy resolution of the nuclear-sharing issue from within his own State Department and from the government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the one side, and opposition to the Multilateral Force from the British and French governments on the other. The nuclear-sharing issue is discussed in the context of challenges to NATO, most notably French President Charles de Gaulle's rejection of US leadership and his withdrawal of French forces from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966 and broader debates about nuclear consultation within the alliance. The article concludes that by using the advisory process well and through some deft diplomacy, particularly refusing to demand a quick resolution to the nuclear-sharing problem, the Johnson administration had effectively resolved the nuclear-sharing issue by late 1966.

Transmission control in multilateral system for teletraining

AbstractRecently, preservation of the skills of experts has become a serious problem in the medical and production fields. It is difficult to acquire human motion, including touching motion, by means of a conventional visual‐based system. Touching motion is inherently bilateral, since an action is always accompanied by a reaction. Bilateral force feedback control is necessary to acquire another person's skill. This paper proposes a haptic teletraining system using multilateral force feedback control. Since the multilateral control transmits haptic information among three or more remote systems, it is possible to train multiple remote trainees simultaneously using one skilled trainer. In the proposed haptic teletraining system, each local system consists of a master‐slave system. Since a touching motion is subject to the law of action and reaction, it is possible to decompose the force information into an action force and a reaction force by using bilateral control. Thus, the skilled motion of a trainer is acquired and saved as a digital database integrated with his haptic information. The proposed system is applied to a one‐trainer/two‐trainee system. As a result, motion including contact with the environment is transmitted and trained with vivid force feedback. The experimental results show the viability of the proposed method. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Electron Comm Jpn, 93(12): 26–34, 2010; Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com). DOI 10.1002/ecj.10237

Détente, Entente, or Linkage? The Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in U.S. Relations with the Soviet Union

The idea of a conference on European security problems that might provide an alternative to the post-war bloc-to-bloc divide of the continent dates back to the fifties. For fifteen years, the Soviet Union and its allies advanced proposals on this issue, always meeting with Western indifference, skepticism, or overt opposition. The Soviet Union aimed, sometimes overtly, at setting conditions likely to hamper the Western integration—North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Communities, the Multilateral Force (MLF) project, and nuclear potential sharing. The Kremlin also looked for a solution of the German question that might guarantee either neutralization of all of Germany or recognition of the German Democratic Republic. The Western governments thought that the Kremlin wanted a multilateral conference to fix a European settlement in which the communist bloc's territorial and political realities were confirmed and recognized and to promote such a relaxation of tensions as to make an American presence in Europe superfluous. Consequently, the Western powers always rejected Soviet appeals and concentrated on the strengthening of the Atlantic bloc. Furthermore, the government of West Germany stuck to its “Hallstein doctrine,” according to which the only solution to the German question was reunification through free elections and full sovereignty of the new German state.1

Force Transmission Control in Multilateral System for Teletraining

Recently, skill preservation of an expert has been a serious problem of the medical or production fields. It is difficult to acquire a human motion including touching motion by the conventional visual-based system. A touching motion is inherently bilateral, since an action is always accompanied by a reaction. A bilateral force feedback control is necessary to acquire the human's skill.This paper proposes a haptic teletraining system by multilateral force feedback control. Since the multilateral control transmits haptic information among three or more remote systems, it is possible to train remote trainee by one skilled trainer simultaneously. In the proposed haptic teletraining system, each local system consists of a master-slave system. Since a touching motion is subject to the “law of action and reaction”, it is possible to decompose the force information into action force and reaction force by using the bilateral control. Thus the skilled motion by a trainer is acquired and saved as a digital database integrated with his haptic information.The proposed system is applied to one-trainer/two-trainee system. As a result, a motion including contact with the environment is transmitted and trained with vivid force feedback. The experimental results show viability of the proposed method.

Lyndon B. Johnson, alec Douglas-home, Europe and the Nato multilateral force, 1963–64

Lyndon B. Johnson, alec Douglas-home, Europe and the Nato multilateral force, 1963–64

The Wilson Governments and the Italian Centre-Left Coalitions: Between ‘Socialist’ Diplomacy and Realpolitik, 1964-70

The purpose of this article (based on archival material from the National Archives, Kew, and the Labour archive in Manchester) is to explore the relationship between the British Labour Party and the Italian Socialist Party during the Wilson governments and the Italian centre-left coalitions between 1964 and 1970. The inclusion of the PSI within the Italian government was very much appreciated (and promoted) by Labour as it was expected it would be of great help with regard to issues such as the Multilateral Force or Britain’s second application to join the EEC. For this reason, the British Labour government did its best to support the success of the centre-left formula and was similarly very active in promoting socialist reunification, which was eventually achieved in 1966. As regards the PSI’s occasional radical departures in foreign policy matters - as, for instance, in relation to Vietnam - the Italian socialists’ ‘filial admiration’ for their British counterparts enabled Labour on more than one occasion to bring Nenni’s party into line

"In Common Cause": The NATO Multilateral Force and the Mixed-Manning Demonstration on the USS Claude V. Ricketts, 1964-1965

In mid-1964, the USS Claude V. Ricketts began an eighteen-month operation known as the Mixed-Manning Demonstration. The Ricketts (formerly the USS Biddle) carried men from seven different North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations and was intended to demonstrate the viability of "mixed-manning" as part of NATO plans for the so-called Multilateral (Nuclear) Force, a purpose-built flotilla of nuclear armed ships to be owned, operated, controlled, and manned by Alliance members. While the Multilateral Force never came to fruition, the Mixed-Manning Demonstration proved to be a considerable success. This article aims to provide an alternative perspective on the history of the Multilateral Force by examining the development of the multilateral mixed-manning concept, showing how officers from the Ricketts attempted to overcome the difficulties encountered in operating with an international crew, and analysing the inherent long-term disadvantages of manning a ship in such a way.

Unipolarity and the Middle East

Bipolarity and Middle Eastern politics the model for unipolarity the unipolar world order the unification of the Yemens Iraq's invasion of Kuwait the formation of the Multilateral Force the end of the Lebanese civil war operation Desert Storm operation Provide Comfort Madrid and the Palestinian autonomy Israel and the Arabs survey of Middle Eastern politics 1989-1996 the unipolar Middle East.

Trick or truth? The British ANF proposal, west Germany and US nonproliferation policy, 1964–68

The deployment and control of nuclear weapons in Europe was a major aspect of Cold War diplomacy. The Multilateral Force (MLF) is a prime example. First proposed in 1960, the MLF attempted to reconcile European demands for collective alliance control within the broader framework of US nonproliferation policy. The MLF was opposed by both Britain and France, who feared the proposal would lead to a nuclear armed West Germany. To counter the MLF, the Wilson government advanced an alternate scheme ‐ the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). This article examines British objectives in advancing the ANF. It contends that the ANF was not a cynical attempt to frustrate the MLF, as suggested by previous commentators, but embodied a serious attempt by the Labour government to implement a nonproliferation regime.

Anglo-American Nuclear Weapons Cooperation After the Nassau Conference: The British Policy of Interdependence

The Anglo-American summit at Nassau in December 1962 did not strictly separate Britain's deterrent from the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF). As a result, Conservative governments in the 1960s tried to safeguard maximum British independence in nuclear relations with the United States. The British tried to thwart American initiatives on the mixed-manned MLF; some British officials even hoped to preserve an “independent British deterrent” through nuclear cooperation with France. For the United States, the British deterrent had political value in an intra-alliance or East-West context, but no military or political significance in itself. The MLF idea of bilateral nuclear cooperation with Britain and France was a means to contain French and German nuclear ambitions and to settle Cold War disputes with the Soviet Union. In London, however, leading officials believed that Britain's future as a great power was inextricably linked to the possession of an independent nuclear deterrent. When nuclear independence was lost, the appearance of independence became more important.

The economic community of West African states, the defence of democracy in Sierra Leone and future prospects

The wave of democratization in the 1990s has brought considerable challenges and opportunities for post‐cold war Africa. One such challenge is the democratic intervention of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) under the aegis of the multilateral intervention force, ECOMOG, to restore a democratic government and constitutional order. The ECOWAS democratic intervention in the West African state of Sierra Leone can be located in a wider debate about international dimensions of democratization. In several respects, it also reflects the changing nature of international politics in the post‐cold war period particularly with regards to certain traditional norms of international society, namely non‐intervention and state sovereignty. The ECOWAS democratic efforts in Sierra Leone demonstrate that it is increasingly becoming acceptable for regional and international organisations to ‘defend’ democracy, albeit under the auspices of forcible as well as non‐forcible humanitarian intervention. However, these kinds of external intervention on behalf of democracy have in most cases led to its retrenchment. This article therefore critically assesses how the nature of domestic politics led to the suspension of democracy in Sierra Leone, the domestic and international implications of the ECOWAS defence of democracy there and the country's post‐conflict democratic prospects.

Subersion in British Guiana: Why and How the Kennedy Administration Got Rid of a Democratic Government

On June 30, 1963, President John F. Kennedy, his British counterpart Harold Macmillan, and a coterie of ambassadors, Foreign Ministers and assistants, met for talks at scenic Birch Grove, England. A joint press communique revealed that the delegations discussed issues of mutual and global importance, such as the multilateral force treaty. However, nowhere in the text of the communique is it mentioned that the question of British Guiana (now Guyana) figured prominently in the Birch Grove discussions. Macmillan's memoirs and those of Presidential Aide Theodore Sorenson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk all fail to acknowledge that British Guiana—a small, economically backward colony in South America with the population of a small American city—was actually the first subject on the agenda that summer day in 1963. Even Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s Pulitzer Prize-winning history of the Kennedy Administration only covers the Birch Grove meeting in one cryptic sentence: "... Macmillan said no on multilateral force and yes on British Guiana."This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.