ЧЕТВЕРТАЯ АФГАНСКАЯ ВОЙНА ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИИ

Abstract

In the collective memory of the British, there was a perception that Afghanistan was a space that could not be colonized: a space that limited British power and influence. Nevertheless, selectively using its experience of colonial warfare, Britain invaded Afghanistan for the fourth time, this time as part of a multilateral force. In analyzing the performance of Britain’s counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan, Western sources have most often favored identifying tactical and operational failures of military or civilian structures rather than addressing the fundamental shortcomings of the operation in Afghanistan. Britain has joined the efforts of the «collective West» in Afghanistan, primarily to demonstrate to Washington that London remains its most reliable and most significant military ally. Over time, attachment to the United States went so far as to atrophy Britain’s ability to develop its own national strategy. Western countries have replaced the fight against al-Qaeda who carried out terrorist attacks in the United States with the fight against the Taliban insurgency. The English narrative used the category of moral obligation more often than national interest. Great Britain demanded that Afghanistan turn into a liberal-democratic state. The troops not only introduced foreign Western ideas of democracy and the rule of law, they also tried to expand the power of the central government in Kabul, a government that was not accepted by the insurgents and generally lacked legitimacy among Afghans. The continued presence of Western forces in Afghanistan has generated hatred and initiated jihad.