Abstract
The idea of a conference on European security problems that might provide an alternative to the post-war bloc-to-bloc divide of the continent dates back to the fifties. For fifteen years, the Soviet Union and its allies advanced proposals on this issue, always meeting with Western indifference, skepticism, or overt opposition. The Soviet Union aimed, sometimes overtly, at setting conditions likely to hamper the Western integration—North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Communities, the Multilateral Force (MLF) project, and nuclear potential sharing. The Kremlin also looked for a solution of the German question that might guarantee either neutralization of all of Germany or recognition of the German Democratic Republic. The Western governments thought that the Kremlin wanted a multilateral conference to fix a European settlement in which the communist bloc's territorial and political realities were confirmed and recognized and to promote such a relaxation of tensions as to make an American presence in Europe superfluous. Consequently, the Western powers always rejected Soviet appeals and concentrated on the strengthening of the Atlantic bloc. Furthermore, the government of West Germany stuck to its “Hallstein doctrine,” according to which the only solution to the German question was reunification through free elections and full sovereignty of the new German state.1
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