Multi-stage Game Model Research Articles

Multi-Stage Game of Knowledge Pricing

Knowledge pricing is a game process between buyers and sellers. Firstly, through the analysis of multi-stage knowledge pricing, this paper reaches a conclusion that the knowledge pricing game for the first stage is an incomplete and perfect dynamic game and is a complete and perfect information dynamic game for the following stages. Secondly, this paper tries to build a knowledge-priced multi-stage game model for knowledge pricing, analyzing and studying a va- riety of situations. By using backward induction to solve the objective function, the paper obtains some pricing criteria for sellers when the knowledge quality is different and the rules for whether the buyers choose to buy this knowledge when the knowledge pricing is different.

Channel selection for simultaneous move game in cognitive radio ad hoc networks

In cognitive radio ad hoc networks, the nodes exhibit autonomous behavior and selfishly search for the available channels to make spectrum selection decisions. A natural competition among cognitive users arises that may result is chaos and serious degradation in spectrum utilization. In this competitive and hostile environment, game theoretic model can ease this rivalry and autonomously assist in creating a subdued environment. We introduce a repeated game to alleviate the spectrum allocation problem and facilitate the cognitive radio users to make spectrum selection decision simultaneously or asynchronously. In contrast to sequential games, the proposed simultaneous move multi-stage game model is appropriate for practical applications where paucity of central spectrum management resources is common. In order to avoid the conflicts arising from coinciding concurrent decisions, we incorporate learning via history statistics to attain a stable and efficient equilibrium point. Every player computes the feasibility of playing a strategy from the action of the opponents in the previous iterations by incorporating the proposed learning rule. This learning process assists in decision making for the next iteration and the Nash equilibrium is achieved.

Multistage Effort and the Equity Structure of Venture Investment Based on Reciprocity Motivation

For venture capitals, it is a long process from an entry to its exit. In this paper, the activity of venture investment will be divided into multistages. And, according to the effort level entrepreneurs will choose, the venture capitalists will provide an equity structure at the very beginning. As a benchmark for comparison, we will establish two game models on multistage investment under perfect rationality: a cooperative game model and a noncooperative one. Further, as a cause of pervasive psychological preference behavior, reciprocity motivation will influence the behavior of the decision-makers. Given this situation, Rabin’s reciprocity motivation theory will be applied to the multistage game model of the venture investment, and multistage behavior game model will be established as well, based on the reciprocity motivation. By looking into the theoretical derivations and simulation studies, we find that if venture capitalists and entrepreneurs both have reciprocity preferences, their utility would have been Pareto improvement compared with those under perfect rationality.

A single-shot game of multi-period inspection

This paper deals with an inspection game of Customs and a smuggler during some days. Customs has two options of patrolling or not. The smuggler can take two strategies of shipping its cargo of contraband or not. Two players have several opportunities to take an action during a limited number of days but they may discard some of the opportunities. When the smuggling coincides with the patrol, there occurs one of three events: the capture of the smuggler by Customs, a success of the smuggling and nothing new. If the smuggler is captured or no time remains to complete the game, the game ends. There have been many studies on the inspection game so far by the multi-stage game model, where both players at a stage know players’ strategies taken at the previous stage. In this paper, we consider a two-person zero-sum single-shot game, where the game proceeds through multiple periods but both players do not know any strategies taken by their opponents on the process of the game. We apply dynamic programming to the game to exhaust all equilibrium points on a strategy space of player. We also clarify the characteristics of optimal strategies of players by some numerical examples.

Corporate governance under proportional electoral systems

This paper provides a political explanation for the form of corporate governance captured by the degree of minority shareholder protection (MSP). Using a multi-stage game model of three-party competition under proportional electoral systems, I demonstrate that the electoral threshold—the minimum percentage of votes a party must receive to get at least one seat in parliamentary PR systems—is inversely related to the degree of MSP. This finding represents an important modification to formal models in the political economic literature that tends to omit the political process.

Analysis of Multi-Stage and Dynamic Incomplete Information Game Model for EIA System in China

Environmental impact assessment (EIA) system has gradually developed in China while several problems still exist in the ecological environment protection implementation as the obstacles. This paper summarized the regular EIA process of China and picked up the stakeholders basis of case analyzing. A multi-stage and dynamic incomplete information game model was established to investigate the interactions among government, enterprises and EIA organizations and explain strategy selection of EIA participants according to perfect Bayesian equilibrium theory and scenario analysis. Furthermore, a suggestion was proposed to improve effectiveness of EIA system in China after discussing the present demerit. Results showed that in a short term, government and enterprises tended to choose evading EIA for their private benefits. But in a long run, they would be willing to take EIA because environmental deterioration would seriously affect their economic benefits. Thus they had to pursuit social benefits firstly instead. The public played a silent role as a victim in EIA system of China currently, caused by present beneficial balance of government, enterprises and EIA organizations. Some countermeasures must be brought out to develop the public participation regulation in the management system in order to break that balance and improve the effectiveness of EIA.

A new model of equilibrium involuntary unemployment

We show that equilibrium involuntary unemployment emerges in a multi-stage game model where all market power resides with firms, on both the labour and the output market. Firms decide wages, employment, output and prices, and under constant returns there exists a continuum of subgame perfect Nash equilibria involving unemployment and positive profits. A firm does not undercut the equilibrium wage since then high wage firms would attract its workers, thus forcing the undercutting firm out of both markets. Full employment equilibria are payoff dominated by unemployment equilibria, and the arguments are robust to decreasing returns.

A Multi-Stage Game Model of Morals by Agreement

If there is one aspect of David Gauthier's program for a contractualist morality that has been most sceptically received, it is his view that instrumentally rational agents would choose to adopt a disposition that would in turn constrain their future choices. Instead of remaining “straightforward maximizers” caught in a suboptimal state of nature, they would become “constrained maximizers” who could avoid prisoner's dilemmas (PDs) by engaging in conditional co-operation. Apart from the fact that Gauthier's entirely prescriptive orientation leads him to omit any specification of the mechanism through which this might be accomplished, serious doubts have been raised about the adequacy of the argument that he offers in support of adopting constrained maximization.