Multiparty Elections Research Articles

Trickle-Down Ethnic Politics: Drunk and Absent in the Kenya Police Force (1957–1970)

How does ethnic politics affect the state’s ability to provide policing services? Using a panel of administrative personnel data on the full careers of 6,784 police officers, we show how the rise of ethnic politics around Kenya’s independence influenced policemen’s behavior. We find a significant deterioration in discipline after Kenya’s first multiparty election for those police officers of ethnic groups associated with the ruling party. These effects are driven by a behavioral change among these policemen. We find no evidence of favoritism within the police. Instead, our results are consistent with co-ethnic officers experiencing an emboldenment effect. Our findings highlight that the state’s security apparatus, at its most granular level, is not insulated from ethnic politics. (JEL D72, J15, K42, O15, O17)

Change, Continuity and Crisis. Montenegro’s Political Trajectory (1988-2016)

Abstract Montenegro has passed through more than two decades of flux to reach its current status as a NATO member and European Union (EU) candidate. The smallest republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Montenegro’s modern history has been characterised by both significant change (in statehood) and relative continuity (in leadership). The author focuses on the period between the republic’s first multiparty elections in 1990, through the 1997 split within the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) and the May 2006 independence referendum to the parliamentary elections of 2016 and the country’s ongoing political crisis, assessing the most significant political developments throughout the aforementioned period.

Patterns of competitive authoritarianism in the Western Balkans

ABSTRACTThe countries of the Western Balkans during the 1990s were dominated by competitive authoritarian regimes that combined multi-party elections with nationalist rhetoric and the privatisation of the state to affiliated business interests. After a move towards democratisation in the early 2000s across the region, authoritarian practices began re-appearing in the late 2000s and have now firmly taken root in many of these countries. This article will argue that the current competitive authoritarian systems (Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) are structurally different from those of the 1990s. These new regimes draw on the failure of reformist governments during the early 2000s to decisively break with authoritarian practices and establish independent and democratic institutions, thus facilitating the return of competitive authoritarian regimes. The current pattern in the Western Balkans is part of a global trend, but is also one embedded in the particularities of democratic transformation of the region. This article argues that the return of competitive authoritarianism is the result of weak democratic structures, facilitated by the weakening and insufficient transformative power of external actors, first and foremost the EU, in incentivizing continued democratisation.

Why Election Monitoring Does Not Always Lead to Democratization: from the Perspective of Information on the International Standards of Electoral Integrity

AbstractThis paper theoretically presents a new structure from the perspective of information on international standards with regards to the actual impact that election monitoring has on political change. Specifically, there is the point of view that after the election monitoring, a report is published, and as a result information relating to international standards of electoral integrity becomes clear in the countries subject to monitoring. Then if it becomes clear, for example, to one country that it is unable to meet the standards required by the international community then that country might abandon trying to meeting international requirements and its inclination toward authoritarianism might strengthen. Therefore, the clarification of information on the international standards of fair electoral integrity as a result of election monitoring could result in a shift toward authoritarianism. Through a case study, this paper shows that new interpretations of democratization in Africa can be advanced by its theoretical framework. Many African countries started to get rid of one-party systems or military dictatorships in the 1990s and to introduce multi-party elections. As a result, they held founding elections. What is often pointed out is that compared to the founding elections, the degree of fraud increased at the second elections. Although there has been no appropriate explanation, this paper suggests a theoretical explanation for this puzzling trend.

Regimes of the World (RoW): Opening New Avenues for the Comparative Study of Political Regimes

Classifying political regimes has never been more difficult. Most contemporary regimes hold <em>de-jure</em> multiparty elections with universal suffrage. In some countries, elections ensure that political rulers are—at least somewhat—accountable to the electorate whereas in others they are a mere window dressing exercise for authoritarian politics. Hence, regime types need to be distinguished based on the<em> de-facto</em> implementation of democratic institutions and processes. Using V-Dem data, we propose with Regimes of the World (RoW) such an operationalization of four important regime types—closed and electoral autocracies; electoral and liberal democracies—with vast coverage (almost all countries from 1900 to 2016). We also contribute a solution to a fundamental weakness of extant typologies: The unknown extent of misclassification due to uncertainty from measurement error. V-Dem’s measures of uncertainty (Bayesian highest posterior densities) allow us to be the first to provide a regime typology that distinguishes cases classified with a high degree of certainty from those with “upper” and “lower” bounds in each category. Finally, a comparison of disagreements with extant datasets (7%–12% of the country-years), demonstrates that the RoW classification is more conservative, classifying regimes with electoral manipulation and infringements of the political freedoms more frequently as electoral autocracies, suggesting that it better captures the opaqueness of contemporary autocracies.

Is Democracy Detrimental for the Environment in Developing Countries? Evidence from Kenya

What was the impact of the democratization wave that hit Sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s on the distribution of economic resources? This paper focuses on closed canopy forests of Kenya. Anecdotal and case studies show that these forests have su ffered severe destruction since the early 1990s. In this paper, I bring new evidence to investigate whether the sudden introduction of multi-party elections in the Moi era raised political motives to allow district access to government forest land. Closed canopy forests in the forest reserves of Kenya are owned and managed by the central government. I create two novel data sets to understand this issue. First, using Landsat satellite imagery I create a panel data of forest cover. Second, to uncover the possible mechanisms, I assemble a detailed panel data of forest land allocations by the government. Satellite imagery reveals that deforestation increased after the introduction of multi-party politics. This has been driven by more deforestation in loyal districts and little in opposition districts. The government administrative data shows that after the introduction of political competition, forest land has been primarily transferred for private use (to individuals/communities) rather than for public use (e.g. building schools). Further, within the private allocations, it is land used for squatter settlements that have increased since the introduction of political competition. Lastly, I find a correlation that in swing districts that greater access to forest land leads to higher votes for the ruling party in the next election. The findings shed light on understanding how weak political institutions can lead to serious pathologies in resource allocation.

Introduction: State capacity and elections in the study of authoritarian regimes

Studies of multiparty elections in authoritarian regimes have proliferated in recent years. Nevertheless, the available evidence remains inconclusive in terms of when, where, or why elections work to sustain or undermine authoritarian rule. The contributions to the special issue ‘State Capacity, Elections and the Resilience of Authoritarian Rule’ argue that analyzing the extent to which the effect of elections on authoritarian regime resilience is mediated through the factor of state capacity helps to solve this puzzle. This introduction lays out the analytical foundation for this discussion by reviewing key terms and concepts, and by highlighting possible theoretical connections between the state capacity literature on the one hand and the electoral authoritarianism literature on the other. Furthermore, it considers the contributions in this special issue, and points out areas of agreement and disagreement between the authors, while simultaneously placing the different arguments within the broader field of enquiry.

Election-Day Experiences and Evaluations of Electoral Integrity in Unconsolidated Democracies: Evidence from Nigeria

Why do voters’ evaluations of elections in unconsolidated democracies appear to be unaffected by election-day events? Among the handful of studies that examine the consequences of election experiences in countries with less experience with multiparty elections, a majority finds that what happens on election day does not matter. I seek to reexamine this puzzle using original post-election survey data on the 2015 Nigerian presidential elections. First, I distinguish between voters’ evaluations of the process (1) at their own polling stations ( local) and (2) across the entire country ( national). Second, I highlight three types of election-day experiences that are relevant for unconsolidated democracies: experience with manipulation, administrative irregularities, and election observers. Multivariate regression results indicate that all three experiences are associated with local and national perceptions of electoral integrity. However, the salience of some experiences, such as interactions with election observers, depends on whether voters make local or national election integrity evaluations.

The effects of rating scale format on the measurement of policy attitudes in web surveys

Recent research suggests that policy attitudes should be assessed with surveys that use branched rating scales that separately measure the direction and intensity of issue preferences. However, past studies have not tested whether branched rating scales improve the quality of survey data in the context of self-administered web surveys. In the current study, I compare the effects of different issue scale formats on response distributions, survey satisficing and issue-based voting in multiparty elections. Using data from a randomized web experiment, I find that partially labeled seven- and eleven-point issue scales and fully verbalized branched scales produce very similar response distributions and comparable effects of policy attitudes on party choice. However, the findings regarding the extent of satisficing behavior are mixed. Based on the efficiency of different scale formats, scholars are encouraged to use seven- or eleven-point rating scales to measure policy attitudes in web surveys.

The Strategic Origins of Electoral Authoritarianism

Why do autocrats hold multiparty elections? This article argues that transitions to electoral authoritarianism (EA) follow a strategic calculus in which autocrats balance international incentives to adopt elections against the costs and risks of controlling them. It tests this hypothesis with a multinomial logit model that simultaneously predicts transitions to EA and democracy, using a sample of non-electoral autocracies from 1946–2010. It finds that pro-democratic international leverage – captured by dependence on democracies through trade ties, military alliances, international governmental organizations and aid – predicts EA adoption. Socio-economic factors that make voters easier to control, such as low average income and high inequality, also predict EA transition. In contrast, since democratization entails a loss of power for autocrats, it is mainly predicted by regime weakness rather than international engagement or socio-economic factors. The results demonstrate that different forms of liberalization follow distinct logics, providing insight into autocratic regime dynamics and democracy promotion’s unintended effects.

When and where do elections matter? A global test of the democratization by elections hypothesis, 1900–2010

ABSTRACTSuccessive multiparty elections in sub-Saharan Africa are associated with incremental democratization. Yet tests in other regions are less than encouraging. Non-significant findings on Latin America and post-communist Eurasia, as well as conceptual criticism regarding the theory’s application in the contemporary Middle East, suggest that this may be a case of African exceptionalism. This article moves these debates forward by posing a comprehensive, global set of tests on the democratizing effect of elections. We seek to establish the scope conditions of the argument geographically, temporally, and substantively. Although we find a correlation between reiterated multiparty elections and improvements in the liberal-democratic components of electoral regimes globally since 1900, the relationship is only substantial in the period since the onset of the third wave of democracy. Experiences with iterated multiparty elections have substantive importance for democratization in sub-Saharan Africa, the post-communist region, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia. For the Middle East and North Africa, the relationship is weaker and less robust. Finally, the results suggest that reiterated sequences of multiparty elections are associated with improvements to liberal and deliberative components of democracy more so than egalitarian components.

Public trust in manipulated elections: The role of election administration and media freedom

As multiparty elections have become a global norm, scholars and policy experts regard public trust in elections as vital for regime legitimacy. However, very few cross-national studies have examined the consequences of electoral manipulation, including the manipulation of election administration and the media, on citizens' trust in elections. This paper addresses this gap by exploring how autonomy of election management bodies (EMBs) and media freedom individually and conjointly shape citizens’ trust in elections. Citizens are more likely to express confidence in elections when EMBs display de-facto autonomy, and less likely to do so when mass media disseminate information independent of government control. Additionally, we suggest that EMB autonomy may not have a positive effect on public trust in elections if media freedom is low. Empirical findings based on recent survey data on public trust in 47 elections and expert data on de-facto EMB autonomy and media freedom support our hypotheses.

Do multiparty elections improve human development in autocracies?

ABSTRACTImprovements in human development under democratic institutions are often attributed to electoral contestation. We evaluate the effect of multiparty contestation on infant mortality in the authoritarian context. Contrary to what extant scholarship argues, we find no evidence that multiparty elections in authoritarian regimes reduce infant mortality. Specifically, we show that electoral autocracies do not produce better infant mortality outcomes compared to closed autocracies holding no multiparty elections. We also demonstrate a non-monotonic effect of electoral competition on infant mortality: Infant mortality increases in levels of electoral contestation common in electoral authoritarian regimes and decreases only at levels of contestation that are nearly exclusive to democracies. Finally, we show that increases in infant mortality in electoral authoritarian regimes operate partially through increased political violence and reduced state capacity.

The Obligations on Government and Society in our Constitutional State to Respect and Support Independent Constitutional Structures

The Obligations on Government and Society in our Constitutional State to Respect and Support Independent Constitutional Structures

Incumbency Effects and the Strength of Party Preferences: Evidence from Multiparty Elections in the United Kingdom

Previous researchers have speculated that incumbency effects are larger when voters have weaker partisan preferences, but evidence for this relationship is surprisingly weak. We offer a fresh look at the question by examining the United Kingdom’s multiparty system. In general, the electoral value of incumbency should depend on the proportion of voters who are nearly indifferent between the parties competing for incumbency; in a multiparty system, that proportion may differ across constituencies depending on which parties are locally competitive. After first showing that UK voters in recent decades have stronger preferences between Conservatives and Labour than between Conservatives and Liberals, we show that incumbency effects are larger in close contests between Conservatives and Liberals than in close contests between Conservatives and Labour. By documenting how partisanship influences incumbency effects, our analysis shows that the comparative study of incumbency effects offers broader insights into el...

Coming of age in peace, prosperity, and connectivity: Cambodia’s young electorate and its impact on the ruling party’s political strategies

ABSTRACTCambodia’s youthful population is significantly responsible for a recent unexpected decline in the popularity of the Cambodian People’s Party, which has governed since the end of the Khmer Rouge regime. This increasingly young electorate has lived through an era of peace and openness with regular multi-party elections and impressive economic growth resulting in rapid structural change in the economy. Compared to their parents’ generation, this younger generation is better educated, highly mobile, aspires to salaried employment, and is well connected to new sources of information and technology. Because of this, their expectations, aspirations, opportunities, as well as challenges they face are remarkably different from those of older generations. However, Cambodia’s institutions of governance, dominated by personalized and patron–client networks that have been propped up by the ruling elite, has effectively marginalized this emerging youth population. This marginalization from political and economic resources has produced alienation and discontent, which represents a significant political problem for the ruling party’s political strategies.

Electoral authoritarianism and weak states in Africa: The role of parties versus presidents in Tanzania and Cameroon

State capacity is arguably an essential factor that stabilizes electoral authoritarian rule. Yet, in the context of sub-Saharan Africa many measures of state capacity are generally weak. What therefore explains the persistence of electoral authoritarianism in Africa? This study provides a comparison of Tanzania and Cameroon to highlight two divergent reactions to the problem of power consolidation in Africa. In Cameroon, a centralized presidency and comparatively large coercive apparatus underpinned a strong patrimonial state. By contrast, in Tanzania the ruling party became an institution that integrated elites and appeared to subsume the state. These regime configurations stabilized electoral authoritarianism in unique ways, and led to different dependence on the state during elections. The study sheds new light on contemporary Africa, and the diverse sources of authoritarian resilience in the face of multiparty elections.

Electoral authoritarianism and economic control

While electoral revolutions in the Philippines and the post-Communist world have ousted dictators, autocrats from Mexico to Zimbabwe have cemented their rule through regular multi-party elections. Why do elections sometimes undermine authoritarian regimes while at other times they help sustain them? I argue that a dictator’s control over the economy conditions the effect of authoritarian elections. Where rulers command the heights of the economy, elections are more easily manipulated to sustain their rule. But where such control is lacking, elections may spur regime change. In a cross-national study of autocracies from 1970 to 2006, I find that as incumbent control over the economy increases, elections are less likely to lead to regime breakdown. Where economic control is at its lowest, elections increase the risk of regime collapse. Thus, research on authoritarianism needs to supplement the study of authoritarian regime types and institutional characteristics with a focus on the rulers’ control over the state and the economy.

Institutional stepping stones for democracy: how and why multipartyism enhances democratic change

ABSTRACT Scholars of electoral authoritarianism and comparative institutions have emphasized how authoritarian regimes implement multiparty elections to stabilize authoritarian rule and diffuse political opposition. Consequently, the literature has advised against the notion that multiparty elections constitute a general lever for democratization. This article presents evidence in support of a more positive understanding of multipartyism and democracy. We argue that multiparty elections create an institutional space for oppositional parties, instrumentally motivated to promote further positive democratic change. We hypothesize that multiparty regimes are (1) generally more likely to experience positive democratic change, and (2) more importantly, more likely to do so when faced by internal or external regime threats. We test these hypotheses using cross-section time-series data on 166 countries in the period 1973–2010. Our results show a general positive effect of multipartyism for democratic change, and that multiparty regimes are more likely to improve their levels of democracy when faced with demonstrations and economic crisis.

Perils of pluralism: Electoral violence and incumbency in sub-Saharan Africa

Why do some multiparty elections lead to political violence while others do not? Despite extensive literatures on democratization, civil war, and violence against civilians in civil war, the topic of electoral violence has received less attention. We develop a set of theoretical propositions to explain this variation, testing them on an original dataset on African elections from 1990 to 2008. We find that elections in which an incumbent presidential candidate is running for re-election are significantly more likely to experience electoral violence, both prior to the election and after voting has taken place. We argue that clientelism is behind this pattern, and that clients often resort to electoral violence to protect a reliable incumbent patron. On the other hand, when an incumbent candidate is not running for office, we argue that clients are less willing to assume the risks of participating in electoral violence because candidates in the election have not established a record of delivering patronage at the executive level. We further find some evidence that pre-existing social conflicts increase the risk of pre-election violence. We suggest that this finding is due to the tendency of political elites to mobilize voters around pre-existing political and economic grievances to promote their candidacies, in turn heightening tensions and divisions. We also examine, but find little support for, a number of other possible determinants of electoral violence, such as regime type, income level, international observers, ongoing civil war, pathway to power, and first elections after civil war. The article contributes not only to a small but growing literature on electoral violence but also to a burgeoning literature on political behavior in African elections.