Few events reveal the nature of the Old Regime better than the subsistence crises that plagued it. Few incidents better expose the economic, geographic, and political structures or allow us to understand more clearly the administrative power of the monarchy or the condition of the people and their relationship to their institutions. This is particularly true of general crises, such as the one in 1709. In a given year one or another region of France always suffered poor crops and food shortages. Other regions were usually able, if not always willing, to make up the difference. In 1709, however, as in 1662 and 1694, the shortage was general, and provinces, cities, and towns became competitors for meager supplies. Although it might be assumed that the monarchy of Louis XIV, so legendarily absolute, would have coordinated the movement of grain to even out the impact, such royal efforts were at best sporadic and at worst nonexistent. For the most part, local officials in cities and towns throughout France were left to their own devices, and their survival, as well as that of those dependent upon them, hinged largely on their own individual or collective networks of influence and local power.'