In Being and Nothingness, Sartre distinguishes between two types of freedom. One is what one has wished, which is empirical and popular concept of 'freedom.'1 The other is oneself to determine oneself to wish, which is philosophical concept of . . . [that] means only autonomy of (483/563). The former can be termed freedom to obtain and latter freedom to choose. to obtain refers to our ability to act in certain ways in practical world. to refers to fundamental projects that we set for ourselves and, accordingly, meanings we confer on situations in which we find ourselves. Sartre is unequivocal that, for example, a person with no legs is not to walk. Nevertheless, he is to confer meanings on his in a variety of ways, according to his fundamental projects in life. We are a choice, and for us, to be is to choose ourselves. Even this disability from which suffer have assumed by very fact that live; surpass it toward my own projects, make of it necessary obstacle for my being, and cannot be crippled without choosing myself as crippled. This means that choose way constitute my disability (as unbearable, humiliating, be hidden, be revealed to all, object of pride, the justification of my failures, etc.). (328/393) The term freedom to could be confusing, since many of our choices lie within sphere of freedom to obtain. Sartre offers an example of a person who has a flat tire, understands that he will not arrive in time to close a deal with a prospective client, and, hence, chooses to sign a contract with a different client or even give up entire endeavor (505/58687). But such a choice would fall in sphere of what Sartre calls to obtain, not to choose, since it does not have to do with a sufficiently fundamental project in life and basic meanings a person attributes to himself and his situations, but, rather, with instrumental decisions about specific courses of action. Freedom to choose, then, is a technical term relating to a certain set of general choices about one's basic projects. Freedom to choose and to are interrelated, since specific projects we undertake assign particular meanings to situations in which we find ourselves, and it is only within these spheres of meaning that we obtain, or fail to obtain, certain specific ends. Sartre presents example of a mountain (488-89/569). If take on project of being a mountain climber, mountain acquires meaning of obstacle or challenge. But if my project is that of a lawyer, real estate developer, or environmental activist (to add more options to Sartre's original example), mountain has different meanings. Once projects are chosen and meanings conferred, we could find ourselves, in those spheres of meaning, succeeding or failing to what we want. The mountain climber could, for example, fail to reach mountain top; real estate developer could fail to build hotels on mountain; and environmental activist might fail to preserve natural habitat there. But success or failure to what they seek acquires its identity only because these individuals chose projects of a mountain climber, real estate developer, or environmentalist. Sartre uses this distinction to respond to anticipated criticism of one of his famous claims about freedom: that it is absolute. He writes, for example, I am absolutely and absolutely responsible for my situation (509/59 1);2 man cannot be sometimes slave and sometimes free; he is wholly and forever or he is not at all (441/485); and existence precedes and determines essence (438/513). Likewise, he asserts that we are totally free (555/64 1 ) and that there is no obstacle in absolute sense, but obstacle reveals its coefficient of adversity across freely invented and freely acquired techniques. …
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