Moscow Patriarchate Research Articles

ON THE DATE OF BIRTH OF PATRIARCH HADRIAN OF MOSCOW AND ALL RUSSIA

The Russian historiographic sources recognize three probable birth dates of Hadrian, the last Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia in 17th century, i.e.1627, 1637 and 1639. The fourth date, 1636, is not widely recognized. Two epitaphs to the Patriarch Hadrian, both written by Karion Istomin, a major court poet of that time, serve as the main source of information about the life of the head of the Russian Church. The first epitaph is prosaic, mounted on his tomb in the shrine of the heads of the Russian Church in the Assumption Cathedral in the Moscow Kremlin, and the second is poetic, preserved in the papers of the poet. . This paper establishes that the cause of chronological differences were errors in reading and interpreting the date of the Patriarch's death in the prosaic epitaph, which were made in historical studies of the 19th - early 20th century and without cross-checking with the gravestone inscription were reproduced in various publications. A visual study of the prosaic epitaph, conducted by the author in March 2014, indicates that Patriarch Hadrian died on October 2, 1700 at the age of 62 . The same date is written in the poetic epitaph. The “birthday” of Patriarch Hadrian (October 2), also raises doubts; most likely this date originated in the 19th century on the basis of the day of his baptism. The conducted research on the base of combination of archival sources and critical analysis of the writings of historians of the 19th - early 20th centuries established that Patriarch Hadrian was born in 1638.

Discussing the de-secular online: Legitimization and resistance to the political engagement of the Moscow Patriarchate in the Russian blogosphere

To date, there has been an abundance of studies that either cover the interaction of religion and secular institutions or focus on how religious actors seek to reshape institutional differentiation by protecting a ‘sacred life-world’. Nevertheless, the reaction of religious communities to de-secular changes has rarely been studied. This article fills this lacuna by analyzing the debates of Orthodox bloggers over the de-secular strategy of the Moscow Patriarchate (MP). This research draws on Castells’ concept of resisting and legitimizing identities in order to map out the ideological positions that Orthodox bloggers take when arguing for or against de-secularization. The analysis of the blogs reveals that the difference in the way in which the MP’s de-secular agenda is assessed has played a key role in engendering a split within the online Orthodox community along attitudes towards the church’s religious and political power.

Медиатизация православия — это возможно?

Тотальная медиатизация всех сфер современных обществ ставит социологов перед непростой проблемой необходимости ревизии устоявшихся теорий и подходов. Применительно к отечественной и зарубежной социологии религии это означает ревизию все еще используемой по старинке парадигмы секуляризации. Институционально оформившееся медиаизмерение традиционных религий слабо укладывается в жесткие рамки теорий секуляризации, предписывающих трактовать любые инновации религиозной системы как ее обмирщение и выхолащивание. В такой системе координат плохо помещаются медиатизированные миры традиционных религий, опосредующие выходы религий в публичные социальные пространства. Так, совершенно незамеченным остался прецедент 2015 г., когда православный иеромонах Фотий стал победителем развлекательного шоу «Голос» и концертирующим «Голосом России». В равной степени вне социологической рефлексии пребывает и российское православие эпохи web 2.0 — множественные цифровые церковные СМИ, медиахолдинги, сайты Московского патриархата и синодальных отделов, приходов и православных храмов, православная поисковая система, священнические и монашеские профили в социальных сетях Vk.com, Facebook, Instagram, медийное вещание православных подкастов и спутниковых каналов, видеоблоги и документалистика на платформе YouTube. Меж тем, определенным образом соотнесенные офлайн- и онлайн-измерения современного российского православия конструируют новые идентичности, сообщества, модели национального патриотизма, процедуры цензуры и контроля российских медиа- и интернет-пространств. Настоящая статья предлагает проанализировать медиатизацию российского православия как составляющую процесса его долгосрочной реинституционализации. В качестве методологической рамки исследования автор использует концепции медиатизации общества, предложенные Фридрихом Кротцем, Андреасом Хеппом и Ником Коулдри. Это позволяет рассмотреть уже существующие православные медиамиры и кейс иеромонаха Фотия как маркеры определенных этапов реинституционализации российского православия.
 Благодарность. Исследование выполнено при финансовой поддержке РФФИ, в рамках проекта № 19-011-00871 «Социальные медиа как фактор трансформации православия в современной России».

Kyiv Metropolia and Moscow Diplomacy: an Ottoman Viewpoint

Abstract The Muscovite legation to the Ottoman Empire in 1686 enabled the final stage of annexation of the Kyiv Metropolia by the Patriarchate of Moscow at the end of the 17th century. However, previously ignored Ottoman sources (the official register of Ottoman affairs in 1686-1687, the History of Silahdar chronicle, and a fragment of the European chronicle Relazione di Constantinopoli) contradict the Russian narrative. This casts doubt on the veracity of the Muscovite diplomatic mission in 1686 and, therefore, the process of separation of the Kyiv Metropolia from the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

ПСИХОЛІНГВІСТИЧНИЙ АНАЛІЗ РЕЛІГІЙНИХ КОМУНІКАЦІЙ У ЧАСИ СТАНОВЛЕННЯ ПРАВОСЛАВНОЇ ЦЕРКВИ УКРАЇНИ

У статті здійснено психолінгвістичний аналіз релігійних комунікацій у часи становлення Православної церкви України (ПЦУ). Представлено тлумачення поняття релігійних комунікацій та його основні характеристики. Зазначено особливості релігійних ЗМІ, переваги релігійних Інтернет-комунікацій. Здійснено огляд змісту друкованих видань Української православної церкви Московського патріархату (УПЦ МП) щодо висвітлення події утворення ПЦУ. Описано основні чотири етапи фреймового аналізу тексту, що містить також характеристику визначення сценарію тексту. За результатами здійсненого фреймового аналізу офіційної заяви Священного синоду УПЦ щодо ситуації в українському й світовому православ’ї виділено десять фреймів: структури, дії, агресія, люди, цінності, право, влада, території, релігійні терміни, часова орієнтація. Найбільшу кількість слів містять фрейми структури, дії, агресія, люди. Найменшими за обсягом є фрейми «релігійні терміни» та «часова орієнтація». Виокремленням найчастотніших слів у кожному фреймі визначено сценарій досліджуваної заяви: Церква, дії, розкол, віруючі, єдність, права, патріархат, шлях, Господь і рік. Загалом заява містить багато звинувачень про незаконні дії, утручання в життя Церкви Константинопольського патріархату, ПЦУ та державної влади. Заява не закликає до єдності, вона містить заклики до подальшого протистояння й «виправлення помилок». Чітким у заяві є прохання до влади щодо скасування закону про перейменування УПЦ МП, проте у цій заяві Синод називає себе УПЦ. Це вводить в оману пересічних українців, які не ідентифікують УПЦ як таку, що має російське підпорядкування.

Moscow rules: what drives Russia to confront the West

Some Russia-watchers are rather surprised that it was not only easier, but much more pleasant and rewarding, for foreigners to deal with Mr Gorbachev, when he was still (pretending to be?) a convinced communist, than it is to negotiate with Mr Putin, who is (pretending to be?) a fervent Christian and wholehearted supporter of the Moscow Patriarchate. This apparent paradox is no surprise to Keir Giles, who is more inclined to stress the continuity of, rather than the change in, Russian behaviour over the centuries. For him, the notion that things will somehow sort themselves out fairly soon after Putin is succeeded by, conceivably, a more accommodating individual, is ludicrously simplistic and even dangerous. Perhaps, one might add, a small, densely populated country like Japan (127 million) can change quite quickly, but not a huge, sparsely populated (at most, 144 million) Great Power like eternal Russia. This is how I read Moscow rules, bearing in mind that ‘Moscow’ here could be both a noun and an adjective and ‘rules’ both a noun and a verb. This ambiguity is telling. After all, how significant were the coup and counter-coup in Moscow in late 1991? Did they really lead to a revolution, as the coup in Petrograd did in late 1917, or, basically, to more of the same? Giles, questionably, writes that the Cold War (as he understands it) really is over and that Russia is currently going through a post-Soviet, not a neo-Soviet, period. But what's in a name? The tsarist (Giles knowingly always spells it in the old-fashioned way, czarist, except when quoting others) heritage is every bit as important as, or perhaps even more important than, the 70-odd years of communist, atheist rule. At the very least, readers might add, because the ‘Soviet’ period lasted about six times as long as the Nazi period in Germany, it may well take Russia(ns) some six times as long to get over it. There can be no quick fix, only the long haul. After the defeat of Nazism, most Germans atoned for the Holocaust. After the collapse of communism, the Russians chose not to show much repentance for the Gulag, selecting instead as the foundation stone of the ‘new’ Russia the victory in the Great Fatherland War (1941–5). Indeed, the ‘Wall of Mourning’ monument recently opened in Moscow even suggests that those responsible for the Gulag should be forgiven—unlike, presumably, those responsible for the Holocaust and the invasion of the USSR.

Автокефалия Украинской православной церкви как инструмент обострения российско-украинского территориально-политического конфликта

The study discusses the fact of granting autoceph-aly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church by the Patri-arch of Constantinople as a political move aimed at aggravating Russian-Ukrainian relations at the pre-sent stage. The authors note the following reasons for this decision: the struggle of Constantinople and Moscow for primacy in the Orthodox world, the ge-opolitical factors in Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the role of the USA as a destabilizing factor in Rus-sian-Ukrainian relations, an appeal of the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko to Ukrainian autocephaly issue as a key point in his election program in terms of low public approval rating. Based on sociological data, the research examines the spiritual and reli-gious influence of the Ukrainian Orthodox churches opposing the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, i.e. the Ukrainian Auto-cephalous Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Ortho-dox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate, and the Ukrain-ian Uniate Church. In conclusion, the study presents two possible development scenarios: Polish (the autocephalous church will later return to the Rus-sian Orthodox Church) and Lithuanian ones (the spiritual confrontation of churches will develop against the background of aggravating geopolitical contradictions in the region).

Primacy in the Church: Theology and church practice

Журнал «Вопросы теологии» — международный академический журнал по теологии. Журнал ориентирован на развитие всех направлений и областей, входящих в исследовательскую отрасль «Теология», прежде всего в том варианте, в каком она развивается в светских вузах и научно-исследовательских структурах, а также в духовных академиях.

The Russian Orthodox Church as the Mechanism of Degradation of National Unity in Ukraine

The article deals with the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on the Ukrainian society and the problems that arise as a result. The author claims that the ROC and its branch, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, pursue a purposeful and systematic pol-icy of destruction of the autocephalous status of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the policy of national unity in Ukraine. It is argued that on 3 April 2019, the Synod of the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate reiterated that the ROC and the UOC (MP) will not concede to full and global recognition of the autocephalous status of the newly-established UOC. A wide range of tools is used for that purpose. The author analyses the attitude of the UOC (MP) to the Russian military aggression. He claims that part of the priests of the UOC (MP) openly supported terrorists and systematically cooperated with the invaders in the territories beyond Ukraine’s control. It is noted that the administration of the UOC (MP) adheres to the paradigm of the ‘Russian world’ and ‘spiritual unity of fraternal Ukrainian and Russian peoples’, therefore refusing to refer to the armed aggression in Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea as the Russian aggression, occupation or hybrid war. It is stated that the UOC (MP) together with the ROC has become a strong instigator of a stressful situation in Ukrainian society through creating ‘multiple lines of confrontation’. They also regularly conduct information and manipulative campaigns aimed at discrediting Ukraine. In addition, they appeal to international organizations on the violation of hu-man rights in order to realize their own interests. The article elaborates upon the exploitation of religious issues by the Kremlin in the context of the attack on Ukrainian history. It is argued that Moscow considers part of the territory of Ukraine ‘the spiritual source of the formation of the Russian nation and the Russian state’. It is proposed to take a number of measures to neutralize the destructive influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on the consolidation of Ukrainian society. Keywords: Russian Orthodox Church, national interests of Ukraine, Russian aggression, hybrid war, Moscow Patriarchate, international religious relations.

Епископат обновленческой церкви на территории СССР в 1941—1945 годах: трансформации политических взглядов

The article is devoted to the problem of political preferences of the renovationist episcopate in the USSR in 1941-1945. The author notes that, contrary to the popular opinion about the Pro-Soviet positions of all the bishops-renovationists in the temporarily occupied by the Nazis territory of the RSFSR, many of them were able to successfully return to their ministry, took the previously empty Episcopal chairs and actively carried out anti-Soviet propaganda. It is emphasized that in the territory free from occupation, the Renovationism leaders from the first days of the war stood actively on the Pro-Soviet position, called on believers to fight the enemy. The author proves that initially the Soviet government provided the Church with the same support as the sergians, and only after September 1943 a smooth preponderance of state preferences in favor of the “old churchmen” begins. Attention is paid to the fact that in the conditions of the end of the war many active figures of the Renovationist movement for a long time successfully competed with the Moscow Patriarchate, and then, when it was necessary to reunite with the Russian Orthodox Church, took all possible steps to preserve their own influence. The presented author’s development is based on the materials of Russian archives, as well as modern scientific literature devoted to the problems of the history of religion during the Great Patriotic war and the study of divisions within the Russian Orthodoxy.

Деятельность певчих главных хоров Российского государства XVI —XVII вв. как придворных служилых людей

In Moscow of the 16th—17th centuries there were two closely related centers of professional musical art. They were the choir at the Tsar’s court and the choir at the court of the metropolitan (since 1589 — patriarch) of Moscow and all Russia, which united the best creative powers of the country. According to the author, the study of historical data on the life and activities of the Tsar’s and patriarchal singers indicates that they belonged to the category of court service class people. Directions of their activities have often expanded. This was determined not only by the fact that the singers were literate, and sometimes had a high level of education, but also by the lack of a clear dif- ferentiation of services in the developing state apparatus, which made it possible to use the singers in various services — from file clerk to military. The findings are based on an analysis of a wide range of diverse archival documents and other sources. The obtained results allow us to clarify the social status of masters, who are often referred to the clergy class by researchers.

Социальная деятельность Хабаровской епархии Русской Православной Церкви в 1988—2016 годах

The question of the formation of community service and charity of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Khabarovsk Territory in the period from 1988 to 2016 in the context of a change in the socio-political system is considered. The research is based on materials from the Khabarovsk Diocesan Administration, the State Archive of the Khabarovsk Territory and the Information and Education Portal of the Khabarovsk Diocese. Particular attention is paid to the processes of the establishment of diocesan bodies in social service and matters of mercy. It analyzes the socio-economic conditions in which the development of the Church’s social ministry in the region took place. The data on the assistance to needy categories of the population are given. It is shown that in the 90s of the twentieth century, the orders of the Moscow Patriarchate were only advisory in nature. The authors of the article believe that in those economic and political conditions this seems justified. It is noted that during this period, the bishops on the ground themselves prioritized the development of church life, in particular with regard to helping those in need. It is emphasized that the development of this direction of church activity began due to the position of His Holiness Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill (Gundyaev). The novelty of the study is seen in the fact that the charitable activities of the Church during the period under review are practically not affected in publications devoted to the recent history of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Православная Америка: прошлое и настоящее

The article presents a review of the main stages of historical evolution of Orthodox Christiani-ty in the United States as well as an analysis of recent trends in its contemporary development. The present-day Orthodox Christianity in America is a combination of several cultural layers based on Russian spiritual legacy laid by the Russian Orthodox mission in Alaska beginning from the late 18th century. The subsequent transformation of this “diaspora Church” into an American Orthodox Church was followed by its fragmentation into three different jurisdictions: Orthodox Church in America (OCA), Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR) and parishes of Moscow Patriarchate. Based on survey research and other sociological studies of Orthodox America, the article’s main focus is on the current state of these jurisdictions: their place in changing U.S. religious landscape, their geographical distribution, socio-demographic characteristics of their clergy and laity, their level of integration into American society as well as factors of its relatively marginal status compared to main America’s religions. The authors’ conclusion is that despite its small numbers U.S. Orthodoxy is firmly rooted in American society and has good prospects for further growth.

Сохранение исторической памяти о вкладе Русской Православной церкви в победу в Великой Отечественной войне

We present the key directions in the activity of the Russian Orthodox Church in preserving and restoring the historical memory of the Great Patriotic War. We consider the main stages and aspects of the church's activity in this direction. The construction of the Great Patriotic War historical memory now occupies a large place in patriotic and civic education. The issues of historical memory and its differences from the actual history in Russia began to work with recent-ly. We also consider various ways of preserving historical memory of the Russian Orthodox Church contribution to the victory in the Great Patriotic War in connection with the peculiarities of the source base. Also, in the conditions of limited actions of the Russian Orthodox Church as a full-fledged subject of law, in different periods of time certain types of historical memory preser-vation came to the fore. The main areas of activity in terms of preserving historical memory of the Russian Orthodox Church contribution to victory are identified. Among them we highlight the coverage of church activities in the official publication of the Russian Orthodox Church “Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate”, the construction of churches in memory of the war, the biography restoration of repressed priests and believers during the war, co-operative work on museums and museum exhibitions, etc. We also reveal the correspondence of the work content with historical memory to basic Russian values.

Panagia for Patriarch Jeremia II of Constantinople Made in Moscow: One Not Survived Insignia of the Beginning Age of Moscow Patriarchate

From the two act documents of the beginning and middle of the 17th century, that are known from the publications of I. E. Zabelin and A. I. Uspensky (the beginning of 20th century), we have the mentions of a cameo on green jasper with facial images. An analysis of the iconographic details accompanying this mention, the names of historical persons, circumstances and other indirect information suggests the hypothesis that it is a question of the precious church insignia that was preserved in the tsar's treasury, the richly decorated panagia/encolpion-reliquary, which was made for the Constantinople Patriarch Jeremy II during the approval of the Moscow Patriarchate. A comparison with the preserved similar works in the collections of the Moscow Kremlin Museums, the Trinity-Sergius Lavra, other museums in Russia and other countries makes it possible to estimate the value of the lost/undetected jewel and reconstruct some unknown details from other sources of the historical event — the patriarchate’s approval in Moscow Russia (1589).

УКРАЇНСЬКА ЦЕРКОВНА ЕЛІТА І РОСІЙСЬКИЙ ЦЕНТРАЛІЗМ: ПРОТИСТОЯННЯ СИНОДАЛЬНОГО ПЕРІОДУ

The essence of opposition of the Ukrainian church elite to the Russian centralism of the Synodal period (1721-1786) and analyzes its role in defending the rights and interests of the Orthodox Church are described in the article. The formation of Synod in 1721 opened in a new period in the history of the Orthodox Church in the Russian Empire, and in Ukraine in particular. The task of this institution, established on the European model, was to unify church life and to offset its local features according to the program outlined by the Spiritual Regulation at the behest of Peter I. The activities of Synod came into sharp contradiction with the privileges of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, which it continued to enjoy from the time of its subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate. The Metropolitan of Kyiv was deprived of its decisive status, and its superiors - the title of Metropolitan and the right of free election. The restoration of these rights became the main task for the Ukrainian church elite. Under the reign of Empress Anna Ioanivna, the clergy made a major effort to restore the economic rights of the Church, undermined by the release of Hetman Danylo Apostol in 1728, which, however, were fruitless. The reign of Empress Elizabeth began a new era in the autonomous aspirations of the Ukrainian church elite. In response to the petition of Kyiv Bishop Rafail Zaborovskyi, the Metropolitanate of Kyiv was returned to its former status, and ts head - the title of Metropolitan. At the same time, the attempts to restitute the clergy property rights, as so as the restoration of the jurisdiction of the Kyiv Metropolitanate were unsuccessful. The reign of Catherine II, whose main purpose was the complete centralization in all spheres of the Russian Empire and the secularization of church property, became the most difficult and acute period of confrontation with the Russian imperial regime. The Ukrainian church elite, headed by Metropolitan of Kyiv Arsenii Mohylianskyi, tried to use the preparation of the New Code Commission to assert its rights. This has been proven by petitions to restore the status of the Kyiv Metropolitanate and clergy rights. However, the Commission did not complete its activities and the relicts of the autonomy of the Ukrainian elites were finally buried.

ПОЛІТИЧНА СКЛАДОВА У КОНФЛІКТИЗАЦІЇ МІЖКОНФЕСІЙНИХ ВІДНОСИН В УКРАЇНІ

The article identifies the place and role of the political component in the conflictization of interconfessional relations in Ukraine by taking into consideration that the network of religious organizations in our country is one of the largest on the European continent. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the political component in the conflictization of interconfessional relations in Ukrainian Orthodoxy. During more than thousand years the Orthodoxy, despite the conflicts between the churches and their believers in past and present is still the most widespread Christian confession in Ukraine. Moreover, it saved a tendency to the inner unity, including creation of the Local Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). Obtaining by the Orthodox Church of Ukraine on January 6, 2019 from the Ecumenical Patriarchate the Thomas was an important step in founding of independent and competent national church. This is also evidenced by the fact that during the first year of existing of the OCU the number of its parishes increase up to 7,000, not less important is the fact that three churches: The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, the Hellenic Church and the Patriarchate of Alexandria recognized the OCU and this already testifies its international acceptance as the part of Orthodoxy. Undoubtedly, the Russian occupation of Crimea and Putin's war in Donbas and the support of these shameful actions by the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and its Ukrainian branch, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) served to the political choices and self-identification of a big part of Ukrainian believers and it gives hope for the gradual stabilization (deconflictization) of interconfessional relations in the Ukrainian Orthodoxy.

DIVIDE ET IMPERA. РОСІЙСЬКИЙ ЦЕНТРАЛІЗМ ЯК КОНФЛІКТИЗАЦІЙНИЙ ЧИННИК ДЛЯ УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ПРАВОСЛАВ’Я В РЕТРОСПЕКТИВІ ТА СУЧАСНИХ РЕАЛІЯХ

The topicality of the article is motivated by the present situation of Ukraine under conditions of Russian military and information aggression and of the active spread in the information space of the aggressive concept of the "Russian world". The purpose of the article is to investigate the causes and essence of conflict processes in Ukrainian Orthodoxy, in particular, to analyze the role of the Russian centralism in them in the past and in contemporary realities. It is determined that the causes of conflicts in the sphere of Ukrainian Orthodoxy aч re largely related to the act of ecclesiastical submission to the Moscow Patriarchate in 1686. The situation of Ukraine under conditions of Russian military and informational aggression, in which the church matters also played an important role, refer to the exploration of Russian centralism as a conflict factor for Ukrainian Orthodoxy. The actual character of the issue is also determined by the modern planting in the information space of the aggressive theory of the "Russian world" as well as the necessity to find the ways for consolidation of the Ukrainian society, in particular in the sphere of interconfessional relations. In order to weaken the opposition of the Ukrainian ecclesiastical superiors to imperial centralism, the Russian government deliberately resorted to incitement between the secular and the ecclesiastical elites. Such measures were taken by Empress Anna Ioanovna, who ordered Prince Oleksii Shakhovskyi, the ruler of Little Russia at that time to persuade the Cossack elders secretly to protest against the giving of land possession to the Church. In the same way the Empress Catherine II acted and consciously orientated the ruler of the Little Russia Earl Piotr Rumiantsev to support conflicts between the Ukrainian nobility and clergy according to the principle “divide et impera” (divide and rule). Contemporary Russian information aggression has revealed various forms of propaganda in Ukrainian society, one of which is the project of the “Russian world”. A major point in overcoming the influence of the Russian neoimperial factor in Ukrainian society as well as the contemporary conflicts on the level of Ukrainian Orthodoxy is the development of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine founded a result of the age-old aspirations of Ukrainian society for church unity. The important steps for strengthening if the church unity were outlined by the Bishops' Council of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine convened on December 14, 2019.

РЕЛИГИЯ И НАУКА: КОНФЛИКТ ИЛИ ДИАЛОГ? (ИССЛЕДОВАНИЕ МИРОВОЗЗРЕНЧЕСКИХ И СОЦИАЛЬНЫХ ПРОТИВОРЕЧИЙ В РОССИЙСКОМ ОБЩЕСТВЕ)

The article is devoted to the study of the worldviews and social contradictions in Russian society on the example of two different positions on the relationship between religion and science. According to one of these positions these relationships are defined as conflict. The second, opposing point of view says there never was and there cannot be any conflict between religion and science. In the publication such points are called “the paradigm of conflict” and “the paradigm of dialogue”. It shows, the first “paradigm” in the Soviet period of Russian history was determined by ideologization of science and was an important part of anti-religious propaganda. On the contrary, “the paradigm of dialogue” has always been represented primarily by religious thinkers. Today it is the official position of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The official Church document “The Basis of the Social Concept” says religion and science are designed to complement each other, especially in solving ethical problems that inevitably arise in the face of modern science. However, secular scientists often see in such statements the Church’s claims to active participation in the public life, including the educational process. Representatives of the academic community often speak out against the introduction of the theological educational programs and the theological departments in secular Universities of the Russian Federation. Thus, in contemporary Russian society some continue to believe that there is a conflict between religion and science, while others insist on the need for dialogue.

PROBLEMS OF SEPARATION UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH FROM THE MOSCOW PATRIARCHATE

The modern problems of obtaining autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church are analyzed. The centennial struggle for autocephaly of the UOC proves that the problem of obtaining independence from the Russian Orthodox Church îf the Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) is very complicated, both according to the legislation of Ukraine and the canons of the church law. The Kyiv metropolis was an integral part of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from 988 to 1686, when it was, from the point of view of many Orthodox churches, illegally and not canonically annexed to the Moscow Patriarchate. In this movement the Orthodox Church was divided into three separate churches – the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), which now calls itself simply «the UOC»; UOC of the Kyiv Patriarchate (KP), established in 1992 and not recognized by the Ecumenical Orthodoxy as canonical and God-inspired, and The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), which arose in 1919-1921. It should be noted that in the period of the Ukrainian Revolutions of 2004 and 2014 and at the beginning of the war in the Eastern Ukraine, the hierarchs of the UOC-MP organized an open antiUkrainian and anti-constitutional campaign, both behind the walls of temples, and at mass events. During the presidential election, this church illegally campaigned for one a pro-Russian Candidate only. In these conditions, the question of the separation of the UOC from the Moscow Patriarchate became more pressing and urgent.Proponents of autocephaly point out that the grounds for granting UOC Tomos for autocephaly are identical to that of the Polish version of 1924. However, we consider the obvious difficulties that distinguish the situation with Orthodoxy in Ukraine, compared with the UOC of Poland. In order to make the Russian Orthodox Church not to interfere in the internal affairs of Ukraine, not to agitate against the state of Ukraine, include in the name of the UOC the phrase that it is an Orthodox Church in Ukraine with a center abroad – in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine two bills – No. 4511 and No. 5309, which since 2016 it was never accepted, because they duplicate the existing Law and contradict Art. 35 of the Constitution. However, as we see, de facto the ROC (MP), directly and indirectly, is campaigning for so-called – «Russian World». For example, just recently the Russian edition of «Orthodoxy and World» published an interview with a member of the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and a supporter of Ukrainian autocephaly by the Metropolitan of Prussia Elpidophor, from which the publication dropped unwanted phrases.On April 22, 2018, the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate adopted a petition from the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko to the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to give Tomos on autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Resolution in support of this appeal, and the appeal of the hierarchs of the Ukrainian Orthodox churches – KP and UAOC and some of the ÌPs. Similar Tomos is now awaiting northern Macedonia. History shows that the procedure for the delivery of Tomos for autocephaly is not easy, long-term.The analysis shows that, despite the difficulties of securing the separation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate by legislative means, there are grounds to expect that the UOC of Tomos would be still received. This decision is not obvious, since some autocephalous Orthodox churches against it and support arguments of the Russian Orthodox Church. The petition of the state authorities concerning the autocephaly of the church is a long-standing claim by the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Thus, Ukraine has to wait for the decision of the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I to hold the Unifying Synod.