Moral Status Research Articles

Ascribing consciousness to artificial intelligence: human-AI interaction and its carry-over effects on human-human interaction.

The question of whether artificial intelligence (AI) can be considered conscious and therefore should be evaluated through a moral lens has surfaced in recent years. In this paper, we argue that whether AI is conscious is less of a concern than the fact that AI can be considered conscious by users during human-AI interaction, because this ascription of consciousness can lead to carry-over effects on human-human interaction. When AI is viewed as conscious like a human, then how people treat AI appears to carry over into how they treat other people due to activating schemas that are congruent to those activated during interactions with humans. In light of this potential, we might consider regulating how we treat AI, or how we build AI to evoke certain kinds of treatment from users, but not because AI is inherently sentient. This argument focuses on humanlike, social actor AI such as chatbots, digital voice assistants, and social robots. In the first part of the paper, we provide evidence for carry-over effects between perceptions of AI consciousness and behavior toward humans through literature on human-computer interaction, human-AI interaction, and the psychology of artificial agents. In the second part of the paper, we detail how the mechanism of schema activation can allow us to test consciousness perception as a driver of carry-over effects between human-AI interaction and human-human interaction. In essence, perceiving AI as conscious like a human, thereby activating congruent mind schemas during interaction, is a driver for behaviors and perceptions of AI that can carry over into how we treat humans. Therefore, the fact that people can ascribe humanlike consciousness to AI is worth considering, and moral protection for AI is also worth considering, regardless of AI's inherent conscious or moral status.

The Psychological Process Underlying Attitudes Toward Human-Animal Chimeric Brain Research: An Empirical Investigation

This study adopted an empirical method to investigate lay people’s attitudes toward the bioethical issues of human-animal chimeric brains. The results of online surveys showed that (1) people did not entirely reject chimeric brain research, but showed slightly more negative responses than ordinary animal testing; and that (2) their ethical concerns arose in connection with the perception that chimerism in the brain would humanize the animal. This means that people’s psychology was consistent with the ethical argument that crossing the human-animal boundary would bring moral confusion to our society. Meanwhile, it was not in line with another argument that moral status depended on having high capacities, and that chimerism would cause a problem if it enhanced animals’ capacities. Furthermore, this study analyzed additional psychological factors related to people’s moral judgment and the relationship among those factors. Several psychological factors, such as the perception that chimeric brain research is unnatural, were identified as mediating the relationship between perception of animal humanization and ethical concerns about creating and using chimeric brains. Introducing an empirical approach to the ethics of human-animal chimeric brains brought two findings: (1) this study informed us of socially shared intuition regarding this novel technology; and (2) it unveiled the psychological processes behind people’s ethical concerns in more detail than they spontaneously mentioned. These findings will help to build normative arguments and future policies that are understandable and acceptable to society.

Non-identity accounts: Personal myths, cultural scripts and narrative alignment

This article explores narrative practices of reverse biographical identity work: how people compose and present accounts of non-identity formation. When asked to reflect upon a lost, unlived experience, participants drew upon shared discursive resources: in particular cultural scripts. They performed aligning actions to position their individual tale in relation to dominant, preferred versions of these wider social narratives, making moral status claims to being normative or transgressive. These techniques manifested in three aspects of the stories: personal myths and central themes, sequential ordering and teleological reasoning, and counterfactual emotion tones supporting motive talk. Just like stories of actualised identity, therefore, non-identity accounts forge meaningful connections between self and society, reflecting and enacting modes of narrative power.

A Political and ethical landscape of brain organoid research

Human cerebral organoids (hCOs), produced in labs through directed cell culture of embryonic or induced pluripotent stem cells, closely replicate the 3-dimensional architecture of the human brain on a micro scale. This technology has been used to model neurological disease and shows promise to complement or supplant animal subjects in preclinical therapeutic investigation. However, attention must be paid by researchers and institutions to the various ethical concerns associated with hCO development. Human-animal chimeras produced through the grafting of hCOs have shown integration of neurological function, calling into question the moral status of both the animal chimeras and the organoid itself. Sensationalist reporting on such acts may also prompt public backlash, potentially jeopardizing hCO research and the promised benefits thereof. Moreover, concerns arise over privacy and consent for past and prospective donors of stem cells used to produce organoids. Genetic information may be considered privileged to the public domain and disrupted trust can reduce the supply of willing donors. Though hCOs are believed thus far to lack the capacity for consciousness and cognitive function, consideration must be given to their potential status as moral agents with further development or enhancement. Boundaries concerning organoids adhered to by researchers have been largely voluntary and informal to this point. By edict or by the power of the purse, governmental regulatory agencies ought to formalize necessary guidelines to ensure compliance with ethical principles and the adequate representation of all affected stakeholders in future decisions.

Public Reason, Bioethics, and Public Policy: A Seductive Delusion or Ambitious Aspiration?

Can Rawlsian public reason sufficiently justify public policies that regulate or restrain controversial medical and technological interventions in bioethics (and the broader social world), such as abortion, physician aid-in-dying, CRISPER-cas9 gene editing of embryos, surrogate mothers, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis of eight-cell embryos, and so on? The first part of this essay briefly explicates the central concepts that define Rawlsian political liberalism. The latter half of this essay then demonstrates how a commitment to Rawlsian public reason can ameliorate (not completely resolve) many of the policy disagreements related to bioethically controversial medical interventions today. The goal of public reason is to reduce the size of the disagreement by eliminating features of the disagreement that violate the norms of public reason. The norms of public reason are those norms that are politically necessary to preserve the liberal, pluralistic, democratic character of this society. What remains is reasonable disagreement to be addressed through normal democratic deliberative processes. Specific issues addressed from a public reason perspective include personal responsibility for excessive health costs, the utility of a metaphysical definition of death for organ transplantation, and the moral status of excess embryos generated through IVF and/or their use in medical research.

The Ethics of Rearing Animals for Meat: Can Sentience Provide a Meaningful Threshold for Moral Concern? A Defence of Compassionate Speciesism

Rearing and killing animals for meat poses a few ethical questions. Sentientism holds that a being has moral status if and only if it is sentient. The philosopher Peter Singer considers that the suffering of a sentient being should count equally with the like suffering of any other being and thus prioritising human interests over those of non-human animals amounts to an unjustifiable speciesism. I argue that sentientism is false and that suffering and sentience are separate considerations. Prioritising human interests may be justifiable since species relativism but, a fortiori, I argue that we have ample reasons for endorsing and embracing speciesism. I present the case for conscientious omnivorism and compassionate speciesism.

Better to be a Pig Dissatisfied than a Plant Satisfied

In the last two decades, there has been a blossoming literature aiming to counter the neglect of plant capacities. In their recent paper, Miguel Segundo-Ortin and Paco Calvo begin by providing an overview of the literature to then question the mistaken assumptions that led to plants being immediately rejected as candidates for sentience. However, it appears that many responses to their arguments are based on the implicit conviction that because animals have far more sophisticated cognition and agency than plants, and that plants should not have the same moral status as animals, plants should not have any moral status. Put in simpler terms: it is not as bad to eat plants than to eat, say, pigs. While there are still uncertainties around comparative moral and policy implications between animals and plants, given a gradualist account of quasi-sentience and partial moral status, both of which we claim are a matter of degree, we may not have to abolish our convictions by declaring that plants have no sentience or moral status at all. Indeed, we can hold two things at the same time: that animals and plants have moral status, but animals have prima facie more moral status than plants.

Debuit in te officiosior esse: Power, Place, and Accusations of Prostitution in Late Republican Rome

Abstract: This article explores the cognitive link among female autonomy, political activity, sexual status, and place in the late Roman Republic. The intersection of non-elite status and political engagement could shape the public perception of a woman's moral status and, in turn, could make scandalous her presence in certain places—physical and metaphorical. When the political activities of a woman such as Praecia, Chelidon, or Volumnia brought her into contact with the men and women of the city's senatorial elite, she left herself open to accusations—warranted or not—of prostitution.

Stem cell-derived embryo models: moral advance or moral obfuscation?

Stem cell-derived embryo models (SCEMs) are model embryos used in scientific research to gain a better understanding of early embryonic development. The way humans develop from a single-cell zygote to...

Introducing Complexity in Anthropology and Moral Status: a Reply to Pezzano

Pezzano has offered some relevant considerations to my recently published article Anthropological crisis or crisis in moral status. He advocates for the need to address ontologically and anthropologically the relation between human beings and technologies from the concept of property. Despite its centrality, this concept is taken for granted in the debates on the moral status of artificial intelligence (AI). Both proponents and detractors of the anthropology of properties adopt a position towards it without analyzing in depth what exactly we mean by property. In this reply, I intend to take the thesis put forward in my paper a step further on the basis of Pezzano's commentary. I will defend the urge to explore a complex anthropology, markedly technological, and I will introduce the consequences this may have on the concept of moral status.

Book Review: Social Justice Fallacies

At the heart of _Social Justice Fallacies_ is a refutation of the verdicts of Progressives on the moral status of inequalities between the races, sexes and classes, on their own grounds. Following from this is a criticism of the state interventions proposed to correct these inequalities. Sowell considers three themes throughout the book to make his case, these being, the unchosen background of people, the different tastes of people, and, the responses which people make to Progressive policies to “fix” inequalities. By showing how a majority of the inequality between groups is due to these three factors, he defeats the central idea of the social justice movement, namely, ‘disparities are evidence or proof of the effects of such human vices as exploitation and discrimination’ (2). This is a good book grounded in plenty of empirical evidence and solid arguments. This review summarizes its three themes, outlines its secondary concerns, and offers minor criticism towards the end.

Are propagandists combatants? Analysing the ethical status of propagandists in warfare

Abstract Belligerents increasingly rely on media manipulation, propaganda, and communication to attain strategic advantages in conflict. Given the civilian propagandists’ clear role in creating tactical or strategic advantages for one side in the conflict, should these propagandists be considered combatants, and can they therefore be legitimately targeted because of their activities? This article overcomes traditional binary frameworks of distinction to argue that propagandists are indirectly participating civilians, i.e. participants who cannot be intentionally or directly killed in conflict. Because of their activities, propagandists, it argues, are liable to less-than-lethal harm, of which it identifies three types (destruction of property, privation of liberty, isolation). The article then proposes a necessary criterion – necessity – to decide if less-than-lethal harm is warranted against propagandists. It then creates four new criteria – denial of agency, falsehood, influence, gratification – to serve as assessment criteria able to decide what degree of harm a propagandist may maximally face. In making this argument, the article contributes to just war literature by proposing a novel way to evaluate the ethical status of a highly diverse, yet undoubtedly influential, category of war participants: those who undertake the ‘media battle’, outside of the military.

Death as the extinction of the source of value: the constructivist theory of death as an irreversible loss of moral status

In 2017, Michael Nair-Collins formulated his Transitivity Argument which claimed that brain-dead patients are alive according to a concept that defines death in terms of the loss of moral status. This article challenges Nair-Collins’ view in three steps. First, I elaborate on the concept of moral status, claiming that to understand this notion appropriately, one must grasp the distinction between direct and indirect duties. Second, I argue that his understanding of moral status implicit in the Transitivity Argument is faulty since it is not based on a distinction between direct and indirect duties. Third, I show how this flaw in Nair-Collins’ argument is grounded in the more general problems between preference utilitarianism and desire fulfillment theory. Finally, I present the constructivist theory of moral status and the associated moral concept of death and explain how this concept challenges the Transitivity Argument. According to my view, brain death constitutes a valid criterion of death since brain death is incompatible with the preserved capacity to have affective attitudes and to value anything.

Understanding Artificial Agency

Abstract Which artificial intelligence (AI) systems are agents? To answer this question, I propose a multidimensional account of agency. According to this account, a system's agency profile is jointly determined by its level of goal-directedness and autonomy as well as is abilities for directly impacting the surrounding world, long-term planning and acting for reasons. Rooted in extant theories of agency, this account enables fine-grained, nuanced comparative characterizations of artificial agency. I show that this account has multiple important virtues and is more informative than alternatives. More speculatively, it may help to illuminate two important emerging questions in AI ethics: 1. Can agency contribute to the moral status of non-human beings, and how? 2. When and why might AI systems exhibit power-seeking behaviour and does this pose an existential risk to humanity?

Is moral status done with words?

This paper critically examines Coeckelbergh’s (2023) performative view of moral status. Drawing parallels to Searle’s social ontology, two key claims of the performative view are identified: (1) Making a moral status claim is equivalent to making a moral status declaration. (2) A successful declaration establishes the institutional fact that the entity has moral status. Closer examination, however, reveals flaws in both claims. The second claim faces a dilemma: individual instances of moral status declaration are likely to fail because they do not conform to established moral discourse conventions, and reliance on declarations becomes both unnecessary and implausible for explaining widespread collective recognition of moral status. As for the first claim, accepting it undermines the potential for meaningful moral disagreement. As a remedy, this paper proposed a shift in perspective: interpreting moral status claims as assertions rather than declarations. This refined perspective provides a more plausible framework for understanding moral status and avoids the pitfalls associated with the performative view.

Paternalism at a Distance

I argue that the distance between state and citizen gives state paternalism a pro tanto advantage over paternalism between individuals. Pace Jonathan Quong, the state neither denies nor diminishes my moral status by acting on a justified negative judgment about my rational or volitional capacities. Nor does its failure to paternalize on the basis of detailed information about individuals constitute a source of disrespect. Rather, the less discriminating nature of general legislation both reduces the risk of social stigmatization and avoids a problematic dynamic with the paternalizee. But paternalistic policies may give us reason to be concerned about superiority or contempt in policy-makers towards the citizens at whom they are directed. Governments must remain ‘faceless’ enough for paternalism to operate at a distance, but they must reassure the governed that the judgment that they can do better for them does not conceal the attitude that they are better than them.

Anthropomorphism in AI: hype and fallacy

This essay focuses on anthropomorphism as both a form of hype and fallacy. As a form of hype, anthropomorphism is shown to exaggerate AI capabilities and performance by attributing human-like traits to systems that do not possess them. As a fallacy, anthropomorphism is shown to distort moral judgments about AI, such as those concerning its moral character and status, as well as judgments of responsibility and trust. By focusing on these two dimensions of anthropomorphism in AI, the essay highlights negative ethical consequences of the phenomenon in this field.

Strong Bipartisan Support for Controlled Psilocybin Use as Treatment or Enhancement in a Representative Sample of US Americans: Need for Caution in Public Policy Persists

The psychedelic psilocybin has shown promise both as treatment for psychiatric conditions and as a means of improving well-being in healthy individuals. In some jurisdictions (e.g., Oregon, USA), psilocybin use for both purposes is or will soon be allowed and yet, public attitudes toward this shift are understudied. We asked a nationally representative sample of 795 US Americans to evaluate the moral status of psilocybin use in an appropriately licensed setting for either treatment of a psychiatric condition or well-being enhancement. Showing strong bipartisan support, participants rated the individual’s decision as morally positive in both contexts. These results can inform effective policy-making decisions around supervised psilocybin use, given robust public attitudes as elicited in the context of an innovative regulatory model. We did not explore attitudes to psilocybin use in unsupervised or non-licensed community or social settings.

Preserving the Normative Significance of Sentience

According to an orthodox view, the capacity for conscious experience (sentience) is relevant to the distribution of moral status and value. However, physicalism about consciousness might threaten the normative relevance of sentience. According to the indeterminacy argument, sentience is metaphysically indeterminate while indeterminacy of sentience is incompatible with its normative relevance. According to the introspective argument (by François Kammerer), the unreliability of our conscious introspection undercuts the justification for belief in the normative relevance of consciousness. I defend the normative relevance of sentience against these objections. First, I demonstrate that physicalists only have to concede a limited amount of indeterminacy of sentience. This moderate indeterminacy is in harmony with the role of sentience in determining moral status. Second, I argue that physicalism gives us no reason to expect that introspection is unreliable with respect to the normative relevance of consciousness.

Lessons for Ethics From the Kingdom of Fungi.

This article considers lessons about American (individual-centered) anthropocentric (human-centered) thinking that can be applied to how we confer dignity and moral status to beings other than humans. Interestingly, global bioethics might glean such lessons from fungi.