Moral Salience Research Articles

A New Set of Moral Dilemmas: Norms for Moral Acceptability, Decision Times, and Emotional Salience

ABSTRACTAt the present time, the growing interest in the topic of moral judgment highlights the widespread need for a standardized set of experimental stimuli. We provide normative data for a sample of 120 undergraduate students using a new set of 60 moral dilemmas that might be employed in future studies according to specific research needs. Thirty dilemmas were structured to be similar to the Footbridge dilemma (“instrumental” dilemmas, in which the death of one person is a means to save more people), and thirty dilemmas were designed to be similar to the Trolley dilemma (“incidental” dilemmas, in which the death of one person is a foreseen but unintended consequence of the action aimed at saving more people). Besides type of dilemma, risk‐involvement was also manipulated: the main character's life was at risk in half of the instrumental dilemmas and in half of the incidental dilemmas. We provide normative values for the following variables: (i) rates of participants' responses (yes/no) to the proposed resolution; (ii) decision times; (iii) ratings of moral acceptability; and (iv) ratings of emotional valence (pleasantness/unpleasantness) and arousal (activation/calm) experienced during decision making. For most of the dependent variables investigated, we observed significant main effects of type of dilemma and risk‐involvement in both subject and item analyses. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Gut or Game? The Influence of Moral Intuitions on Decisions in Video Games

Recent theorizing on the role of morality in media entertainment suggests morality serves as a guiding force in audience reactions to content. Using moral foundations theory as a base, research has found significant associations between moral salience and audience preferences for and responses to film and television varying in their presentations of morality. Our study extends this work by testing the same relationship in video games. Because a distinguishing factor between video games and traditional media is interactivity, our study focuses on how moral salience predicts decisions made in a video game. We find that increased moral salience led to a decreased probability of moral violations, while decreased moral salience led to an observed random (50%) distribution of violations. This finding was largely stable across different morality subcultures (German, United States) and age groups (adolescents and elderly), with deviations from this pattern explained by theory. We interpret this as evidence for a gut or game explanation of decision making in video games. When users encounter virtual scenarios that prime their moral sensitivities, they rely on their moral intuitions; otherwise, they make satisficing decisions not as an indication of moral corruption but merely as a continuation of the virtual experience.

The speed of morality: a high-density electrical neuroimaging study

Neuroscience research indicates that moral reasoning is underpinned by distinct neural networks including the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), amygdala, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which support communication between computational systems underlying affective states, cognitions, and motivational processes. To characterize real-time neural processing underpinning moral computations, high-density event-related potentials were measured in participants while they viewed short, morally laden visual scenarios depicting intentional and accidental harmful actions. Current source density maxima in the right pSTS as fast as 62 ms poststimulus first distinguished intentional vs. accidental actions. Responses in the amygdala/temporal pole (122 ms) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (182 ms) were then evoked by the perception of harmful actions, indicative of fast information processing associated with early stages of moral cognition. Our data strongly support the notion that intentionality is the first input to moral computations. They also demonstrate that emotion acts as a gain antecedent to moral judgment by alerting the individual to the moral salience of a situation and provide evidence for the pervasive role of affect in moral sensitivity and reasoning.

Gender Perception as a Habit of Moral Perception: Implications for Philosophical Methodology and Introductory Curriculum

Gender Perception as a Habit of Moral Perception: Implications for Philosophical Methodology and Introductory Curriculum

Elderly people and morality in virtual worlds: A cross-cultural analysis of elderly people’s morality in interactive media

This study examines elderly people’s innate moral foundations in influencing decisions, and their subsequent enjoyment in an interactive media environment. The Moral Foundation Questionnaire was used to distinguish between the moral intuitions of elderly US and German respondents, who were believed to have divergent yet stable moral codes that would be salient in a novel virtual world. In an experimental design, participants (N=116) were confronted with a computer simulation in which they could decide to violate or uphold each of five moral intuitions. Germans and Americans differed in their moral foundations, yet for both groups higher moral salience led to a decrease in decisions to commit moral violations in a virtual world. Results for enjoyment were mixed.

A question of morality? The influence of moral salience and nationality on media preferences

AbstractThis study examines the potential role of morality subcultures in mediating the relationship between one’s nationality and the preferences for three movie (drama, action, horror) and three TV (comedy, news, sports) genres in a sample of US and German students (

Kant's Categories of Freedom as Rules of Moral Salience

Kant's Categories of Freedom as Rules of Moral Salience

The Contribution of Emotion and Cognition to Moral Sensitivity: A Neurodevelopmental Study

Whether emotion is a source of moral judgments remains controversial. This study combined neurophysiological measures, including functional magnetic resonance imaging, eye-tracking, and pupillary response with behavioral measures assessing affective and moral judgments across age. One hundred and twenty-six participants aged between 4 and 37 years viewed scenarios depicting intentional versus accidental actions that caused harm/damage to people and objects. Morally, salient scenarios evoked stronger empathic sadness in young participants and were associated with enhanced activity in the amygdala, insula, and temporal poles. While intentional harm was evaluated as equally wrong across all participants, ratings of deserved punishments and malevolent intent gradually became more differentiated with age. Furthermore, age-related increase in activity was detected in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in response to intentional harm to people, as well as increased functional connectivity between this region and the amygdala. Our study provides evidence that moral reasoning involves a complex integration between affective and cognitive processes that gradually changes with age and can be viewed in dynamic transaction across the course of ontogenesis. The findings support the view that negative emotion alerts the individual to the moral salience of a situation by bringing discomfort and thus can serve as an antecedent to moral judgment.

Animals and Humans: Grounds for Separation?

It is relatively uncontroversial that (at least some) non-human animals are morally considerable in their own right. While recognizing moral obligations to animals, many also hold that humans, but not other animals, pass a distinct, higher, threshold for moral consideration, implying that when choices must be made, serious human concerns always trump those of non-human animals. For example, Carl Cohen argues that “If biomedical investigators abandon the effective pursuit of their professional objectives because they are convinced that they may not do to animals what the service of humans requires, they will fail, objectively, to do their duty.” However, defenders of such views face what Jeff McMahan has called the “separation problem”—the challenge of explaining why members of the human species as such have special moral privilege. It is difficult to find a basis for separating the moral status of humans from that of non-human animals. Whatever criterion is used (language, sufferer, subject of a life, user of tools, cooperator, builder and so on), it seems that any attributes possessed by all humans are manifest also by some non-human animals, to an extent that matches or surpasses the accomplishment of some humans such as infants or those with extreme cognitive disability. Even ethical capacities are arguably possessed by some non-human animals. If being entitled to moral consideration or being owed moral obligation is based on possession of some inherent property, then any being or creature that manifests this property should qualify for that consideration, whichever biological category it belongs to. And unless there is a further argument for inclusion, then those beings or creatures that lack the morally salient property turn out not to be morally considerable in precisely this way, although they might be morally considerable for some other reason. Hence separationists, those who insist that certain special moral claims attach to all and only humans have been accused of “speciesism”—a moral privilege based on species membership parallel to the (rationally and morally) problematic phenomena of sexism, racism and the like. Those who oppose separationism argue that moral considerations, protections, rights, or benefits are independent of species membership. Belonging to a biological species or “looking like us” seem to be improper standards for moral salience. The separation argument needs a fact about the nature of all humans that does not include any other species. Inherent properties are not promising, but argu-

Beyond Disability Civil Rights

This Article argues that to be effective both domestic and international disability rights must adopt a disability human rights paradigm. Such a framework combines the type of civil and political rights provided by antidiscrimination legislation (also called negative or first-generation rights) with the full spectrum of social, cultural, and economic measures (also called positive or second-generation rights) bestowed by many human rights treaties. By acting holistically, this agenda accounts for factors normally exogenous to civil rights laws and ensures that individuals can flourish and participate in their societies. Accordingly, our intention is to share some thoughts on how to best provide disabled citizens with equal opportunity rather than “merely” equal treatment. Internationally, States and civil society organizations have been developing innovative and effective equality measures. We draw on their experiences in providing examples of how disability legislation ! and policy can be developed to implement a more holistic human rights approach. These lessons are also pertinent for invigorating the ADA.The Article proceeds as follows: Parts I and II briefly overview the origins, moral salience, and limitations of the social model’s disability civil rights agenda. Next, Part III advocates for a more integrated, human rights-based approach to disabled empowerment based on a disability human rights paradigm as exemplified by the forthcoming UN Disability Rights Convention. Finally, Part IV briefly illustrates how international practices, in line with a disability human rights based framework can facilitate the development of more effective disability legislation and policy.

Nicole's Father is NOT German! The Immutability of Differences, and the Social Construction of their Moral and Political Salience

AbstractWhy are differences so political significant? Too often political science discussions of differences assume they are immutable. The attendant implication is that the political divisions attached to these variations—in religion, ethnicity, race, or any of the other dissimilarities that frequently enter political life—are considered rigid and inflexible. This commentary draws on recent work in moral and social psychology and evolutionary biology to suggest that the critical political factor surrounding differences is not their immutability but rather the moral and political salience we accord such differences. Simple experiments in social identity theory—and a conversation with an incensed 12-year old—demonstrate that the psychological process by which differences between people and groups become deemed ethically and politically relevant is totally socially constructed and hence can be restructured in a fashion that leads to more tolerant treatment of those judged different.

Nicole's Father is NOT German! The Immutability of Differences, and the Social Construction of their Moral and Political Salience

Why are differences so political significant? Too often political science discussions of differences assume they are immutable. The attendant implication is that the political divisions attached to these variations—in religion, ethnicity, race, or any of the other dissimilarities that frequently enter political life—are considered rigid and inflexible. This commentary draws on recent work in moral and social psychology and evolutionary biology to suggest that the critical political factor surrounding differences is not their immutability but rather the moral and political salience we accord such differences. Simple experiments in social identity theory—and a conversation with an incensed 12-year old—demonstrate that the psychological process by which differences between people and groups become deemed ethically and politically relevant is totally socially constructed and hence can be restructured in a fashion that leads to more tolerant treatment of those judged different.

Morality and Work–Family Conflict in the Lives of Poor and Low-Income Women

Contemporary understandings of work and family are largely based on middle-class women's experience, whereas poverty and welfare researchers focus on the economic struggles of single female-headed families. This qualitative study examines the cultural and moral forces underlying the tension between paid work and family responsibilities through the experience of poor and low-income women. Interview data reveal that as expected, the conditions of poverty and welfare shape work and family decisions. Yet, choices about work and family entail moral and emotional commitments defined through powerful gendered cultural schemas. Providing financially for children reflects a strong work ethic and moral worth corresponding to a masculine model of individual responsibility privileging self-sufficiency and independence. This is challenged by a shared moral imperative that mother's primary responsibility is the care of children. This examination is important for researchers in understanding the moral and emotional salience of gender in shaping the work and family lives of poor and low-income women.

Cracking the Code of Genocide: The Moral Psychology of Rescuers, Bystanders, and Nazis during the Holocaust

What turns neighbors into genocidalists? Why do some stand by, while others risk their lives to help? A narrative analysis of interviews with rescuers, bystanders, and Nazi supporters during World War II focuses attention on self‐image, worldview, and cognitive categorization as critical influences. Rescuers, bystanders, and Nazis demonstrated dramatically different self concepts, yet identity constrained choice for all groups. A critical aspect of identity is relational: the sense of self in relation to others. Worldview, canonical expectations, and idealized cognitive models are critical determinants, with the ethical importance of values emanating not from particular values but from the integration of these values into the speaker's sense of self. Finally, cognitive categorization carries strong ethical overtones. The dehumanization that spurs perpetrators and the sense of moral salience that drives rescuers work through the cognitive classification of “the other.”

Refining the question about judges' moral capacity

The question about whether judges are better than legislatures at identifying and addressing the moral issues associated with rights needs to be posed in a more refined way that takes account of the suggestions made by Professors Beaud, Dyzenhaus, and Sadurski. As Professor Sadurski points out, it is not clear that issues about rights differ in their moral salience from other decisions that need to be faced in politics. Professor Dyzenhaus insists, quite rightly, that the question be posed as a question about institutional competence and institutional procedures. In this response, however, I argue that that reformulation does not make the question go away; it just poses it in a more complex setting. Professor Beaud rightly emphasizes that the question is usually raised in this form only in common law systems. Here, however, I argue that the fact that moral reasoning is concealed beneath the esoteric structures of adjudication in civil law systems does not mean that my question has no application there. All it means is that, in order to answer it, we must persuade judges to be a little more candid about what they are doing.

How Identity and Perspective Constrain Moral Choice

What drives moral action? A narrative analysis of rescuers of Jews during World War II suggests it is not reason or religion (the explanations most frequently offered by scholars), but rather identity and a particular view of self in relation to others. Findings suggest the tremendous power of identity to constrain choice, reveal the complexity of the moral life, underscore the importance of identity for moral motivation, and fill in critical gaps in our understanding of the moral psychology. In particular, an examination of moral exemplars focuses attention on the self concept, especially the extent to which critical values are integrated into one’s sense of self and the extent to which a particular perspective (a way of seeing one’s self in relation to others) triggers a sense of moral salience. The analysis suggests that if we can understand how people see the world and themselves in relation to others, if we can decipher their cognitive frameworks, perceptions, and categorization schema, we may begin to determine why identity exerts such a powerful influence on our treatment of others.

Foreigners: Insiders, Outsiders and the Ethics of Membership

Questions of exclusion, membership and the status of resident foreigners press upon liberal political thought and society with a particular sharpness, given the universalist underpinnings of the liberal commitment. How within the horizon of liberalism and rights discourse are we to think of the foreigner? The article suggests some reasons why we should consider suspect the cluster of notions surrounding alienage and sketches why the moral salience of the foreignness of these outsiders at our door and present among us has diminished, and thus brought under scrutiny our traditional comportment toward them. But it is not so much intended here to seek a resolution of these issues as to motivate a cluster of questions, to argue for their importance and to show the inadequacy of the treatment of them that we have inherited.

Wise Maxims / Wise Judging

One of the reasons often cited for the renewed interest in Aristotelian virtue theory is its alleged sensitivity to the particular case. In addition to rules and procedures is attention to the variety of individual cases, and a reminder of the shortfalls of misplaced rigour. Often quoted are the passages from the Nicomachean Ethics in which Aristotle warns that we must seek only so much precision as is appropriate for the subject matter (EN1094M1-22; 1103b34-1104al0).2 Repeated, too, is the well-known phrase of the Ethics, that judgment rests in perception (EN1109b22). The spirit of these remarks, in essence, that practical wisdom is not scien tific understanding (EN1142a24),3 is contrasted with modern views which stress the sufficiency of algorithms for fully determining right action and deliberation based on deduction from rules. However, the contrast between modern and ancient approaches seems less stark when we turn to recent Kantian ethics. For here there has been a recognizable shift away from interpreting Kant as proposing some generalizable view of deliberation as either algorithmic, prescribing a cor rect act for each situation, or as involving rules that prescribe uniform con duct.4 In their place is an emphasis on the notion of acting on principles responsive to the salient features of complex situations. The principles of a subject (maxims) must of course be lawful if they are to be morally accep table. They are in accordance with law (gesetzm?ssig) when they can be universalized or acted on by others. This is the point at which the Cate gorical Imperative enters?namely in checking our initial proposals. But in stressing the importance of acting on principles formulated from the bottom up, the interpretation also stresses the fact that capacities for perceiving moral salience figure crucially in a Kantian account. The role of these capacities is perhaps most perspicuous in the case of imperfect duties, or wide duties of end or virtue. Whereas perfect duties specify determinate actions the performance of which is obligatory, im perfect duties leave wide discretion for the fulfilling of obligatory ends? imperfect duties underdetermine specific action. Ends such as others' happiness or my own moral perfection are held by Kant to be obligatory in the sense that finite rational agents such as ourselves require these policies in

Strategists, Philosophers, and the Nuclear Question

What should a symposium on ethics and strategy attempt to do? Should the goal simply be to lay down judgments about which strategies are permissible and which are not? Such an approach to the problem does not seem particularly fruitful: for judgments of this sort always depend on an appeal to some principle, generally rooted in some ancient tradition; but if a policy we believe in is inconsistent with that principle, why are we morally compelled to sacrifice the former instead of the latter? The conclusions reached are binding only on those who share the premises on which they are based; those who are convinced that the policy in question is right can simply reject these premises as the obsolete products of the prenuclear age. The strategists, of course, do not actually come out and say that the concerns of the moral philosophers are irrelevant. But they are aware that their basic assumptions about what makes for in the nuclear age contradict traditional principles about morality in warfare. The term stability has referred, since the late 1950s, to a situation where neither superpower has any incentive to strike first with nuclear weapons; targeting strategic weapons might undermine an enemy's confidence in his ability to ride out a first strike and thus give him an incentive to preempt. To those who look at things from this perspective, it follows that the best of all possible nuclear worlds would be one where only cities were targeted, for in that case there would be no incentive-in fact there would be a tremendous disincentive-for either side to strike first, and thus a nuclear holocaust would be virtually out of the question. Most of the strategists at the conference subscribed to the doctrine in one form or another. Since this theory is not consistent with traditional views about the desirability of aiming at military as opposed to civilian targets, those principles themselves had to be sacrificed. Thus Robert Art, one of the political scientists at Aspen, said in this connection that he was willing to live in sin. What he meant, I think, was that in the context of the theory that he depended on, the principles of the philosophers had no real meaning, no moral salience, for him.

PERPETRATOR OR VICTIM? EFFECTS OF WHO SUFFERS IN AN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT ON JUDGEMENTAL STRICTNESS

After reading of an automobile accident in which the driver and/or bystanders either suffered or did not suffer, subjects rated the driver's responsibility for the accident and sentenced him to a jail term. The purpose of this experiment was to contrast three theoretical models: defensive attribution, moral salience, and equity. Results indicated that male subjects utilized an equity principle by relaxing their strictness of judgement, in terms of time sentenced to jail, when the accident perpetrator himself suffered harmful consequences. Females invoked a moral salience principle in that judgemental strictness increased only when bystanders were harmed. Regardless of sex, subjects expressed a preference for information regarding the personal characteristics of the accident perpetrator as contrasted with information about the environment. This finding was considered in relation to recent developments in attribution theory.