Wise Maxims / Wise Judging

Abstract

One of the reasons often cited for the renewed interest in Aristotelian virtue theory is its alleged sensitivity to the particular case. In addition to rules and procedures is attention to the variety of individual cases, and a reminder of the shortfalls of misplaced rigour. Often quoted are the passages from the Nicomachean Ethics in which Aristotle warns that we must seek only so much precision as is appropriate for the subject matter (EN1094M1-22; 1103b34-1104al0).2 Repeated, too, is the well-known phrase of the Ethics, that judgment rests in perception (EN1109b22). The spirit of these remarks, in essence, that practical wisdom is not scien tific understanding (EN1142a24),3 is contrasted with modern views which stress the sufficiency of algorithms for fully determining right action and deliberation based on deduction from rules. However, the contrast between modern and ancient approaches seems less stark when we turn to recent Kantian ethics. For here there has been a recognizable shift away from interpreting Kant as proposing some generalizable view of deliberation as either algorithmic, prescribing a cor rect act for each situation, or as involving rules that prescribe uniform con duct.4 In their place is an emphasis on the notion of acting on principles responsive to the salient features of complex situations. The principles of a subject (maxims) must of course be lawful if they are to be morally accep table. They are in accordance with law (gesetzm?ssig) when they can be universalized or acted on by others. This is the point at which the Cate gorical Imperative enters?namely in checking our initial proposals. But in stressing the importance of acting on principles formulated from the bottom up, the interpretation also stresses the fact that capacities for perceiving moral salience figure crucially in a Kantian account. The role of these capacities is perhaps most perspicuous in the case of imperfect duties, or wide duties of end or virtue. Whereas perfect duties specify determinate actions the performance of which is obligatory, im perfect duties leave wide discretion for the fulfilling of obligatory ends? imperfect duties underdetermine specific action. Ends such as others' happiness or my own moral perfection are held by Kant to be obligatory in the sense that finite rational agents such as ourselves require these policies in