Kant's Architectonic of Duties

Abstract

In the Groundwork Kant supplements his discussion of the Principles of Universality and Humanity by presenting four examples, each of which illustrates a particular kind of duty. As is well-known, two are examples of duties to oneself, and two exemplify duties to others. Cutting across that dichotomy is a second distinction between perfect (or narrow) duties and imperfect (or wide) duties. In a footnote he explains that a perfect duty is which allows no exception in the interests of inclination.' Imperfect duties, by implication, do allow such exceptions. In the Metaphysical Elements of Virtue (MEV) another distinction appears, that between juridical duties (Rechtspflicht) and duties of virtue (Tugendpflicht). Although it may appear initially that Kant has simply given a new name to the earlier distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, a closer look reveals that the classification of the duties in the MEV is far more complex than the relatively simple one advanced in the Groundwork. The contrast between perfect and imperfect duties does not so much get replaced by the distinction between juridical duties and duties of virtue as supplement it, thereby threatening to thwart anyone endeavoring to classify systematically and coherently the moral duties catalogued by Kant in the Metaphysics of Morals. The question whether Kant's schema of duties reflects some single, underlying principle is not of merely academic interest. The problems raised by the attempt to explain the distinction between juridical duties and duties of virtue, or to find a characteristic common to all of the latter, bear on the proper interpretation of those duties themselves. In particular, a symbiotic relationship exists between the effort to explain what it means to adopt an end (such as the happiness of others), on the one hand, and, on the other, the attempt to explain what is required by, e.g., the duties of respect (forbidding mockery, pride, and calumny) and how they qualify as