Moral Realism Research Articles

Formation of the Chinese School of International Relations: Analytical Approaches and Research Methods

In 1987, the first All-China Conference of international scholars took place in Shanghai, which is associated with the beginning of the process of creating the Chinese School of International Relations. Over these decades, a vast array of scientific literature has accumulated, exploring the interaction China with other countries and world community. The article is devoted to the study of analytical approaches prevailing in the Chinese academic environment in the study of foreign policy and world politics of the PRC, and specifically, in relation to the United States. Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and openness” policy contributed to the revival of the discipline of “international relations” and the intensification of international research in academic institutions and universities in China. A deep and systemic influence on these processes was exerted by several factors: uncritical borrowing of western international political knowledge, full-scale training of Chinese scholars in Western, mainly American, universities, and the translation into Chinese of most theoretical works of Western scientists. Methodological tools which include the analytical approaches used by Chinese scientists are taken from publications on realism, liberalism and constructivism. In realism, the emphasis is done on the balance of power, which is investigated in the framework of foreign policy analysis. The interdependence of China and the United States, primarily economic, the subject of study from the point of view of neoliberalism. The socialization and involvement of China in the world community and the liberal world order led by the United States are constructivist studies of bilateral relations. Yan Xuetong’s “theory of moral realism”, Qin Yaqing’s “theory of relations”, the Shanghai school’s “international symbiosis”, and Tan Shiping’s “social evolution of world politics” did not go beyond these paradigms, but are already used as their own innovative methods in a study of China’s relations with external actors. The article pays special attention to the dual identity of the Chinese state, as a developing country and a global power, which is publicly voiced by its representatives. This duality imposes regulatory restrictions on the use of analytical tools and, of course, affects the results of research.

Reply to Wilson Mendonça’s “Supervenience arguments against robust moral realism”

In his “Supervenience arguments against robust moral realism”, Wilson Mendonca sets out to defend robust moral realism (the thesis that moral properties are not identical to natural properties) against the Explanatory Argument based on Supervenience. According to this argument, robust realism is unable to account for specific supervenience facts; given that the identification of moral and natural properties allows one to account for such facts, robust realism has an explanatory disadvantage vis-a-vis reductive realism. Mendonca’s answer consists in holding (i) that reductive realism has trouble accounting for the asymmetric character of specific supervenience facts and (ii) that the notion of reduction by analysis, which allows one to properly explain specific supervenience facts, supports only a weak form of reductionism that is compatible with robust realism. I argue that these claims are false and that, therefore, Mendonca fails to show that the Explanatory Argument is not a threat to robust realism. Keywords: robust moral realism, supervenience, moral reductivism, reduction by identity, reduction by analysis.

From Heaven to Earth: ‘Cultural Idealism’ and ‘Moral Realism’ as Chinese Contributions to Global International Relations

Abstract The discipline of International Relations (IR) is increasingly being criticized for ignoring and marginalizing states and societies outside of the core countries of the West. The idea of a ‘Global IR’ has been proposed since 2014 a pathway toward a bridging the ‘West and the Rest’ divide and thus develop a more inclusive discipline, recognizing its multiple and diverse foundations. At the same time, there is a trend toward developing theories, or ‘schools’, on a national or regional basis, the leading examples of which come from China. This article examines some theoretical constructs emerging in China, such as the ‘Relational Theory’ of Qin Yaqing, who is the foundational scholar in the ‘Chinese School of IR’, the Tianxia (‘all under Heaven’) concept as applied to IR and world order by Zhao Tingyang, and ‘Moral Realism’ of Yan Xuetong, who is the leading figure of the ‘Tsinghua School’. To many scholars, both inside and outside China, the relationship among the various Chinese approaches and their overall contribution to the IR field remain unclear. Without claiming to capture all their nuances and complexity, this article hopes to stimulate a conversation among scholars, Chinese and foreign, with a view to generate greater clarity and highlight their importance to the study of IR. I argue that while making important contributions, the Chinese approaches to International Relations Theory (IRT) also face a number of challenges. This includes the need for them to offer more convincing proof that the concepts and explanations they propose can apply to other societies and to IR more generally. Moreover, there is the need for these approaches to attract a critical mass of followers worldwide, stimulate a research agenda for other, especially younger scholars, and distance themselves from the official Chinese policy framings. The Global IR approach offers a helpful framework for highlighting and perhaps addressing these challenges, especially in avoiding cultural exceptionalism and ensuring their wider relevance beyond China.

Ethical Guiding Principles of "Do No Harm" and the "Intention to Save Lives" in relation to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research: Finding Common Ground between Religious Views and Principles of Medical Ethics.

One of the goals of medicine is to improve well-being, in line with the principle of beneficence (do no harm). Likewise, scientists claim that the goal of human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research is to find treatments for diseases. In hESC research, stem cells are harvested from a 5-day-old embryo. Surplus embryos from infertility treatments or embryos created for the sole purpose of harvesting stem cells are used in the research, and in the process the embryos get destroyed. The use of human embryos for research purpose raises ethical concern. In this context, the religious leaders play the role to be the moral compass and "reality check" to engage with the public. In Malaysia, the Ministry of Health has outlined the Guidelines for Stem Cell Research and Therapy, reflecting on Islamic principles. Since there has not been much focus on the viewpoints of other faiths in Malaysia, this study attempts to (i) explore the ethical guiding principles deliberated by religious leaders from the Buddhist, Hindu and Catholic traditions and (ii) identify if there is a common ground between the mainstream religious views and principles of medical ethics, in relation to hESC research. Eleven religious leaders representing the Buddhist, Hindu and Catholic traditions were interviewed. Interestingly, though reasoning of religious leaders came from different angles, their underlying concerns revolve around the values of "do no harm" and "intention to save lives". These values are also the key principles in medical ethics. The findings are applied to answer the question as to whether religious and medical guiding principles can co-exist and complement in ethical decision-making, without compromising the values.

Was Schopenhauer a Kantian Ethicist?

ABSTRACT Commentators have generally seen the compassionate person as a second-rate character vis-à-vis the ascetic ‘saint’ who denies the will-to-life and resigns from willing altogether in Schopenhauer's ethical thought. In this paper I offer another way to interpret Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion, which is textually grounded and genuinely Schopenhauerian, but which draws out similarities to Kant’s ethics that, I shall argue, have not been hitherto appreciated. Once these Kantian similarities are appreciated one sees that the compassionate person is no longer a runner up ethically and epistemically to the saint, rather, the compassionate person and the saint are at odds with each other, and really represent – unbeknownst to Schopenhauer himself–two distinct and incompatible ethical ideals. To motivate this interpretation, I will first delineate the traditional interpretation of what Schopenhauer means by the compassionate person’s intuitive insight into the way the world really is. Second, I will offer a novel, and to my mind, textually preferable reading of what this intuitive insight consists in. Finally, I’ll suggest in light of recent work in metaethics by Colin Marshall – notably in his 2018 book titled Compassionate Moral Realism–that my interpretation of Schopenhauer’s ethics offers a creditable moral realist option for the contemporary landscape.

Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences, written by Thomas Pölzler

Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences, written by Thomas Pölzler

Leadership and the rise of Great Powers

The ongoing confrontation between the United States and China has highlighted the current deficit in international leadership. A theoretical tour de force, Leadership and the rise of Great Powers by Yan Xuetong, which aims to explore international leadership and the mechanisms behind power transitions, could not be more timely. The book further develops Yan's previous works on moral realism and draws on political determinism in ancient Chinese philosophical thought. The author attributes the rise and fall of Great Powers to political leadership, which he defines as the ability of the government to meet its domestic duties and hold international ‘strategic credibility’, without which a country cannot wield global authority. Yan identifies four types of international leadership: humane authority, hegemony, anemocracy and tyranny. For him, the ideal type is humane authority, as it is trustworthy and consistently generates policies which others would want to follow. This corresponds to Joseph Nye's...

The Progress of Moral Evolution

Abstract Buchanan and Powell’s book is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the evolution of morality. I suggest that they exaggerate the degree to which their view of the evolution of moral progress is committed to a form of moral realism. I also suggest that Darwin’s own approach to the evolution of the moral sense shares more with their view than they may realise. Finally I point to some tensions in their invocation of the concept of the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA).

On the Alleged Laziness of Moral Realists

On the Alleged Laziness of Moral Realists

A debunking explanation for moral progress

According to “debunking arguments,” our moral beliefs are explained by evolutionary and cultural processes that do not track objective, mind-independent moral truth. Therefore (the debunkers say) we ought to be skeptics about moral realism. Huemer counters that “moral progress”—the cross-cultural convergence on liberalism—cannot be explained by debunking arguments. According to him, the best explanation for this phenomenon is that people have come to recognize the objective correctness of liberalism. Although Huemer may be the first philosopher to make this explicit empirical argument for moral realism, the idea that societies will eventually converge on the same moral beliefs is a notable theme in realist thinking. Antirealists, on the other hand, often point to seemingly intractable cross-cultural moral disagreement as evidence against realism (the “argument from disagreement”). This paper argues that the trend toward liberalism is susceptible to a debunking explanation, being driven by two related non-truth-tracking processes. First, large numbers of people gravitate to liberal values for reasons of self-interest. Second, as societies become more prosperous and advanced, they become more effective at suppressing violence, and they create conditions where people are more likely to empathize with others, which encourages liberalism. The latter process is not truth tracking (or so this paper argues) because empathy-based moral beliefs are themselves susceptible to an evolutionary debunking argument. Cross-cultural convergence on liberalism per se does not support either realism or antirealism.

From Epistemic to Moral Realism

From Epistemic to Moral Realism

Evolutionary debunking arguments and the explanatory scope of natural selection

An influential species of evolutionary debunking argument (EDA) against moral realism holds that since cumulative natural selection (likely) shaped the contents of our moral beliefs, those beliefs do not count as knowledge. Critics have taken issue with a range of empirical, epistemic, and metaphysical assumptions that EDAs are said to rely on, which has engendered a complex debate over whether and to what extent the debunking challenge succeeds. However, recently it has been argued that we can reject EDAs without having to enter this thicket of issues. EDAs supposedly fail at the outset, by trading on a glaring misunderstanding about the scope of natural selection explanations. I argue that this objection to EDAs fails, and itself rests on a mistaken view of natural selection explanation and its relation to justification.

Why Humanitarianism Needs a Pacifist Ethos

ABSTRACTDebates concerning the relationship between humanitarianism and the use of force are by no means a new phenomenon, yet humanitarian rationales for waging war have become more and more commonplace over recent decades. The commitment to humanitarian intervention, in particular, raises deep theoretical and practical questions about the foundational principle of political neutrality espoused by many humanitarian aid organisations. In this paper I will provide an overview of the literature on the relationship between humanitarianism and the use of force before advancing the argument that a genuine humanitarianism must necessarily be premised upon a pacifist ethos. A pacifist ethos, in this context, is presented as a commitment to non-violence and anti-war activism even while recognising the limits of such an aspiration. Such an understanding of pacifism in practice, inspired in part by realist ethics, allows humanitarian actors to take strong, principled, and sustained stands in support of universal values of peace and human well-being without losing sight of the material challenges posed by the very real violence of the arenas in which they operate.

Thomas Pölzler, Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences

Thomas Pölzler, Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences

Autonomous Vehicles and Avoiding the Trolley (Dilemma): Vehicle Perception, Classification, and the Challenges of Framing Decision Ethics

This article aims to introduce a degree of technological and ethical realism to the framing of autonomous vehicle perception and decisionality. The objective is to move the socioethical dialog surrounding autonomous vehicle decisionality from the dominance of “trolley framings” to more pressing ethical issues. The article argues that more realistic ethical framings of autonomous vehicle technologies should focus on the matters of HMI, machine perception, classification, and data privacy, which are some distance from the decisionality framing premise of the MIT Moral Machine experiment. To support this claim the article appeals to state-of-the-art technologies and emerging technologies concerning autonomous vehicle perception and decisionality, as a means to inform and frame ethical contexts. This is further supported by considering a context specific ethical framing for each time phase we anticipate regarding emerging autonomous vehicle technology.

Modal Security

AbstractModal Security is a proposed necessary condition for undermining defeat. It has been widely discussed of late. The principal is of interest because it seems to entail that influential epistemological arguments, including Evolutionary Debunking Arguments against moral realism and the Benacerraf‐Field Challenge for mathematical realism, are unsound. Modal Security says, roughly, that if evidence undermines (rather than rebuts) one’s belief, then one gets reason to doubt the belief’s safety or sensitivity. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine Modal Security in detail. We begin by presenting the principle and its motivations as well as the role it plays in the debunking arguments debate. We then develop and discuss what we take to be the strongest objections to the principle, and see what can be said in response. Six such arguments, as well as a worry that epistemic justification requires a “connection” between the beliefs and the facts, are developed, discussed and criticized. The article reveals how the debate surrounding Modal Security interacts with core problems in epistemology—including the generality problem and the distinction between direct and indirect evidence.

Mathematical and Moral Disagreement

AbstractThe existence of fundamental moral disagreements is a central problem for moral realism and has often been contrasted with an alleged absence of disagreement in mathematics. However, mathematicians do in fact disagree on fundamental questions, for example on which set-theoretic axioms are true, and some philosophers have argued that this increases the plausibility of moral vis-à-vis mathematical realism. I argue that the analogy between mathematical and moral disagreement is not as straightforward as those arguments present it. In particular, I argue that pluralist accounts of mathematics render fundamental mathematical disagreements compatible with mathematical realism in a way in which moral disagreements and moral realism are not.1

From Scepticism to Anti‐Realism

A common anti-realist strategy is to argue that moral realism (or at least the non-naturalist form of it) should be abandoned because it cannot adequately make room for moral knowledge and justifie ...

Navigating Moral Struggle: Toward a Social Model of Exemplarity

AbstractExemplars have the power to help people navigate various levels of moral struggle, from the relatively straightforward problem of lacking motivation to the much deeper problem of failing to see the moral realities that surround us. But there are also serious moral risks in the appeal to exemplars: we romanticize them, we make use of them in authoritarian ways, and we tend to forget how our choice of exemplars is conditioned by oppressive cultural formations. I argue that we need to develop a social model of exemplarity, attuned to social contexts of our exemplars themselves as well as the social processes of constructing and appealing to exemplars. More particularly, I argue that we need to develop space for thinking about exemplary groups, not just exemplary individuals, in order to develop the strengths and avoid the weaknesses in exemplarist moral theories.

Should Environmental Ethicists Fear Moral Anti-Realism?

Environmental ethicists have been arguing for decades that swift action to protect our natural environment is morally paramount, and that our concern for the environment should go beyond its importance for human welfare. It might be thought that the widespread acceptance of moral anti-realism would undermine the aims of environmental ethicists. One reason is that recent empirical studies purport to show that moral realists are more likely to act on the basis of their ethical convictions than anti-realists. In addition, it is sometimes argued that only moral realists can countenance the claim that nature is intrinsically valuable. Against this, we argue that the acceptance of moral anti-realism is no threat to the environmentalist cause. We argue, further, that the acceptance of moral realism is potentially an obstacle to delivering on a third core demand: namely, that successful action on climate change and environmental destruction requires us to change some of our commonly held ethical views and, in so doing, to pursue and ultimately achieve a workable consensus.