Abstract
According to “debunking arguments,” our moral beliefs are explained by evolutionary and cultural processes that do not track objective, mind-independent moral truth. Therefore (the debunkers say) we ought to be skeptics about moral realism. Huemer counters that “moral progress”—the cross-cultural convergence on liberalism—cannot be explained by debunking arguments. According to him, the best explanation for this phenomenon is that people have come to recognize the objective correctness of liberalism. Although Huemer may be the first philosopher to make this explicit empirical argument for moral realism, the idea that societies will eventually converge on the same moral beliefs is a notable theme in realist thinking. Antirealists, on the other hand, often point to seemingly intractable cross-cultural moral disagreement as evidence against realism (the “argument from disagreement”). This paper argues that the trend toward liberalism is susceptible to a debunking explanation, being driven by two related non-truth-tracking processes. First, large numbers of people gravitate to liberal values for reasons of self-interest. Second, as societies become more prosperous and advanced, they become more effective at suppressing violence, and they create conditions where people are more likely to empathize with others, which encourages liberalism. The latter process is not truth tracking (or so this paper argues) because empathy-based moral beliefs are themselves susceptible to an evolutionary debunking argument. Cross-cultural convergence on liberalism per se does not support either realism or antirealism.
Highlights
Moral realists believe that there are facts in virtue of which our moral beliefs are objectively and non-relatively true or false (Tersman 2006)
Huemer (2016) turns the argument from disagreement on its head, claiming that cultures are converging on certain moral beliefs, which supports realism
He says that the standard debunking arguments, which purport to explain our moral beliefs by appealing to non-truth-tracking forces such as natural selection and culture, cannot explain the historical drift toward liberalism
Summary
Moral realists believe that there are facts in virtue of which (at least some of) our moral beliefs are objectively and non-relatively true or false (Tersman 2006). Natural selection favors evaluative tendencies that increase inclusive fitness, and cares nothing for whether they lead to judgments that align with objective moral truths (if such truths existed) This is the epistemically defective cause/process—or ‘‘irrelevant influence’’—that undermines our belief in objective moral truth. Huemer (2016) turns the argument from disagreement on its head, claiming that cultures are converging on certain moral beliefs, which supports realism. He says that the standard debunking arguments, which purport to explain our moral beliefs by appealing to non-truth-tracking forces such as natural selection and culture, cannot explain the historical drift toward liberalism. (5) In light of (2) and (3), convergence on liberal practices and values is best explained by moral realism (4b) rather than by a non-realist debunking explanation (4a). We do not need to posit ‘‘large coincidences’’ to explain why many cultures have drifted toward liberalism on a variety of issues
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.