Moral Legislation Research Articles

Moral Legislation and Crime Against Women: Explorations in Indian and Western Values

In recent years, the National Crime Records Bureau recommendation is that the growth rate of crime against women has skyrocketed in India, even higher than the population growth rate. According to lawyer, Kamlesh Vaswani, the commercial exploitation of coital activity paramount in pornography is the result of crimes against women, and fills perverse traits in the roots of society. Following that, he filed a petition (2013) in the Honourable Supreme Court to blanket ban pornography with the aim of diluting the subordination of women and the crimes against women in society. Taking this into consideration, I argue that the Vaswani petition draws back the issue of twentieth century Western political and philosophical debate on pornography which triggers one of the moot problems of moral legislation—whether the state should be neutral or not towards individuals’ preferences, merits, desires, and the status to live well. This article focuses on whether this discourse has any relevance in the Indian value system. In this article, through the comparison between Indian and Western values, I make an attempt to analyse the moot problem of moral legislation which is bridging the gap between public and private morality for the well-being of women as well as our society.

Moral Legislation behind a Veil of Ignorance: Cardinal Sforza Pallavicino (1607–67) on the Procedure of Natural Law

Cardinal Sforza Pallavicino, SJ (1607–67), conceived a procedure for determining natural moral laws by voting under a veil of ignorance. Behind this veil, imagined possible people who are ignorant of their social position, personal characteristics, nation, and the historical period in which they live vote as equals. These possible people are asked to establish a moral law in pursuit of their own and collective happiness, which they are obligated by God to follow. This article discusses Pallavicino's innovative approach to natural law and examines its reception in Southern Germany and (what is now) Austria.

Explaining Morality Policy Coalitions in Spanish Parliamentary Votes: The Interaction of the Church-State Conflict and Territorial Politics

ABSTRACT In this article we empirically explore the impact of the state-Church conflict on progressive moral policies. Taking Spain as a case study, we analyse the parliamentary interaction of political parties in a number of policy domains that provoke a moral conflict. We examine the principal legislative acts relating to abortion, divorce, same-sex marriage, euthanasia and gender equality from the early 1980s to 2021. We look beyond the religious divide and argue that its interaction with territorial politics, which is in turn shaped by specific institutional features, explains the formation of political coalitions that are conducive to moral legislation. Furthermore, we show that political coalitions vary depending on how explicit or implicit a given morality conflict is.

The influence of morality on the personal life of an individual

The article analyzes the norms of the Constitution of Ukraine, civil, family and labor law in respect of their compliance with the moral foundations of society. Based on the analyzed materials, the author offers certain ap-proaches to improve Ukrainian legislation and principles of morality impacts on the personal life of an individual. The article deals with the violation of public morality in the Internet. The views of scientists the moral norms and their impact on the personal life of an individual have been analyzed. It is proved that law and morality have the functional purpose in common, they form the behavior standards, value and normative orientation of society. The positive novelties of the Law of Ukraine “On Protection of Public Morality” have been analyzed, as well as the gaps in it. It has been found out that morality is an important factor in the development of society and, as a form of social consciousness, has much in common with legal consciousness. Both morality and law are a set of relatively well-established norms, rules of human behavior, which are based on the notion of what is due and just. These norms are general and, at least formally, applicable to all citizens of society.It is studied that law and morality are based on the common socio-economic interests, culture of society,people’s commitment to the ideals of freedom and justice. They have a single spiritual nature, a single value core - justice. It is found out how the relationship between morality, religion and law in the context of familyrelations, their interaction, dynamics and development, how the interaction of morality and law can prevent domestic violence.

HUMANISTIC IDEAS IN MORE’S UTOPIA

This article focusses on the humanistic ideas of Thomas More (1478–1535), explained in his book Utopia, a work of fiction and socio-political satire, written in Latin and published in 1516. In Utopia Thomas More gives an exhaustive and detailed description of The State of Utopia which already exists somewhere in the New World. Those types of theories which are oriented into the future, into something which is not yet realised but is potentially possible are called utopian literature. It covers a wide area consisting of itineraries about fictional countries, suggestions of legal or moral legislation, and attempts to find the best state regulation. Humanism is a philosophical movement that emphasizes the value and agency of human beings, individually and collectively. But the questions are: are all More’s humanistic ideas entirely good? Who can take responsibility to judge what is good for each man? The article deals with the mentioned dilemma.
 
 <p> </p><p><strong> Article visualizations:</strong></p><p><img src="/-counters-/edu_01/0771/a.php" alt="Hit counter" /></p>

Kant on Freedom and Spontaneity ed. by Kate A. Moran

Reviewed by: Kant on Freedom and Spontaneity ed. by Kate A. Moran Desmond Hogan Kate A. Moran, editor. Kant on Freedom and Spontaneity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. Pp. xiii + 309. Cloth, £75.00. This fine collection of essays is dedicated to Paul Guyer. It includes work by distinguished experts and younger scholars across a range of topics in Kant’s theoretical, moral, and political philosophy. Karl Ameriks’s “On the Many Senses of ‘Self-Determination’” responds to two misreadings of Kantian autonomy. One dismisses its notion of self-determination, the source of the auto-in autonomy, as an excessively subjective basis for morality; the other interprets its nomos as involving excessive determination of will by reason or sensibility. Ameriks responds with careful analysis of Kant’s “provocative language” concerning the authorship and legislation of morality (186). This includes Kant’s famous description of the will as “giving the law to itself [selbstgesetzgebend] and just because of this as first subject to the law” (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Ak. 4:431). Such formulations, Ameriks argues, do not pick out a “willful process” that undermines objectivity. They reflect Kant’s effort to ground the “strict universality, tantamount to necessity” already imputed to morality in Groundwork II (180). Kant’s concept of moral self-determination thus emerges from the search for a suitable locus for an unconditionally necessary principle of value. Its situation in practical reason justifies talk of “authorship”; however, Kant’s meaning has only “partial, metaphorical overlaps with familiar notions of empirical authorship and legislation” (186). [End Page 152] Kate Moran’s “Inclination, Need, and Moral Misery” sets out from the Groundwork’s notorious claim that “to be free” of inclination “must be the wish of every rational person” (Ak. 4:428). The crucial context, Moran reminds us, is Kant’s effort to exclude inclination as a possible candidate for the absolute worth attributed to humanity. An association of inclination with need, she argues, explains inclination’s morally problematic status. Kant is especially concerned with acquired needs that “change and grow with the indulgence that one allows them,” resulting in a burdensome counterweight to morality and moral misery (KpV, Ak. 5:118). Concern about need’s corrupting potential is consistent with the doctrine of Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone that natural inclinations are “good in themselves” (Ak. 5:158). Rolf-Peter Horstmann’s “Kant on Imagination and Object Constitution” offers a compressed presentation of the argument of half of his 2018 Cambridge University Press book on Kant’s theory of imagination (its other half concerns imagination in aesthetics). Horstmann skillfully defends the partial independence of Kant’s productive imagination vis-à-vis the understanding, emphasizing imagination’s indispensability as a “discerning” power in empirical apprehension—the first stage in Kant’s account of empirical object-constitution. Along with Allen Wood, Patricia Kitcher (“Guyer on the Value of Freedom”) takes issue with Guyer’s interpretation of Kantian morality as “means to the preservation,” “promotion,” or “maximization” of freedom. She also challenges Guyer’s view that Kant regards freedom and morality as valuable “primarily as the necessary condition [of] universal happiness” (90). This is not entailed by Kant’s theory of the “highest good” (summum bonum)—though that includes universal moral perfection and proportional, thus presumably universal, happiness. Guyer’s “happiness-friendly Kant” can receive only qualified endorsement given the merely conditional value of happiness, on account of which it cannot ground morality (105). Kitcher’s reading draws solid support from published texts, and from an unpublished note asserting “happiness is no true good [kein wahres Gut].” The note’s continuation shows, to the reader’s relief, that Kant’s target is again only happiness’s unconditional value: “Worthiness is a true and the highest good, but not the complete good” (Ak. 19:187; cf. KpV, Ak. 5:111). Here I can only indicate a few other highlights. Barbara Herman’s “Religion and the Highest Good” offers a new and intriguing reading of the Religion’s Christology. She reads it as a contribution to the “moral imagination” that helps us manage guilt and anxiety arising from a propensity to evil that threatens to derail our moral identities (226). The Religion...

The moral principles of universality of human rights

The article is an analysis of morality as the characteristics of meaningful in the understanding of human rights as a fundamental principle of their universality. Focuses on the understanding of the universality of human rights. Does this mean that any state expressly reserves all facets of universality (legal, moral) to join its public policy, or universality is based solely on the moral Foundation that emerged in the process of development of social relations and General acceptable for any order. It is noted that current processes of globalization, which seek to universalise human rights is a great challenge with respect to ideas about human nature. Universalization involves determining the value of a certain standard, a kind of legal standard or sample, usefulness and progressiveness which must not be challenged. The attention is paid to conflict legal and moral protection of human rights. It is noted that from the point of view of morality as a means of regulation of social relations and a fundamental principle in ensuring human rights, particularly the criterion of universality, which is multicultural and international. According to the tradition of natural law, the authority of law inevitably relies on the connection of law with morality. So obvious is the importance of moral norms as a meaningful, inherent characteristics of human rights, that is what gives them universality. Because morality exists primarily in the minds of the people, no legal act is not able to fully reflect all the manifestations of public morality. However, numerous international legal instruments that protect human rights, issues of public morality sometimes takes an exceptional place, with this in mind, the analysis is conducted of the norms of international acts and national legislation. In particular, referred to the Law of Ukraine «On protection of public morality», which defines the notion of public morality as a system of ethics, rules of conduct prevailing in the society based on traditional spiritual and cultural values, concepts of good, honor, dignity, public duty, conscience, and justice. However in the state there is a lot of destructive phenomena that go against morals and which is caused by the impulses to tolerance, prejudice the rights of other members of civil society. In particular, we analyze the provisions of the Istanbul Convention, the provisions of which are inconsistent with the Ukrainian legislation and norms of public morality. Proves the impossibility of its ratification in respect of the unjustified creation of additional privileges for the gay, lesbian, bisexual or transgender, which is contrary to art.24 of the Constitution of Ukraine, according to which citizens have equal constitutional rights and freedoms and are equal before the law and that there can be no privileges or restrictions on various grounds. As a conclusion, the crisis of morality is stated, which, in case of further introduction of immoral laws into the sphere of human rights, will become a social crisis, a moral crisis of the Ukrainian nation, where there is no boundary between good and evil, love and hate, justice and public welfare. it can benefit an individual or a small community. And the above-mentioned immorality at the level of implementation in the field of human rights claims to be universal and universal, regardless of the rule of law. Keywords: dignity, globalization, good, morality, human rights, universality.

Teologia moral.

Kant’s doctrine of moral theology is mainly explored, though not exclusively, in the “Doctrine of the method” in the Critique of Judgment, concerning the faculty of teleological judgment. This doctrine is closely related to his concept of final end <Endweck>. According to Kant, only the human being is considered final end, an “end that requires no other end as a condition of its possibility” (KU, §84, AA 05: 396). In order to things can exist in conformity with this end, Kant introduces in this context the admission, not only of an intelligent being as the author of the world, but also a moral being who is both regent and moral legislator. Many questions have arisen in the contemporary debate on these topics, such as the parallelism between Kant’s approach of the final end in the second part of the Critique of Judgment and Religion, the collective character of the concepts of God and highest good, the relationship between the concept of final end - related to the concepts of moral world, kingdom of ends, ethical community – and political community, or the questions that arise from the cosmopolitan conception of the human nature.
 Recebido / Received: 17.11.2019.Aprovado / Approved: 2.12.2019.

Virtus Romana: Politics and Morality in the Roman Historians by Catalina Balmaceda

Reviewed by: Virtus Romana: Politics and Morality in the Roman Historians by Catalina Balmaceda Myles McDonnell Catalina Balmaceda. Virtus Romana: Politics and Morality in the Roman Historians. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2017. xiv + 297 pp. Cloth, $45. This book sets out to examine the changing meanings of virtus in early imperial and late republican Latin historians—Sallust, Livy, Velleius Paterculus, and Tacitus. After a short introduction and a chapter on “The Concept of Virtus,” it devotes one chapter to the work of each author and ends with a short “Conclusion.” The book has a number of good ideas that are, however, marred by serious problems and misconceptions. The first problem is the manner in which Balmaceda uses modern scholarship. In the too few references to Werner Eisenhut’s fundamental Virtus Romana pagination is not always provided (33, n. 91; 132, n. 16), or is inaccurate (102, n. 123). Claiming that the meaning of virtus in early Latin is “quite general” (19), an idea that originated with Eisenhut, rather than citing his work, Balmaceda quotes W. V. Harris (War and Imperialism), who was himself referring to Eisenhut. Referring to Eisenhut (126), along with T. J. Moore’s Artistry and Ideology (5), Balmaceda states that according to Eisenhut, Livy “used virtus in a non-Roman way, following instead a more Greek meaning of it, aretē” (92 and n. 40); not quite what Eisenhut wrote or Moore reported. More importantly it does not represent Eisenhut’s full position. He had also written that when coupled with fortuna, virtus, Damit greift Livius etwas Ungriechisches, typisch Römisches auf (124). Nor is Eisenhut the only author treated this way. When discussing nobiles and novi, Balmaceda refers to Gelzer, Dondin-Payre, Brunt, and Shackleton-Bailey (70 n. 103, all without page numbers), but judging from her misunderstanding of the terms (see below), she does not seem to have read them. An otherwise inexplicable comment about Augustus’ moral legislation, “if there was such a thing at all” (87), seems to derive from the title of a cited article by Ernst Badian, “A Phantom [End Page 178] Marriage Law,” apparently not read. More troubling is Balmaceda’s appeal to Nathan Rosenstein (N. Rosenstein, R. Morstein-Marx, eds., A Companion to the Roman Republic, 366) to support her idea about the Elogia Scipionum, “its (sic) clear message of virtus with its double meaning of courage and moral excellence” (25). But Rosenstein wrote no such thing, and what he did, “the primary sense [of virtus] in the middle Republic is martial,” contradicts Balmaceda. Ideas and some phrasing (23–4) are taken from M. McDonnell, Roman Manliness (82–3) without attribution. A note (43) refers to J. N. Adams, Bilingualism and the Latin Language, but the pages given (760–2) contain little or nothing about the issues being discussed. More examples could be given. Together they indicate more than carelessness. There are also issues concerning terminology that pertain to my book. Contrary to Balmaceda (2), Roman Manliness did not start from the premise “that native Roman virtus was not an ethical quality,” but rather with the contradiction posed by virtus being employed both with a clearly ethical meaning, and a clearly non-ethical one. Balmaceda decides to use the terms “ethics” and “morality” indistinctively (7, n. 20). I, however, made a distinction, which I think is crucial, in adopting the word “ethical” for values that denote absolute standards of right and wrong, and “moral” to indicate a socially sanctioned value, which is not necessarily an absolute standard. Accordingly, an individual can exhibit a socially sanctioned “moral” value, such as courage, and still be a bad person, as Ennius wrote, Melius est virtute ius: nam saepe virtutem mali / Nanciscuntur: ius atque aecum se a malis spernit procul (Hectoris Lytra 155–6 J). Balmaceda’s own classification—virilitas-virtus, courage, and humanitas-virtus, virtue (11 and 17–18)—results in ambiguity, not only in criticisms of my book (e.g., “his [Marius’] insistence on his morally upright behavior . . . makes his virtus hardly unethical” [66–7]), but also more generally, as with the puzzling “morality as something distinct from politics did not yet exist” (46), or the statement that...

Research Collaborations and Authorshipp: Differentiating Legal from Management Norms

The question of who should take credit as the authors of collaborative research papers has long been a matter for discussion, especially within scientific institutions. However, that discussion has not sufficiently taken account of the legalities of the situation. Particularly since the passing of moral rights legislation in Australia and elsewhere, institutional norms are in conflict with the legal rules concerning the attribution of authorship. Yet, when researchers take their grievances to the courts, it is the legal rules that will prevail. The present article considers the institutional rules against their legal counterparts and the steps that have been, and might in future be, taken to manage this divergence of norms.

Understanding Modern Philosophy through Political Philosophy: The Unity of Ideal Subjects—Political, Epistemological, and Moral

Francis Slade offers a view of modern philosophy through the prism of political philosophy, thereby departing from the more traditional interpretive route of epistemology. For Slade, reason understood as rule proves the key to the unity of the modern project of philosophical idealism. Modernity's political form, the state, is an ideal entity that is constituted by the rule of a pure, disembodied, and sovereign reason, paralleling the same employment of reason that generates the epistemological cogito of Descartes, the moral legislator of Kant, and the “disinterested and benevolent spectator” of Mill. The rule of modern reason effects what Slade calls the political, epistemological, and moral ideal subjects of modernity.

Law Reform in the Ancient World: Did the Emperor Augustus Succeed or Fail in His Morals Legislation?

This is an Article with a dual purpose. First, it is concerned with the process of law reform: How do we judge a given reform's success or failure? Do we adopt strictly linear metrics? Or do we look at non-linear impacts? Thus: In the campaign against tobacco, do we judge it a success because it has reduced cigarette smoking? Or because it reduced the political power of the tobacco companies?In this Article, I apply this complex means of analyzing law reform to the Emperor Augustus' morals legislation. Legal historians have typically regarded Augustus' morals legislation as having achieved, at best, mixed results. These historians, however, have tended to perform a linear assessment of the legislation. Did Augustus achieve the results he professed to want: that is, were cases of adultery prosecuted more frequently? Was elite childbirth encouraged? I argue, in contrast, that the legislation must be seen against Augustus' larger political agenda, which was the subjection of elite families to the laws of the emerging Roman Empire. Seen in these political terms, I argue that the legislation can be judged in substantial measure as successful.

Suetonius on the legislation of Augustus (Aug 34)

The Emperor Augustus' so-called social or moral legislation features prominently in legal and historical discussions of his principate. His biographer Suetonius concentrates into one chapter a discussion of Augustus' leges rogatae, which has never been analysed phrase by phrase by any scholar of Roman history or law since Paul Jors in 1893. This article sets out to explain how Suetonius orders his discussion, chooses precise vocabulary, highlights key stages in the legislative programme, and does not conceal opposition to the legislation. The most controversial law, on which Suetonius centres his discussion, is the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus, key provisions of which were amended in the lex Papia Poppaea of AD 9. I argue that Suetonius comments not only on the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus, but also on later amendments, whether in the putative lex Aelia Sentia of AD 4 or the indisputable lex Papia Poppaea. There is, however, no reference to any abortive moral legislation of 27 BC. Suetonius presents an emperor concerned with major social issues, careful in the formulation of his laws, but also suitably responsive to societal pressure.

Does Morality Have a Point

Proceeding from the assumption that moral discourse is best conceived of as a practice in the technical sense specified by John Rawls, this article discusses whether it is possible, adequate or even necessary to take up a legislative perspective on the constitutive rules of the said practice. There seem to be two principal legislative manoeuvres with respect to practices, namely (i) rendering the practice under consideration compatible with a practice that is more important and (ii) evaluating the constitutive rules of the practice with respect to its point, purpose or telos. I explore two projects in normative ethics that offer an affirmative answer regarding the possibility of moral legislation and that make use of the respective manoeuvres, namely neo-Hobbesian contractarianism and rule-consequentialism. I then inquire into the merits of a position that draws upon broadly Wittgensteinian considerations and denies the existence of such a thing as a legislative perspective on morality. Language: en

From the harm principle to harm decisionism: Hart, Feinberg, and the eclipse of Millian ambiguity

From the harm principle to harm decisionism:Hart, Feinberg, and the eclipse of Millian ambiguity Bernard E. Harcourt (bio) That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.1 This simple sentence from John Stuart Mill’s “Introductory” to On Liberty—pulled out of context and denuded of Mill’s sophisticated philosophical treatment—became a foundational reference of Anglo-American criminal law and helped shape the course of penal legislation, enforcement, and theory during the twentieth century. Known as the “harm to others” principle—or “harm principle” for short—Mill’s simple sentence emerged, in the hands of H. L. A. Hart, Joel Feinberg, Herbert Wechsler, and other liberal legal thinkers at mid-century, as the critical principle used to shield individuals from the legal enforcement of morals legislation—including, most notably, penal laws against homosexual conduct, commercial sex, illicit drugs, and other behaviors that came to be known as “moral vices” for some and “victimless crimes” for others. “Harm to others” became, in the 1970s and 1980s, the defining criteria of liberal thinkers in the debate over the proper scope of the criminal law and the legitimate reach of the State—as evidenced, perhaps most notably, by the lead volume of Feinberg’s magisterial and influential treatise on The Moral Limits of Criminal Law, titled “Harm to Others,” published in 1984. As Mill himself had recognized in his sophisticated analysis of the “harm to others” language in later chapters of On Liberty, however, the simple notion of “harm to others” was far too crude a criterion to [End Page 185] withstand the pressure of majority opinion—far too vulnerable to the rhetorical ploys and charismatic interventions that shape mass public sentiment—which was precisely what Mill was trying to rein in. The advent of liberal democracy in the nineteenth century, Mill explained in framing On Liberty, had raised a new set of concerns, not only about representation, but also about “social tyranny.”2 In the emerging liberal democracies, Mill wrote, the problem was no longer, or not only to protect against “the acts of the public authorities,” but also to guard against the tidal wave of public opinion that could so easily encroach on individuality and self-development: “Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough; there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling, against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them…”3 Mill was rather explicit in his criticism of public opinion, which, he observed, “now rules the world” and reflects “the tendencies and instincts of the masses,” which he expressly equated with “collective mediocrity.”4 Mill was by no means opposed to liberal democracy, to majority rule, nor to the extension of suffrage—in fact, he was an outspoken advocate of women’s suffrage and defended universal suffrage5—but he was deeply concerned about the potential impact of mass popular opinion on individualism. He did not resist, but sought instead to mediate the emerging defects of the more generalized suffrage by refining democratic theory. And he did so, in part, by advocating leadership by the more enlightened few: I am not complaining of all this. I do not assert that anything better is compatible, as a general rule, with the present low state of the human mind. But that does not hinder the government of mediocrity from being mediocre government. No government by a democracy or a numerous aristocracy, either in its political acts or in the opinions, qualities, and tone of mind which it fosters, ever did or could rise above mediocrity except in so far as the sovereign Many have let themselves be guided (which in their best times they always have done) by the counsels and influence of a more highly gifted and instructed one or few. The initiation of all wise or noble things comes and must come from individuals; generally at first from some one individual.6 From this perspective, evidently, the simple notion of...

Recritude: Reflections on Postural Ontology

Recritude: Reflections on Postural Ontology

Recritude: Reflections on Postural Ontology

Recritude: Reflections on Postural Ontology

The Paralyzing Instant

AbstractKierkegaard in Fear and Trembling presents a reductio ad absurdum regarding the time‐spans subject to moral evaluation. The text's classic dilemma depends on assuming that we only evaluate discrete, contextless instants. The pseudonymous author constantly seeks the single instant or moral “photograph” that indicates Abraham's status. Doing so, however, extracts scripture's moral legislation out from narrative, resulting in theological paralysis and thereby requiring an alternative temporal vocabulary for evaluating Abraham. Fear and Trembling contains an under‐explored alternative that sets Abraham within the covenantal narrative's temporality. The paper explores the consequences of shifting from evaluating instants to evaluating narrative durations, showing that while Genesis 22 remains a challenging episode, it also offers a model of imaginative faith, fidelity to promises, and hope in the face of trauma that focusing on moral instants overlooks.

When Fringe Goes Mainstream: A Sociohistorical Content Analysis of the Christian Coalition's Contract With The American Family and the Republican Party Platform

Successful social movements gain an inside voice and reshape the larger system from within. Knowing the extent to which the Christian Right has gained a voice within the Republican Party is vital to understanding the current state of party politics and civil religion in America. This study considers sociohistorical developments in the Christian Right and analyzes the placement of the goals contained within the Christian Coalition's Contract with the American Family in Republican platforms. The goals, which sought the legislation of morality, were in alignment with and an outworking of the larger social and ideological context of the Christian Right and its legitimating myth. Each of the goals of the CAF was placed within the 2000 Republican platform to varying degrees, from increased emphasis on what was already present to shifted focus or new inclusion of previously absent propositions. The incorporation of Coalition goals indicated assimilation of Christian Right ideology within the GOP, precipitated the Coalition's demise as a dissenting social movement organization, and widened the religion gap in American politics. The election of George W. Bush and dominionist interpretation of following events illustrate an increased Christian Right influence from within the Republican Party, which shifted further right in conjunction with the Christian Coalition's decline.

Moral Rights and Open Licensing

This paper will first discuss the moral rights legislation in various jurisdictions. It will then provide a short overview of open licensing on the Internet. Finally, it will analyze whether open licensing (particularly the Creative Commons scheme) is capable of providing meaningful protection of an author’s moral rights, and what alternatives or complements to Creative Commons might exist.