IN what sense, or to what degree, is it the proper business of the state to, as we say, promote morality? It is notoriously difficult to answer this in a principled way, and the temptation has, therefore, been to leave it unanswered, and to deal with questions of repressive moral legislation piecemeal, each on its own merits. This, however, has practicalas well as theoretical disadvantages, and we should clearly be better off if we could lay down limiting conditions as a suggestive guide for legislative programs. I shall, therefore, in the present article, be concerned, not with the merits of this or that reform in particular, but with the general logic of a certain theory of state action. I shall assume as my hypothesis that the business of the state is, neither to compel its citizens to live the life it thinks to their, or its, advantage, nor to encourage a general competitive scramble in the interests of an abstract liberty, but to provide the positive conditions under which a good and satisfying life is open to all alike, leaving, however, the individual man to take advantage of these in the degree to which his own inclinations may prompt him. And what I wish to do is to inquire whether one can deduce from such a standpoint anything to throw light upon the question as to just how far it is desirable for the state to go in its interference with the moral habits of the citizen. It is evident that the principle of of opportunity creates a certain presumption to begin with in favor of leaving men to work out their own salvation; it puts the burden of proof on a proposal for active interference. I am not unaware that there is a plausible turn to be given to the conception of freedom which would reverse this .declaration. Is a man really at liberty .to use his powers to the utmost when he weakens them by personal habits that are harmful-drink or debauchery,-or throws away in gambling the money that might have been used to
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