Moral Asymmetry Research Articles

Causation and Moral Responsibility: Moral Asymmetry and Its Problems

Causation and Moral Responsibility: Moral Asymmetry and Its Problems

On the Moral Asymmetry of Gametic Contributions

An Ravelingien and Guido Pennings (2013) argue that donor-conceived children have a moral right to know the identity of their genetic fathers 1 in cases in which the genetic father is not the socia...

Killing in the Fog of War

This article answers two of the most urgent and important questions facing the contemporary law of armed conflict. First, how certain must a soldier be that a given individual is a combatant and not a civilian before attacking that individual? Second, what risks must soldiers accept to themselves and to their mission in order to reduce the risk of mistakenly killing civilians? In the absence of clear legal rules, leading states, scholars, and practitioners have embraced a Balancing Approach according to which both the required level of certainty and the required level of risk vary with the balance of military and humanitarian considerations. However, this article shows that the Balancing Approach ignores the moral asymmetries between killing and letting die and between intentionally and unintentionally killing civilians. As a result, in a wide variety of situations, the Balancing Approach would permit soldiers to intentionally kill individuals who are probably, much more likely, or almost certainly civilians rather than combatants. These implausible implications expose the fatal defects of the Balancing Approach and demonstrate the need for a morally defensible alternative. To meet this need, this article develops a deontological account of both the required level of certainty and the required level of risk. The first part of this new account, Deontological Targeting, prohibits a soldier from intentionally killing an individual whom she believes is a civilian or whom she does not reasonably believe is a combatant. These constraints establish a minimum threshold of certainty that soldiers must reach before using deadly force. Above the reasonable belief threshold, the required level of certainty varies with the relative costs of error but, crucially, also reflects the moral asymmetry between killing and letting die. In particular, except in rare cases, targeted killing operations against individuals who pose no immediate threat are permissible only if there is conclusive reason to believe that the individuals are combatants. The second part of this new account, Deontological Precaution, requires, at a minimum, that soldiers take as much risk as necessary to reach the required level of certainty. In addition, soldiers must take further precautions unless doing so would increase the risk to the soldiers substantially more than doing so would decrease the risk to civilians. If soldiers are unwilling or unable to reach the required level of certainty or accept the required level of risk then they must hold their fire. The article concludes by distilling these complex moral principles into new legal rules, reinterpretations of existing legal rules, and model rules of engagement in which soldiers can be trained and that can guide soldiers through the fog of war.

When the Badness of Vice Outweighs the Goodness of Virtue: A Moral Asymmetry

Kant found ingratitude among the most contemptible of vices. An ungrateful individual does not properly respect or appreciate people who have bestowed a benefit upon him. Wishing to avoid the indebtedness that comes with acknowledging the kindness of a benefactor, an ingrate denies the kindness. Yet neither Kant nor anyone else believes that the corresponding virtue, gratitude, is as admirable as ingratitude is despicable. The moral value of the disposition to be grateful is far overshadowed by the badness of ingratitude. There seems to be a disproportion or asymmetry between a vice and its corresponding virtue such that the evil of the vice exceeds the goodness of the virtue. The asymmetry in value should perplex us because most pairs of virtues and vices possess comparable moral weight. Considered in the abstract, apart from concrete circumstances, the goodness of virtues is roughly proportionate to the badness of their corresponding vices. For example, courage and cowardice seem to be roughly on a par. The badness of cowardice is not greater than the goodness of courage. Much the same is the case for other virtues and their related vices. The values of patience and impatience, justice and injustice, and generosity and stinginess all seem approximately on a par. Although Aristotle correctly notes that for most vices there are two vicious extremes, we will only consider the vice more opposed to the virtue. Despite the fact that parity in the moral significance of a virtue and its oppositional vice is commonplace, the disproportionality between ingratitude and gratitude is not

Exploring agency problems in corporate governance from the perspective of economic ethics of the capitalist market

Moral hazard is reflected in the information asymmetry between the agent and the principal, as well as under the assumption that humans are egotistic with limited rationality, often risk-averse and antagonistic towards each other’s goals. The agent could thus hide the truth from the principal, not abide by their mutual agreement, and tamper with the investment objectives and plans. From the perspective of Taiwan’s external market mechanisms to corporate governance, shareholders (principals) can exploit situations such as poor sales of company products or corporate managers failing to yield satisfactory performance, etc., to monitor and keep the managerial hierarchy (agents) in check through capital market and corporate control market. A practical way to avoid such moral hazard is for the agents to follow the Golden Rule advocated by Hans Kung “Do unto others as you would have others do unto you”, and to live up to the ethical principle of “commitment to a culture of tolerance and a life of truthfulness”. Relatively, the agency costs required by other methods to reduce information asymmetry and moral hazard problems seem comparatively higher than the former. Key words: Agency problem, corporate governance, business ethics, moral hazard information asymmetry, economic ethics of the capitalist market.

People Lie for a Reason: Three Experiments Documenting the Principle of Veracity

The principle of veracity specifies a moral asymmetry between honesty and deceit. Deception requires justification, whereas honesty does not. Three experiments provide evidence consistent with the principle of veracity. In Study 1, participants (N = 66) selected honest or deceptive messages in response to situations in which motive was varied. Study 2 (N = 66) replicated the first with written, open-ended responses coded for deceptive content. Participants in Study 3 (N = 126) were given an opportunity to cheat for monetary gain and were subsequently interrogated about cheating. As predicted, when honesty was sufficient to meet situational demands, honest messages were selected, generated, and observed 98.5% to 100% of the time. Alternatively, deception was observed 60.0% to 64.3% of the time when variations in the same situations made the truth problematic. It is concluded that people usually deceive for a reason, that motives producing deception are usually the same that guide honesty, and that people usually do not lie when goals are attainable through honest means.

Understanding the adult moralist requires first understanding the child scientist

AbstractChildren learnfrompeople andaboutpeople simultaneously; that is, children consider evidentiary qualities of human actions which cross traditional domain boundaries. We propose that Knobe's moral asymmetries are a natural consequence of this learning process: the way “child scientists” gather evidence for causation, intention, and morality through early social experiences.

The Moral Community and Immigration

In “Which American Dream Do You Mean?” David Stoll never justified his assumption that Guatemalans who want to immigrate to America have a moral claim on our attention. The “conversation” he describes really involves only Americans as only they are held responsible for immigration. Some advocates justify immigration on the basis of rights while others appeal to compassion, but both assign all responsibility to rich Americans and none to the sending societies. A huge moral asymmetry separates the West, which is assumed capable of achieving civic values from the non-West, which is not. Americans hunger for a more candid conversation about how to distribute the responsibility for immigration. That is essential to legitimizing immigration policy and preserving the civic character of American society.

Proscriptive versus prescriptive morality: Two faces of moral regulation.

A distinction is made between two forms of morality on the basis of approach-avoidance differences in self-regulation. Prescriptive morality is sensitive to positive outcomes, activation-based, and focused on what we should do. Proscriptive morality is sensitive to negative outcomes, inhibition-based, and focused on what we should not do. Seven studies profile these two faces of morality, support their distinct motivational underpinnings, and provide evidence of moral asymmetry. Both are well-represented in individuals' moral repertoire and equivalent in terms of moral weight, but proscriptive morality is condemnatory and strict, whereas prescriptive morality is commendatory and not strict. More specifically, in these studies proscriptive morality was perceived as concrete, mandatory, and duty-based, whereas prescriptive morality was perceived as more abstract, discretionary, and based in duty or desire; proscriptive immorality resulted in greater blame, whereas prescriptive morality resulted in greater moral credit. Implications for broader social regulation, including cross-cultural differences and political orientation, are discussed.

KILLING, SELF‐DEFENSE, AND BAD LUCK

ABSTRACTThis essay argues on behalf of a hybrid theory for an ethics of self‐defense understood as the Forfeiture‐Partiality Theory. The theory weds the idea that a malicious attacker forfeits the right to life to the idea that we are permitted to prefer one's life to another's in cases of involuntary harm or threat. The theory is meant to capture our intuitions both about instances in which we can draw a moral asymmetry between attacker and victim and cases in which we cannot. I develop the theory by attending to instances of intentional, villainous harm and instances of involuntary danger—the latter of which are a matter of bad luck. I call some bad luck cases “Interpersonal Lottery Conflicts.” These cases refer to potentially lethal conflicts into which parties are thrown as victims of circumstance. Although neither party has a moral advantage over another, that fact does not preclude permissible self‐defense.

Seeing Oneself through the Eyes of the Other: Asymmetrical Reciprocity and Self-respect

Iris Marion Young argues we cannot understand others’ experiences by imagining ourselves in their place or in terms of symmetrical reciprocity (1997a). For Young, reciprocity expresses moral respect and asymmetry arises from people's greatly varying life histories and social positions. La Caze argues there are problems with Young's articulation of asymmetrical reciprocity in terms of wonder and the gift. By discussing friendship and political representation, she shows how taking self-respect into account complicates asymmetrical reciprocity.

Utilitarianism without Consequentialism: The Case of John Stuart Mill

This essay argues, flouting paradox, that Mill was a utilitarian but not a consequentialist. First, it contends that there is logical space for a view that deserves to be called utilitarian despite its rejection of consequentialism; second, that this logical space is, in fact, occupied by John Stuart Mill. The key to understanding Mill's unorthodox utilitarianism and the role it plays in his moral philosophy is to appreciate his sentimentalist metaethics—especially his account of wrongness in terms of fitting guilt and resentment. Mill recognizes a fundamental moral asymmetry between the agent and others, which conflicts intractably with a presupposition of consequentialism. This allows him to differentiate three potentially conflicting evaluative spheres: morality, prudence, and aesthetics. This essay's account of Mill's utilitarianism coheres with his defense of individual liberty and his embrace of supererogation, both of which elude traditional interpretations.

Limits on Patient Responsibility

As we debate the nature and extent of patient responsibility it is important to keep in mind the reasons for giving a relatively minimal role to patient responsibility in medical ethics. It is argued that the medical profession ought to be characterized by two moral asymmetries: even if some degree of responsible behavior from patients is called for, placing the dominant emphasis on pro- fessional responsibility over patient responsibility is largely correct; insofar as we do want to encourage an increase in patient re- sponsibility, we have good reasons to emphasize prospective rather than retrospective notions of responsibility in clinical practice. Concerns about patient vulnerability along with the determined factors in disease leave little room for blame at the bedside. These two asymmetries generate normative limits on any positive account of patient responsibility.

Limits on Patient Responsibility

The medical profession and medical ethics currently place a greater emphasis on physician responsibility than patient responsibility. This imbalance is not due to accident or a mistake but, rather is motivated by strong moral reasons. As we debate the nature and extent of patient responsibility it is important to keep in mind the reasons for giving a relatively minimal role to patient responsibility in medical ethics. It is argued that the medical profession ought to be characterized by two moral asymmetries: (1) Even if some degree of responsible behavior from patients is called for, placing the dominant emphasis on professional responsibility over patient responsibility is largely correct. The value of protecting the right to refuse treatment and arguments against paternalism block a more expansive account of patient responsibility and support a strong notion of professional responsibility. (2) Insofar as we do want to encourage an increase in patient responsibility, we have good reasons to emphasize prospective rather than retrospective notions of responsibility in clinical practice. Concerns about patient vulnerability along with the determined factors in disease leave little room for blame at the bedside. These two asymmetries generate normative limits on any positive account of patient responsibility.

On the relative preponderance of empathic sorrow and its relation to commonsense morality

Empathy is a nominally neutral term: in principle, the affective tone of empathic concern may be either negative (insofar as the relevant experience is that of apprehending and sharing in another's aversive state) or positive (i.e., apprehending and sharing in another's joy). Yet, we propose (Section 1) that, contrary to this standard conception of empathy as a potentially bivalent, generalized disposition towards emotional perspective-taking, in actuality, negative empathic responses, as a rule, (a) are more common, (b) are more differentiated, and (c) span a broader range of human relationships than their positive counterparts. Furthermore, we suggest that, barring certain types of privileged relationships, a failure to be empathetically aroused by another's good fortune is subject to far less severe (if any) social disapproval than the failure to share in another's aversive state. In Section 2, we posit that the negativity bias evident in the nature of our empathic concern may well be at the base of the negative–positive asymmetry found in the structure of commonsense morality, particularly as it expresses itself in the view that the furtherance of another's good has a greater moral claim on us in its negative form (e.g., the relief of suffering) than in its positive form (the promotion of “enjoyment”). We conclude by asking whether this moral (and the underlying empathic) asymmetry warrants our normative concern and we suggest that there are at least two reasons to think otherwise.

Nature, Respect for Nature, and the Human Scale of Values

I. The development of the earth has not progressed in the way that Leibniz so hopefully envisaged three hundred years ago. Late twentieth century disillusion demonstrated by citation. II-IV. In making sense of that disillusion it is a good beginning to abstain from speculative extravagance and simply to bring the human scale of values to bear; then to inquire how far the destruction of that which we prize has been gratuitous or economically subsidized. The human scale of values is not a scale of exclusively human values. (Cp. Williams.) It gives no licence to the instrumentalist attitude. V. The swallow or the lapwing in Cambridgeshire (for instance) as a value recognized by the human scale of values, but misrepresented by many forms of economic analysis. The off-colour presuppositions of the question ‘Can we afford to save the swallow in Cambridgeshire?’ Will the natural framework be preserved for meaningful life, or will human beings face an aeon of inanition? VI. Every departure from policies of ‘sustainability’ to be justified by dire need. Incommensurability in the theory of practical reason, and in possible forms of politics. John Stuart Mill on a world with ‘nothing left to the spontaneous activity of Nature’. VII. ‘Nature’ explicated by the use of three contrasts proposed by Hume. VIII. Respect for Nature? Roman religio and its secular-cum-precautionary counterpart. In risk analysis, are there moral asymmetries between assurable satisfaction of vital needs (one part of contentment) and probable provision of future benefits? Analogous asymmetries with respect to the reasonableness of the reliance on Nature under normal conditions and under radically altered conditions.

Suffering and moral responsibility

1. Introduction 2. The Meaning of Suffering 3. The Measurement of Suffering 4. The Moral Significance of Suffering 5. The Duty to Relieve Suffering 6. The Moral Asymmetry of Happiness and Suffering 7. Trade-offs Internal to the Duty to Relieve Suffering 8. The Limits of the Duty to Relieve Suffering Notes Bibliography Index

Lying and Deceiving Moral Choice in Public and Private Life

Suppose that there are good or morally defensible reasons for not responding truthfully to a question or request for information. Is a lie or a deception better as a means to avoid telling the truth? There are many situations in public and private life in which the answer to this question would serve as a useful moral guide, for instance, clinical situations involving dying patients, educational situations, involving young children and personal situations involving close friends. Intuitively, we feel that there is a moral asymmetry in favor of deceiving over lying. However, doubts have been cast on such intuition. The aim of this paper is to bolster this intuition. It will be argued that the claim of moral asymmetry in favor of deception can be supported on a consideration of the different degrees of expectation involved in communicative ethics. Two other objections to the claim of asymmetry will also be considered.

The Moral Asymmetry of Happiness and Suffering

The Southern Journal of PhilosophyVolume 34, Issue 3 p. 317-338 The Moral Asymmetry of Happiness and Suffering Jamie Mayerfeld, Jamie Mayerfeld University of Washington Jamie Mayerfeld teaches political theory at the University of Washington. He is currently writing a book entitled Suffering and Moral Responsibility.Search for more papers by this author Jamie Mayerfeld, Jamie Mayerfeld University of Washington Jamie Mayerfeld teaches political theory at the University of Washington. He is currently writing a book entitled Suffering and Moral Responsibility.Search for more papers by this author First published: Fall 1996 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1996.tb00795.xCitations: 9 Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume34, Issue3Fall 1996Pages 317-338 RelatedInformation

Post Investment Demand for Accounting Information by Venture Capitalists

Abstract The key concepts of principal-agent analysis are utilised to investigate influences on venture capitalists' accounting information requirements as used in their dealings with investees. The findings are based on structured interviews held with 20 leading venture capitalists, managing funds which together comprise over three quarters of all UK venture capital funds. The results confirm that a number of the key concepts of principal-agent analysis are mirrored in the financial communication process between venture capital investors and their investees. They reveal the venture capitalists' appreciation of the dangers of moral hazard and information asymmetry. It is shown that, as a consequence, their information demands are designed to provide safeguards through bonding arrangements. These establish and define an information flow which can be utilised as the basis for frequent and regular monitoring of the investee.