When the Badness of Vice Outweighs the Goodness of Virtue: A Moral Asymmetry

Abstract

Kant found ingratitude among the most contemptible of vices. An ungrateful individual does not properly respect or appreciate people who have bestowed a benefit upon him. Wishing to avoid the indebtedness that comes with acknowledging the kindness of a benefactor, an ingrate denies the kindness. Yet neither Kant nor anyone else believes that the corresponding virtue, gratitude, is as admirable as ingratitude is despicable. The moral value of the disposition to be grateful is far overshadowed by the badness of ingratitude. There seems to be a disproportion or asymmetry between a vice and its corresponding virtue such that the evil of the vice exceeds the goodness of the virtue. The asymmetry in value should perplex us because most pairs of virtues and vices possess comparable moral weight. Considered in the abstract, apart from concrete circumstances, the goodness of virtues is roughly proportionate to the badness of their corresponding vices. For example, courage and cowardice seem to be roughly on a par. The badness of cowardice is not greater than the goodness of courage. Much the same is the case for other virtues and their related vices. The values of patience and impatience, justice and injustice, and generosity and stinginess all seem approximately on a par. Although Aristotle correctly notes that for most vices there are two vicious extremes, we will only consider the vice more opposed to the virtue. Despite the fact that parity in the moral significance of a virtue and its oppositional vice is commonplace, the disproportionality between ingratitude and gratitude is not