Mohammed Morsi Research Articles

Islamist political parties formed through the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement in Egypt

The Muslim Brotherhood movement, which was born in Egypt, has influenced not only Egypt but also coun-tries such as Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, and many Islamic movements in these countries have beenorganized on the model of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood movement started as a socialand cultural movement, but later on it gained a political character and aspired to govern Egypt. In addition tothe Freedom and Justice Party, which was founded in 2011 under the leadership of Mohamed Morsi and wasinfluential in the Arab Spring process, there are other Islamist parties in Egypt that are related to or influencedby the Muslim Brotherhood movement. These parties, which are less known in the world public opinion, canbe listed as the Wasat Party, the Islamic Labour Party and the Egyptian Current Party. In this study, firstly,the historical course of the Muslim Brotherhood movement is analysed and then the political parties in Egyptthat were founded by or influenced by this movement are presented. Finally, the study concludes with a gen-eral analysis and comparison of these parties.

Ten Years After: Revisiting the Ouster Of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood

AbstractThe ouster of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011 marked a turning point in Egypt's modern history. The long‐persecuted Muslim Brotherhood immediately became a key political player, and its candidate, Mohamed Morsi, won election to lead the country. But despite those two years of popular engagement and victories at the ballot box, Morsi was ousted and the movement banished once again after a confrontation with the military in July 2013. Why did the Brotherhood choose to risk a conflict with the armed forces and not seek a compromise? This article contends that the decision was driven by the Muslim Brotherhood's long history of persecution, its broad base of support, its impressive successes after Mubarak fell, and its fear of losing the presidency. These set the Brotherhood on a course of action that suited its experiences and preferences. This path led the movement to ignore several facts suggesting it must seek to coordinate with the armed forces: The Brotherhood and the military did not enjoy cordial relations after Morsi's election in 2012; the movement's grassroots power was substantial, but there was no evidence it could prevail over the military's demand for Morsi to step down; and the military maintained its internal cohesion. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood's historical path guided its decision to avoid cooperation.

‘Following the Straight Path’: Egypt Political Regime’s Quest for Political Legitimacy

The study aims to investigate the sources of the Egyptian regime’s legitimacy after the removal of Mohammed Morsi from office in 2013. The ruling elite, in particular President alSisi, has recently shown a growing inclination towards adopting Islam in the political discourse. As a result, there is a need to examine the factors that have contributed to this trend. The central hypothesis of the research is that the government, lacking institutional legitimacy, is compelled to reinforce the Islamic values in political communication to overcome internal political divisions and establish a sense of social connection between the authorities and citizens. To test this hypothesis, the study employs a qualitative content analysis of speeches made by President alSisi to the nation between 2014 and 2023. The analysis identifies four techniques for legitimation (mobilization, national identity consolidation, construction of a common past, and construction of a common future) and examines the functional role of Islam in each of them. The findings of the study suggest that Islamic norms and values are most actively appealed to in segments of texts devoted to national identity consolidation and constructing a common future. Both approaches involve a similar strategy of invoking Islam by associating and transferring attributes within pairs of words (religious context - secular context): nation - the Ummah; state - Islamic world; citizen - a Muslim. By using this rhetorical strategy, the government is shaping a narrative that places the contemporary Egyptian state within a religious and historical framework, as depicted in the Qur’an. This approach is aimed at establishing a set of values that can unite the nation and foster loyalty among citizens towards the government’s vision for Egypt’s future. However, there are almost no semantic sections dedicated to mobilizing citizens in the texts. This can be attributed to a pragmatic effort to steer clear of politicizing the electorate.

Centralization of power as a result of the development of the egyptian elite during 2014-2023. Forward to the past?

This article attempts to analyze the key groups of the Egyptian elite in 2014-2023 in accordance to the elite theory. A.F. El-Sisi was first elected to the presidency of Egypt in 2014 after the 2013 military coup that overthrew former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi (in position 2012-2013). There is an opinion that with the advent of A.F. El-Sisi to power there was a rollback of the political system to pre-revolutionary times until 2011. Nevertheless, as a result of an analysis, the article shows significant differences between the regimes of Presidents H. Mubarak and A.F. El-Sisi, especially in relation to the opposition. Despite the relative success in security issues, Egypt remains in a tense economic situation, rising inflation and dependence on external debt (among the creditors both the Gulf States and international institutions like IMF). The mega-projects in accordance with the “Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS): Egypt Vision 2030” do not have enough positive impact on the economy. In this regard, Egypt is facing a complex of structural geopolitical and economic challenges. The paper demonstrates the relationship between key state institutions, and also reveals the strengthening of the role and influence of the General Intelligence Service (GIS) in the political process. At the same time, GIS itself underwent serious personnel changes - infiltration by the military intelligence of the Armed Forces (where the president came from).Despite the repeating resistance of certain parts of the elite (both business elites and the religious establishment), President A.F. El-Sisi consistently promotes the centralization of power.

Muslim Brotherhood Memoirs: Prison as a Link among Hostile Groups

AbstractIn Egypt's 2012 elections, the Muslim Brotherhood came to power after many years of repression, an unprecedented victory for the country's most active opposition movement. The Brotherhood's journey can be divided into several stages. One of the most important, which has not received enough attention, is the imprisonment of many of its major figures. Long before the coup that overthrew President Mohamed Morsi in 2013, the Arab nationalist President Gamal Abdel Nasser brutally put down the movement with mass arrests. The Brotherhood's members dominated Egypt's prisons, but they were far from the only activists in the system, which also held communists, Zionists, and other Jewish prisoners. This article uses the memoirs of the incarcerated enemies of the state to examine the struggles of these groups inside Egypt's prisons and show how the institutions served as platforms to promote the ideological struggle against the regime.

On the Eve of the Authoritarian Turn: Mourning the Lives of the “Terrorists”

ABSTRACT On 14 August 2013, Egyptian security forces killed hundreds of supporters and sympathizers of the Muslim Brotherhood in two squares of Egypt's capital Cairo: Rab‘a al-‘Adawiyya and al-Nahda. Those killed had protested against the military coup that ousted President Mohamed Morsi. The state's propaganda machine and the media connected to Egypt's influential business people designated those killed as terrorists. Human rights organizations paint a grim picture of the decade of authoritarian rule. In the regime's rhetoric, the fight against terrorism justifies the continued crackdown on Egyptian civil society movements and opposition. Again this year, the anniversary of the Rab‘a al-‘Adawiyya and al-Nahda massacres is likely to receive little coverage in the country's mainstream media. While the voices of those opposing the military coup in 2013 in Egypt are long silenced, on the massacre's tenth anniversary, it is time to recall an alternative to the narrative of the Egyptian state. Participants of a women's Quran reading group in one of Cairo’s impoverished neighborhoods questioned the military coup in 2013 and anticipated what was to come.

Weaponizing Democratization: Street Battles and Transformation in Post-Revolutionary Egypt

: Scholarship on the connection between democratization and political violence typically views democracy through a liberal prism prioritizing elections and elite dynamics and qualifies violence through the lens of civil war or organized armed conflict, which leaves the political salience and effects of alternative modes of violent contentious mobilization underexamined. This study analyzes the connection between the weaponization of Egypt’s post-revolutionary democratizing roadmap and politically transformative street battles that divided and reconfigured social and political alliances through bloodshed, grievance and betrayal. Weaponization describes a process in which Egypt’s transitional democratizing roadmap championed free and fair elections while revolutionary activists were systematically repressed and stigmatized. The resultant polarization from street battles, particularly between the Muslim Brotherhood and their opponents, significantly contributed to support for the Tamarrod (rebellion) campaign, leading to mass mobilization and the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi of the Brotherhood. This ushered in an authoritarian restoration structured through heightened political polarization and repression. The analysis largely draws from the accounts of informal political actors, not least in order to address the underrepresentation of such experiences within orthodox democratization scholarship. The Battle of Mohamed Mahmoud Street and the Ittehadiyya presidential palace clashes are developed as two exemplar empirical cases (re)directing Egypt’s transitional trajectory, which enrich wider debates on democratization, authoritarian entrenchment, political violence and the fluidity of transitional politics.

The Political Path of Copts in Egypt after 2011

The Coptic Church monopolized the religious and political representation of the Copts since the establishment of the Egyptian state. It withdrew from direct involvement in the political sphere during the presidency of Hosni Mubarak, characterized by a close relationship between the Church and the political regime, especially in times of perceived common threats. Consequently, the Church often supported the regime to safeguard against potential risks that might arise if the regime were to fall. In this context, Mubarak's regime used Islamist elements to intimidate the Copts, while justifying its actions by claiming that the secular political system had become sectarian. Consequently, Mubarak's regime closed its doors to Coptic representation within his party.
 The January 25th, 2011 revolution provided an opportunity for the Copts to act more freely in the political climate. However, this newfound democracy had its challenges, as it witnessed the mobilization and substantial participation of Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, utilizing their organizational capacity. Through this religious polarization, the Islamists succeeded in winning elections, leading to the presidential victory of Mohamed Morsi.
 The Muslim Brotherhood failed to alleviate the Copts' concerns about religious freedom and their marginalization in state institutions. Moreover, some Brotherhood leaders and their allies adopted a sectarian rhetoric against the Copts, which had negative consequences on the overall political direction of the Brotherhood. This ultimately led to their downfall, paving the way for a new era of governance in Egypt.

The Obama Administration and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (2010-2016): Ally or Predicament?

The Muslim Brotherhood has always been very controversial. Since its creation in the late 1920s, it has been at the heart of Egypt’s most important upheavals and struggles. As a Pan-Islamist religious and social movement, its self-stated aim is “Islam is the solution”. During the early days of the so-called “Arab Spring,” the movement was the readiest political power to go through the electoral process and achieve victory far more than any other party. This was due to its long history in charity and social services and the well-organized preachers who are deeply rooted in Egyptian society. The sharp victory in the 2011 Legislative Elections was not enough for the movement. Backed by his Islamist allies and most of the youth who participated in the “Revolution,” Mohamed Morsi ran for president and won in 2012. One year later, he was ousted after a “second uprising” in the streets of Cairo and many other Egyptian cities. Another crackdown was inevitable and the movement went back to clandestinity. Amidst all these events, the United States under President Obama could not distance itself from what was going on. In the beginning, the US administration was divided over the popular uprisings in the whole region and in Egypt in particular. In Egypt, the Obama administration backed Morsi during his presidency although his movement was known to be traditionally against Western interests in the region. Many Egyptian politicians were into the idea that the cabinet was compromised and officials with connections to the Muslim Brotherhood were influencing the decision-making process. When it was time, the US government has leaned into the army which is the only institution that guarantees the peace treaty with Israel. The aim of this paper is to provide an understanding to the blur in the US stance before and during the period when the army took over. It explains the major interests which did not make the issue of democracy a priority and led to the disposal from the Muslim Brotherhood.

In the shadow of the Islamic State: political violence in post-revolutionary Egypt, 2013–2020

ABSTRACT This article examines the trajectory and identity of the militant groups that resorted to political violence in post-revolutionary Egypt without adhering to Salafi-jihadist ideology. Non-jihadist violence has often remained in the shadow of the Islamic State, and is relatively unknown and underestimated, however data analysis shows that it accounted for a large share of the Egyptian market for violence following the downfall of Mohamed Morsi. Although these militant groups arose as a reaction to the coup that overthrew Morsi, their ethos was influenced by political and social practices that emerged from the 25 January Revolution. Far from being a mere fringe of the Muslim Brotherhood that shifted towards jihadism, militant groups in fact constitute a specific phenomenon and a legacy of revolution.

Revolution, Change, and Democratic Transition in Egypt Since 2011: A Critical Political Economy Approach

The causes, consequences, and trajectory of the 2011 uprising in Egypt have been and continue to be a subject of scholarly debate. This article is situated within this debate with a particular focus on the role of political economy factors in engendering democracy and democratic transition. The key research objectives are to address why the Egyptian people came together in 2011 in an unprecedented show of solidarity to overthrow the Hosni Mubarak regime, to evaluate the interpretive frames for this uprising from two overlapping but fundamentally opposed perspectives—liberal democracy and radical democracy; to assess the extent to which the adoption of neoliberalism, accompanied by poverty and inequality, played a role in fomenting the countermovement against the regime; and to identify the underlying structures and process that links the 2011 uprising to the regime of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. The article concludes that the imposition of a neoliberal regime of capital accumulation, with dispossession and upward wealth redistribution at its heart, created the conditions for the rise of radical democratic mass movements that overthrew both Mubarak and Mohammed Morsi. The article further underlines that the regime of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi not only halted the democratic reforms demanded by the Egyptian people but continues, at a faster pace, to impose the same neoliberal economic restructuring that catalyzed the uprising in the first place.

Egyptian State Media in Opposition: Al-Ahram under Morsi, 2012–2013

Based on quantitative and qualitative analysis of opinion columns in the Egyptian state newspaper Al-Ahram during Mohamed Morsi's 2012???13 presidency, this article argues that columnists substantially shifted to critical commentary on government policies and advanced an oppositional political agenda. Seeking to delegitimize the Muslim Brotherhood, the newspaper's columns continued to promote the worldview of the non-Islamist elite that had been privileged under the prerevolutionary regime. Only a small number of columns sided with Morsi and his allies. These findingssupport the claim that Egypt's established political institutions helped undermine Morsi's electoral legitimacy.

Trends in Egyptian Terrorism in the Post-Mubarak Period

Egypt has experienced a distinct wave of terrorism since the early 1980s. An analysis of trends shows that the intensity of political violence and armed clashes has increased significantly since the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi on 3 July 2013. Terrorist acts have since spread from the Sinai Peninsula to mainland Egypt, where the perpetrators have included religious fundamentalists and marginalised Bedouin groups in society, as well as increasing numbers of political opponents of the Sisi regime. However, the use of extremist means to gain religious, ideological, and political legitimacy has provoked an increasingly violent response from the Cairo leadership, which has launched several large-scale operations to dismantle terrorist bases in the country. Although the clashes have claimed the lives of thousands of soldiers, police and civilians, the fight is far from over. In the present study, the authors outline the demographic background and social problems of Egypt's modern history of terrorism, in an attempt to give a sense of the trends. Their overall conclusion is that, despite the Egyptian government's propaganda announcements, the large-scale action of the security forces has not been able to completely eradicate the presence of fundamentalists in the country but has been able to significantly reduce their operational capabilities in the region.

НЕ В ОДНОМ РЯДУ С ИГИЛ: О КНИГЕ “VOICE OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD: DA’WA, DISCOURSE AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION”, NOHA MELLOR (L.; N.Y.: ROUTLEDGE, 2018. 240 P.)

The article deals with the issues that were posed in Noha Mellor’s monograph “Voice of the Muslim Brotherhood**: Da’wa, discourse, and political Communication”. Despite the large amount of literature about the Muslim Brotherhood (MB or Brotherhood) knowledge about the organization is still quite limited. In particular, little information is available about their communication strategy. Research into that aspect of the organization’s activities explains why Egyptians continued to support the Brotherhood even in years of opposition and repression. “Voice of the Muslim Brotherhood**: Da’wa, discourse, and political communication” is a first analysis of the Brotherhood’s early media, tracing its media discourse from the late 1920s to the overthrow of Mohammed Morsi in 2013. The author considers the movement’s media strategy looking beyond publications in periodicals, works or biographies of prominent figures but also by studying the Brotherhood’s Internet products. It makes the research important not only for the history of modern Egypt but also the study of the Muslim Brotherhood**. Mellor provides a noteworthy analysis of how MB’s personal brand was shaped throughout decades. The study contributes to a broader understanding of the relationship between the secular and the religious in contemporary discourses.

Turkish-Egyptian Relations after 2011: Political Dynamics of Geopolitical Turbulence

The Arab Spring process, which started in Tunisia in 2010 and soon spread throughout the entire Arab world, ended in 2011 with the resignation of Hosni Mubarak’s government in Egypt. Subsequently, as a result of the parliamentary elections held on November 28, 2011, the election of Mohammed Morsi under the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood caused great enthusiasm in the Turkish public and marked a high point in the history of bilateral relations. However, in 2013, relations reached a breaking point and were reduced to a minimum after Morsi and his supporters were removed from power in a coup. On the other hand, in addition to the deep-rooted historical backgrounds of Turkey and Egypt, the presence of diplomatic opportunities in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean in a geopolitical context enabled the repeated development of bilateral relations. Thanks to all of this, relations between the two states began to normalize at the diplomatic level since the end of 2020. This study examines reasons for the development of the turbulent relationship between the two countries, which quickly reached both the peak and the bottom, before it began to normalize due to its geopolitical importance. The first part of the study examines Turkey’s foreign policy during the Arab Spring and its reflections on Egypt. The second part analyzes the reasons for the relations that peaked with the Morsi era. Then, it examines the causes of the negative impact of the military coup that took place in Egypt in 2013, which led to the breaking point in bilateral relations. Finally, it seeks to comprehensively explore the causes of turbulent relations by examining relations that have recently begun to normalize due to geopolitical concerns.

Ambivalent allies: How inconsistent foreign support dooms new democracies

Since the Cold War ended, foreign support has been identified as an important factor in facilitating democratization. However, in certain parts of the world Western enthusiasm for democratization has been highly uneven, particularly when regime change has been achieved through nonviolent revolutionary mobilization. This article introduces the concept of ‘ambivalent allies’ and argues that ambivalence may be highly detrimental to new democracies emerging from nonviolent resistance. Ambivalent allies signal public support for a democratic transition while remaining quietly skeptical about the desirability or viability of the new regime. These misleading signals cause democratic leaders to deprioritize the maintenance of their diverse coalitions, choosing instead an exclusivist approach that alienates their domestic partners. They therefore end up doubly exposed to counterrevolutionary threats, lacking both a broad domestic support base and strong foreign backers. The article illustrates this argument through an examination of Egypt’s 2011 revolution and 2013 coup, drawing on approximately 100 interviews with Egyptian political leaders and foreign diplomats. It shows that the USA’s ambivalence toward the transition contributed to the coup by giving the elected government headed by Mohamed Morsi a false impression that it had strong foreign backing, and that it could afford to marginalize the secularist wing of the original revolutionary coalition. Egypt’s experience is then compared to two cases in which new governments survived counterrevolutionary threats: Burkina Faso in 2014 and Madagascar in 2009. The study contributes to our understanding of how international support may facilitate or undermine democratic consolidation following nonviolent revolutions.

Turkish-Egyptian economic relations 2011-2013 AD

The economic relations between the two countries have gone through important stages, as we note the great development in relations, especially after the success of the Egyptian revolution on January 25, 2011. The golden stage in the two countries’ economic relations was during the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood, during the rule of President Mohamed Morsi. Investments and commercial relations in Introduction to the economic relations between the two countries, which were of great importance in the development of economic relations, and the political relations between the two countries did not witness the development that the economic aspect witnessed.

THE ROLE OF PRESIDENT ABDEL FATTAH AL-SISI'S GOVERNMENT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF EGYPT'S POST-REVOLUTIONARY ECONOMIC REFORMS IN 2011

<pre style="text-align: justify; background: #F8F9FA;"><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;" lang="IN">After the revolution in 2011, Egypt has experienced various conditions of instability in various fields, especially the economy and politics. <span class="y2iqfc">The government of Mohammed Morsi, which was previously expected improve the Egyptian economy, actually exacerbated the situation. The Egyptian people staged various protests and other forms of protest in order for the government to immediately improve the situation. However, the government failed to carry out conflict management so the military carried out a coup. Morsi's position was later replaced by Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi. Al-Sisi's background as a military figure led to repressive policies being implemented. During Al-Sisi's reign, there was a significant increase in the Egyptian economy. The purpose of this research is to identify the role of President Al-Sisi's government for the development of economic reform in Egypt after the 2011 Revolution. This research use</span></span><span class="y2iqfc"><span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US">d</span></span><span class="y2iqfc"><span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="IN">a qualitative approach with an exploratory type of research, and refers to the theory of liberalism and the rational actor model. The results of this research indicate that President Al-Sisi's policies have a positive impact on the development of the Egyptian economy as indicated by an increase in Egypt's Gross Domestic Product, a decrease in inflation rates, and poverty.</span></span></pre>

The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan

The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan

Understanding the Praetorian Rule of Fatah al-Sisi in Egypt

Gamal Abdel Nasser established the praetorian regime in 1952. Nasser ruled Egypt with the ‘party-state’ system to maintain the ‘social contract’ between the state and the Egyptians. The government thrived on the patrimonial relationship and de-politicization of the population. The ‘Egyptian upheaval’ in 2011 sought the protection of individuals’ rights, equality, and freedom against the military-led praetorian regime. A short-democratic experiment led to the arrival of Islamist majority rule in Egypt under the leadership of President Mohammed Morsi. The liberal-secular oppositions and the military removed President Morsi because Islamists failed to achieve the protesters’ aspirations. Egyptians supported the military’s rule that led to the election of General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi as President of Egypt. Fatah al-Sisi shifted the dynamics of government from ‘party-state’ to ‘ruler-arbiter’ praetorian rule that centralized the authority and power under his leadership through military domination to counter the Islamists and revolutionary aspirations. The research explains the causality behind the Egyptian military's intervention in politics, structuring of the praetorian regime in Egypt; the return of military praetorianism after the removal of President Hosni Mubarak; the rise of the Sisi as ‘ruler-arbiter’ and its implications on the democratization process. The paper’s method is explanatory to study the ‘structural’ (military) and ‘agential’ (Sisi’s rule) factors to determine the causes of establishing the praetorian ‘ruler-arbiter’ type Sisi’s regime. The approach to examine the ruler-arbiter phenomenon is the ‘actor-centric’ instead of the ‘mechanistic’ to understand the praetorian rule in Egypt. The research finds that the rise of the ‘ruler-arbiter’ regime under the leadership of the Sisi, caused by the military-established praetorian authority and President Sisi's choices and decisions, led to the failure of the democratization in Egypt.