This essay will address the following question: how did Avicenna, the follower and commentator of Aristotle, manage to achieve a more comprehensive account of “place” (makān) than Aristotle himself did before differently in Categories and Physics. This theory of “place” is also phenomenological, since Avicenna’s related works deal with the concrete phenomena of the physical world, thereby describing how place shows itself to us, illustrating the ways we understand through its relation to bodies. Rather than delivering the essence of place, Avicenna delineates the priority of place by expressing that every body that is in the physical world must be emplaced. In other words, there would be no world (ʿālam) without local places particular to the things placed in that world. This ontological power of place not only guarantees every body its “proper place” (that is, every thing has its own place by its very nature) but also describes how places must be filled with bodies (i.e., “thinged”), without falling into the error of identifying one with the other. A phenomenological approach to Avicennan physics, in this essay, will disclose that the power of place designated by Aristotle is strengthened in terms of its uniqueness and irreducibility, before giving way to the supremacy of space (spatium) in modern philosophy.