Modern Military History Research Articles

Modern Military History

As the editors say in the introduction, military history has often been looked down upon by academia, which sees it partly as antiquarianism and partly as suited only for boys who refuse to grow up. Too often, too, the cardinal role that war plays in history is ignored; if only for that reason, any effort to correct this situation, such as the present one, is welcome. Most of the authors who have written the various essays in this volume are relatively young and little known, though the most senior among them, Professor Joanna Bourke of Birkbeck College London, is the author of no fewer than seven books. Nevertheless, the quality of their work is almost uniformly excellent, a fact which promises well for the future. One characteristic of the work in question is that as much, or more, attention is paid to historiography as to history proper; as a result, the volume as a whole also constitutes a very good introduction to some of the most important issues that have preoccupied military historians during the last three decades or so. This includes that much-discussed concept, military revolutions, their origins, their nature, and their impact; the link between warfare and the rise of the state; war and society (a vast subject which Michael Neiberg manages to cover in just nineteen pages, including a bibliographical essay and footnotes); the evolution of military thought from Machiavelli to Liddell Hart; the evolution of land warfare from Machiavelli to Desert Storm; the various forms of low-intensity conflict, guerrilla, terrorism, insurgency and the like; total war; the rise and impact of air power; naval warfare; war as waged in the non-European world; imperial military history; technology, science and war; and, last but not least, the ‘new’ military history. As this list shows, by ‘modern’ the authors mean anything that has happened in the field over the last five centuries or so, a fact that enables them to provide perspective while casting their net far and wide.

Strategic Geography and the Spanish Habsburg Monarchy's Failure to Recover Portugal, 1640-1668

In a war lasting almost twenty-eight years (1640–68), Spanish forces endeavoured to recover Portugal for the Spanish Habsburg monarchy. This article examines the war in terms of strategic geography, a crucial but rather neglected dimension of early modern military history. Drawing comparisons with Alba's successful 1580 campaign to annex Portugal, it shows how geographic and climatic factors influenced the conduct of the 1640–68 war in terms of strategy, tactics, and logistics. It also reveals how these factors contributed to the outcome of the war and to Spain's military failure against its smaller neighbour.

Early modern military history, 1450-1815

Early modern military history, 1450-1815

The World History Highway: A Guide to Internet Resources (review)

Reviewed by: The World History Highway: A Guide to Internet Resources Ivan Wolfe The World History Highway: A Guide to Internet Resources. Edited by Dennis A. Trinkle and Scott A. Merriman. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002. 501 pp. $29.95 (paper). ISBN 0-7656-0906-1. Navigating the Web is a treacherous activity (as well as a mixed metaphor) during which even the most erudite scholar may need a good road map to avoid the potholes and dead ends of the information superhighway. Quite a market has emerged to help fill this need, with books covering a wide range of subjects, from the best Star Wars Web sites (The Incredible Internet Guide to Star Wars by Peter J. Weber) to gardening (Everything for the Garden: Website Guide by Brian Cotton). However, not all of these books are of value or even helpful. Every book covering the Internet/Web eventually runs into one of three problems: they tend to go out of date fairly quickly due to the ephemeral nature of Web sites; they do not allow for immediate access to the Web sites being described; and they do not explain how to deal with the enormous amount of information on the Web (i.e., do the compilers cover as many Web sites as possible or only highlight the best ones?). Any book claiming to offer a guided tour of the Web needs to be judged on how well it can overcome these obstacles. The World History Highway: A Guide to Internet Resources attempts to overcome these problems in several ways, and it mostly succeeds (as we shall see). As an aid for students who are lost or for scholars looking for resources they might not otherwise know about or even for interested history buffs, this guide to history-related Web sites works very well and makes more sense than most Web guides on the market. Hundreds of Web sites are covered, neatly broken down into carefully organized categories, including "General History," "Canadian History," "Historiography," and "Modern Military History." Many of the larger categories, such as "United States History" and "European History," are broken down even further into more manageable subcategories such as the Civil War or Irish history. Beyond all that, the editors include some nice (if a bit general) introductory essays on the history of the Internet and the World Wide Web. These essays also give helpful advice on how to use a search engine, how to evaluate the content of a Web site, and general "netiquette" (Internet etiquette). Mercifully, this section spans only a few pages, leaving plenty of room in the rest of the book for the [End Page 109] cataloging and description of Web sites that might be of interest to history buffs and scholars. The descriptions are brief, often no more than a sentence or two. For example, the entry on the Web site Civil War Soldiers and Sailors System on page 302 reads: "This Project is an attempt to build a database of basic information about all those who served in the war." The description for the Historical Text Archive Web page on page 445 has a bit more: "This site is divided into two sections: articles, books, documents, and photographs, and Web Links to other sites. Organized by geographical and topical subject headings, sites focus on the studying and teaching of history." While these descriptions give enough information to allow readers to make decisions on whether any given Web site might assist with their research, it would help if the blurbs included just a little more information, such as if the Web sites tend toward scholarship or popularization. To combat the problem of being unable to immediately access the Web sites in question, the publishers have wisely included a CD-ROM that contains the book's entire contents as a PDF file, with hyperlinks to every site in the book. An immensely useful tool, the CD-ROM oddly renders the physical book unnecessary. Because it contains all of the text of the book and allows readers to immediately go to the Web site in question and see if the site is what they might be looking for in their research, it raises...

Overreliance on Technology in Warfare: The Yom Kippur War as a Case Study

Modern military journals are replete with articles claiming that recent advancements in technology constitute a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The authors of these articles claim that innovations in weapon systems-for example, the development of precision guided munitions--and the capacity to wage network-centric warfare are symptomatic of this RMA, and will afford the United States an unprecedented level of situational awareness and the ability to apply force rapidly, accurately, and precisely without fratricide or collateral civilian casualties. (1) Should these prophets be believed? One of the questions that is often sidestepped in these discussions is whether advancements in technology can fundamentally change the character of war. Classical theorists suggest that the essential nature of war is immutable, and as such one is able to derive from its study principles that commanders will always be able to use to guide the development of strategy and tactics. (2) On the other hand, it is difficult to argue that technology has not been a factor in warfare. In 1298, for example, it was the English use of the longbow that broke the line of the Scots at Falkirk; the same technology was used to similar effect against the French at Crecy in 1346, at Poitiers in 1356, and at Agincourt in 1415. But had technology changed the nature of war? While the French suffered repeated defeats, the Scots learned their lesson at Falkirk, and when they fought the English again, just 16 years later at Bannockburn, they held a contingent of cavalry in reserve to attack the English archers as soon as they appeared. The archers broke and the English were routed. (3) Clearly technology has been able to affect the outcome of individual battles, but can it change the nature of war? Italian theorist Giulio Douhet believed that the invention of the airplane had done just that. Douhet, one of the fathers of strategic bombing, suggested several reasons for his belief: (1) with air power it is no longer necessary to break through the enemy's front lines before attacking his rear; (2) air power can attack industrial and command and control sites in the rear of the enemy army, which can prevent him from adequately communicating with or resupplying his forces; and (3) air power allows for the indiscriminate bombing of civilians as well as soldiers. The first two points, though overstated by Douhet, are important, and have been implemented in nearly every war since the dawn of air power. But the third point is most interesting, not so much for its content but for the peculiar corollary Douhet draws from it: that the mere threat of aerial bombardment of civilian targets will cause governments to capitulate even before the commencement of hostilities, and in fact may bring about an end to warfare .4 Needless to say, this has not occurred. There are two problems with Douhet's interpretation. The first is that the invention of aircraft simply added another dimension in which combat may occur. The role of the air force in combat is the same as that of the army or the navy--the application of force to an enemy's centers of gravity. The second is that Douhet overestimated the ability of strategic bombing to rapidly destroy the enemy's ability to make war, and underestimated the capacity of civilian populations to endure aerial bombardment. Both of these points were noted during the Second World War, and in many wars since. Proponents of network-centric warfare, like those of strategic bombing, claim that this new concept of operations will engender an RMA that will fundamentally change the nature of warfare. It too has its discontents, however. Thomas Barnett has enumerated seven reasons why network-centric warfare may not fulfill all of its promises, while Milan Vego has returned to the Clausewitzian argument that technology cannot change the character of war? More recently, my colleagues and I have analyzed examples from modern military history to derive five principles that should be applied before introducing technological solutions to problems of decisionmaking and command and control. …

Monuments, Public Space, and the Memory of Empire in Modern Italy

How are wars defined and described, and for whose benefit? What constitutes a war worth remembering? Among European historians, a great deal of innovative scholarship has been devoted to rethinking the causes and legacies of World War I and World War II. The first and only wars to secure these august titles, they are still seen by most Europeans as the defining and constitutive experiences of the modern era. The very intensity of disagreement over this period has made it fertile ground for public forms of civic, though not always democratic, debate and regeneration. Yet not all conflicts are created equal. Nor are all wars remembered with the same gravity or revisionist vigor. This is true, regardless of their length, intensity and the number of their victims. In this article, I address one type of war that many Europeans have found difficult to openly debate. Focusing on twentieth-century Italy, I address the history and memory of empire, with a special emphasis on Italy’s colonial wars in Africa. In particular, I consider how and why Italian political leaders and ordinary citizens have included—but also excluded—colonial conquest as a central chapter of their modern national military, political and civic history. To do so, I examine a number of official, public markers to Italy’s colonial wars, including monuments, squares, street names, and military and civilian

Monuments, Public Space, and the Memory of Empire in Modern Italy

How are wars defined and described, and for whose benefit? What constitutes a war worth remembering? Among European historians, a great deal of innovative scholarship has been devoted to rethinking the causes and legacies of World War I and World War II. The first and only wars to secure these august titles, they are still seen by most Europeans as the defining and constitutive experiences of the modern era. The very intensity of disagreement over this period has made it fertile ground for public forms of civic, though not always democratic, debate and regeneration. Yet not all conflicts are created equal. Nor are all wars remembered with the same gravity or revisionist vigor. This is true, regardless of their length, intensity and the number of their victims. In this article, I address one type of war that many Europeans have found difficult to openly debate. Focusing on twentieth-century Italy, I address the history and memory of empire, with a special emphasis on Italy’s colonial wars in Africa. In particular, I consider how and why Italian political leaders and ordinary citizens have included—but also excluded—colonial conquest as a central chapter of their modern national military, political and civic history. To do so, I examine a number of official, public markers to Italy’s colonial wars, including monuments, squares, street names, and military and civilian

Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea (review)

The Korean conflict was a pivotal event in China's modern military History, constituting an important experience for the newly formed People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), not only as a test case for this fledgling service but also in the later development of Chinese air power. Xiaoming Zhang fills the gaps in the history of this conflict by basing his research on recently declassified Chinese and Russian archival materials and interviews with Chinese participants in the air war over Korea. Zhang's findings challenge conventional wisdom as he compares kill ratios and performance by all sides involved in the war, addresses how air power affected Beijing's decision to intervene, and touches on ground operations and truce negotiations during the conflict. Zhang also offers considerable materials on the training of Chinese aviators and the Soviet role in that training, on Soviet and Chinese air operations in Korea, and on diplomatic exchanges over Soviet military assistance to China.

Who's Who in Twentieth-Century Warfare

This authoritative biographical guide to warfare in the twentieth century is at once fascinating reading and an invaluable work of reference for anyone interested in modern military history. As well as the First and Second World Wars, this Who's Who takes in key figures from conflicts in Vietnam, Korea and others. Those whose lives and careers are covered here include not only major military leaders, but also politicians, inventors and other key public figures central to the course of twentieth-century military history. From Che Guevara to Mao Zhedong, from Albert Speer to Norman Schwarzkopf, and from Josef Stalin to Charles de Gaulle - this volume's breadth of coverage makes it a unique and indispensable guide to an important and absorbing element of modern history.

Shorter notice. Delbrück's Modern Military History. H Bucholz [ed.

Shorter notice. Delbrück's Modern Military History. H Bucholz [ed.

Shorter notice. Delbruck's Modern Military History. H Bucholz [ed.

Shorter notice. Delbruck's Modern Military History. H Bucholz [ed.

“Bella gerant alii …”? On the State of Early Modern Military History in Austria

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Delbruck's modern military history

Delbruck's modern military history

Delbrück's Modern Military History

Delbrück's Modern Military History

Macedonians and Mutiny: Discipline and Indiscipline in the Army of Philip and Alexander

SOMETIMES WHAT WE LABEL something profoundly affects our understanding of it. Historians commonly refer to two events in the reign of Alexander the Great as mutinies.1 In the summer or early fall of 326, camped on the banks of the Beas or Hyphasis River after an arduous but victorious campaign in India, Alexander wanted to proceed further east. His troops, exhausted from years of fighting, troubled by unfamiliar terrain and climate, and anxious about the future, did not want to continue. In the end, the troops got at least some of what they wanted: the army turned south and the king's original intention was thwarted.2 At Opis, about two years later, Alexander's dismissal of many Macedonian troops triggered a second confrontation. The outcome of this second confrontation was in many respects the reverse of the earlier trouble: this time the army entirely failed in its goals and the king succeeded.3 Were these two incidents mutinies and is it appropriate for us to apply such terminology to them? Scholarship about the incidents on the Hyphasis and at Opis has been shaped by modern expectations and ideals (not necessarily reality) about the behavior of armies and their generals, and especially by the concept of mutiny in modern military history. It is suggestive that scholars have been uncertain about what term to apply to the Beas incident; some have admitted their uneasiness with calling the incident a mutiny and others have rejected this terminology outright.4 While those who doubt that events on the Beas constituted a mutiny are wise, their discussions seem somewhat misdirected. Similar problems surround scholarship on the

Hans Delbrück and Modern Military History

(1993). Hans Delbruck and Modern Military History. The Historian: Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 517-526.

World War I and Federal Military History

AMERICANS HAVE WRITTEN military memoirs, autobiographies, historical reports, and histories for more than two hundred years, but the establishment of military historical offices is a relatively recent development. Between the Civil War and World War I, the rise of the American historical profession and the U.S. military officers' recognition of the usefulness of historical studies for their profession provided a fertile environment for the first steps in this direction. The United States's declaration of war in 1917 was an important additional catalyst for the creation of these offices. The relations between federal military history and its consumers were reciprocal from an early date. To judge the production and varieties of federal military history by its current use is deceptive. Justifications of the government's increasingly complex military history programs come from civilian and military officials who desire not only to learn from the successes and failures of the past but also to promote the heritage of their favorite service. It is not widely acknowledged that the civilian scholarly community repeatedly urged the military to collect and utilize the historical records of their own profession. That all of the armed services history offices now fully embrace this philosophy is significant as a sign of the times and for the coming of age of history in a military environment. Modern military history offices in the United States have two principal sources. One may be found in the popular demand for publication of historical documents and records drawn from government military archives. This was related to the lack of accessibility of these records before the founding of the National Archives. The State Department provided an early precedent when Secretary of State William H. Seward began to

The State of the Art -- Recent Scholarship in Late Medieval and Early Modern Military History

The State of the Art -- Recent Scholarship in Late Medieval and Early Modern Military History

The State of the Art -- Recent Scholarship in Late Medieval and Early Modern Military History

The State of the Art -- Recent Scholarship in Late Medieval and Early Modern Military History