Classical economic analysis is based on the hypothesis of perfect rationality attributed to economic agents. Their behavior is considered, according to this analysis, in a narrow sense represented by Homo-oeconomicus. The latter is a calculating agent in the true meaning of the term, who calculates to optimize his choice and maximize a utility function. However, in a decision-making process, the economic agent finds himself interacting with a complex and uncertain environment. To decide, he adapts his choice behavior to an end, considering the constraints of this environment. He does not always seek the optimal solution, but he can be satisfied with the solution that he considers satisfactory. This solution highlights the role of deliberation, which considers the norms and customs of society, as well as environmental constraints. This work revisits rationality by examining the assumptions underlying decision-making behaviors. This analysis considers the real motivations of the decision-maker and their implications in his decision-making process, both in the individual context and in that of the organization. It studies the sources of the limitation of rationality and seeks to know why the decision-maker abandons optimization and is interested in satisfactory solutions in his choice. The results of this analysis recommend that bounded rational behavior can still be considered when motivations are considered. They advocate that their understanding is fundamental to refound the economic behavior of choice on hypotheses, which correspond well to the social and economic context of the decision.
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