Auction Model Research Articles

A Demand Response Trade Model Considering Cost and Benefit Allocation Game and Hydrogen to Electricity Conversion

With the widespread utilization of hydrogen in industry and the development of hydrogen-to-electricity (H2E) technology, how to design an efficient market-based demand response trade mechanism draws lots of attention for incentivizing industrial users to promote their demand response quantities and willingness with rational use of hydrogen. This article proposes an auction model of buyers and sellers considering the cost and benefit allocation game among electric transaction manager (ETM), electric response agents (ERAs), and electric-hydrogen industrial users (EHIUs) in demand response trade. First, a participant-led distributed trading framework of electricity demand response (EDR) with ETM, ERAs, and EHIUs is proposed. Second, in order to inspire ERAs to facilitate EDR trade and enhance EHIUs’ willingness to participate in the EDR, a bargain game of the cost and benefit allocation among ETM, ERAs, and EHIUs is established. Then, a co-optimization model with electricity and hydrogen considering production constraints is formed for promoting the ability and economy of EDR of EHIUs. Finally, a modified IEEE-69 node system is employed to illustrate the validity of the proposed method.

Price discovery and gains from trade in asset markets with insider trading

The present study contributes to the ongoing debate on possible costs and benefits of insider trading. We present a novel call auction model with insider information. Our model predicts that more insider information improves informational efficiency of prices, but this comes at the expense of reduced gains from trade. Testing these hypotheses in the lab, we find that insider information increases informational efficiency of call auction prices but does not decrease the realized gains from trade. We further find that the call auction does not perform worse than the continuous double auction. In fact, when the probability of insider information is high, the call auction has the most informative prices and highest realized gains from trade. Our experiment provides new evidence, from markets with very asymmetrically dispersed information, that lends support to the decision by many stock exchanges to use call auctions when information asymmetries are severe and the need for accurate prices is large, e.g. at the open or close of the trading day.

Auction mechanism on construction land quota with selection on land location.

Due to unreasonable pricing, farmers have low enthusiasm for reclaiming their homesteads, which can be used to generate construction land quota. This paper studies how to design a feasible pricing mechanism to stimulate the enthusiasm of farmers. First, we analyze the practice that the local government gives the developers with quota the selection, the right to select the location of the land to be auctioned. Then, applying sequential auction theory, we propose first- and second-price sealed-bid sequential auction models and design quota auction pricing mechanisms. Through theoretical and numerical analysis, we obtain the equilibrium strategy and analyze the impact of selection and on developers’ bidding pricing on quota. The results show that the selection can enhance the developer’s quota bidding price and farmers’ income. And the higher the value of selection to the developer, the higher the quota bidding price and farmer’s income. Contrarily, the larger the number of developers, the smaller the quota bidding price and farmers’ income. Finally, the quota bidding price and farmers’ income in the second-price sealed-bid sequential auction are higher than in the first-price sealed-bid sequential auction.

Heavy tailed distributions in closing auctions

We study the tails of closing auction return distributions for a sample of liquid European stocks. We use the stochastic call auction model of Derksen et al. [1] to derive a relation between tail exponents of limit order placement distributions and tail exponents of the resulting closing auction return distribution and we verify this relation empirically. Counter-intuitively, large closing price fluctuations are typically not caused by large market orders, instead tails become heavier when market orders are removed. The model explains this by the observation that limit orders are submitted so as to counter existing market order imbalance.

PADaaV: Blockchain-Based Parking Price Prediction Scheme for Sustainable Traffic Management

In most countries, traffic congestion has reached a level where managing traffic is tedious for regulatory bodies. The traffic management faced many issues such as route routing based on congestion, delivery of messages/emails to end-users, and real-time allocation of parking slots. There have been many works on predicting parking prices for traffic management, but most favor users or owners and are not secure. To address these issues, a blockchain and Interplanetary File System (IPFS)-based parking price prediction scheme (PADaaV) is proposed to facilitate the users to reserve a parking slot securely and efficiently. It mainly focuses on ensuring security, privacy, and transparency for parking slot owners and users. Furthermore, we employ a second price auction model to optimize the parking price for users, and parking slot owners can also get benefit from it. The performance of the PADaaV has been simulated for 100 users with 40 parking slots based on different auction models. The various performance parameters considered are profit for users, profit for parking slot owners, overall revenue of the system, scalability, computation time, and data storage cost. The performance results show that the PADaaV is secure and beneficial for users and parking slot owners.

Factors Influencing the Acceptance of Online Mobile Auctions using User-Centered Agile Software Development: An Early Technology Acceptance Model

e-Commerce is booming everywhere, and Saudi Arabia is no exception. However, the adoption and prevalence of online mobile auctions (aka m-auction) remain unsatisfying in Saudi Arabia and the MENA region. This paper uncovers the enabling factors and hindering barriers against the use of mobile auctions by online consumers. To this end, a multiphase mixed methods design is applied to acquire an in-depth understanding of online mobile bidding or auctioning attitudes and practices of the Saudi auctioneers and bidders. Initially, an interactive mobile auction app was developed by applying the principles of user-centered agile software development (UCASD) methodology, which incorporated several design iterations based on feedback from 454 real users. The mobile auction requirements were collected using a mix of research methods, including a survey, focus groups, prototyping, and user testing. The UCASD methodology positively influenced the early evidence-based adoption and use of mobile auctions in the Saudi market. Subsequently, three consecutive focus groups were conducted with another 22 participants to induce further insights regarding the antecedents impacting the intention to embrace online auctions using mobile phones. A taxonomy of requirements coupled with thematic analysis of the discussions gave rise to 13 influential factors of mobile auctions, namely risk, quality of products, trust, ubiquity, usefulness, access to valuable products, ease of use, age, social influence, monetary costs, enjoyment, past experience, and facilitating conditions. Our inductive approach resulted in an early technology acceptance model of mobile auctions. We conclude by reflecting on the challenges observed to suggest some practical guidelines to pave the way for other researchers in this promising area to carry out experimental studies to ameliorate the proposed model.

A Latent Auction Model of Firm Establishment Location Choice in the Greater Toronto Area

A Latent Auction Model of Firm Establishment Location Choice in the Greater Toronto Area

On Joint Distribution of Bids in Some k-th Price Auction Model

On Joint Distribution of Bids in Some k-th Price Auction Model

Sum-Rate Optimization for IRS-Aided D2D Communication Underlaying Cellular Networks

The intelligent reflective surface (IRS)-assisted communication is recognized as a promising technology to enhance capacity and coverage of the network by controlling propagation. However, in IRS-aided device-to-device (D2D) communication underlaying cellular networks, co-channel interference is more complicated and challenging than traditional D2D communication networks due to the addition of extra reflection paths. To alleviate interference and improve sum-rate, we establish a multivariable resource optimization function based on IRS-assisted D2D communication in this paper. Then, a hybrid sub-optimal algorithm is proposed, which includes channel allocation based on game theory, power allocation and phase shift optimization. Specifically, a sub-channel allocation algorithm is introduced to maximize system sum-rate, where the problem of sub-channel allocation is formulated as a two-stage combinatorial auction model, and the approximate optimal solution is obtained by bidding and adjustment. Then, a sub-optimal solution for transmission power and phase shifts is obtained through local search and iterative optimization. Simulation results show that the proposed hybrid sub-optimal algorithm is feasible and effective. Compared to the other 5 schemes, it has best sum-rate performance and lowest power consumption.

ЕКОНОМІЧНІ МЕХАНІЗМИ СТИМУЛЮВАННЯ РОЗВИТКУ ВІДНОВЛЮВАНОЇ ЕНЕРГЕТИКИ В ЄС ТА УКРАЇНІ

The experience of the EU and Ukraine in stimulating the development of renewable energy is analyzed. Economic instruments that have become widespread in the EU are considered, namely, Feedin-Tariff, Feed-in-Premium, as well as systems of quotas and "green" certificates. An analysis of the effectiveness of these support tools was performed. It was found that EU countries are gradually abandoning support for the development of renewable energy in the form of Feed-in-Tariff and moving to more market-based support mechanisms, i.e., Feed-in-Premium and holding auctions for the distribution of support quotas. The advantages of the support mechanism in the form of auctions are shown, at the same time, certain problematic issues that may arise in case of poor design of auctions are indicated. It is noted that in order to achieve the effectiveness of the auction model of support for producers of "green" energy, it is necessary to introduce auction ceiling prices and ensure a high level of competition at auctions. Appropriate requirements for the financial capacity of bidders should be introduced as well as the duration of the project implementation period should be carefully selected. The state of affairs regarding the stimulation of the development of renewable energy in Ukraine was considered. It is emphasized that the introduction of the "green" tariff in Ukraine caused an increase in the share of renewable energy in the energy balance of the country, at the same time, due to the rapid development of renewable energy, the debts of the State Enterprise "Guaranteed Buyer" to the producers of "green" energy and problems with the balancing of the energy system arose. It is shown that in the near future it is planned, as in the EU member states, to more widely apply incentive tools that lead to competition between producers of "clean" energy and a reduction in the cost of renewable energy. It is noted that in Ukraine it is necessary to take into account modern global, in particular, European trends in stimulating the development of renewable energy and apply more diverse support mechanisms, for example, the spread of the practice of public-private partnership, flexible depreciation of capital investments in renewable energy, financial incentives for consumers to purchase equipment for generation of "green" energy, investment grants, etc.

Evaluating Auction Mechanisms for the Preservation of Cost-Aware Digital Objects under Constrained Digital Preservation Budgets

Digital preservation is a field of research focused on designing strategies for maintaining digital objects accessible for general use in the coming years. Out of the many approaches to digital preservation, the present research article is a continuation work of a previously published article containing a proposal for a novel object-centered paradigm to address the digital preservation problem where digital objects share part of the responsibility for self-preservation. In the new framework, the behavior of digital objects is modeled to find the best preservation strategy. The results presented in the current article add a new economic constraint to the object behavior. Now, differently from the previous paper, migrations, copies and updates are not free to use, but subject to budget limitations to ensure the economic sustainability of the whole preservation system, forcing the now-called cost-aware digital objects for efficient management of available budget. The presented approach compares two auction-based mechanisms, a multi-unit auction and a combinatorial auction, with a simple direct purchase strategy as possible efficient behaviors for budget management. TiM, a simulated environment for running distributed digital ecosystems, is used to perform the experiments. The simulated results map the relation between the studied purchase models with the sustained quality level of digital objects, as a measure of its accessibility, together with its budget management capabilities. About the results, the best performance corresponds to the combinatorial auction model. The results are a good approach to deal with the digital preservation problem from a sustainable point of view and open the door to future implementations with other purchase strategies.

Mobilizing a pluralist theoretical approach to understand microlending digital platforms: the AfricaMC case

Purpose This study aims to explore how a microlending digital platform connects social investors in developed countries and micro-entrepreneurs in Africa. However, additional research is necessary to discuss how online auction models are designed and implemented and how existing theories can explain their use in the so-called developing countries. Design/methodology/approach The research is based on a single case study: an online auction model for microlending named AfricaMC. Two main methods collected empirical data, namely, online participant observation, i.e. real-time participation in the online auction market and in the forum of discussions, where the authors observed the processes of microlending transactions as registered members; analysis of online documents, by reviewing forum discussions, analyzing reports, blogs, chats and other materials. Findings The results suggest that using sociological and information systems theoretical lenses in a complementary manner could provide greater value than using economics. Originality/value The study makes two main contributions. First, it mobilizes a pluralist theoretical approach based on economic, sociological and information systems perspectives to improve the understanding of microlending digital platforms using online auction models. Second, it uses the understanding produced from data analysis of one particular African case to validate propositions derived from these three theoretical approaches that might be applied to other cases.

Renewable support and strategic pricing in electricity markets

We show how policies to support clean technologies change price competition and market outcomes. We present evidence from electricity markets, where regulators have implemented different policies to subsidize clean energy. Building on a multi-unit auction model, we show that currently applied subsidy designs either foster or attenuate competition. Contract-based output subsidies decrease firms’ mark-ups. In contrast, market-based designs that subsidize clean output via a regulatory premium on the market price lead to higher mark-ups. We confirm this finding empirically using auction data from the Spanish power market. Our empirical results show that the design choice for renewable subsidies significantly impacts pricing behavior of firms and policy costs for consumers.

Efficient Allocations in Double Auction Markets

This paper proposes a simple descriptive model of discrete-time double auction markets for divisible assets. As in the classical models of exchange economies, we consider a finite set of agents described by their initial endowments and preferences. Instead of the classical Walrasian-type market models, however, we assume that all trades take place in a centralized double auction where the agents communicate through sealed limit orders for buying and selling. We find that, under nonstrategic bidding, double auction clears with zero trades precisely when the agents’ current holdings are on the Pareto frontier. More interestingly, the double auctions implement Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” in the sense that, when starting from disequilibrium, repeated double auctions lead to a sequence of allocations that converges to individually rational Pareto allocations.

Two-stage energy auction model and strategy among multiple microgrids for trading incentives and default management

The lack of trust caused by rigid pricing strategies, third-party participation, and transaction default may lead to a decline in transaction willingness and misgivings about the availability of resources among microgrids (MGs). In particular, if large-scale transaction default occurs, it may endanger the safe and stable operation of the power grid. In this paper, a two-stage energy auction model based on blockchain and smart contracts to solve the problem of lack of trust and transaction default, and to increase flexibility in energy transactions among microgrids is proposed. The novelty of the proposed method lies in the transaction incentives and management of payment defaults through smart contracts and the partition management of buyer MGs' energy demands. Partitioning energy demands in the first stage of the auction can increase the diversity of sellers' bidding in the second stage. A credit management model based on the completion of historical transactions is designed to manage defaults. The priority factor affecting transaction order and energy allocation is designed to incentivize transactions. The introduction of blockchain can reduce dependence on trusted third parties and solve the security and privacy issues of transactions. Smart contracts are used to host the entire process of the auction and record, calculate the priority of each microgrid before the auction starts, and allocate energy fairly. In the energy delivery stage, the smart contract determines whether there is a default and automatically realizes the transfer of transaction funds, avoiding any selfish behavior in the transaction. Finally, we verify the effectiveness of the above-mentioned trading method through numerical analysis.

Dispatching Model in Online Taxi System by Using Stable Marriage and First Price Sealed Bid Auction Models

Dispatching Model in Online Taxi System by Using Stable Marriage and First Price Sealed Bid Auction Models

In the basic auction model, the optimal reserve price may depend on the number of bidders

A widespread claim in the auction literature about the most well known auction setting with i.i.d. private values is that the optimal reserve price for a second price auction is independent of the number n of bidders. This is indeed the case if the virtual valuation function is increasing, but this result fails to hold if the virtual valuation is non-monotone. In such case the optimal reserve price is weakly increasing in n and, as n tends to infinity, it tends to the highest regular valuation with zero virtual value.

Design of Combined Auction Model for Emission Rights of International Forestry Carbon Sequestration and Other Pollutants Based on SMRA

In this paper, the combined transactions for emission rights of international carbon sequestration and other pollutants in forestry have been taken as the research object, and the Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction (SMRA) theory has been used to design a new model for the current auction transactions. In this paper, the feasibility and application of the SMRA model of reach object are studied by the methods of simulation experiment, model analysis, and analogical analysis, and the promotion of this model is discussed. The results show that the new auction model designed in this paper fills in the blank of the combined auction of international forestry carbon sequestration and other pollutant emission rights. It successfully eliminates the winners’ curse and the losses of the sellers. Meanwhile, it provides a new way of resolving ecological deficits problems, achieving the ultimate goal of an overall reduction in carbon and pollution emission. Moreover, it’s beneficial in resolving the structural contradictions between ecological purification and pollutants discharge, hence maximizing the benefits for all the stakeholders. Finally, it is suggested that the SMRA should be adopted in the international trading of emission rights of international carbon sequestration and other pollutants to promote the emission reduction of greenhouse gases and pollutants.

Auction design for cross-edge task offloading in heterogeneous mobile edge clouds

Task offloading is a promising technology to exploit the available resources in edge cloud efficiently. Many incentive mechanisms for offloading systems have been proposed. However, most of existing works study the centralized incentive mechanisms under the assumption that all mobile edge infrastructures are operated by a central cloud. In this paper, we aim to design the auction-based truthful incentive mechanisms for heavily loaded task offloading system in heterogeneous MECs. We first study the homogeneous MEC situation and present a global auction executed in the central cloud as a benchmark. For the heterogeneous MEC situation, we model the system as a dual auction framework, which enables the heterogeneous MECs to perform cross-edge task offloading without the participation of central servers. Specifically, we design two dual auction models: secondary auction-based model, which enables the system to offload tasks from a large-scale region in a single auction, and double auction-based model, which is suitable for the time sensitive tasks. Then the auctions for these two dual auction models are proposed. Through rigorous theoretical analysis, we demonstrate that the proposed auctions achieve desirable properties of computational efficiency, individual rationality, budget balance, truthfulness, and guaranteed approximation. The simulation results show that the secondary auction and double auction can obtain 14.5% and 4.2% more social welfare than comparison algorithm on average, respectively. In addition, the double auction has great advantage in terms of computation efficiency.

Rent distribution in an ex-vessel auction market of fisheries

While the rent generation for harvesters in common property resource exploitation has been well studied, questions about the rent distribution between the resource users and the downstream sector remain. We study the effects of information asymmetry on the distribution of rent between harvesters and buyers in the ex-vessel fish market and discuss the implication on the outcomes of natural resource management. Under a first-price sealed-bid auction of the fish-by-fish firsthand market in Japan, the markdown gained by buyers is estimated using a structural auction model with a nonparametric method. The results suggest that auction winners enjoy considerably high markdown (48% on average) from market transactions in fish. In a market in which asymmetric information drives down the price, the markdown can work as a resource management tax and disincentivize harvesters from overfishing and overinvesting. This “unintended tax” should be recognized in the design of public policy because a policy that changes the equilibrium may affect the trade-off between marginalized low-income harvesters and the abundant resource stock.