Mission In Afghanistan Research Articles

The Expanded Doctrine of Self-Defence & International Security Assistance - The Case of Afghanistan 2001 – 2020

The concept of self-defense in international law has been subject to discussion in recent years particularly in relation to its application on the fight against terrorism. The article re-considers such an application in the light of customary international law and via the use of the case of Afghanistan. More specifically the article aims at demonstrating how the Afghanistan mission informed the development of the classical concept of self-defense in the context of international security assistance. Via a historical presentation of the use of the concept of self-defense the work reveals key developments in the field.

Segregated brotherhood: the military masculinities of Afghan interpreters and other locally employed civilians

ABSTRACT This article offers an innovative contribution to research on military masculinities by – counterintuitively – drawing on the experience of civilians, namely Afghan locally employed civilians (LECs), such as patrol interpreters. Centering the analysis on Afghan LECs’ own gendered experience of war, this article forms an important counterpoint to the racialized hypervisibility of Afghan men in the discourses structuring the “War on Terror.” The article’s argument unfolds along two lines. On the one hand, it disrupts discourses that portray Afghan men as radically Other by demonstrating the parallels between Afghan LECs and Western soldiers, such as in their military coming-of-age stories and motivations for enlistment. On the other hand, it introduces the notion of “segregated brotherhood” to capture the everyday differentiations and inequalities that frame the relationship between LECs and Western soldiers. While this article’s primary aim is to analyze the gendered experiences of LECs as under-researched but essential actors in the military missions in Afghanistan, by “returning the gaze” I also cast new light on the masculinities of Western soldiers, exposing their dependencies on locally recruited civilians, especially interpreters, thereby challenging masculinized accounts of Western soldiers’ autonomy and neo-imperial power/knowledge.

Le choix d’un métier à risque : fantassin de l’infanterie canadienne en temps de guerre

In our opinion, academic research into why young Canadians choose a military career in times of war
 remains very peripheral. Nevertheless, during Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, many young people
 joined the Canadian Armed Forces, including as infantry soldiers. We address this phenomenon as a way
 of reflecting on the sociological, cultural, and existential factors that lead young people to make such a
 career choice – one that, in the contemporary context, remains unconventional and can prove fatal. The
 notion of risk taking and the role it plays in the lives and career choices of certain young people serves as
 both the starting point and common thread for our analysis.

President Biden’s remarks about Afghanistan: the end of us liberal interventionism?

In August 2021, the United States completed their military mission in Afghanistan and withdrawn all their troops after 20 years of war. This article provides a discourse analysis of the public speeches released by US President Joe Biden during such a month, from 16th to 26th August. The primary goal is to critically address the US President’s speeches on Afghanistan to the contextual situation on the ground as well as to the conceptual basis of the US foreign policy strategy. What emerges from this study is a revised US foreign policy where some of the basic pillars of liberal interventionism are sacrificed in the name of a renewed national interest. In particular, the prospect of directly fostering democracy in foreign states as a way to promote international peace and security seems here abandoned for more surgical interventions of counterterrorism. Likewise, the world is depicted as a zero-sum game where the gain of one player is inevitably associated with the loss of another one. Such strategical change, if confirmed in the next years, will produce noteworthy consequences on the future US global policy. Key words: Afghanistan, US military withdrawn, Joe Biden, discourse analysis, liberalism.

Picking up the Pieces in Afghanistan: Need for Smarter Diplomacy and Targeted Counterterrorism

AbstractThe 20‐year mission in Afghanistan for which the United States (US) had sacrificed tremendous blood and treasure ended in the worst way imaginable with a poorly planned and executed withdrawal that saw the Taliban immediately retake power and form a hardline interim government that includes known terrorist leaders. The manner in which the US handled negotiations with the Taliban over the last three years contributed to the speed with which they were able to over‐run the country in August 2021. The return of Taliban rule will likely increase terrorism challenges both for the region and on a global scale as groups like Al‐Qaeda rebuild in the country and foreign terrorist fighters relocate there to find shelter under a regime ruled by fellow Islamist radicals. Moving forward, the US must work with like‐minded nations to condition assistance and diplomatic recognition on the Taliban meeting certain human rights and counterterrorism conditions and improve its remote counterterrorism capabilities.

ЧЕТВЕРТАЯ АФГАНСКАЯ ВОЙНА ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИИ

In the collective memory of the British, there was a perception that Afghanistan was a space that could not be colonized: a space that limited British power and influence. Nevertheless, selectively using its experience of colonial warfare, Britain invaded Afghanistan for the fourth time, this time as part of a multilateral force. In analyzing the performance of Britain’s counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan, Western sources have most often favored identifying tactical and operational failures of military or civilian structures rather than addressing the fundamental shortcomings of the operation in Afghanistan. Britain has joined the efforts of the «collective West» in Afghanistan, primarily to demonstrate to Washington that London remains its most reliable and most significant military ally. Over time, attachment to the United States went so far as to atrophy Britain’s ability to develop its own national strategy. Western countries have replaced the fight against al-Qaeda who carried out terrorist attacks in the United States with the fight against the Taliban insurgency. The English narrative used the category of moral obligation more often than national interest. Great Britain demanded that Afghanistan turn into a liberal-democratic state. The troops not only introduced foreign Western ideas of democracy and the rule of law, they also tried to expand the power of the central government in Kabul, a government that was not accepted by the insurgents and generally lacked legitimacy among Afghans. The continued presence of Western forces in Afghanistan has generated hatred and initiated jihad.

Democratic backsliding as an obstacle in Polish-American cooperation in promoting democracy

The United States has been the main promoter of democratic values in the world for decades. After the Cold War, promoting these values in Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland, was their important strategic goal. Poland, striving for the closest possible relations with the US, joined its efforts to promote democracy in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world. While this had tangible effects in the vicinity of Poland, doing so as part of military missions in Afghanistan and Iraq ended in failure. In recent years, Polish-American cooperation to promote democracy has been limited due to democratic backsliding in Poland. The American authorities have criticized the legal changes in Poland that limit the independence of the judiciary and freedom of the media, as well as other actions that violate the principles of liberal democracy and the rule of law. Criticism has a limited impact on stopping the regression of democracy in Poland. Moreover, with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the issue of democratic backsliding has been overshadowed by the military aspects of Polish-American cooperation.

Афганистан и Мали: попытки ФРГ реализовать стратегию “антиухода”

Against the backdrop of the modern Cold War, the instability threats the sources of which are located in the conflictprone countries of Asia and Africa have not disappeared. One of the key tendencies is the structures of international terrorism in Western Africa, Horn of Africa, Near and partly Middle East being still in force. The article explores Germany’s attempts to keep the strategic presence in Afghanistan and Mali in the context of previous efforts to resolve armed conflicts here. The choice is due to the FRG being in a position of moving towards the role of a full-fledged global player in political and military spheres. The “rising” power becomes especially susceptible both to the risks of instability projected on it and its partners, and to the loss of strategic influence in various regions of the world. The author explores in a comparative way different aspects of German participation in the missions in Afghanistan (ISAF, then “Resolute Support”) and Mali (EUTM Mali and MINUSMA in parallel). The paper highlights political and military factors which determine the scale and forms of the Bundeswehr usage in the peacekeeping sphere during different stages of the resolution process. In Mali, Germany has tried to take into account and correct the mistakes in security sector reform conducted in Afghanistan. But at the same time, there were quite a few “narrow places” of EUTM Mali activity with FRG’s role as a framework nation. The first factor of German positions’ strategic vulnerability is dependence on a partner fully engaged in anti-terrorist combat operations. The second one is the critical perception of German efforts by the forces which have come to power in Afghanistan (Taliban) and Mali (local military officers) and have preferred the nationalization of armed conflict resolution. In this regard, the article concludes about German “anti-withdrawal” strategy.

In Afghanistan: Western and Soviet Methods of Counterinsurgency

The two-decade-long U.S.-led military mission in Afghanistan ended in August 2021 after a chaotic departure of the NATO troops. Power in Kabul transferred back to the Taliban, the political force the United States and its allies tried to defeat. In its failure to achieve a lasting change, the Western mission in Afghanistan is similar to that of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. These two missions in Afghanistan had many things in common, specifically their unsuccessful counterinsurgency efforts. However, both managed to achieve limited success in their attempts to impose their style of governance on Afghanistan as well. The current study compares and contrasts some of the crucial aspects of counterinsurgency operations conducted by the Soviet and Western forces during their respective missions, such as special forces actions, propaganda activities, and dealing with crucial social issues. Interestingly, when the Soviets withdrew in 1988, they left Afghanistan worse off, but the US-backed opposition forces subsequently made the situation even worse. On the other hand, the Western mission left the country better off in 2021, and violence subsided when power in the country was captured by the Taliban, which the United States has opposed.

George XI of Kartli and his military mission in Afghanistan

George XI of Kartli and his military mission in Afghanistan

At What Price? Managing the Costs of Tolerating Corrupt or Criminal Partners in Stability Interventions

States or coalitions may conduct intervention operations to stabilise weak or failing states. Intervening powers often use military or police forces to impose security while development agencies rebuild the affected state’s institutions, including the Rule of Law. However, recent experience suggests that interventions may perpetuate criminal conduct. This paper examines the NATO missions in Afghanistan and other interventions to suggest links between partnering with corrupt or criminal actors and subsequent setbacks in stabilisation. It then proposes strategies by which future intervention forces may mitigate the risks of perpetuating criminal conduct. The paper asserts that intervention forces may empower criminal actors inadvertently or deliberately. It suggests that criminal allies may offer apparent security gains, and command popular support; and may be the only allies available. However, it concludes that perpetuating crime and corruption undermines the legitimacy of the affected state’s government and the intervention force, and potentially enables state capture. These outcomes may perpetuate violence. The paper suggests that intervention forces may mitigate these risks by setting clear priorities, planning against all potential threats including organised criminals, linking aid to the achievement of governance objectives, delaying transition until the affected state’s institutions are ready, and conducting deep selection of future leaders.

Who commits the most to NATO? It depends on how we measure commitment

Studies of NATO rely heavily on military spending as a fraction of GDP as the key indicator of members’ contribution to the alliance, but a growing number of scholars have challenged this approach. We suggest that each member’s public goods provision is a better measure of commitment to the alliance. In the case of post-Cold War NATO, out-of-area troop deployments (adjusted for population) constitute one of the strongest indicators of a state’s contribution to public goods. Providing troops for NATO missions in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina is one of the clearest signals of high commitment to the alliance. Using deployment data from 2004 to 2018, we show that there is evidence of disproportionate burden-sharing within the alliance. Countries like Slovenia, Denmark, the USA and UK contributed far more to NATO deployments than others like Turkey, Spain, Poland, and Portugal. We also use the data to begin examining possible causes of these disparities. We find that wealthier countries, countries that spend more on their militaries, and newer alliance members are more likely to contribute. Our indicator and first-cut model open avenues for further research on why some members demonstrate higher commitment to NATO than others.

Operational stressors, psychological distress, and turnover intentions: The impact of potentially morally injurious experiences

ABSTRACT Military personnel experience stressors during deployment that could take a toll on their psychological well-being and on the organization’s function. One common approach to better understanding the impact of such stressors is measuring events using psychological scales. The current research examined items measuring potentially morally injurious experiences in post-deployment assessments of personnel involved in the Afghanistan mission using the United States Mental Health Advisory Team – Combat Experiences Scale (MHAT-CES). Study 1 found that the scale produced five components. Three components showed consistency with past studies that examined the structure of other versions of the CES (i.e., dangerous environments, exposure to dead and injured and active combat). A fourth component that we labeled life threats included items that were typically divided between the aforementioned components. Finally, a stable and reliable fifth component included items related to potentially morally injurious experiences. Study 2 replicated this structure and showed that increased perceptions of potentially morally injurious experiences during deployment were associated with higher levels of psychological distress, which in turn promoted stronger turnover intentions, even after controlling for the effects of the other combat stressor components on these variables. We discuss the implications of potentially morally injurious experiences in relation to individual psychological distress and organizational retention.

Will Biden could withdraw the US forces from Afghanistan?

The article analyzes the military operation of the United States and its NATO allies in Afghanistan, which lasted for 20 years, and the prospects for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from this country. The author states that the new US President D. Biden does not abandon the foreign policy course pursued by his predecessors earlier to reduce the US military presence in Afghanistan. Moreover, the new president reaffirmed his commitment to the peace agreement between the United States and the opposition Taliban, reached in the Qatari capital of Doha in February 2020, which provides for the withdrawal of US troops and their NATO allies from the country. However, the author comes to the conclusion that due to a number of objective and subjective factors, the timing of the final withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan may be postponed indefinitely, and even the deadline recently declared by the White House on September 11, 2021, may be far from final and may be repeatedly subjected to revisions. The main obstacle to the implementation of this important clause of the bilateral agreement is the lack of progress in negotiations between the Taliban representatives and the central government, as well as the lack of security guarantees for the withdrawn contingent of the US Armed Forces, NATO and the remaining staff of Western foreign missions in Afghanistan. Not only the radical Taliban wing, but also a number of current ministers in Kabul are trying to sabotage the conclusion of a second peace agreement and the subsequent integration of the Taliban into power. Without a lasting agreement between the Taliban and the central authorities in Kabul and the formation of a new coalition government, the likelihood of a resumption of civil war in the country will remain. New terrorist attacks and outbursts of violence on the part of the radical wing of the Taliban movement against the central government and foreign troops are not excluded. The penetration of Islamic State gangs into Afghanistan, which can undermine the stability of the military-political situation from within and provoke new armed conflicts, also carries certain risks. Much will also depend on the position of one of the main external players in Afghan affairs — Islamabad. Time will show whether Pakistan will be ready to take on part of the functions of a peaceful settlement within the Afghan conflict. The US administration would like more participation in stabilizing the further situation in Afghanistan from other regional forces (China, Russia, India, Iran, Turkey, Uzbekistan).

American “Odyssey” in Afghanistan

This article aims to analyze the development and implementation of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan under President Donald Trump’s Republican administration. By removing constraints, which limited U.S. action in Afghanistan under President Obama, Trump added more flexibility to American strategy in Afghanistan. Sporadic attempts to reach a compromise with the Taliban, which the U.S. made since 2010, resulted in signing the Doha Agreement in February 2020. Despite Trump’s willingness to bring the war to a close, there is lack of overwhelming consensus over strategy in Afghanistan among American politicians and pundits. Some influential segments of U.S. foreign policy and military elites advocate for a limited counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan. Regardless of fulfilling plans to minimize America’s involvement in the war, the U.S. will keep the capability to interfere in Afghanistan if the security situation in this country deteriorates further. The development of the U.S. Afghan strategy under Trump reflects continued infighting in America’s policy and expert circles between proponents of different strategies. To consolidate their influence on foreign policy debates, they use a number of axiomatic views. Unlike the advocates of the Afghanistan mission, its opponents use a wider variety of arguments, including shifting regional dynamics and dramatic changes in the international system. The infighting of Trump’s decision-making team concerning U.S. continued involvement in Afghanistan reflects a broader struggle between liberal internationalists and supporters of a more restrained U.S. foreign policy.

Impact of air pollution on reproductive health in Afghanistan

The presence of one or more contaminants (harmful substances) in the atmosphere in a specific quantity, for such duration, which is injurious or tends to be injurious to human health, welfare, animal, or plant life is called air pollution. Air pollutants are of commonly two types, which are produced through natural pollutants; they include dust (crustal material), sea salts, biological material, pollen, spores or plant-animal debris, volcanic eruptions (which release a very large quantity of gases and particles into the atmosphere), periodic forest fires, thunderbolts, wind erosion, and low concentration ozone. Other types of pollutants are produced in human-made (technical) environments, like mobile sources (cars, trucks, airplanes, marine engines, etc.) or point sources (factories, electric power plants, etc.). The high level of air pollution is a big problem all over the world and also in Afghanistan, and all residents of this country are severely exposed to this ever-worsening situation. Air pollution and other extraordinary environmental problems are factors that threaten the livelihood of millions of Afghans, as a study report shows that 60% of Kabul’s residents are exposed to increased levels of harmful toxins, such as, nitrous oxides and sulfur dioxide. According to the State of Global Air report, more than 26,000 afghan deaths could be attributed to pollution in 2007, but United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented nearly 3,500 civilian casualties from the war for the same time period, so air pollution is killing more Afghans than war because they burn anything possible to get energy and heat they need. Result of air sampling in major urban centers of Afghanistan shows high amounts of particulate matters (PM), benzo-a-pyrene, and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) originating from vehicle exhaust emission. The highest concentrations were founded in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif (13.6 ng/m3 ). The absence of industrial parks, nonconformity of environmental protection rules, especially by industries, urbanization, degradation of fertile lands, deforestation, seasonal winds, drought, internal migration, and low knowledge about pesticides and herbicides use, are factors that boost the severity of air pollution in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, women are more exposed to high levels of indoor air pollution because they spend more time at home due to their cultural rules; also, women have responsibility for household activities, working in the kitchen to prepare food, they are exposed to poor sanitation and contaminated water supplies, they clean and sweep rooms and yards with inadequate protection equipment, which are significant sources of dust, so they are often exposed to high levels of smoke and dust for long periods.

The rules and organization of air traffic at airstrips during military operations: Based on experience gained on missions in Chad and Afghanistan

The aim of the article is to present the characteristics of airstrips used by Polish and allied aircraft during military operations in Chad and Afghanistan. The main goal is to examine their organisation and the management of air traffic by Polish ATC staff as well as to answer the question: How did Polish controllers plan the air operation? Answers to this question were sought through empirical and theoretical research. The theoretical methods were a study of literature (analysis, synthesis, abstraction, generalisation, interpretation, analogy and comparison). The empirical method – “opinion poll” took the leading role, which used different techniques conducted in a tested environment to gather the data (interviews with experts and an ex post facto experiment). Consequently, the article looks at the method of planning and preparing air operations and the rules of air traffic organisation in the area of responsibility of Polish controllers. The selected issues discussed herein include the rules of airspace segmentation, the adopted air traffic control solutions and the landing zone infrastructure used. All in all, the experience discussed herein constitutes valuable information regarding air traffic security and may prove helpful in organising landing zones and preparing air personnel for future operations conducted by Polish and allied Military Contingents at home and abroad.

Organizational synthesis in transboundary crises: Three principles for managing centralization and coordination in the corona virus crisis response

Boin (2019) argues that in transboundary crisis management it is almost impossible to achieve centralization and coordination. This article identifies three principles through which actors in a transboundary crisis can balance centralization with autonomy while shaping coordination along the way. We reanalysed three transboundary cases: the Dutch military mission in Afghanistan, the downing of MH17 and hurricane Irma striking Sint‐Maarten. The principles we found are as follows: (a) reformulating key strategic priorities, (b) flexible adaptation of crisis management protocols and (c) the emergence of multifunctional units. With these three principles, we reflect on challenges in the Dutch crisis response to the corona outbreak and propose improvements for progressing current crisis management efforts.

The Afghan Ministry of Refugees: an unruly trainee in state capacity building

This article looks at the interactions between the officials of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)’s mission in Afghanistan and the heads of the Afghan Ministry of Refugees in the mid-2000s. It examines the rationales that guide officials at both the UNHCR and the ministry, as a way of unpacking the politics of state capacity building in post-2001 Afghanistan. The first section looks at the tense relationship between the two bodies from the point of view of UN officials, who strive to redress a ministry portrayed as ‘incapable’. By looking in turn at the fundaments of the political legitimacy of the Afghan state, at how international intervention transforms the Afghan political arena, and at Afghanistan’s position in global power relations, the following sections identify three rationales that can be ascribed to ministry officials, namely reconciling internal and external state legitimacy, strategic resource tapping and resistance to inter-state hegemony. From its standpoint at the juncture between an ‘external’ and a ‘local’ institution, the article ultimately stresses the importance of gaining epistemological distance from the peace building project in order to consider ‘local’ actors as full political actors.

Comparing ‘deep’ insider knowledge: developing analytical strategies for cross-national qualitative studies

ABSTRACTOne overarching question in scholarly methodological discussions on qualitative comparative approaches concerns how it is possible to compare and generalise deep insider knowledge across (nationally) specific contexts. The aim of this article is to propose a research strategy that both facilitates the comparison and theorisation of such knowledge across nations and limits the risks of reproducing naturalised national ‘truths’. The strategy is developed within a feminist, cross-national, qualitative comparative analysis of how European countries addressed military deaths in connection with the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The article underlines the importance of collective analytical work and of strategies that allow continuous movement between insider and outsider positions throughout the research process. A number of analytical strategies are presented: collective project design, alternating between analytical closeness and distance, and de-familiarising writing practices.