Missile Forces Research Articles

The determinants of change: Deterrence and technology

Deterrence is the characteristic strategic concept of the nuclear age. By no means new, it has been invested with fresh and central significance by the potential of nuclear weapons for producing a rapid and complete catastrophe, against which there is commonly assumed to be no defence. The technological breakthrough at the heart of this new military situation — the perfection of nuclear weapons — is unforgettable scientific and engineering knowledge; its consequences in strategic terms can never be wholly reversed, in the sense that the possibility of sudden and virtually complete destruction henceforth hangs over all potential victims of the leading military powers. In much strategic discussion, particularly that of a more popular nature, the problem of maintaining a secure retaliatory response to such a threat is the only subject of debate, currently exemplified by doubt about the continued viability of land-based strategic missile forces.

Multiple Aim Point Basing

A major concern of some strategic analysts and Defense Department officials is the projected vulnerability of the U.S. land-based missile force. One proposed solution to this problem is the deployment of the MX in a mobile basing mode. A basing mode that received strong support from Department of Defense officials was the Multiple Aim Point (MAP) system In this article we examine vulnerability and verification problems associated with a MAP system as the ability to detect the location of a missile in a group of silos varies.

The Strategic Forces Triad: End of the Road?

y the early to mid-1980s, the United States will be unable to repose confidence in the ability of all save a small fraction of its silo-housed missile force to ride out a Soviet first nuclear strike. The possible implications of this early predictable development, and the policy choices that it poses for the U.S. government, are the subjects of this article. For nearly 20 years the United States has maintained a triad of strategic forces, comprising silo-housed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and manned penetrating bombers. An entire leg of this triad is approaching mass obsolescence ? as currently deployed in fixed hardened sites. Although the growing debate over the meaning of silo vulnerability is focused heavily upon the issue of whether or not a follow-on ICBM, called MX (missile experimental), should be developed and procured ?and if so, how it should be de ployed?the MX debate is operating as a catalyst to open, or reopen, discussion of a wide-ranging set of strategic and political issues. At stake in, and closely related to, the MX/ICBM debate are matters of far deeper significance than might immediately be discerned. At one level, it is the technical merits of a particular weapon system, in all aspects, that are being debated ?but behind the technical issues lurk such questions as the following: What will the United States ask of its strategic forces in the 1980s and 1990s (i.e., what quantity and quality of strategic posture will be appro priately supportive of American foreign policy)? How do we deter the Soviet Union in plausible (or not implausible) crises and conflicts in the 1980s and 1990s? How do the strategic forces contribute to that deterrence? To a major degree, technical answers must be driven by broad political-military choice. Our foreign policy goals, be they more or less expansive than in the past, should point to a prudent strategic

The future of land‐based missile forces

(1977). The future of land‐based missile forces. The Adelphi Papers: Vol. 17, The Future of Land‐Based Missile Forces, pp. 1-2.

On Achieving Stable Mutual Deterrence

Abstract In this paper it is established that there are strong, stabilizing mechanisms in an “arms race” based on mutual deterrence, despite ambiguous capabilities of ballistic missiles and despite time delays or errors inherent in intelligence estimates. It is shown analytically that the introduction of multiple-warhead technology (MIRV) does not lead to an ever-spiraling arms race. However, it can dramatically increase the number of boosters required by each party. The analysis is also applied to strategic confrontations involving more than two major powers, and it is shown that the stable solutions in these cases can require vastly increased force levels. Perturbation of two-party mutual deterrence by a relatively small third party is also analyzed. It is shown that an ABM defense of only retaliatory missile forces may well be less escalatory and less expensive than the alternative of increasing the land-based missile forces. The paper also examines “ambiguous” ABM, i.e., defenses deployed to optionall...

A Force Effectiveness Model with Area Defense of Targets

This paper describes an analytic method for computing the effectiveness of an ICBM force for the assured destruction mission, in which the missile force must attack a number of targets of different value, all protected by a fully preferential area defense. Some targets may also be protected by a terminal defense. The ICBM force is assumed to be composed of several types of re-entry vehicles that differ in lethality and in the numbers of area and terminal interceptors required for intercept. The model assumptions are offense-conservative in that the defense is credited with maximum information and capability. However, the offense allocation is optimum against the best cooperative use of the area and terminal defenses so that the computed force effectiveness is offense-enforceable. The paper derives the optimum employment of the missile force and the area defense, and proves that, in the presence of an area defense, the terminal interceptor stockpile should be allocated among terminally defended targets strictly in proportion to their value. Because of its simplicity, the inclusion of defense penetration parameters, the allowance for several types of re-entry vehicles, and its two levels of defense, the model is useful as a force-evaluation submodel in force-mix, force-defense, and re-entry-vehicle configuration studies.

Bomber Command's Thor Missile Force

(1963). Bomber Command's Thor Missile Force. Royal United Services Institution. Journal: Vol. 108, No. 630, pp. 131-136.

Propellants: the feasibility of their manufacture in India

In the light of the recent Chinese aggression, the modernization of our defence forces has become a vital necessity. In this paper, one aspect of this problem has been considered in detail viz. the development of an indigenous rocket and missile force. While it is true that many factors e.g. rocket motors, propellants, guidance systems etc. are involved, it is also true that a start in one area will act as an impetus to developments in the other fields. Solid/liquid propellant and oxidizer systems have been considered, the properties of solid and liquid propellants evaluated and on the basis of such comparison, it has been concluded that effort concentrated on the development of liquid propellants will be well expended. Liquid propellant/oxidizer systems have been compared amongst themselves and it has been concluded that the hydrazine fuels oxidized by RFNA/WFNA/IRFNA would represent systems fulfilling the country's immediate military needs best. The availability of raw materials for the manufacture of hydrazine fuels (and also of some solid propellants) has been considered and it is shown that the necessary raw materials are available in sufficient quantities to support an indigenous propellants industry.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The Ministerial Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held its eleventh annual ministerial review at NATO headquarters in Paris from December 16 to 18, 1960. The main topic of discussion at the meeting was the announcement by United States Secretary of State Christian Herter of what he reportedly termed a new concept for the operation of medium-range ballistic missiles. The United States plan included: 1) a proposal that NATO discuss a multilateral system for the political control of the weapons; 2) an offer to place five ballistic missile submarines armed with 80 Polaris missiles under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), by the end of 1963; and 3) a suggestion that the other members of the alliance contribute approximately 100 more medium-range ballistic missiles by purchasing them in the United States. The press reported that Lord Home, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, welcomed the United States proposal and said that NATO should examine the possibility of a medium-range ballistic missile force under multilateral control, a suggestion in which M. Couve de Murville, the French Foreign Minister, concurred. The West German Defense Minister, Franz Joseph Strauss, told the Ministers, the press announced, that concrete decisions on the United States proposal should be taken in the near future, and that plans for NATO control of the Polaris missile force should be pushed through by military and political authorities early in the spring of 1961. The Council of Ministers decided to pass on to its Permanent Comand other related materials, according to the press.