Missile Defense Program Research Articles

Greenland, US Bases and Missile Defence

The US Thule Air Base in Greenland will need upgrading should President Bush's missile defence programme go ahead. This has already brought the US administration into three-sided negotiations between itself, Denmark and Greenland. The article looks at the historical background to the present negotiations and, using an adaptation of Putnam's `logic of two-level games', traces the move from one-level to two-level and three-level negotiations in previous negotiations and the ones now emerging. Over time, US dealings about their bases in Greenland have evolved from the one-level negotiations of 1941 and 1951 to the two-level game of the 1980s — with a smattering of early Greenlandic involvement — to the current three-level game. Should the US and Greenland face each other directly over the negotiating table, a new two-level game will begin with the Greenlanders in a stronger bargaining position than Denmark, according to a reading of Putnam.

Strategic threats and national missile defenses: defending the U.S. homeland

Homeland Defense: The Threat of Direct Attacks with Long-Range Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat Assessment and Prioritization The History of the Modern U.S. National Missile Defense Program The Changing Architecture of the U.S. National Missile Defense Program Risk, Cost, and Benefits The Deployment and Non-deployment Schedule for the NMD Looking Beyond the Current System and Deployment Plan The Role of Other Nations in Ballistic Missile Defense Conclusions and Future Options Notes

Missile Defence, the ABM Treaty, and Nuclear Weapons--An Opportunity Missed

The contention that current US policy settings on missile defence, the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM treaty), and strategic nuclear weapons signal the end of the Cold War and lay the foundations for a new strategic framework is premature. Against the background of withdrawal from the ABM treaty, the missile defence programme offers little assurance to Russia and China that it will be limited to the threat from 'rogue' states. More particularly, the US position on nuclear weapons reveals the strength of entrenched Cold War thinking. A clear opportunity to lead the world decisively away from high-salience nuclear postures has been missed. The paper outlines approaches to missile defence and nuclear weapons that offer a better fit with the various objectives of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, revitalising non-proliferation, and providing defences against limited but undeterrable missile threats. The paper also argues that the new focus of intense concern--the theft of weapons of mass destruction or their component materials by terrorists--could be the trigger to bolder thinking on nuclear weapons than has been displayed to date.

The U.S. Missile Defense Program under the Capabilities-Based Approach: Significance of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

The U.S. Missile Defense Program under the Capabilities-Based Approach: Significance of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Round table: Missile defence in a post‐September 11th context

Since September 11, 2001, questions regarding how to protect the United States, Canada and their allies from attack have caused a resurgence in the debate regarding the US National Missile Defence (NMD) program, or variations on it. In an attempt to elucidate the primary arguments in the debate, CFP convened a virtual forum of academics, from across the country, to respond to the opening arguments of one of NMD's strongest Canadian proponents, Dr. James Fergusson of the University of Manitoba. Included in the dialogue were: Prof. Douglas Ross of Simon Fraser University; Prof. Ann Denholm Crosby of York University; Prof. J. Marshall Beier of McMaster University; and Prof. Frank Harvey of Dalhousie University. Their two‐round debate covered, inter alia, American motives, global implications, the rationality of rogue states, the effectiveness of ballistic missile defences, alliance repercussions and Canada‐US relations.

Hypervelocity impact of spaced plates by a mock kill vehicle

In support of the National Missile Defense (NMD) program, a series of Light Gas Gun (LGG) lethality tests were conducted at the Arnold Engineering Development Center (AEDC). A new projectile was designed for this test series that would be representative of aspects of a generic NMD system kill vehicle. A series of projectile development tests were performed during the design phase of the projectile. This paper reports the results from the second development shot, in which the projectile impacted normally against two thin aluminum target plates, spaced approximately 5.5 diameters apart. Results reported include the documentation of the damage to the first and second plates, the debris generated behind the first plate, and correlation of these with analytical and numerical predictions. Hydrocodes used for analyses included ALE3D, run by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and CTH, run by the Sandia National Laboratory. The purpose of the hydrocode analyses was to help in assessing the ability of these codes to predict the debris formation process and the target damage.

Goodwill and Proactive Exchange Policy: How Taipei manages the cross-strait relations

Dynamic developments within both Mainland China and Taiwan have compounded the uncertainties looming across the Taiwan Strait. Since mid-2000, the cross-strait relationship has evolved into a mixture of four elements: lingering, though less confrontational, political stalemate; growing and even accelerating economic exchanges; rapidly expanding social interactions; and heightened military competition. Since July 1999, four distinct periods have marked Beijing's tactical operations toward Taiwan: military intimidations and verbal threats (9 July‐21 September 1999); verbal threats (21 September 1999‐18 March 2000); passive observation (18 March‐20 June 2000); and the two-pronged campaign (20 June‐present). Beijing's two-pronged campaign is well-coordinated and full-scaled. One soft prong aims at winning 'the hearts of Taiwanese people'. The soft prong includes the following elements: softening of rhetoric without concrete change of behavior; escalated efforts to invite opinion leaders in Taiwan; mentioning preferential treatments for Taiwanese investors on the Mainland; and allowing a dramatically increased number of Mainland visitors to Taiwan since July 2000. On the other hand, the hard prong seeks to put 'appropriate pressure' on Taipei to accept Beijing's precondition of resumption of cross-strait talks, and eventually Beijing's terms on unification. The hard prong includes the following elements: continuing to conduct military exercises with no reduction in frequency and scale; continuing strangulation of Taipei's international living-space with a new twist of diplomatic war in Africa; mobilizing Chinese overseas globally to oppose Taiwanese independence; escalating Beijing's pressure on Washington not to include Taiwan in the theater missile defense program, and not to transfer arms to Taiwan. The new Taiwan government has adopted much continuity in its cross-strait policy from the previous one. The new administration seeks a structured and constructive cross-strait relationship, holds no precondition for the resumption of cross-strait talks, continues to express maximum goodwill, exercises absolute restraint to avoid being seen as provocative, and takes a proactive approach on promoting socio-economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait.

Kenneth Bailey McAfee Jr

Kenneth Bailey McAfee Jr, who spent nearly 40 years in pure and applied research at AT&T Bell Laboratories (now a part of Lucent Technologies), died on 21 February 2000 in Basking Ridge, New Jersey, from complications of heart disease. Born in Chicago on 22 June 1924, he served in the US Navy during World War II aboard the USS Macon Island. Ken received a bachelor’s degree in chemistry in 1946, a master’s in chemistry in 1947, and his PhD in chemical physics in 1950, all from Harvard University. His doctoral research, done under the guidance of E. Bright Wilson, involved chemical structure determination by microwave spectroscopy. Ken joined Bell Laboratories in 1950 as a member of the technical staff in the physical chemistry research department. His initial work concerned charge mobility in semiconductors, an important aspect of the physics of the transistor that had been discovered only four years earlier. He later developed a method for separating pure helium from natural gas, with which it is found in nature, by gaseous diffusion using silica tubes. He also began a program to develop high dielectric strength gases based on an understanding of their electron affinities. Microwave waveguides pressurized with high dielectric strength gases can transmit higher peak power without breakdown, thereby increasing the maximum radar detection range attainable. Development of radars capable of detecting small objects at great range was of critical importance to the Ballistic Missile Defense effort.In 1966, Ken became the head of the atmospheric physics research department in the Bell Labs military research division in Whippany, New Jersey. He designed, conducted, and analyzed experiments that improved understanding of the physics of the reentry process. This understanding led to development of processes for discriminating warheads from decoys based on atmospheric effects observable by radar during reentry of these objects into the atmosphere. He also was a member of the Defense Science Board and a member of the Scientific Advisory Committee of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.In 1972, after Bell Labs withdrew from R&D on the Ballistic Missile Defense program, Ken returned to the Bell Labs research area at Murray Hill, New Jersey, as the head of the environmental chemistry department. His broad knowledge of the physics and chemistry of atmospheric processes was directly relevant to many of the environmental problems then becoming manifest, such as stratospheric ozone pollution and the sources of low-altitude pollution. His work contributed to understanding and ameliorating of some of these problems. He was a unique resource to the Bell system in its efforts to make certain that it was a good corporate citizen.From 1972 to 1974, Ken served on the Delphi Panel of the Environmental Protection Agency and from 1975 to 1978, on the Commission on Sociotechnical Systems of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. He chaired New Jersey’s first science advisory committee from 1979 through 1983. This committee advised the state’s department of environmental protection on environmental standards, provided peer review of departmental science and technical policies, and became an integral part of the structure of advisers to the state government.Ken was well known for his ability to mentor new staff members, many of whom rapidly became highly productive researchers under his tutelage.He was a fine tennis and squash player and very much enjoyed climbing and skiing. Kenneth Bailey McAfee Jr PPT|High resolution© 2001 American Institute of Physics.

Missile Defense and Extended Deterrence in the Japan-US Alliance

Abstract As long as the United States remains vulnerable to an attack with long-range nuclear missiles, Japanese confidence in US extended deterrence would rest on the ability of Tokyo and Washington to (1) maintain a favorable balance in conventional forces most relevant to the defense of Japan, (2) avoid provoking the potential adversary into threatening a nuclear assault against Japan and (3) fasten the bilateral relationship so as to impress the adversary about the possibility of US response with strategic nuclear weapons in case he launched such an assault. Further Japanese cooperation in the US theater missile defense (TMD) program would generally have positive effects as regards the first and third conditions above, although management of the process might be quite challenging. The impact on the second condition would be harder to judge, largely because it is difficult to predict how missile defense in East Asia might affect Chinese nuclear strategy.

1.2.1 Realizing Complete Traceability With An Integrated Systems Engineering Environment (ISEE)

AbstractThe development of any major system involves a dynamic atmosphere of ideas, people, and information. Traceability (from requirements to functions to physical architecture) grounds a system and all its confusing details to the founding ideas that are critical to its success. Documenting the process (i.e., decision rationale, considered and discarded alternatives, changes, approvals, etc.) is as important as documenting the system requirements, concept, and design themselves. As chronicled in this paper, the US Navy has undertaken an effort using RDD‐100® to provide such traceability with an Integrated Systems Engineering Environment (ISEE) for the Navy Theater Wide Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (NTW TBMD) Program. The NTW ISEE is used to centrally locate all technical information related to the engineering development of the NTW TBMD system. It supports critical activities such as specification development, concept definition, and certification by utilizing critical database capabilities. Such an information management environment has become a necessity in developing large systems.

A Fully Integrated Engineering Approach For Navy Theater Wide Theater Ballistic Missile Defense

AbstractA cornerstone of any successful system development is in its engineering approach and planning. A concisely defined process, complete with objectives and products identified at each stage is necessary to draw multiple organizations together in working toward a common goal. This paper identifies the major parts of the engineering approach being taken on the U.S. Navy Theater Wide (NTW) Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) Program. Guided by the general guidelines prescribed by the EIA‐632 Interim Standard (dated 1994), the authors developed a Systems Engineering Management Plan (SEMP) which defines the organizational structure and teaming arrangements, task responsibilities, engineering process, products, and schedule events.

Current Russian perspectives on arms control and ballistic missile defense

The primary Russian focus regarding ballistic missile defense is the need to maintain its special status as a strategic peer vis‐a‐vis the United States, largely through preservation of the Anti‐Ballistic Missile Treaty. U.S. ballistic missile defense programs are perceived as a U.S. effort to gain strategic advantage. However, Russia's approach to ballistic‐missile defense and arms control is in flux because of the rapid deterioration of its military power. The debate now centers around the tension between “traditionalist” and “realist” worldviews. Eventually, Russian‐American accommodation on ballistic‐missile defense‐related matters should be based on a “top‐down” approach, in which both sides decide to address the entire range of contentious ballistic missile defense issues, including nuclear missile defense deployment, in an honest, constructive, and systematic way.

Another strategic deception initiative

Deals with the missile defense program of the United State's Congress. Examples of failure, fraud and deception in missile defense research and practice; Key part of Ronald Reagan's `Star Wars' address; Task of the Congress in support to Reagan's promise of democratic decision-making on missile defense; Certain measures that should be taken if U.S. citizens want missile defense.

An Airborne Passive/Active Electro-Optic Sensor System for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense

An airborne passive/active surveillance aircraft-based, electro-optic sensor system, named Gatekeeper, is being developed for the US Navy Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Program. The sensor is designed to detect theater ballistic missiles (TBMs), either in boost or post-boost phase, and make precision three-dimensional measurements of the TBM's post-boost, ballistic trajectory with sufficient state-vector accuracy for handover to naval, air and land based missile defense systems. The sensor includes a dual-band IRST for acquisition, a precision angle tracker (MWIR focal-plane array and high-bandwidth mirror), and a short-pulse, direct detection laser radar. The sensor subsystems are coupled and controlled by a sophisticated multiprocessor computer control system. The system has a highly compressed engagement timeline resulting in a substantial target handling capacity. This paper describes the sensor, its specifications, and performance in terms of the accuracy of the state-vector, and its target handling capability in a realistic engagement scenario.

Technology 1993 - Aerospace and military

Significant developments during 1992 are discussed. The winding down of the cold war continued to batter the defence industry. The Third World emerged as a nuclear threat, spurring the Pentagon to rearrange its missile defense programs to provide more advanced short and medium-range missiles to cope with conflicts like the Persian Gulf War. Lack of a monolithic enemy cast doubt on the future of the European Fighter Aircraft just as the first prototypes were being readied for test flights in 1993. With air travel cut by the recession and revenues sliced even more by fare wars, the airlines idled about 10% of their fleets. Political and economic changes also portended large shifts in the world's space programs, possibly toward a single international program. NASA scored with several resoundingly successful space shuttle missions. These and other space missions during the year are briefly discussed.< <ETX xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">&gt;</ETX>

Comparing technological risks in large scale national projects

In policy debates concerning large scale R&D efforts, the achievements of the Manhattan and Apollo projects are frequently cited as evidence of “Yankee ingenuity” and the ability to overcome technical obstacles. In this article, the factors which contributed to the success and failure of large scale “crash” development projects are analyzed systematically. Successes are distinguished from failures according to two criteria. First, while the successes are marked by “parallel” development of technological components which began only after the basic scientific and technical obstacles had been overcome and the basic feasibility had been demonstrated, in the failures, parallel development began much earlier. In addition, the successful “crash” projects, such as the atomic bomb effort and the moon program, were designed to meet static technical goals and did not depend on overcoming countermeasures. The unsuccessful projects, such as the Safeguard ballistic missile defense (BMD) system, failed in the face of changes in Soviet military technology. Using these criteria to analyze the Reagan administration's space-based ballistic missile defense program (SPBMD), the author concludes that despite the claims made by supporters, this R&D effort is not similar to the Manhattan or Apollo projects. Rather, like the Nuclear Airplane and Skybolt missile, parallel developments have begun prior to proof of feasibility, and like the Safeguard BMD, the SPBMD must adapt to countermeasures.

U.S. Ballistic missile defense technology: A technical overview

Abstract In March 1983, President Reagan announced his intention to pursue a defense for the United States against ballistic missiles. In doing so, he questioned the traditional orthodoxy of nuclear deterrence, which holds that the vulnerability of both sides preserves the peace. Although the President recognized that such a defense probably could not be achieved before the end of the century, he felt it would be foolish to dismiss the technological possibility altogether, since it is impossible to predict all scientific breakthroughs. The President's speech raises questions about America's strategic nuclear policy, especially with regard to defensive systems. Will such systems prove destabilizing? Could they protect the United States against nuclear attacks? How soon could they be available? To answer these questions, it is first necessary to review the history of the American ballistic missile defense (BMD) program.

Star Wars Plan Gets a Green Light

Star Wars Plan Gets a Green Light