Russian Minority Research Articles

Ruchy etnopolityczne mniejszości rosyjskiej w państwach byłego ZSRR po aneksji Krymu do Rosji

The aim of the article is to analyze the ethno-political movements of the Russian minority in post-Soviet countries after the annexation of the Crimea to Russia and attempt to answer the research question: how annexation of the Crimea caused and / or strengthened among the Russian minority living in those countries with separatist tendencies. The author analyzes the activity of Russians living in former Soviet republics selected, pointing to their behavior towards annexation and activity within the organization in which they operate. In his concluding remarks comes to the conclusion that due to the annexation of the Crimea to Russia, ethno-political movements of the Russian minority in post-Soviet area will be even more strongly oppose discrimination against the Russian people and actively fight for their rights. The current activity of the Russian post-Soviet area suggests that they will continue to work towards achieving its goals, while activity is (also of a separatist) will depend largely on domestic policy the authorities of the country in which they live, as well as the Kremlin's policy to compatriots abroad.

Integration Policy and Outcomes for the Russian-Speaking Minority in Estonia

Estonia’s integration policy vis-à-vis its Russian-speaking residents was developed and reformed several times since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. While comparative data from the international community certainly indicates that Estonia has progressed in the realm of social, political and societal integration, the ‘success’ for each individual policy is now increasingly measured—and contested— within broader considerations of geopolitical security and minority rights. The authors converge interview-based data compiled from various representatives and scholars of nongovernmental organizations, government agencies, and think tanks with secondary research on the topic of Russian minority integration in Estonia. The report will seek to address the ways in which various representatives in both mainstream and bottom-up organizations score and assess Estonia’s development in citizenship, education, and language policy domains for the Russian-speaking minority

The mediating role of identity incompatibility in the relationship between perceived discrimination and acculturation preferences in two generations of the ethnic Russian minority in the North Caucasus

The present study tested a model in which the perceived incompatibility of ethnic Russian and regional North Caucasian identities mediates the relationship between perceived discrimination and acculturation strategies in two generations of ethnic Russian minority members living in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, North Caucasus, Russian Federation. Two identities might be perceived incompatible when they represent conflicting sets of norms and values and the two communities may place competing demands on individual commitment and loyalty. We sampled 105 dyads from ethnic Russian families (youth: M = 18 years, SD = 2.35, 48.6% female; parents: M = 43 years, SD = 6.97, 68.6% female). The questionnaire included measures of perceived discrimination, perceived identity incompatibility, and acculturation strategies. The results of multigroup path analysis showed that the perceived identity incompatibility mediated the relationship between perceived discrimination and two strategies, aimed at culture maintenance (integration and separation) in both generations. Identity incompatibility is regarded as a psychological mechanism that explains the impact of perceived discrimination on minority acculturation preferences in a multicultural region.

The “secularization” and ethnicization of migration discourse: the Ingrian Finnish Right to Return in Finnish politics

ABSTRACTFinland’s Right to Return policy for Ingrian Finns (1990–2010) presented Russian and Estonian citizens who qualified as having Finnish ancestry the legal means to resettle in Finland. The policy was initially driven by Finnish President Mauno Koivisto, who spoke publicly of his belief that the Ingrian Finnish minority in Russia was Finnish because it was Lutheran rather than Orthodox. However, Finnish politicians increasingly abandoned the view of a common Lutheran identity between Ingrian Finns and Finland, and shifted the discussion to language, ancestry and historical memory, which were used to both endorse and disendorse Ingrian Finns’ Finnishness. We argue that the disappearance of religion from the Right to Return discourse was a strategic – if not necessarily conscious – choice that emphasized the more primordial aspects of Finnish identity (and the Ingrian Finns’ lack of those), which in turn enabled stricter restrictions and, ultimately, the discontinuation of the policy.

Motivation for Ethno-Cultural Continuity as a Predictor of Acculturation and Adaptation in Two Generations of Latvian Russians

This article presents the results of empirical research on the relationship of motivation for ethno-cultural continuity (MEC) and strategies of acculturation among two generations of the Russian minority in Latvia. We sampled 107 Russian families (mothers: N = 107, age = 35-59, M = 42 years; late adolescents and youth: N = 107, age = 16-24, M = 17 years). The questionnaire included measures of motivation for ethno-cultural continuity, acculturation strategies, sociocultural adaptation, and self-esteem. A path model showed that motivation for ethno-cultural continuity, preference for assimilation, self-esteem, and sociocultural adaptation of mothers significantly related to those of their children. A motivation for ethno-cultural continuity of mothers predicted their preference for integration and self-esteem, while a motivation for ethno-cultural continuity of adolescents predicted their preference for separation. Preference for integration promoted better sociocultural adaptation and self-esteem in both generations. The results allowed consideration of the process of acculturation on the three interrelated levels: individual, family, and ethnic group, with the central role of the family, teaching younger generations to maintain heritage culture and successfully integrate in the larger society.

Considering Ukraine's Ethnic Minorities and Their Influence on Russian Foreign Policy

Transnational Ethnic Alliance Theory at its core posits that the majority ethnic group in one state will come to the defense of its ethnic brethren that are a minority in a neighboring state, if that group is facing discrimination or repression. The actions of political leaders in Moscow, who claimed that they were concerned about the Russian minority in Ukraine, suggest that modifications to this theory are necessary. Intervention will only occur when it is in the self-interest of the neighboring state or in the self-interest of the governing elite of that state. Russian perceptions of threats to Russian national interests originating in the West made the interference in the Ukrainian political system more likely. Similar perceptions of threats from abroad to foreign policy interests for other states, or their leaders, could lead to support for ethnic minorities. The resulting modified Transnational Ethnic Alliance Theory can be used as a tool to predict better and explain foreign interference anywhere that ethnic groups overlap between states.

Nazi national policy towards the Russian minority in the Baltic States

Nazi national policy towards the Russian minority in the Baltic States

THE ALLUNION CENSUSES 1959, 1970 AND 1970 AS A SOURCE OF STUDYING POPULATION TITULAR NATION OF UKRAINIAN DURING THE 60’S70’S OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The article analyses the All-Union censuses in 1959, 1970 and 1979 as a primary source for a comprehensive studying the population dynamics and the settlement of Ukrainians in different regions of the Ukrainian SSR during the 60’s – 70’s of the XXth century. The author has studied a state of preservation of their native language, has defined the factors which under the totalitarian regime negatively influenced the change of demographic processes, especially the ethnic composition of Ukrainian society at the outlined period. The article also describes the national policy of Soviet authorities which guided by the national priority of state and nationwide community of «the Soviet people» and ignored the value of an ethnic nation. The author also finds out that Ukrainians were the dominant nation almost throughout the USSR in the outlined period. The number of Ukrainian grew exclusively by natural population growth, while the number of representatives of the Russian nation increased as a result of internal republican migration. The article brings the idea that Ukraine was one of the centers of accumulation of immigration flows in the Soviet Union, and because of this fact the multicultural Ukrainian SSR society, which constituted basically of the Ukrainians, gradually turned into bi-national, where Ukrainian majority coexisted along with continuously growing Russian minority. Such resettlements were carried out primarily for political reasons and were aimed at the loss by native people their national characteristics – language, culture and the like. The main task of migration, which was run by the Soviet government was the assimilation, denationalization and the russification of the Ukrainian people which was hidden by slogans of rapprochement of nations.

Ethnic Russian Minority in Estonia

The article examines the position of Russians in Estonia and their relation with ethnic Estonians. The author analyzes models of the society integration introduced by Tallinn after 1991. The results raise questions regarding language education in Estonia, the proficiency level of Estonian is getting widely known by Russians, but on the other hand, there is still a significant part of the population that cannot communicate in Estonian. Those who have a good command of Estonian tend to be better integrated and to coexist with both Estonians and Russians. Russians living in Estonia are supposed to be equally involved in social and political life of the state. The potential of all residents has to be effectively and considerably used, especially when the number of population is decreasing. The position of Russians in Estonia is a major domestic and bilateral issue in the relations with the Russian Federation.

Why No Kazakh Novorossiya? Kazakhstan’s Russian Minority in a Post-Crimea World

Some Western pundits have embraced a “domino” logic to suggest that Kazakhstan might share the fate of Ukraine, with its Russian minority being used as the pretext for Russian intervention and irredentism. In this article I explore several reasons that invalidate this simplistic and mechanical parallel. Russia’s policy toward Kazakhstan aims at remaining the main political and cultural yardstick for the whole of Kazakhstani society, not merely the protector of Russian minorities. Perceived historical and demographic similarities between Kazakhstan and Ukraine are narrower than it seems at first glance. Defining a potential “Kazakh Novorossiya” is not an easy task, even for Russian nationalists. Moreover, current demographic and economic trends do not favor Kazakhstan’s Russian-majority regions, and local political activism and grievances have remained limited since Crimea’s annexation.

More Than a Name? Variation in Electoral Mobilisation of Titular and Non-Titular Ethnic Minorities in Russian National Elections

Do patterns of electoral mobilisation differ between titular and non-titular ethnic minorities in Vladimir Putin’s Russia? Despite the fact that ‘titular privileging’ has been identified as one of the central causal mechanisms for patronage-based electoral mobilisation in Russia, existing literature has not tested this systematically. This study investigates whether turnout patterns differ between titular and non-titular ethnic minorities in Russia. We leverage unique raion-level electoral and demographic data in a series of multilevel models to analyse whether turnout patterns between these two groups vary in recent Russian legislative elections (2003 and 2011) and presidential contests (2004 and 2012). The empirical findings suggest that electoral turnout is consistently higher in raions with a higher share of titular minorities and that this effect is moderated in unexpected ways by contextual characteristics at the raion and regional levels.

Academic help seeking among Russian minority and non-minority adolescents: A social capital outlook

Academic help-seeking and help-providing in school setting streamlines learning process and advances social competencies among students. Little research has examined differential patterns of help-seeking among students of ethnic minority and non-minority status. The present study conceptualizes school help-providing as remedial exchange of social capital among students. To explore possible barriers to such exchange, we compare help-seeking networks among mid-adolescents (15–16y.o.) of migrant ethnic minority opposite those of non-minority origins, in Russian high schools (N=3496). The data were collected in 183 classrooms from 49 schools of Greater Moscow area; network information was elicited from students' nominations of their classmates whom they ask for help in Math. Statistical analysis relied on multilevel dyadic p2 model. The data strongly suggest that school performance, academic self-evaluation, and gender are factors affecting help-seeking and help-providing behavior in classroom. By contrast, socio-economic status and, importantly, ethnic minority status had no influence on peer help relations in Moscow schools, suggesting that (1) minority status does not universally introduce stigmatizing barriers in youth social capital exchanges; and (2) majority-minority dynamics may vary as a function of the macro-context in which adolescents are embedded. Implications for further research and policy are discussed in turn.

ETHNONATIONAL RUSSIAN FACTOR IN THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT POLICY OF LEGAL FORMATIONS OF PRIDNEPROVIE (1917–1921 YEARS)

The Russian minority as ethno-national factor in Ukrainian legal policy of national state formations of Pridneprovie of 1917–1921 – of two UPR – Central Council and the Hetman Ukrainian State and Directory – of the Ukrainian State is investigated. The thesis is substantiated that the number of Russians, their place in the ethnic structure of Ukrainian land as the second after the Ukrainian national group, and the most important thing - the developed Russian imperial tradition, were among the main factors underlying the beliefs of the Ukrainian political elite at the beginning of the liberation struggle on national-territorial autonomy of Ukraine as a part of a federal democratic Russia as the only possible form of realization of Ukrainian national statehood. The Russians within all Ukrainian provinces of the empire, last year before the collapse of the latter, numerically dominated among other non-Ukrainians (including the most numerous – Poles and Jews), although it was the second largest (after Ukrainian) national group. The Russian imperial government strongly supported ethnic Russians in alien ethnic regions. But imperial national policy provided the dominant political and legal status and high position on the social ladder. The imperial tradition prompted Russians to consider themselves the representatives of a monopoly, ruling, state nation with the relevant claims of the particular situation in the different spheres of public life. It is noted that in the revolutionary Ukraine the Russian ethno-national factor, due to the loss of the previous leading social and political significance of Russians became the creation of ethnic conflicts. This affected the nature, content and dynamics of Ukraine-Russia relations. Because many Russians considered themselves the actual representatives of Russian state interests, the Russian ethno-national factors largely determined the success of Ukrainian people in building its own national state. On the basis of the principal legal measures of the Ukrainian national state formations the research proved that their policy towards Russians and other minorities, despite the fact that depended on the «national» or «territorial» understanding of the state was reasonable and tolerant. And in this sense, it coincided with the European democratic tradition. It is observed that the Ukrainian national state formations of Pridneprovie of 1917–1921 were the first in modern times that faced the problem of regulating state-level relations with the Russians (and other national groups) as national minorities. As a result, the legal basis of free and comprehensive national development of Russian and other ethnic minorities were laid as well as the first real steps for their implementation were made.

Intercultural relations in Russia and Latvia: the relationship between contact and cultural security

The project Mutual Intercultural Research in Plural Societies was designed to examine three hypotheses of intercultural relations: the multiculturalism hypothesis, the integration hypothesis, and the contact hypothesis. These hypotheses were derived from the Canadian multiculturalism policy (Berry, 1984), and their validity has been assessed in a number of countries. Our goal was to evaluate these hypotheses in Russia (Moscow) and Latvia (Riga). We used sociopsychological surveys of two dominant groups (Russian Muscovites and Latvians in Riga) and two nondominant groups (migrants from the Caucasus in Moscow and the Russian minority in Riga) employing structural equation modeling. A sense of perceived security promoted tolerance toward other cultural groups in three of the samples. Perceived security was related significantly to multicultural ideology in Riga, but there was no significant relationship to multicultural ideology in the Moscow samples. A preference for the integration strategy among the migrants in Moscow as well as among the Russians in Latvia promoted their better sociocultural adaptation and had a significant impact on the life satisfaction of the Muscovites but had no impact on the Latvian sample in Riga. Our results provided some support for the effect of intercultural contact on the acceptance of others in three of the groups: the migrants in Moscow, the Russian minority in Riga, and the dominant group in Moscow. However, among the Russians in Riga, the relationship between contacts and perceived security was negative. The multiculturalism hypothesis was confirmed with the dominant group in Riga and was partly confirmed with both the dominant and the nondominant groups in Moscow and with the Russian minority in Riga. The contact hypothesis received partial support with both groups in Moscow and the Russian minority in Riga but was not confirmed with the Latvians in Riga. There was partial support for the role of the integration strategy in promoting sociocultural adaptation and well-being among the migrants in Moscow and the Muscovites. These findings require additional analysis of the sociopolitical and historical context in Latvia in order to understand the psychological outcomes of acculturation among the Russian minority there.

Русские в современной Украине

Issues of modern situation of Russians in Ukraine analyzed in the article. Lighted up some aspects of migrations of Russian population and their consequence, level of education of Russian population and role of Russian minority in the Ukrainian society. Analyzed the issues and problems linguistic Policy implementation, public resonance and political fight around this issue. Analyzed some results of mobilization on ethnic base and influence of external factors for escalation of a separatist movement supported by Russia in the East part of Ukraine.

From Xinjiang to Australia

Russians have lived in Xinjiang since the nineteenth century and those who accepted Chinese citizenship were recognised as one of China’s ethnic minorities known as guihua zu (naturalised and assimilated people). In the minzu identification programme (1950s–1980s), the name eluosi zu replaced guihua zu and became Russians’ official identification in China. Russians (including both Soviet and Chinese citizens) used to constitute a significant population in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and several other regions in China before the 1960s. According to the 2000 census, eluosi zu had a population of only 15,609 and more than half of these lived in Xinjiang. Based on anthropological fieldwork in China and Australia, this article investigates the formation of the eluosi zu and the changing concept of ‘the Russian’ in Xinjiang, with the emphasis on the socialist period after 1949. The emigration to Australia from the 1960s to 1980s initially strengthened the European identity of this Russian minority. With the abolition of the ‘white Australia’ policy in 1973 and China’s growing importance to Australia, this Russian minority group’s identification with Xinjiang and China has been revived. Studying Russians from Xinjiang also provides an insight into the Uyghur diaspora in Australia, since their emigration history and shared regional identity are intertwined.

Anti-National Population Policy in the Ukrainian SSR during the 1960s–1970s: The Titular Nation of Ukraine as an Example

The article studies the anti-national population policy of the USSR taking as the example the titular nation of Ukraine during the 1960s –1970s. The author investigates inner republican effects of migration (increasing the number of mixed marriages and the displacement of the Ukrainian language by Russian) and studies official statistics – Union censuses in 1959, 1970, and 1979 which allow a comparative analysis of the dynamics of the Ukrainians and territorial distribution in different regions of the republic. The author has found that in the outlined period the USSR government always created anti-Ukrainian background at all levels, which formed a widespread anti-national population policy of Russification and assimilation of the Ukrainians; there was an artificial formation of national-ethnic structure of the Ukrainian SSR and forcing international convergence to create a “single Soviet people”. Any statement or reference to Ukrainian national problems was regarded as a ground for harassment and persecution by the Soviet authorities and accusation of “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism”. It has been proved that Ukrainians were the dominant nation almost throughout the USSR in the outlined period. The number of Ukrainians increased exclusively trough natural population growth, while the number of representatives of the Russian nation increased as a result of internal migration. The article presents the idea that Ukraine was one of the centers of accumulation of immigration flows in the Soviet Union, and because of this fact the multicultural Ukrainian SSR society, which basically constituted of Ukrainians, gradually turned into a bi-national society, where the Ukrainian majority coexisted with the continuously growing Russian minority. Resettlements were carried out primarily for political reasons and their aim was to deprive the native people of their national characteristics – language, culture, and the like. Demographic, economic, and social processes that were spread under the slogan of “internationalist aid” substantially changed the proportion of native and settled populations in some regions.

Kazakhstan’s challenge: the threat posed by Astana’s ethnic russian minority and what it means for International Law

Trabalho enviado em 27 de junho de 2015. Aceito em 03 de agosto de 2015. DOI: 10.12957/rqi.2015.18815 Resumo Durante dois séculos o Cazaquistão funcionou sob o jugo do imperialismo russo e soviético. Talvez o legado mais duradouro do período é a grande minoria étnica russa no norte do Cazaquistão. Ao longo dos últimos vinte e cinco anos desde que Astana declarou sua independência, tem havido pouco ou quaisquer sinais visíveis de tensões étnicas no Estado. Entretanto, o uso do Kremlin de minorias étnicas russas na Geórgia e na Ucrânia como justificativa para uma ação militar agressiva nos assuntos internos de ambos os Estados provou ser desconcertante para muitos dos vizinhos da Rússia. Talvez o maior agravante tem sido a falta de uma resposta em espécie pela comunidade internacional. Na ausência de uma ação mais demonstrativa, há uma preocupação crescente na Eurásia de que a Administração Putin estabeleceu um novo precedente em matéria de política regional. Independentemente disso, o Cazaquistão deve desenvolver uma campanha diplomática e planejamento estratégico coerentes para construir os meios e mecanismos necessários para dissuadir potencial agressão russa. Promover oportunidades de envolvimento de cooperação com os seus vizinhos regionais e parceiros internacionais oferece a contundência necessária para potencialmente dissuadir futura agressão russa. Envolvimento holístico para reforçar a defesa e a economia, e a elevação dos níveis sociais irá demonstrar a todos os envolvidos que Astana tem as ferramentas à sua disposição para conter a agressão estrangeira. Palavras-chave: política internacional - Cazaquistão - conflitos territoriais - soberania - Direito Internacional Abstract For two centuries Kazakhstan functioned under the yoke of Russian and Soviet imperialism. Perhaps the most lasting legacy of the period is the large ethnic Russian minority in northern Kazakhstan. Over the last twenty-five years since Astana declared its independence there have been little if any noticeable signs of ethnic tensions in the state. However, the Kremlin’s use of ethnic Russian minorities in both Georgia and the Ukraine as justification for aggressive military action in both states’ internal affairs has proven disconcerting for many of Russia’s neighbors. Perhaps compounding matters further has been the lack of a response in kind by the international community. In the absence of more demonstrative action there is growing concern in Eurasia that the Putin Administration has established a new precedent in regional policy matters. Regardless, Kazakhstan must develop a coherent diplomatic and strategic planning campaign to build the necessary means and mechanisms to deter potential Russian aggression. Promoting cooperative engagement opportunities with its regional neighbors and international partners offers the necessary forcefulness to potentially dissuade future Russian aggression. Holistic engagement to strengthen defense, economic, and social levers will demonstrate to all involved that Astana has the tools at its disposal to curb foreign aggression. Keywords: international politics - Kazakhstan - territorial conflicts - sovereignty - international law

NEW RESEARCH OF NEOGRAPHY: TOPICAL PROBLEMS OF THE ARCHIVAL ORIENTAL STUDIES (by the example of modern source study of the regional history of Kalmykia)

The article highlights the present situation in archaeography, new approaches in the study of the problem, describes the archaeography in southern Russia, shows a model of the main directions in the development of source studies in the modern times. The importance of in-depth study of the phenomenon of history of human memory, in addition to its academic value, has obvious practical significance, by virtue of the fact that namely retrospectively colored intentions have the most powerful impact on realization of the determining social memory not only in modern historiography, but also in future. The modern historiographic situation in science is not stochastic; historians begin to call the social project of science of the modern epoch as the next “world theory” or the “next myth”. The modern stage of the development of cognition is characterized by the process of purifying the object or subject of studies from mythologization of event statements of the history of Motherland and rethinking the history of development of national languages of ethnic minorities in Russia.

Voting, identity and security threats in Ukraine: who supports the Radical ”Freedom“ Party?

This article investigates voters and sympathizers of Ukraine's radical right party, Svoboda. Using an original survey conducted in 2010, it shows that support for Svoboda was rooted less in extreme levels of xenophobia vis-à-vis Russians, and more in concerns about the support that the Russian minority receives from the state, fear of losing Ukrainian sovereignty, and economic anxiety. In contrast to the conventional view, the analysis suggests that support for Svoboda was not a function of inter-group ethnic hostilities; instead, it originated in perceived threats and anxieties about the character of the Ukrainian state.