Minimalist Account Research Articles

The Factualist Interpretation of the Skeptical Solution and Semantic Primitivism

According to the factualist interpretation, the skeptical solution to the skeptic’s problem hinges on rejecting inflationary accounts of semantic facts, advocating instead for the adoption of minimal factualism. However, according to Alexander Miller, this account is unsound. Miller argues that minimal factualism represents a form of semantic primitivism, a position expressly rejected by Kripke’s Wittgenstein. Furthermore, Miller states that minimal factualism presupposes the conformity of meaning ascriptions with rules of discipline and syntax. However, he contends that this maneuver is also undermined by Kripke’s skepticism. In this paper, I demonstrate that Miller’s arguments against minimal factualism are unsound. To achieve this goal, I argue that the minimalist account of semantic facts should not be equated with semantic primitivism. Moreover, I argue that statements regarding the conformity of meaning ascriptions are either beside the criticism of Kripke’s skeptic or should be interpreted from the perspective of the account on assertibility offered by the skeptical solution. On this basis, I conclude that the factualist interpretation provides a conducive environment for solving the problem posed by Kripke’s skeptic.

A Minimalist Account of Free Relative Clauses in Zahrani Spoken Arabic

This paper explores the syntax of free relative clauses in Zahrani Spoken Arabic (henceforth ZSA). The paper shows that ZSA possesses two types of free relative clauses, viz., nominal free relative clauses and adverbial free relative clauses. The focus of the paper is on nominal free relative clauses. It is shown that nominal free relative clauses can appear in a subject position and a direct object position, and the range of relativization involves subject, direct object, indirect object, prepositional object and possessor relativization. The derivation of free relatives in ZSA involves resumption relativization strategy only where gaps are treated as null resumptive pronouns. As for distribution of null and overt resumptive clitics, there is an alternation between the use of null and overt resumptive pronouns/clitics in subject and direct object position. However, the utilization of overt resumptive pronouns/clitics is mandatory in indirect object, prepositional object and possessor position. It is argued that the free relative markers illi: and mi:n are complementizers. Furthermore, as null and overt resumptive clitics exhibit a big resemblance with respect to their behaviour in the coordinate structures and parasitic gaps, both free relatives with null or resumptive pronouns/clitics involve a null operator movement (in non-island contexts) from inside the free relative clause to the specifier of a complementizer phrase (spec CP). The CP is adjoined to a null antecedent occupying the head of a noun phrase (NP) which is a complement of a determiner phrase (DP) with an empty D.

How to be minimalist about shared agency

AbstractWhat is involved in acting together with others? Most shared agency theorists endorse the Shared Intention Thesis, i.e., the claim that shared agency necessarily involves shared intentions. This article dissents from this orthodoxy and offers a minimalist account of shared agency—one where parties to shared activities need not form rich webs of interrelated psychological states. My account has two main components: a conceptual analysis of shared agency in terms of the notion of plan, and an explanation of undertheorized agency‐sharing mechanisms. My analysis states that we act together just in case our activities conform to a plan and that plan figures in an explanation of our activities’ joint conformity to it. To sloganize: shared activity is plan‐coordinated activity. Sometimes, plan‐coordination goes by way of shared intentions. However, besides shared intentions, there are at least two additional families of agency‐sharing mechanisms. The first features a central planner who determines the content of a plan and attributes the different parts of that plan to a collection of agents. The second does away with the planner and involves a roughly Darwinian selection of patterns of activity. Both families of mechanisms enable us to act together even in the absence of shared intentions.

Conceptualising democratic resilience: a minimalist account

ABSTRACT The aim of this article is to contribute in two respects to the evolving research agenda focused on the problem of democratic resilience. First, we attempt to provide several clarifications regarding the general concept of ‘democratic resilience’, in the course of which we both assess a number of accounts offered thus far and discuss some difficulties raised by elements of its most attractive articulation. Second, we outline a specific conception of democratic resilience framed on minimalist grounds and designed so as to be compatible with a wide range of descriptive and normative models of democracy. Aside from the conceptual and analytical value of these contributions, we also point to their practical relevance for both empirical assessments and for the normative and applied-level evaluation of democratic institutions and their performance.

The Structure of Dagbani Sentential Negation*

AbstractThe goal of this paper is to provide an account of the syntactic expression of sentential negation in Dagbani, a Mabia, Niger‐Congo language of West Africa. I show that Dagbani employs two strategies for the marking of sentential negation: negative markers/particles and negative verbs. The overtly expressed negative markers are kù/bì and dì, used for negating declaratives and imperatives, respectively. Besides, the inherently negative verb ká is used to negate possessive‐locative‐existential constructions. The paper further demonstrates that there is an incompatibility between the negative marker and the imperative morpheme in Dagbani and attempts to account for this empirical fact. In line with recent probe‐based Minimalist account of negation, I assume that the negative markers (heads) carry a [iNeg] feature, which is interpretable, and its interpretation triggers a negative polarity of the clause. I further offer a formal account for the incompatibility between the imperative negation marker dì and the imperative morpheme.

Correction to: Steps Towards a Minimalist Account of Numbers

Correction to: Steps Towards a Minimalist Account of Numbers

Quine’s conflicts with truth deflationism

Compared to the extensive amount of literature on various themes of W.V.O. Quine’s philosophy, his immanent concept of truth remains a relatively unexplored topic. This relative lack of research contributes to a persistent confusion on the deflationary and inflationary details of Quine’s truth. According to a popular reading, Quine’s disquotational definition of the truth predicate exhausts the topic of truth, thus amounting to a deflationary view. Others promote opposing interpretations. I argue that by relying on Tarski’s semantic conception of truth, Quine’s disquotational account inherits a commitment to classical correspondence intuitions. Based on this, Quine posits a firm constitution for truth as an intermediary between language and the world. From this constitution claim follows that the disquotational account proves incompatible with both the general deflationary thesis and, more specifically, the minimalist account, which deny any constitution for truth past what is given by the preferred deflationary schema. This reading is significant for refuting the widespread misrepresentations of Quine as a prominent deflationist.

Conspiracy Theories are Not Beliefs

Napolitano (The epistemology of fake news, Oxford University Press, 2021) argues that the Minimalist Account of conspiracy theories—i.e., which defines conspiracy theories as explanations, or theories, about conspiracies—should be rejected. Instead, she proposes to define conspiracy theories as a certain kind of belief—i.e., an evidentially self-insulated belief in a conspiracy. Napolitano argues that her account should be favored over the Minimalist Account based on two considerations: ordinary language intuitions and theoretical fruitfulness. I show how Napolitano’s account fails its own purposes with respect to these two considerations and so should not be favored over the Minimalist Account. Furthermore, I propose that the Minimalist Account is the best conception of ‘conspiracy theory’ if we share Napolitano’s goal of advancing the understanding of conspiracy theories.

Complex Cardinal Numerals and the Strong Minimalist Thesis

Different analyses of complex cardinal numerals have been proposed in Generative Grammar. This article provides an analysis of these expressions based on the Strong Minimalist Thesis, according to which the derivations of linguistic expressions are generated by a simple combinatorial operation, applying in accord with principles external to the language faculty. The proposed derivations account for the asymmetrical structure of additive and multiplicative complexes and for the instructions they provide to the external systems for their interpretation. They harmonize with those of coordinate nouns, and thus offer a unified Minimalist account of their core properties. Firstly, the empirical problem addressed is stated. Secondly, the theoretical framework is presented. Thirdly, Minimalist derivations for additive and multiplicative complexes are provided. Fourthly, the proposed derivations are contrasted with derivations not relying on the Strong Minimalist Thesis. Lastly, consequences for linguistic theory are identified as well as questions open to further inquiry.

Collective moral agency and self-induced moral incapacity

ABSTRACT Collective moral agents can cause their own moral incapacity. If an agent is morally incapacitated, then the agent is exempted from responsibility. Due to self-induced moral incapacity, corporate responsibility gaps resurface. To solve this problem, I first set out and defend a minimalist account of moral competence for group agents. After setting out how a collective agent can cause its own moral incapacity, I argue that self-induced temporary exempting conditions do not free an agent from diachronic responsibility once the agent regains its moral faculties. For collective agents, any exempting condition is potentially temporary due to the ‘malleability’ of their constitution. Therefore, in cases of self-induced moral incapacity and subsequent wrongdoing, unlike individuals, every collective agent can be (made) morally responsible for its actions even though it did not qualify as a moral agent at the time of wrongdoing. Hence, this is no reason for skepticism concerning corporate responsibility.

Fundamentality and minimalist grounding laws

What grounds facts of ground? Some metaphysicians invoke fundamental grounding laws to answer this question. These are general principles that link grounded facts to their grounds. The main business of this paper is to advance the debate about the metaphysics of grounding laws by exploring the prospects of a plausible yet underexplored minimalist account, one which is structurally analogous to a familiar Humean conception of natural laws. In the positive part of this paper, I articulate such a novel view and argue for its merits. The minimalist account shuns essences and takes laws to be unmysterious elite regularities. Therefore, it is a promising alternative for theorists of ground who spurn the acceptance of essentialism about the grounding laws but think that these are needed in our theorizing. In the negative part, I argue that widely accepted principles of ground, coupled with the tenets of minimalism, jeopardize the fundamentality of the grounding laws. I discuss two immediately available and prima facie appealing strategies to evade this threat. However, I show that both have undesirable theoretical costs. I conclude by casting doubts on whether the benefits of a minimalist account of fundamental grounding laws outweigh such costs.

Steps Towards a Minimalist Account of Numbers

AbstractThis paper outlines an account of numbers based on the numerical equivalence schema (NES), which consists of all sentences of the form ‘#x.Fx=n if and only if ∃nx Fx’, where # is the number-of operator and ∃n is defined in standard Russellian fashion. In the first part of the paper, I point out some analogies between the NES and the T-schema for truth. In light of these analogies, I formulate a minimalist account of numbers, based on the NES, which strongly parallels the minimalist (deflationary) account of truth. One may be tempted to develop the minimalist account in a fictionalist direction, according to which arithmetic is useful but untrue, if taken at face value. In the second part, I argue that this suggestion is not as attractive as it may first appear. The NES suffers from a similar problem to the T-schema: it is deductively weak and does not enable the derivation of any non-trivial generalizations. In the third part of the paper, I explore some strategies to deal with the generalization problem, again drawing inspiration from the literature on truth. In closing this paper, I briefly compare the minimalist to some other accounts of numbers.

A counterfactual account of diachronic structural rationality

ABSTRACT Philosophers who take rationality to consist in the satisfaction of rational requirements typically favour rational requirements that govern mental attitudes at a time rather than across times. One such account has been developed by Broome in Rationality through reasoning. He claims that diachronic functional properties of intentions such as settling on courses of actions and resolving conflicts are emergent properties that can be explained with reference to synchronic rational pressures. This is why he defends only a minimal diachronic requirement which characterises forgetting as irrational. In this paper, I show that Broome’s diachronically minimalist account lacks the resources to explain how a rational agent may resolve incommensurable choices by an act of will. I argue that one can solve this problem by either specifying a mode of diachronic deliberation or by introducing a genuinely diachronic requirement that governs the rational stability of an intention via a diachronic counterfactual condition concerning rational reconsideration. My proposal is similar in spirit to Gauthier’s account in his seminal paper ‘Assure and threaten’. It improves on his work by being both more general and explanatorily richer in its application with regard to diachronic phenomena such as transformative choices and acts of will.

Joint Improvisation, Minimalism and Pluralism about Joint action

AbstractThis paper introduces freely improvised joint actions, a class of joint actions characterized by (i) highly unspecific goals and (ii) the unavailability of shared plans. For example, walking together just for the sake of walking together with no specific destination or path in mind provides an ordinary example of FIJAs, along with examples in the arts, e.g., collective free improvisation in music, improv theater, or contact improvisation in dance. We argue that classic philosophical accounts of joint action such as Bratman’s rule them out because the latter require a capacity for planning that is idle in the case of FIJAs. This argument is structurally similar to arguments for minimalist accounts of joint action (e.g., based on joint actions performed by children before they develop a full-fledged theory of mind), and this invites a parallel minimalist account, which we provide in terms of a specific kind of shared intentions that do not require plan states. We further argue that the resulting minimalist account is different in kind from the sort of minimalism suggested by developmental considerations and conclude in favor of a pluralistic minimalism, according to which there are several ways for an account of joint action to be minimal.

New Testament Christology: A Critique of Hurtado’s Influence

Abstract This article offers a critique of one of the most crucial and controversial pillars of Larry W. Hurtado’s reconstruction of the origins and nature of earliest “Jesus ­devotion.” Unlike most other engagements with Hurtado, this article takes seriously into account all of his published work and not simply his magnum opus, Lord Jesus Christ. Likewise, unlike most other engagements, this article critically focuses on the explanatory relationship between Hurtado’s minimalist account of the Christology of Jesus and his earliest disciples and the postulation that powerful Easter and post-Easter “religious experiences” played the key role in the origins of Jesus devotion. Essentially, this article contends that Hurtado’s persuasive case concerning the very early origins of Jesus devotion (perhaps, so he argues, to be dated as early as the first few months of the post-Easter period) ought to have pushed his search for the major causes of such devotion back beyond the “religious experiences” of post-Easter Christians and into the life of the historical Jesus himself.

Remarks on some minimalist accounts for Binding

The present paper is a reassessment of the empirical and theoretical arguments presented by some of main minimalist accounts for binding. Some if these accounts assume that the binding principles are conditions on LF representations, others argue that they are derived by narrow syntax computations. Despite that, I present some observations indicating that there is not yet a satisfactory minimalist account for binding. The amounted evidence indicates that binding is derivational. However, pragmatics seems also engaged in building coreferentiality.

Derivation and Interpretation of Expressiveness Devices in North Hail Arabic: Minimalist Account

This paper investigates the interpretive properties of what are termed expressiveness devices, characterised as clitic, pronoun and demonstrative. In what seems to be cases of multiple expression of a single argument, the proposed investigation involves generative syntactic analyses to the interaction of a set of expressiveness devices with an associate DP, accounting for their interpretation at both LF and PF interfaces (Chomsky, 1995 et seq). Exploration of a set of North Hail Arabic (henceforth, NHA) data containing expressiveness devices, all of which agree in φ-features with the associate DP, it is shown that the expressiveness devices maintain rigid order in the left periphery of the clause, each generated for certain discourse-interpretive property expressing a distinct value of information structure, through establishing an Agree relation (Chomsky, 2001) with the associate DP. Amongst the insights the analyses show is that NHA allows for multiple probes agreeing with a single goal. In this way, a probing head probes through another c-commanded probing head, in which case the goal is visible to the upper probing head. Movement is therefore shown to be triggered in case where goal’s visibility, related to feature valuation, is not available, hence, movement presupposes agreement.

Barclay, Linda. Disability with Dignity: Justice, Human Rights, and Equal Status. New York: Routledge, 2018. Pp. 142. $124.00 (cloth).

Barclay, Linda. <i>Disability with Dignity: Justice, Human Rights, and Equal Status</i>. New York: Routledge, 2018. Pp. 142. $124.00 (cloth).

The focus function and derivation of object displacement in Standard Arabic

The aim of this paper is to provide a minimalist account of object displacement in terms of its trigger and its landing site in the syntactic tree structure of Standard Arabic (SA) clauses. The account utilizes Chomsky's concept of edge feature (EF) within the Minimalist Program and Rizzi's Split-CP analysis. In terms of its data scope, the paper is limited to a class of data identified as displaying the Verb – Object – Subject (VOS) order wherein the object is a full DP (not a pronominal clitic), and appears in a position preceding the subject. It will be argued that this order is the result of focus displacement of the object from its canonical position inside VP across the subject DP to the outer periphery of vP. The result of this operation is a marked order VOS driven by the vP edge feature (EF) to achieve the pragmatic function of focus.

The Evolvability of Words: On the Nature of Lexical Items in Minimalism.

Work within the minimalist program attempts to meet the criterion of evolvability: “any mechanisms and primitives ascribed to UG rather than derived from independent factors must plausibly have emerged in what appears to have been a unique and relatively sudden event on the evolutionary timescale” (Chomsky et al., 2017). On minimalist assumptions the evolution of the language faculty must have involved at least three major developments: (i) the evolution of computational atoms, lexical items, understood as bundles of features, (ii) the evolution of a single, simple recursive operation that glues together lexical items and complexes of lexical items, and (iii) externalization linking the syntactic component of the language faculty to the cognitive systems that humans use for sound and gesture. The first development, the evolution of lexical items and the lexicon, is especially poorly understood. A complete account of the evolution of lexical items will state what evolved, how, and why. The focus of this article is the first question: what evolved. What properties do lexical items have, what determines these properties, and what is the internal structure of lexical entries? The article identifies what the key open problems are for a minimalist account of the evolution of words that strives to meet the criterion of evolvability.