Abstract

Abstract This paper introduces freely improvised joint actions, a class of joint actions characterized by (i) highly unspecific goals and (ii) the unavailability of shared plans. For example, walking together just for the sake of walking together with no specific destination or path in mind provides an ordinary example of FIJAs, along with examples in the arts, e.g., collective free improvisation in music, improv theater, or contact improvisation in dance. We argue that classic philosophical accounts of joint action such as Bratman’s rule them out because the latter require a capacity for planning that is idle in the case of FIJAs. This argument is structurally similar to arguments for minimalist accounts of joint action (e.g., based on joint actions performed by children before they develop a full-fledged theory of mind), and this invites a parallel minimalist account, which we provide in terms of a specific kind of shared intentions that do not require plan states. We further argue that the resulting minimalist account is different in kind from the sort of minimalism suggested by developmental considerations and conclude in favor of a pluralistic minimalism, according to which there are several ways for an account of joint action to be minimal.

Highlights

  • This paper introduces freely improvised joint actions, a class of joint actions characterized by (i) highly unspecific goals and (ii) the unavailability of shared plans

  • We argue that classic philosophical accounts of joint action such as Bratman’s rule them out because the latter require a capacity for planning that is idle in the case of FIJAs

  • This argument is structurally similar to arguments for minimalist accounts of joint action, and this invites a parallel minimalist account, which we provide in terms of a specific kind of shared intentions that do not require plan states

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Summary

Freely Improvised Joint Actions

We introduce a kind of joint action that has so far been relatively neglected in the philosophical literature on joint action – namely freely improvised joint actions (“FIJAs” for short). The basic idea is that there should be a wide variety of significantly different joint actions that may fulfill this intention, so that the agents are in a sense collectively free to fulfill this intention in many different ways This should be clear from the musical example: the general intention to freely improvise music together leaves a wider variety of possible realizations than the much less general intention to play Bartok’s Second quartet in A minor as rehearsed. FIJAs, unlike other improvised joint actions, are such that the online formation of shared plans is not possible, or at least highly unlikely While it is common for participants in a joint action to settle in advance a shared plan by means of verbal communication, there are cases where available background or contextual knowledge is enough for agents to derive a series of appropriate means that allows the group to reach its collective intention. That we have delineated the class of FIJAs, the step in our argument is to motivate a distinctive brand of minimalism based on this class of joint actions

Minimalism from Freely Improvised Joint Actions
Shared Intention to Freely Improvise: A Minimal Account of Joint Action
A New Kind of Minimalism
Conclusion
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