The Eastern Question had numerous regional aspects. Conflicts and crises on the southeastern periphery of the Ottoman Empire, which was already facing numerous internal problems and external pressures, were not particularly novel during the 19th century. These issues were usually resolved without endangering peace in Europe. Offensive realism views great powers as the most significant actors in the international system. The political geography of the Balkans was largely reshaped by their interests, regardless of their inadequate understanding of the complex situations and peoples in that volatile region, defined by the “architecture of roads and inns.” The Great Eastern Crisis (1875-1878), a dramatic stage in the prolonged resolution of the Eastern Question, began with the Serbian uprising in July 1875 in the Bosnia Eyalet. It continued with the Bulgarian uprising in April 1876 and the war between Serbia and Montenegro against the Ottoman Empire in July of the same year, initiated in support of Orthodox Christians in the Bosnian pashaluk, but “in truth to expand their territory and consolidate their still insecure independence.” European public opinion during the escalation of the crisis, when the Ottoman side had military superiority, was being prepared for harsh interventions against the Ottoman Empire. This sentiment was particularly pronounced in Russia. Russia did not reconcile with the provisions of the Treaty of Paris in 1856 and the previous failure in the Crimean War (1853-1856), which was a struggle for access to the straits - the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. It sought ways to free itself from the imposed provisions of that treaty. The entire “Russian 19th century” passed under the sign of the Slavophile dream of Constantinople - “which sooner or later must be ours,” as well as the “southern, warm seas.” Every Russian war with the Ottoman Empire in that century activated, on the Russian side, the armed participation of Orthodox peoples in the Balkans. Russia supported their movements, involving them in a “historical clash” with the Ottoman state. Pan-Slavism also served as a justification for Russian military-political interventions. Essentially, it represented the ideology of Great Russian imperialism. For the great powers, the key motive was interest, not imaginative “historical connections” and “brotherly emotions.” Benjamin von Kállay wrote that the “struggle of Russia against Turkey” was one of the “most interesting, most important facts of world history.” Religious motives were present in all Russo-Ottoman wars. These conflicts had, to a greater or lesser extent, political consequences in the Balkans. All peoples have separate stories and different dates in their memory. After the war of 1812, the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878, an integral part of the Great Eastern Crisis and a continuation of the Crimean War, was the only foreign policy event that had a significant impact on all layers of Russian society. It became one of the “most ideologized” in Russian history, as the causes, course, and consequences of the war were directly related to public opinion. Numerous Slavophile associations constantly urged the tsar to liberate Christians in the Balkans from the “Turkish yoke.” According to numerous accounts, the war with the Ottoman Empire was invoked to a considerable extent by the press. It fueled the “Pan-Slavic fire” in Moscow and St. Petersburg, which forced the Russian government in 1877 to undertake diplomatic actions, following the Ottoman suppression of the Bulgarian uprising in 1876 and alarming reports of their mass suffering, while neglecting the significant Muslim losses on the other side, to start a war with that empire for which it already had plans and goals prepared. Russian intervention, amidst propaganda and the “Bulgarian horrors,” was expected, considering the broader ambitions of this imperial state.
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Sep 19, 2024
John Aerni-Flessner + 1
Open Access