US Deterrence against Russia and China (based on strategic documents of J. Biden administration)

Abstract

The contemporary world order is rapidly changing, which is manifested, inter alia, in the growing erosion of the US global military superiority. This trend is acknowledged in the US military-strategic and policy planning documents. In this context the strengthening of the military potential of both the Russian Federation and the PRC, coupled by the expansion of political and economic cooperation between them, is a matter of particular concern for the US ruling elites. At the same time, recognizing a problem does not mean assessing it correctly. A closer examination of key strategic documents published in recent years shows that if from a political and military point of view, the US strategists come up with a generally rational list of measures aimed at countering the challenge, posed by Russia and China, from an ideological point of view they doggedly follow liberal-hegemonic premises that are increasingly inconsistent with current international political realities. The author notes that the policy of D. Trump and J. Biden administrations towards China is characterized by a high degree of continuity. The main role in containing the PRC should be played by a system of military-political alliances with the countries of Southeast and South Asia located along the perimeter of its borders. In addition to the alliances inherited from the Cold War, the Biden administration is seeking to develop new ‘bloc structures’ in the Indo-Pacific region, in particular the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). However, not all countries in the region, in particular India, support the anti-Chinese orientation of the US initiatives. Washington’s relations with Moscow deteriorated sharply after the start of the special military operation in Ukraine, but even before that, the United States faced serious challenges in maintaining strategic parity with the Russian Federation. This primarily concerns the quantitative, rather than qualitative side of the equation: according to the US military strategists, Russia has made significant progress in modernizing its strategic nuclear forces and developing fundamentally new types of nuclear delivery vehicles. At the same time, the Biden administration’s approaches to building relations with Moscow are no less ideological than in the case of the PRC, which makes the prospects for resuming Russian-American (and ideally trilateral Russian-American-Chinese) negotiations on strategic arms control extremely vague. The question arises to what extent this ideologized foreign policy of the Biden administration meets the new international realities and the strategic interests of the United States itself.