Military Predominance Research Articles

Imagining the security of innovation: technological innovation, national security, and the American way of life

ABSTRACT In US national security policy the protection of technological innovation is of signal importance. US policy stresses, on the one hand, the need to protect technological innovation to ensure its global economic and military predominance. This reflects the classic view of innovation articulated in security studies: technological innovation is the foundation of economic and military power. Yet this account captures only one aspect of technological innovation in US national security thinking. Drawing on a combination of socio-technical imaginaries frameworks and critical theories of technology, this article argues that technological innovation is not merely a means to the end of American national security. Rather, a series of sociological and normative ideas disclosed by US policy frame market-led innovation as necessary, just, and central to the reproduction of American national identity. A specific way of creating technological systems and artefacts is the object of security in American national security policy. The security of technological innovation is central to securing the American way of life.

The emergence and function of narrative images in ancient Greece

Conceptions of military valor underwent a fundamental change at the turn from the eighth to the seventh century, with the emergence of the hoplite phalanx: rows of heavily armed men standing close to each other and marching in step, each using his own shield to cover also his neighbor, and relying on the shield of his other neighbor for his own coverage.39 This new formation, which is depicted in the upper frieze of the Chigi vase (fig. 5), robbed the well-trained, highly mobile single warrior—the heroic prototype of which is swift-footed Achilles in the Iliad—of his military predominance and much of his social privilege. The composition of the elite changed.

The Legacies of Iraq and the Future for Peace in War : Lessons of British Defence Intervention Strategy

Since the end of the Cold War, the United Kingdom (UK) has intervened militarily in a number of security crises, engaging in so-called wars of choice and it seems likely that the future will see more operations such as Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan.In 2003, the UK participated in the US-ledcoalition that invaded Iraq and quickly overthrew the Ba’ath Party and captured Saddam Hussein. Despite the successes of the initial combat operations in Iraq, the drawn-out anti-insurgency campaign that followed has proved challenging and unfruitful in restabilising the state. The 2011 withdrawal of forces left a fractured state that necessitated re-intervention as early as 2014. The unresolved instability of Iraq to date demonstrates the failures of the coalition to institute peace and to transition the state out of war. This paper, with a focus on British Defence Doctrine, explores the approaches that contributed to both the success and the failures of the post-conflict stabilization of Iraq.It concludes that, as a result of the military predominance within the strategic planning process, the focus on destruction of strategic centres of gravity does not contribute positively to the successful transition from war-fighting to peace-restoration operations. An earlier focus must be placed upon rebuilding campaigns and a holistic approach must pay more consideration to stabilization in order that the greater political aims of a campaign are ensured. This paper proposes three alternative approaches in which operations focus not on the destruction of the old order but the creation of a new one.

Military Primacy Doesn't Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think)

Acommon argument among scholars and policymakers is that America's military preeminence and deep international engagement yield significant economic benefits to the United States and the rest of the world. Ostensibly, military primacy, beyond reducing security tensions, also encourages economic returns through a variety of loosely articulated causal mechanisms. A deeper analytical look reveals the causal pathways through which military primacy is most likely to yield economic returns: geoeconomic favoritism, whereby the military hegemon attracts private capital in return for providing the greatest security and safety to investors; direct geopolitical favoritism, according to which sovereign states, in return for living under the security umbrella of the military superpower, voluntarily transfer resources to help subsidize the costs of hegemony; and the public goods benefits that flow from hegemonic stability. A closer investigation of these causal mechanisms reveals little evidence that military primacy attracts private capital. The evidence for geopolitical favoritism seems more robust during periods of bipolarity than unipolarity. The evidence for public goods benefits is strongest, but military predominance plays only a supporting role in that logic. While further research is needed, the aggregate evidence suggests that the economic benefits of military hegemony have been exaggerated in policy circles. These findings have significant implications for theoretical debates about the fungibility of military power and should be considered when assessing U.S. fiscal options and grand strategy for the next decade.

Soft Power and Leadership in East Asia

Soft Power and Leadership in East Asia David C. Kang (bio) Jing Sun's new book Japan and China as Charm Rivals: Soft Power in Regional Diplomacy is a welcome addition to the growing body of literature addressing the complex foreign relations of East Asia. Sun explores how China and Japan have sought to utilize "soft power" in their relations with each other and neighboring East Asian countries, and he provides some long-needed clarity and dimensionality to this analytically loose concept. Sun points out, for example, that the key aspect of soft power is "power," and that observers often vastly overestimate the influence of popular culture or commercial products on national attitudes and foreign policies. In chapters detailing Japan's and [End Page 134] China's wooing of Southeast Asia, South Korea, and Taiwan, Sun delves into the problems and processes of pursuing foreign policy goals through a soft power—or charm offensive—strategy. Ultimately, he concludes that while leaders in both Japan and China see soft power as important, neither country holds "idealistic perceptions" of soft power. The book concludes that soft power is "embedded in international relations realities: states are still competing for limited resources...and threats of the use of force are real" (p. 170). Sun has performed a valuable task by deeply exploring the concept of soft power and its current utility in explaining Chinese or Japanese foreign policies in the Asia-Pacific region. Given the detailed and careful manner in which he makes his theoretical arguments and the wealth of empirical data brought to bear on this issue, his conclusions appear convincing. Sun shows that soft power does not appear to significantly change states' underlying strategic orientation or their preferences, and that by itself soft power also rarely even changes the perceptions held by other countries. Cultural or commercial success has likewise done little to change underlying perceptions. Sun's careful study of Southeast Asian countries' perceptions of Japan, for example, reveals that "the local desire to see Japan turn its economic might into political capital was lukewarm" (p. 72). Sun's conclusions lead to a somewhat interesting implication: why should we even study a fuzzy theoretical concept that has little empirical evidence of its existence, much less that it is consequential for international relations? It might be tempting to conclude that only hard power is driving relations between countries. The distribution of capabilities may, in fact, be the fundamental driver of regional relations. But that is not at all clear, and if Sun had explored concepts linked to soft power, he could have widened the impact of his work by addressing theoretical and empirical issues that lie at the heart of the study of East Asian international relations and truly interrogated the way in which the pursuit of hard power interacts with other state goals. The concept of soft power—intuitively plausible but empirically difficult to measure—actually provides a lever by which to explore a much wider set of concepts that are linked to, but not entirely subsumed by, this concept. Leadership, status, and legitimacy each appear to be central to foreign relations in East Asia. Like soft power, these concepts derive from the values and ideas a country espouses, and like soft power they are linked only imperfectly to the material capabilities of a country. For example, the concept of leadership necessarily implies that there are followers, as well as that there exists a recognized social rank-order that places leaders above followers. The two are not equal in voice, responsibility, standing, or influence. Leadership—like soft power—can only emerge if there is consensus [End Page 135] on what constitutes leadership and who gets to lead. John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan argue that, more than being simple military predominance, "the exercise of power—and hence the mechanism through which compliance is achieved—involves the projection by the hegemon of a set of norms and their embrace by leaders in other nations."1 That is, leadership is inherently a social phenomenon, and the question of why some states may be willing to follow is as important as that of why other states wish to lead. Leadership thus incorporates soft power but...

Dollar primacy and American power: What's at stake?

ABSTRACT While the demise of the dollar has been predicted in the past, expectations of a fundamental change in the international role of the dollar are increasingly widespread, and eminently plausible. From a situation where the dollar was the undisputed and dominant international currency, one likely scenario is that it will become one of several key currencies that could be characterized as ‘peer competitors’. This raises the question: does it matter? In particular, does it matter for US power? This paper reviews why the dollar's status might change, from that of a ‘top’ to a ‘negotiated’ currency. It then considers the consequences–the loss of economic benefits and structural power, and the costs associated with managing a currency in (relative) decline and eroding international prestige. I conclude that, even as the dollar is likely to remain the world's most widely used international currency, the vulnerability of the greenback presents a potentially significant and underappreciated restraint on contemporary American political and military predominance.

The Japan-Australia security declaration and the changing regional security setting: wheels, webs and beyond?

The March 2007 Japan-Australia Security Declaration has garnered more than its share of hyperbole. Described variously as an historic milestone for peace or an agreement designed to encircle China; the declaration's actual strategic consequences are somewhat unclear. The purpose of this article is to provide a critical analysis of the security declaration and to assess its impact in the context of the changing patterns of the region's security setting. Some have argued that it marks a small but qualitatively significant shift in the essential features of the regional security architecture. The article assesses this claim and argues that while the declaration is of some diplomatic importance, and clearly contributes to improving cooperation in disaster relief and other humanitarian operations, it is of little strategic significance to the broader patterns of East Asian security over the short to medium term. Each side's operational constraints, their different strategic priorities, most obviously their perceptions of China, as well as the continued military predominance of the US, means that the agreement will be of little immediate significance for East Asian security. That said, it remains an important development for the respective parties and is a leading edge indicator of broader forces for change that are increasingly present in East Asia.

The Strategic Logic of Taiwanization

n Taiwan, since the early 1990s, Taiwanese identity has rapidly supplanted Chinese identity. This has pushed all the main political parties to adopt policies favorable to the new identity, and brought the Democratic Progres sive Party to power. Rising Taiwanese identity has also affected military strategies. It has accelerated the cross-strait arms race by alarm ing Beijing, which in turn has led to an offset ting buildup in Taiwan. It has also strengthened Taiwan's will to retain her independence and, thereby, led to newer, more unconventional defense strategies. One such policy is to enhance the ideological legitimacy of Tai wanese nationalism in the United States and Japan. Another policy is to embrace economic integration with China-a development hitherto seen as threatening. A third policy is to deter a Chinese attack by credibly committing Taiwan and its allies to a more dogged fight to preserve Taiwanese independence, even under condi tions where such a fight seems hopeless. Finally, a strong Taiwanese identity makes it more likely that China's increasing conventional military predominance will ultimately call forth a Tai wanese nuclear deterrent. National identity and political development: A distinctly Taiwanese national identity unfolded rapidly following Taiwan's democratization in the late 1980s. This process can be seen in many areas of Taiwan's culture and politics. Consider the changes over time in the familiar polls asking if people identify themselves as Taiwanese, Chi nese, or both. From 1992 to 2004, those that con sider themselves to be only Taiwanese rose from 17.3 percent in 1992, to around 25 percent in the mid-1990s, to around 40 percent from 1999 to the present; whereas those that self-identify exclusively as Chinese fell from about 26 per cent in the early 1.990s, to around 20 percent in the mid-1990s, to a bit over 10 percent in late 2001, to 6.3 percent in June 2004.1 Since the early 1990s, there has been a corre ponding decline in the fortunes of Taiwan's tra itional rul g party, the Kuomintang (KMT). The KMT, which continued to rule Taiwan after being driven f m the mainland in 1949, long presided over an authoritarian regime commit ted to eunification with China under a noncom

Bush’s Choice: Athens or Sparta

continues to be defined by a phrase, by a reality, and by a metaphor. The phrase, post-Cold War world, harks back to a familiar past, its vagueness redeemed by its suggestion that the current state of affairs is interim and temporary, that another organizing structure will eventually emerge. The reality is the overwhelming global fact of American power after the implosion of its adversary of the previous half-century. Since the Soviet Union had been a superpower, another and more awesome term had to be coined to define the unprecedented combination of military, economic, technological, political, and cultural predominance that America achieved in the 1990s. France's foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine, obliged; the reality of the past decade has been hyperpuissance America as hyperpower. The metaphor that best expressed this, even before Vedrine coined his neologism, was that of the United States as the modern equivalent of ancient Rome. But this transitional period is now drawing to a close, and the contours of the real aftermath of the Cold War may already be discerned. Despite its military predominance, America will have great difficulty in maintaining the political will and the financial means, and cannot guarantee the technological monopolies, that might indefinitely sustain its lonely eminence. Regional challengers are already flexing their muscles. To manage what appears likely to become a turbulent political environment, America must look beyond the simplistic metaphor of itself as the modern Rome. It may find that its choices for a sustainable grand strategy are best illustrated and defined by two other models from classical times. The United States in the twenty-first century must decide whether it wants to play the role of Athens or of Sparta. Athens would be more congenial, and would probably come more naturally to a free trading and self-indulgent democracy with a robust belief in the merits and survivability of its own culture and a strong naval tradition. But there is much in the American political and military culture that leans to the fortress mentality and uncompromising attitudes of a modern Sparta. America as Athens would be extrovert and open, encouraging the growth of democracies and trading partners. America as Sparta would be introspective and defensive, tending to protectionism, and determined to maintain military superiority at all costs. America as Athens would seek to work with allies and partners in collaborative ventures with a common purpose, from global warming treaties to international legal structures. America as Sparta would be unilateralist, suspicious of the erosions of national sovereignty that might flow from cooperation with other states, and would prefer clients and satellites to allies that might some day challenge Sparta's primacy. The metaphor of Athens and Sparta presents the two extremes of policy, and no U.S. administration is likely in current circumstances to adopt so fully the attitudes of one that it abandons altogether the other. The most Spartan-minded administration may embrace free trade, from a farsighted

Forum: Demographic Thought and Reproductive Realities: From Montesquieu to Malthus

Introduction Carol Blum From the beginning of the eighteenth century until the Revolution, anxiety over what was thought to be a decrease in France’s population spawned an enormous literature in which schemes of all kinds were advanced to fortify the nation’s faltering reproduction. Particularly after Montesquieu’s brilliant improvisation on the theme in the Lettres persanes (1721), depopulation became a favorite arm of the philosophes in their attacks on the monarchy and the Church. However, by the end of the century, in 1798, another apocalyptic scenario was being invoked. Malthus warned against excessive demographic success, claiming that plagues, war, and famine awaited the people who permitted their reproduction to outstrip their resources. In fact, not only was it untrue that France’s population was declining across the century, but from 1740 to 1790 it rose by about three and a half million, or 13.4%, despite the nation’s turn toward contraceptive practices. Thus, the alarmists in France were wrong, although only in absolute terms. In a relative sense their intuition was correct for the British, whose population is estimated to have risen over the same period by 38.8%, moving towards the abolition of the great numerical advantage France had once enjoyed in Europe and opening a new chapter in her history. Jacqueline Hecht’s article, “From ‘Be Fruitful and Multiply’ to Family Planning,” traces the paradoxical story of a nation increasingly controlling its fertility in private life while publicly declaiming the merits of demographic expansion. Many of the great eighteenth-century issues relating to populationism—celibacy, the effects of luxury, the military, and the problem of pauperism—are addressed by Revolutionary legislators, attempting to turn the demographic tide. As it has sometimes been observed, however, it is neither demographic theorists, nor statistical arguments, nor government edicts that make babies, but women. Christine Théré has brought together a large assortment of opinions from the period’s women authors, most of them unknown, who express their concerns about reproduction; not surprisingly, their focus is less on nationalistic and military predominance than on the practical realities of marriage, family, and the raising of children. [End Page 535] In “‘More Men than Corn’: Malthus versus the Enlightenment,” Rudolph Binion discusses the concepts of limiting excessive growth by “moral restraint,” that is, celibacy, as opposed to the “immoral” kind, or artificial contraception, to which Malthus was sternly opposed and France evermore disposed. Binion concludes that Malthus, like the French prophets of depopulation, was probably wrong, although his error, like theirs, generated a great swell of central scientific theory in the nineteenth century. Malthus’s premise was faulty, we are told, because what seems like “overpopulation” is really the product of governmental inefficiency and problems in distributing resources. Yet, as we end the century that has seen history’s greatest population explosion and enter the next millennium in a world of endemic wars, uncontrollable pandemics, and widespread malnutrition, it is perhaps understandable that for many people Malthus is still very much alive. Copyright © 1999 The American Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies

Strategic Appraisal 1996

Abstract : The Western victory in the Cold War has left the United States as the world's preeminent power. At the moment, it faces no global rival and no significant hostile alliance that might threaten its security or vital interests. Despite a decline in its relative economic power, the United States still has the world's largest economy. Moreover, the United States possesses military predominance, and American political and economic ideas have broad global appeal. Almost all of the economically capable nations are our allies. In modern times no single nation has held a position as preeminent as that of the United States today. At the same time, with the end of the Cold War, there has been an increase in disorder as a result of the rise in ethnic nationalism and the fragmentation of several states. Among the Cold War allies, there is intense economic competition, and managing alliance relations has become more difficult in the absence of a powerful common enemy. Several powers are opposed to the new international configuration. Some of these are rogue states, such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. But some major powers, such as Russia and China, are also dissatisfied with the status quo.

Democratic ‘empowerment’ and democratisation of politics: Radical popular movements and the May 1992 Philippine elections

Why is it that struggles for freedom, civil rights and democracy become increasingly important in the third world and not least in the Far East? Recently, when Bangkok was paralysed by huge protests against military predominance, most analysts maintained that previous disturbances in the area were usually due to peasant-based attempts at real revolutions. But later on, they said, it was rather capitalism that gained strength. The societies were modernised. A new and increasingly broad middle-class soon emerged. And now these middle class people are instead the ones who protest – but mainly against the authoritarian state. And usually for freedom, the rule of law, and democracy. This sweeping generalisation can of course be questioned. To be sure, many people from the lower classes also protest. And it is not exactly crystal clear what the new middle class actually encompasses. But generally speaking, more and more people with some skill and education in urban areas obviously have a little bit more freedom of action than other dissatisfied groups and do play a vital role. So a more important problem is, therefore, if the new middle class can not only initiate democratisation but is also capable of carrying it through – and, in case it is not, if other democratic forces are emerging.

スグール・シャーミーヤ再建史考

al-Thughur al-Shimiya was western part of the Arabo-Byzantine borderland, along the Taurus and the Amanus Mountains. In the early Islamic period, when the Byzantines were obliged to withdraw from Syria to Anatolia, towns and fortresses in this region was destructed and its inhabitants evacuated with Byzantine army. Then this region remained devastated as a buffer zone between the Byzantine and the Muslim territories. The project of reconstruction of this region by the hands of the Muslims began from the second half of the Umayyad period, and the 'Abbasids succeeded it. As a result of the efforts of them, al-Thughur al-Shamlya was reestablished as the Muslim territory. Then, the Muslims planed to expand their sphere to the region behind the Taurus Mountains. But soon they give up this attempt, and the Arabo-Byzantine border once was stabilized on the line along the Taurus Mountains. After that, al-Thughur al-Shamiya became one of the most prosperous Muslim districts, not only as a outpost of the Muslim expeditions to the Byzantine territory but as a commercial and cultural center of the Muslims. This article aims to trace a history of reconstruction of this region and reexamine some characteristics of it, from a view point of the expansion of the Muslim territory and the extend of Islamization in the Middle East.As a border area, political and military predominance of the Muslims in this region did not establish swiftly as compared with other districts in the Middle East, and Muslim rule had been threatened by Byzantine reactions to recover there. The vulnerability of this region resulted in a great excess of expenditure, which needed to be compensated by help of the central government and booty or other gains from the expeditions. In result, it can be said that Muslim community had not been stabilized in al-Thughur al-Shamiya, and Islamization of this region were superficial. Thus, when the 'Abbassid dynasty became declined and Muslim hegemony was weakened in general, this region soon was reconquered by the Byzantines and all of the Muslim settlements were abandoned.

The Indo-Pakistani Military Balance

Research Article| May 01 1986 The Indo-Pakistani Military Balance Jerrold F. Elkin, Jerrold F. Elkin Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar W. Andrew Ritezel W. Andrew Ritezel Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Far Eastern Survey (1957) 26 (5): 518–538. https://doi.org/10.2307/2644480 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Jerrold F. Elkin, W. Andrew Ritezel; The Indo-Pakistani Military Balance. Far Eastern Survey 1 May 1957; 26 (5): 518–538. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2644480 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1986 The Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

The Janzus Option: A Key to Asian/Pacific Security

FOR OVER A decade, American foreign towards the East Asian/Pacific region has been in a constant state of transition.1 With the advent of the post-Vietnam era, U.S. defense commitments underlying the Mutual Defense Treaties with Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and the Philippines and the long-standing multilateral security arrangements comprising the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Australian-New Zealand-U.S. Tripartite agreement (ANZUS) have been subject to American domestic reappraisals as to their usefulness and in one case (SEATO) have been discontinued. Currently, traditional Western military predominance in the Indian and Pacific Oceans is confronted with a growing Soviet and potential Chinese strategic presence. Until recently, America's containment policy in the Asian/ Pacific had been an expression of its overall interest in checking Communist military power. During the era of detente, U.S. domestic preoccupations have precluded any Asian/Pacific geared to match Soviet or Chinese land and naval power now being deployed there. As one analyst recently observed, the United States is taking a calculated risk of selling to the American public and to our Asian/ Pacific allies the credibility of a ambitious and less expensive' U.S. military role in that area.2 Yet, what has occurred has been an

Indonesia 1973: A Climate of Concern

17he year 1973 was difficult for Indonesia. A poor rice harvest, an inflationary spiral, a coercive government rice procurement program, the perpetuation of clear military predominance, a questionable governmental regard for civil liberties, an anti-Chinese riot, increasing urban unemployment and rural underemployment, and student demonstrations against highlevel official corruption and arbitrary governmental practices iall produced a pervasive climate of apprehension and concern. Indonesia's 'army-administrative-economist governing elite is not entirely responsible for the above situation. Rice crops throughout all -of Southeast Asia were disappointing, part of the inflationary spiral was attributable to Indonesia's dependent position in the world economy, and racial tensions have been a constant factor in Indonesian history for three centuries. Nonetheless, public concern is substantial, receiving expression in rural resentment of rice procurement methods, an anti-Chinese riot in Bandung on August 5, and student demonstrations against a government that was increasingly perceived as rigid and unresponsive.

Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force

Military predominance in public life has a long and strong tradition in Turkey. Lybyer has told us: “The Ottoman government had been an army before it was anything else. … in fact, Army and Government were one. War was the external purpose, Government the internal purpose, of one institution, composed of one body of men.” And Gibb quotes el-Gazali, at the end of the eleventh century: “Government in these days is a consequence solely of military power, and whosoever he may be to whom the holder of military power gives his allegiance, that person is the caliph.”

Solar Energy—Its Domestic and Foreign Implications

FOR NEARLY A DECADE after the victorious conclusion of World War II, we in the United States assumed that, since we possessed the world's greatest productive capacity, we were also the world's leaders in all aspects of science. On October 4, 1957, our complacency was rudely shattered by the appearance in our skies of a sphere, a cone, and a cylinder. The sphere was the Russian satellite, 1957 Alpha, and the cone and cylinder were debris from the vehicle which hoisted this ingenious petard into its orbit. Far from being a mere iron ball tossed casually into outer space by an over-enthusiastic skyrocket, Sputnik was a Fourth of October announcement that the future has crowded in upon the present, and far sooner than most of us expected. Today we find ourselves engaged in a race for scientific supremacy, a race in which we and the Soviets will seek astounding accomplishments as much for the purpose of influencing men's minds as for gaining military predominance. We must without fail overcome the lead which Russia's rocket experts gained in the field of penetrating outer space, but we must pay even more attention to the vastly more important problem of raising the standard of living of the billions of people on this planet who have never read a book, known a doctor, or seen an electric light bulb.' The United States is the only nation which, at the beginning of its history, possessed large and readily accessible supplies of the three fossil fuels-coal, petroleum, and natural gas. Liberal use of those fuels has enabled us to achieve the world's highest standard of living, but in so doing we also developed the world's greatest appetite for energy. Today, with only 7 per cent of the world's population, and 8 per cent of its land area, we are using 40 per cent of the earth's total annual energy production. Even more important is the fact that two-thirds of our annual demand is for the fluid fuels, which constitute less than 2 per cent of our total fossil fuel reserves.

The Diplomatic Origins of the First World War

TALY has always been an excellent vantage point from which to observe the workings of European diplomacy. And Senator Albertini, as proprietor and editor of the most authoritative Italian newspaper, the Corriere della Sera of Milan, lived in close touch with the events leading up to the first World War. Driven into private life by Mussolini's abolition of the freedom of the Italian press in I926, Senator Albertini devoted the remainder of his life, his first-hand knowledge and wide resources, his learning and acumen, to the present exhaustive study of the diplomatic origins of the war, an undertaking which would have been beyond the powers of any single scholar less well equipped. The comprehensive bibliography accompanying and alimenting the work includes the relevant literature in the Slavonic languages. Albertini reconstructs and analyses the sequence of events with an exactitude which, as the crisis gathers momentum, notes the precise moment of dispatch and receipt of the fateful messages as they sped from one European chancellery to another. These high precision methods show up omissions or falsifications which have occurred in primary sources as clearly as camouflage shows up in aerial photography; and bias in secondary authorities gives way before the logic of Albertini's exact documentation. There is no seeking after picturesque effect; character delineation, while subtle and penetrating, is limited to what the analysis of the situation demands. Most western writers have viewed the first World War as in essence a clash between Germany, striving to add mastery of the seas to military predominance in Europe, and Britain, defending her naval supremacy as her life-line. They thus overlook the fact that war began at a moment of appeasement in Anglo-German relations, not in the west but as a local affair in Eastern Europe, in which both Powers at first failed to see that they would be involved. No Italian historian could fall into this error of perspective. Vhile ever-sensitive to the perils inherent in Anglo-German friction, Italy felt as no less dangerous the long tension between Austria, ambitious to extend her sovereignty over all Southern Slavs, and Russia,