The Janzus Option: A Key to Asian/Pacific Security

Abstract

FOR OVER A decade, American foreign towards the East Asian/Pacific region has been in a constant state of transition.1 With the advent of the post-Vietnam era, U.S. defense commitments underlying the Mutual Defense Treaties with Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and the Philippines and the long-standing multilateral security arrangements comprising the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Australian-New Zealand-U.S. Tripartite agreement (ANZUS) have been subject to American domestic reappraisals as to their usefulness and in one case (SEATO) have been discontinued. Currently, traditional Western military predominance in the Indian and Pacific Oceans is confronted with a growing Soviet and potential Chinese strategic presence. Until recently, America's containment policy in the Asian/ Pacific had been an expression of its overall interest in checking Communist military power. During the era of detente, U.S. domestic preoccupations have precluded any Asian/Pacific geared to match Soviet or Chinese land and naval power now being deployed there. As one analyst recently observed, the United States is taking a calculated risk of selling to the American public and to our Asian/ Pacific allies the credibility of a ambitious and less expensive' U.S. military role in that area.2 Yet, what has occurred has been an