Military Intervention In Libya Research Articles

The United States, Sweden, and the military intervention in Libya: explaining the similar foreign policy responses of a great power and a small state

The United States, Sweden, and the military intervention in Libya: explaining the similar foreign policy responses of a great power and a small state

The Arab Spring and Russia's Middle East Policy

Russia's Middle East policy has undergone a significant change following the occurrence of the Arab Spring. The main reason for this change was the new strategic realities created by the Arab Spring in the region. Russia first considered the Arab Spring as a regional domestic issue, but this perspective changed as outside influences became involved in the events. The Western powers viewing the Arab Spring as a new regional political configuration influenced the overall framework of this change. The development that had the greatest impact on Russia's approach to the Arab Spring was the events in Libya. NATO's military intervention in Libya has led to the disruption of Russia's gains in the region. In this context, the Libyan issue has provided an opportunity for Russia to radically reconsider its Middle East policy. Unlike the reluctant and cautious attitude in Libya, Russia's regional policy on Syria has taken a more concrete form. Russia’s military operation in Syria can be considered in this context. It is impossible to consider the military operation in 2015 in isolation from the developments that emerged after the annexation of Crimea, which led to Russia's relative international isolation. The paradigm shifts and differences in approach in Russian foreign policy after 2014 should not be ignored within this context.

From Humanitarian Intervention to Regime Change in Libya: Human Agency in the Production and Transformation of Global Security Assemblages

The paper examines human agency in the production and transformation of global security assemblages. A situated conception of human agency is elaborated theoretically through the reincorporation of key concepts from Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s original oeuvre, such as ‘bodies’ ‘desire’ and ‘affect’. Through this Deleuzoguattarian assemblage framework it becomes possible to distinguish between human/non-human and active/reactive forms of agency, while not losing sight of how human actions invariably take place within broader structures of signification. To showcase the utility and analytical potential of this approach, the paper returns to a paradigmatic case of global security cooperation in recent times: the military intervention in Libya of 2011. Through the assemblage framework advocated it is illustrated how the agency of the governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States is crucial for making connections with other bodies in the production of a Libyan humanitarian intervention assemblage, and later bringing about its transformation into a Libyan regime change assemblage. More than this, it becomes possible to grasp how in fact both these processes form part of a single Western-led biopolitical-geopolitical strategy. The paper concludes by emphasising the political and ethical significance of an appreciation of human agency in global security assemblages. De l’intervention humanitaire au renversement du régime en Libye : l’agentivité humaine dans la production et la transformation des agencements de la sécurité mondiale

Assessing the Decade After: A Critical Analysis of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in the Libya Intervention

Currently, 12 years post-NATO intervention, Libya falls into the category of a fragile state, with worsening indices in the economic, security, and social aspects since 2011. While not a new topic, the situation in Libya in 2011 can always serve as a lesson and exemplification of the discourse on humanitarian intervention, specifically the principal aspects of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The current situation in Libya raises questions about whether there were flaws in the military intervention carried out by the NATO alliance in 2011. This paper aims to analyze the just ad bellum features related to the principal aspects within R2P were implemented in the NATO intervention in Libya. Thus, this study argues that the failure of the military intervention in Libya is due to the non-fulfillment of the basic aspects of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), especially in relation to just ad bellum, such as right authority, last resort, just cause, right intention, proportional means, and reasonable prospects in carrying out humanitarian intervention.

Libya ve Suriye’de Koruma Sorumluluğu (R2P): Rakip Normatif Söylemlerin Analizi

In 2011, based on the R2P principles, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorized a military intervention led by NATO in Libya to “protect civilians”. Yet, the UNSC could not agree on sanctions or military action to protect civilians in Syria. Analyzing the relevant UNSC resolutions, official documents, and formal statements of state representatives, this study aims to uncover the discursive practices around military interventions. More specifically, it explores official discourses that legitimized the NATO-led military intervention in Libya and non-intervention in Syria. A comparative analysis of the Libyan and Syrian cases presents us with an opportunity to assess where R2P currently stands as an international norm.

Prawne uwarunkowania interwencji zbrojnej w koncepcji „odpowiedzialności za ochronę”. Uwagi de lege lata i de lege ferenda

The purpose of the article is to analyse the legal conditions of armed intervention under the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The author presented and assessed the effectiveness of undertaking military actions within its framework. It should be emphasized that the armed aspect of the R2P concept has not been broadly analysed in the doctrine. The author discussed the issues of the effectiveness of military intervention on the example of the “Odyssey Dawn” and “Unified Protector” operations in Libya in 2011. He also referred to the concept of applying the military intervention mechanism to the Syrian Arab Republic after 2011. The text indicates that the greatest weakness is the generality of the concept of armed intervention within the R2P concept and the vagueness of its forms of implementation. In the context of the military intervention in Libya, which occurred as a result of the lack of veto by one of the permanent members of the Security Council, the author showed that although the use of the formula of military intervention under the R2P model is possible, it is also reasonable to assume that in the near future in a similar situation, the permanent members of the Security Council will exercise their right of veto.

Revisiting state personhood and world politics: identity, personality and the IR subject

The questions of whether states are persons, and whether they have emotions or other psychological traits, are old but ever relevant in International Relations (IR). The debate has attracted renewed interest in recent years, due to the increase in scholarship drawing on insights from psychology and psychoanalysis. Revisiting state personhood and world politics starts with the observation that states’ foreign policies are frequently described as ‘schizophrenic’ and questions what can be gained from treating states as full psychological persons. To this end, Bianca Naude offers an alternative way to approach the state-as-person debate: the author mobilizes the notion of ‘personality’, defined as an ‘ensemble of emotions, desires, beliefs, values, behaviors … that characterize a person's interactions with the outside environment’ (p. 10). Drawing on Heinz Kohut's elaboration of Sigmund Freud's theory of narcissism, Naude argues that narcissism is a normal aspect of psychological health, which creates aspirational self-images and thus the foundation for self-esteem. By relating to others, state persons develop a personality and identities that generate behavioural expectations. When they cannot live up to these expectations, states use ego defences to protect themselves and regain self-esteem. Consequently, ‘seemingly incomprehensible state behaviors are, in reality, reactions to the everyday stresses of life’ (p. 170). To illustrate this argument, Naude provides an in-depth analysis of two instances where South Africa seemingly acted ‘schizophrenically’: during its vote in favour of the United Nations Security Council resolution supporting military intervention in Libya (2011), and during its decision not to execute an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (2015).

Brief Synopses of New Arabic-Language Publications

Brief Synopses of New Arabic-Language Publications

From the White Man’s Burden to the Responsible Saviour: Justifying Humanitarian Intervention in Libya

: In recent years, there has been renewed interest in conceptualising the political nature of human rights as well as intense debate over the precise nature of Western biases in the whole project. Spurred by the fresh renewal of radical theory, a growing body of literature explores the role that racialized power hierarchies have played in the human rights project through the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine. Drawing from critical human rights scholarship, this article explores the way human rights have been employed as a legitimising discourse for justifying military intervention in Libya. In doing so, it illustrates the Eurocentric conceptualisation of power, power hierarchies and subjectivities.

PUTİN VE MEDVEDEV’İN DIŞ POLİTİKALARININ KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALİZİ: SURİYE VE LİBYA ÖRNEĞİ

This article explains the shift in Russia’s foreign policy strategy towards the Middle East. Particularly, it aims to address the question of why Russia supported the UNSC Resolution 1970 towards Libya in 2011 but refused to cooperate with the West in Syria. In this article, it is argued that the West’s use of the authorization of the no-fly zone as a green light for military intervention in Libya paved the way for Russia’s obstinacy in Syria. To test this hypothesis, this article focus on the foreign-policy decision-making mechanism in Russia regarding these two events. In this article two decision-making processes are compared to provide an alternative explanation of Russia’s Middle Eastern policy. This article contributes to the existing literature on Russian foreign policy and Foreign Policy Analysis literature.

Reintegrative shaming in international relations: NATO’s military intervention in Libya

Reintegrative shaming in international relations: NATO’s military intervention in Libya

Revisiting the remoteness of remote warfare: US military intervention in Libya during Obama’s presidency

ABSTRACT This paper aims to develop the study of remote warfare’s constitutive “remoteness.” It proposes a novel definition of remoteness as the degree of the American public’s socio-psychological detachment from the realities of political violence fought at a physical distance from the continental United States, as mediated through spectatorship of the use of military force. The remoteness of remote warfare has physical, psychological, and social properties. We argue that it exists on a continuum subject to change over time and should not be approached as a fixed condition measured solely by the physical distance separating combatants involved in armed fighting or as the use of various weapons technologies. The numerous dynamics associated with the remoteness of remote warfare are illustrated through an examination of American military intervention in Libya during Obama’s presidency. From the height of the 2011 NATO intervention in the country onwards, US military operations in Libya became more “remote” for the American public. Whilst other contextual factors contributed toward this outcome, we argue that the diminished spectacle surrounding the 2016 Operation Odyssey Lightning helps explain the American public’s increasing remoteness from military intervention in Libya.

Review: The World Community and the Arab Spring, edited by Cenap Kakmak and Ali Onur Ozcelik

Review: The World Community and the Arab Spring, edited by Cenap Kakmak and Ali Onur Ozcelik

The British Component of the 2011 Military Intervention in Libya

The military intervention in Libya in 2011 showed certain new tendencies in the global politics in the re-colonial world. Although the Great Britain was one of the nations which participated in the intervention, its expenses on the operation were extremely high due to the overexpenditure of expensive precision-guided munition (PGM) and the support of high-tech equipment. Several forms and methods of hybrid and network-centric warfare were tested in the course of the intervention. The main role in the British military operation belonged to the Royal Air Force and Special Forces with minute participation of the Royal Navy. The majority of the ground forces was formed by the rebellious irregular forces which had been trained by the special forces of NATO and certain Arabic states. Those bands were headed by the commanders of the special forces in key moments. Propagation of distorted and false information by the British political circles and mass-media formed the background for the preparation of the military operation as well as for the warfare itself. The article critically analyzes the specific features and the major tendencies of the British component in the 2011 military intervention in Libya concerning its aims, methods and consequences, the historical and political context being taken into account. A number of existing views on the British participation in the conflict is reappraised, and some new judgements are suggested. The Libyan events are also put in connection with the official conception of a Global Britain which emerged a few years later.

Trust or Perish? The Responsibility to Protect and Use of Force in a Changing World Order

AbstractAs part of the roundtable, “The Responsibility to Protect in a Changing World Order: Twenty Years since Its Inception,” this essay asks the reader to consider the role that trust, distrust, and ambivalence play in enabling and constraining the use of force under pillar three of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). Drawing on interdisciplinary studies on trust, it analyzes the 2011 military intervention in Libya for evidence on how trust, distrust, and ambivalence help explain the positions taken by member states on the United Nations Security Council. In so doing, it challenges the mainstream view that the fallout over Libya represents a shift from trust to distrust. We find this binary portrayal problematic for three reasons. First, it fails to take into account the space in between trust and distrust, which we categorize as ambivalence and use to make sense of the position of Russia and China. Second, it is important to recognize the role of bounded trust, as those that voted in favor of going into Libya did so on certain grounds. Third, it overemphasizes the political fallout, as six of the ten elected member states continued to support the intervention. Learning lessons from this case, we conclude that it is highly unlikely that the Security Council will authorize the use of force to fulfill the RtoP anytime soon, which may have detrimental implications for the RtoP as a whole.

Why Libya, but not Syria?

In both Libya and Syria, an uprising of civilians against their rulers resulted in intra-state conflicts. Despite comparable circumstances, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has approached these situations in different ways. The existing literature tends to consider both conflicts in the context of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. Rather than compare and contrast the two conflicts in terms of assessing the effectiveness of R2P, the purpose of this paper is to examine why the UNSC authorized a military intervention in Libya, but not in Syria. This question arises out of the notion that similar conditions should elicit the same response. This research will present three main arguments to explain why the UNSC did not authorize the use of force in Syria as they did in Libya. The first is that the variety of actors fighting in Syria makes it difficult for intervention. The second is that the individual interactions between the permanent Security Council members and Syria further complicate intervention. The final argument is that the Security Council is upholding the foundation of the UN in preventing World War III.

O processo de transição política na pós-Primavera Árabe Líbia

É possível exportar democracia pelo uso da força? Este artigo refere-se a essa questão, tomando como caso empírico a intervenção militar da OTAN/Estados Unidos no Líbano durante os levantes da Primavera Árabe em 2011 e seu seguimento. Propomo-nos a testar e refinar o modelo da Foreign Imposed Regime Change- FIRC (quantitativo) utilizando os métodos qualitativos de estudo de caso e process tracing. Tais métodos permitem identificar variáveis independentes não antecipadas pelo modelo FIRC, desvendando as reais e complexas clivagens sócio-políticas do país que inibem a democratização e abrem caminho para a guerra civil.

OPERATIONS “ODYSSEY. DAWN” AND “UNIFIED PROTECTOR”: CAUSES, PROCESS, CONSEQUENCES

International military intervention in Libya in 2011 was caused, first of all, by the threat to the civilian population from the regime of M. Gaddafi. During the massive popular protests the dictator used police and army forces leading to numerous casualties. The UN Security Council authorized the implementation of a military operation to protect the Libyan civilian population. The conceptual framework for international intervention was the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. The aim of the article is to analyze the causes, course and outcomes of the international military operation in Libya in the context of the doctrine “Responsibility to Protect” and its enforcement tools - preventive humanitarian intervention. The grounds for application, eligibility and especially the outcome of large-scale military intervention in the event in Libya need serious analysis. After all, the current situation in this country where the civil war is in full swing is far from stable. The main issues that have arisen as a result of preventive humanitarian intervention in Libya, part of which was a multinational military operation, are the following: what criteria should determine the degree of success of international intervention? Was the answer of the international community proportional to the threat posed by the regime of Gaddafi? Can we separate the strategy involved in the activities concerning the protection of Libyan civilians from acts of own interests’ defence from the side of external actors? How viable is the R2P doctrine in general? The results of international intervention cannot be assessed unambiguously. On the one hand, the authoritarian regime of M. Gaddafi was destroyed; on the other hand, the creation of a democratic state did not take place. Libya today is in a state of civil war and Libya is a source of tension in the region. As a result of the analysis, it can be concluded that the Libyan operation raised the question of the advisability of using humanitarian intervention in the future. The cornerstone test of any humanitarian initiative must be proportionality between potential threats and actual losses. The invasion of Libya has not passed the test of humanitarian intervention.

The barking dogs: junior coalition partners and military operations abroad in Italy

AbstractVarious studies explored under which conditions junior coalition partners are able to have an impact on foreign policy outcomes. However, these parties do not always manage to get what they want. In this situation, they face a dilemma: defecting or staying? In the Italian context, as far as Military Operations Abroad (MOA) are concerned, the latter option has invariably prevailed. In particular, Italy's involvement in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo (1999) and Operation Unified Protector in Libya (2011) raised considerable contestation from junior partners that did not result in the termination of the respective cabinets. Employing extensive qualitative data, including a set of original interviews with relevant policymakers, this article aims to understand why junior partners did not defect in these two cases. The empirical findings highlight a variation in parties' motivations according to their ideological leaning: while extreme-left parties were afraid of being punished by their own voters for leaving the cabinet because of the participation in the operation in Kosovo, the far-right and autonomist Lega Nord did not consider opposition to the military intervention in Libya as a salient issue. Therefore, the article has considerable implications for the research agendas on the party politics of military interventions and government termination.

Envision, Not Argue: Innovating EU Policy After the Failures of Libya and Syria

The EU now needs to innovate policies towards the Middle East. The disastrous consequences of the military intervention in Libya are for all practical purposes a European mistake. The air campaign was originally a French initiative with Norway taking a lead role. By the perception of failure, it most likely caused inaction towards the regime in Syria. Only a concert of the regional states can create a new regional political order, and an innovative EU policy needs to engage these states for this purpose. A regional concert is the yet untried option in Western policy towards the Middle East. An effective EU diplomacy is to engage parties in envisioning an alternative regional political order by the analogy of European transformation from violent confrontation to pragmatic cooperation. EU, Middle East, common security, strategy, discourse.